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PREFACE 
The reader will note that this volume has not been footnoted, a lack 
which will probably be a red flag to historians and other scholars, even 
if a mercy to readers. But this is not really a scholarly work, nor is it 
intended as such. Actually, I began it as a brief review of the Bert 
Combs administration in Frankfort, and it somehow grew on me. 
Everyone to whom I showed the first draft (and then the second, and 
the third) had suggestions to make about needed additions. I had 
neglected this or that political figure, this episode, that squabble. 
Before I knew it, I had a full-length book on my hands, and a project 
that took years instead of the months that I had planned. But that is all 
right. I have had a good time writing it. I only hope that someone will 
have as much fun reading it. 
In that regard, I want to thank such people as Thomas Clark, John 
Kleber, Al Smith, and Barry Bingham for reading the manuscript of this 
book and for their criticism and advice. It was invaluable. So were the 
objections and suggestions and criticisms of the people who read the 
manuscript for the University Press of Kentucky. 
I am indebted to the many officials of the Combs, Wetherby, 
Clements, Chandler, and Breathitt administrations who were kind and 
patient enough to furnish me with documents and recollections; and to 
such men as Bill May, John Crimmins, Ed Prichard, Ed Farris, Henry 
Ward, and Robert Bell, who granted me interviews. I also want to 
thank Kimberly Lady of the Kentucky Oral History Commission and 
Terry Birdwhistell of the University of Kentucky Library and Archives 
for their considerable time and patience in helping me with the tapes 
and papers of some of the figures treated in this book. Bob Bender of 
the Department of Parks furnished me with a raft of facts concerning 
the parks and the tourist industry. I benefited greatly from con-
versations with James Klotter of the Kentucky Historical Society, 
Louisville historian George Yater, author and longtime friend Philip 
Ardery, author and archivist Sam Thomas, and publisher Tyler Mun-
ford of Morganfield. 
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Of course, many of the people to whom I refer in the book are dead 
now, and I have been obliged to depend to an unfortunate extent on my 
own recollection of events when I was not able to find newspaper 
clippings or official papers to fill in the blank spots. By all measures, 
my chief source of information about the years from 1920 to 1963 was 
the files of the Courier-Journal in Louisville, and I want to thank librarian 
Sonny Tharp and his assistants for helping me in this regard. I also had 
the advantage of copies of the Legislative Record in Frankfort, limited 
files of the Lexington Herald and Leader, and records of the Kentucky 
Court of Appeals. 
But a great deal of the material in this book, especially the personal 
and intimate references that would not be likely to show up in official 
records, are just from my own memory. I have known most of these 
people fairly well. I was never a favorite of Governor Chandler; I can 
understand this, since I was an editorial writer for the Courier-Journal 
during Mr. Chandler's second race and administration, when the pa-
per did not support him and was often critical. There were periods 
when Earle Clements was cool toward me (to indulge in some massive 
understatement). I regretted this. As a newsman, as a student of 
politics, and as an ordinary onlooker, I liked and respected Clements. 
He was a great personality. 
I had better explain something of my relationship with Bert 
Combs, since it is inevitable that some people will consider this book 
biased in his favor because we have long been friends. As an editorial 
writer for the Courier-Journal in 1955, when Combs first ran for gover-
nor, I got to know him casually. I met him again when he began to run 
in 1959. We were supporting Wilson Wyatt at the time but switched to 
Combs when he and Wyatt merged their campaigns. But I did not get 
to know him well until, in 1960, he appointed me to the newly created 
Parks Board. I was permitted to take the post by the Courier-Journal 
management only with the provision that the job would be nonpaying, 
and it was so stipulated (a provision that did not leave my fellow board 
members overjoyed). It was after that that I really came to know and 
admire Combs. I regret that I have not had occasion for much associa-
tion with him since his most recent (and unsuccessful) try for office 
and now see him infrequently. 
At the same time I think I can, and have shown that I can, view him 
and his administration objectively. During his term in office I was the 
author of many editorials that were critical of him and his policies. I 
would be less than honest, however, if I did not admit that I thought 
then and think now that his administration was outstanding. I hope I 
have not let this approval distort my reporting of his years. 
____ INTRODUCTION ___ _ 
The governors of Kentucky have not been an exceptional lot. While 
there have been few outright rogues or scoundrels among them, there 
also have been relatively few outstanding performers, partly because of 
the nature of the job; It has never paid much. The state constitution 
won't let governors succeed themselves (though they may run again 
after a term has elapsed), and in the four years' term they do not have 
much chance to design or carry out long-range programs. For the past 
century Kentucky has been one of the poorer states, and poverty tends 
to feed on poverty, limiting what a governor can accomplish. By the 
time the average governor leaves office, he has had to say no so often 
that he enjoys little popularity. 
The ferocity with which Kentuckians play politics and the corrup-
tion that so often marks the average courthouse-the vote buying, the 
patronage, the selling of public services for political loyalty-have their 
roots in that poverty. Political power is sought for the financial gain it 
offers; corruption is accepted, if not condoned, since the outs intend to 
do the same when they get in; and spoils, not service or progress, 
become the point of the political process. 
People made cynical by such a process are often suspicious also of 
reform, modernization, and necessary taxation. To lead them out of the 
resulting poverty and ignorance requires capable, determined, and 
courageous leaders, willing to risk the political price of telling people 
the unpleasant truth. It is the lack of such leadership, more than any 
other factor, that accounts for Kentucky'S troubles today. 
Furthermore, it is hard to design laws that will meet both the needs 
of the moment and the multitude of restrictions contained in the 
cumbersome state constitution. Yet the people and usually their gover-
nors have persisted in refusing to revise and modernize the constitu-
tion, a destructive attitude that, again, results in part from a lack of 
positive leadership. It is a self-defeating cycle: the lack of good lead-
ership perpetuates the handicaps that discourage good people from 
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seeking positions of leadership. Perhaps it is remarkable that Kentucky 
has had governors as good as they have been. 
The record is spotty. Modem government in Kentucky can be said 
to have begun with the governmental reorganization effected during 
the 1935-39 administration of Governor A. B. Chandler. But if there has 
been a particular era when the state got consistently better than aver-
age government, it was during the middle of the current century when, 
beginning with Governor Earle C. Clements and extending through 
the administration of Edward Breathitt, the performance of state gov-
ernment enabled Kentucky to break with a generally backward past. In 
some respects, especially in education, it did not have enough money 
to keep abreast of its sister states. Perhaps it never will. But those who 
remember the roads, colleges, hospitals, mental institutions, and wel-
fare services of the years before World War II can appreciate the 
progress made since. 
The peak of this 20-year period was probably reached during the 
1959-63 term of Governor Bert T. Combs, who is becoming recognized 
as one of the key figures in Kentucky history. A major reason for his 
success was the passage, at the beginning of his term in office, of the 
sales tax that has since produced revenue without which Kentucky 
could not have operated on modem levels. With revenue from the tax 
and innovative use of a bonding mechanism approved by Kentucky 
courts, Combs was able to push and haul a reluctant state a significant 
distance along the road to modem governmental services. 
Combs suffered one major setback: he almost persuaded the peo-
ple to approve a convention to revise their constitution but, strangely 
enough, lost the effort because the people of Louisville-the state's 
only metropolis and usually considered a center of some enlighten-
ment-failed to go along. That failure was significant. Kentucky'S 
refusal to scrap its archaic charter and give its government a new 
beginning, though every student of government and every political 
scientist of the past half-century has urged such reform, is typical of the 
attitude that has helped to keep Kentucky backward. And wherever 
Combs turned, he ran into one stubborn fact: Kentuckians are to a 
harmful extent a cautious, conservative people. They are suspicious of 
change, and while not all change is progress, all progress involves 
change. And though Kentuckians are devoted to democracy, they are 
suspicious of the dirty engine of politics that powers the vehicle of 
democratic government, and they are above all suspicious of taxes of all 
kinds, for all purposes. 
Despite the evidence and lessons of a century of disappointment, 
Kentuckians persist in believing that there is such a thing as a free 
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lunch. They persist in following candidates who promise to give them 
good government through such alchemy as "sober government," 
"common sense," and "cutting out the fat." Ironically, leaders who 
have bellowed their hatred of taxes most loudly have often been the 
heaviest taxers. There is, after all, a price for the free lunch. 
Many political observers and some people in government argue 
that Kentuckians have seldom been politically progressive because 
they have seldom been offered progressive leadership. It is true that 
Kentucky's rich soil seems to sprout pseudopopulists as thickly as it 
yields burley and bluegrass. Such people, luring the voter with as-
surances that they can run government without taxes, make it difficult 
for honest candidates to win-and, if they do get into office, make it 
hard for them to achieve progressive goals. But there is no denying that 
even when they have been given good leadership, Kentucky voters 
have often balked at needed reforms. 
While these are the most evident drawbacks to the governor's job, 
they are not necessarily the most crippling. Kentucky is and has always 
been a divided state-divided by geography, politics, history, folk-
ways, speech patterns, and economics. The history of eastern Ken-
tucky, like its accents, differs from that of the Bluegrass, which differs 
from that of western Kentucky, and all are different from those of 
Louisville and the river cities. These differences make it a difficult state 
to govern, to unite in common cause and effort, to persuade to give a 
little in one place in order to help a little in another. It is not surprising 
that for a century political factions were one of the great dividing and 
retarding forces in the state, complicating the work of governors and 
diluting the quality of government. Time after time, as sooh as one 
faction took office, the other-instead of uniting behind a party pro-
gram-launched an attack based not on philosophy but on' politics, 
designed not to create but to cripple. For generations, the leaders of the 
losing faction preferred to see the state suffer rather than see the 
winning faction succeed. The willingness of candidates to appeal to the 
voters' historic resentment of taxes, urban culture, and higher educa-
tion has made it difficult and politically risky for those winning office to 
impose taxes and effect changes that would let Kentucky keep pace 
with her sister states. 
The more we examine the history of Kentucky, the more it seems 
the state was, like the hero of a Greek tragedy, doomed by the circum-
stances of its beginnings. The political history of the state is the story of 
a people struggling against handicaps largely the result of things 
beyond their control. It is ironic that the state seal bears the words 
"United We Stand, Divided We Fall," for no state has ever been more a 
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house divided against itself. Even before Kentucky became a state, the 
seeds of division were being planted, and they were to bear bitter fruit. 
All of these divisions-cultural, political, economic, geographic, and 
historic-have imposed an incalculable burden. According to legend, 
Dragging Canoe, the son of the Cherokee chief who sold most of 
eastern and southern Kentucky to Colonel Richard Henderson of 
North Carolina, warned the buyers that II a dark cloud hangs over that 
land," supposedly a warning from which the term II dark and bloody 
ground" derived. The name of the cloud was surely division, and it is 
still overhead. 
Kentucky was never able, for one grisly example, to unite on the 
issue of slavery, for or against; the resulting division caused lingering 
hatreds. Perhaps more serious, the division and violence following the 
Civil War bred poverty and party factionalism, which in turn proved 
roadblocks to progress. Since before the turn of the century, the domi-
nant Democratic party has itself been so torn into warring factions that 
it has been unable to shape and develop a coherent, enduring philoso-
phy of government. Few state administrations have managed to over-
come these handicaps. Backwardness and provincialism have proved 
too great a burden. 
In the experience of one administration that succeeded to an un-
usual degree may lie some indications of how progressive government 
may be attained, as well as regret for the opportunity not seized. And in 
the public service of three men-Albert Benjamin Chandler, Earle 
Chester Clements, and Bert Thomas Combs-one can see the effects of 
the factional division and reaction that have so handicapped the state. 
1 __ _ 
Dividing the Bloody Ground 
The history of Kentucky is the story of missed opportunity. In colonial 
days explorers, hunters, and surveyors who pushed westward took 
back to the colonies along the. eastern seaboard glowing tales of an 
Eden beyond the mysterious mountains, and people along the sea-
board soon believed that if a man could acquire a few acres of Kentucky 
land he would be rich. The place had-indeed, it still has-natural 
advantages that made their exaggerated expectations understandable: 
fertile soil, a mild climate, a varied terrain offering heavily forested 
mountains, numerous navigable rivers, rich and rolling land for farm-
ing, and a favorable location at the north-south and east-west 
crossroads of the country. But 200 years later, Kentuckians are waiting 
for Eden to take shape and the dream to come true. 
The trouble started before Kentucky became a state, when the 
English, tired of the expense of defending the long western frontier, 
made a treaty with the Indians that said, in effect, you stay on your side 
of the mountains, we'll stay on ours. The Indians were agreeable for 
the most part, though some tribes had already been embittered by 
colonist incursions into their territory. The colonists, on the other 
hand, simply ignored the treaty and pushed beyond the mountains as 
fast as conditions would allow, surveying and staking out land, claim-
ing and squatting on it. Many titles were based on surveys in which 
boundary lines ran from trees or rocks to creeks or springs; these 
tended to shift or disappear, making it impossible to determine bound-
aries later. Colonel Richard Henderson of North Carolinabought most 
of eastern and southern Kentucky from the Cherokees and started 
selling acreage to anyone who would buy. When Virginia, with the 
Revolution, assumed authority over the territory, it invalidated his 
claim, thus putting in jeopardy the titles of all who had bought from 
him. The Virginia legislature, concerned primarily with the loyalty of 
the settlers and their willingness to defend the frontier against the 
Indians, passed laws in 1777 and 1779 giving settlers who had im-
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proved their land up to 1,400 acres. It also used the promise of Ken-
tucky land to get men into the military and to reward them for their 
service, giving grants ranging from 100 acres for common soldiers to 
5,000 acres for colonels. Unfortunately, it did this without requiring 
surveys and issued warrants for more land than was there, resulting in 
overlapping boundaries and a hopeless tangle of disputed claims. 
Soldiers, afraid that they were to be cheated out of their holdings, 
demanded that a territory be set aside for them; for this purpose 
Virginia created a vast "Green River Military District," composed 
roughly of what is today known as the Pennyroyal. That helped but did 
not prevent land speculators from getting control of vast acreages. And 
generous grants to officers, who were usually Virginia aristocrats, 
encouraged the creation of big plantations in the richer central area of 
Kentucky, dividing the settlers into classes and opening the door to the 
importation of slaves. 
The great migration to Kentucky began in the winter of 1778--79, as 
surveyors, farmers, merchants, lawyers, criminals, political refugees, 
and just ordinary people swarmed iflto the territory seeking a new life. 
Some were obvious adventurers and cutthroats, but most were willing 
to work for the wealth they hoped to gain, and these were embittered 
when they found, as they often did, that the land they had claimed and 
were working was already owned by someone else. 
The Virginia Assembly then passed a law declaring that squatters 
who had built and farmed on the land could keep it. This created chaos, 
not to mention a paradise for lawyers. It has been said, with some 
truth, that there is not a property line in eastern Kentucky that has not 
been "lawed over or fought over." By 1785 there were claims for 50 
percent more land than existed, and the resulting lawsuits ran for 
generations. Historian Joan Coward has estimated that by 1790 a major-
ity of Kentucky householders were landless, many of them tenants. 
Generally speaking, the wealthy and influential got the better 
land, especially in central Kentucky; the poor and latecomers got 
shoved back into the hills and hollows. Many, including old settlers, 
got no land at all. This produced sullen divisions between rich and poor 
(a division not uncommon on the frontier farther west) and a cultural 
blight that persisted for more than a cenb.lry. Stuck back on their mud 
roads, when they had any roads at all, with little or no access to the 
political, cultural, and commercial mainstream, Kentucky agrarians 
developed a narrow, provincial view of life. They had a tight suspicion 
of culture, manners, and refinement, all of which they saw as the 
marks of the town and corruptive of honest farm life. They developed a 
distrust of schools, which in their view existed only to teach farm boys 
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book learning they did not need to raise a crop, and to take them away 
from the plow when they were needed. 
This was not just meanness or ignorance; the rural dwellers, in the 
hills of eastern Kentucky or on the river farms of the west, sensed that 
formal, institutional education constituted a threat to their native 
cultural values; they saw that those who managed to get an education 
put a barrier between themselves and the culture they had known and 
with which they had once been comfortable. The only thing a farm boy 
could do with an education was to leave. The agrarian also had a 
stubborn resistance to taxes of all kinds, for whatever purpose, seeing 
them as the invention of politicians to help the decadent town at the 
expense of the honest farmer. Tragically, but perhaps inevitably, there 
have always been politicians willing to appeal to these class, cultural, 
and regional prejudices in order to gain votes, thus aggravating the 
problem. 
Kentuckians have always been inordinately willing to believe their 
own myths. Just as they have clung to the distorted legend of Daniel 
Boone, so have they nurtured the image of the rugged, proud, self-
dependent Kentuckian, and the image has been a burden. The spirit of 
fierce independence that was salvation to the frontiersman and proud 
legacy to successive generations of agrarians became a lingering hand-
icap, and remains so today, impelling Kentuckians to resist or regard 
with suspicion the cooperation and collective action through which 
society progresses in the modem world. 
Conditions for progressive government were not improved when, 
during the early decades of the nineteenth century, the legislature 
spewed out counties as though on a prolonged drunk. Counties were 
created for any reason. Real estate dealers, eager to sell lots in the town 
that would grow up around a courthouse, would offer to donate land 
for a courthouse and jail and, on the day when the referendum on 
forming the county was held,would put out barrels of whiskey to 
influence the voters. Many counties were formed through the efforts of 
men who wanted only to hold the office of judge, sheriff, or jailer. Once 
the citizens had voted to petition the General Assembly to make them a 
county, representatives curried favor in Frankfort by proposing to 
name the new county· for the governor or lieutenant governor. A 
splitoff from Floyd and Letcher counties in 1884 was named Knott 
County to gain the support of Governor Proctor Knott, and the county 
seat was diplomatically named Hindman in honor of Lieutenant Gover-
nor John Hindman. Thus Kentucky was jigsawed into 120 counties, 
more per capita than any other state; only Georgia and Texas have more 
in number. 
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The existence of these "Little Kingdoms," as historian Robert 
Ireland dubbed them, made some sense at the time. The crumpled 
terrain of Kentucky, especially its eastern and southern sections, made 
it hard for the country dweller to get in to the county seat to conduct 
necessary business. Because of the sprawling shape of the early coun-
ties, residents often had to walk or ride 100 miles to the courthouse, a 
terrible undertaking in a territory with few roads. Therefore, new 
county seats were located when possible in spots that could be reached 
from all sections in a day's ride. (Even so, distance and bad roads made 
it almost impossible for the sheriff to enforce the law effectively in the 
far reaches of the county. Isolated families necessarily turned to self-
defense, adding to a feeling of alienation from the law and a distrust of 
it, and laying the groundwork for feuds.) 
Unfortunately, the counties continued to exist after the need for 
them had vanished, saddling Kentucky, apparently forever, with a 
multitude of unnecessary, burdensome governments. Their very exist-
ence bred provincialism and xenophobia, increasing the difficulty of 
persuading Kentuckians to cooperate and take concerted action for 
their mutual benefit. Not surprisingly, inefficient and often corrupt 
courthouse operations compounded the suspicion of the rural tax-
payers that all politicians were crooks and all politics crooked. This 
attitude, in tum, was reflected in the state constitution of 1891, which 
provided another handicap to responsive government. 
Opposition to taxes and distrust of government in general were 
inevitably reflected in Frankfort, helping to keep Kentucky on the back 
roads of progress. Until 1950, it was a detour state: travelers would go 
to great lengths to avoid passing through Kentucky, with its bad roads 
and the small-town speed traps that preyed on outsiders. Inadequate 
roads also perpetuated stubborn prOvincialism, since they kept Ken-
tuckians from knowing even their own state. And bad roads crippled 
efforts to consolidate schools and do away with the primitive one-room 
schools, since buses could not run over many of the roads. Before 1960, 
when the Mountain Parkway was built into the mountains, eastern 
Kentucky had 17,000 miles of roads but not one mile of four-lane, 
limited-access highway; in fact, 9,000 of those miles were mud or 
gravel. It was not until 1928 that Harlan County, one of the most 
mineral-rich counties in America, had a hard-surfaced road to the 
outside. 
The lack of social contact made the frontier Kentuckian susceptible 
to the emotional, open-air revivals where crowds of thousands were 
pilloried with fiery sermons by dozens of preachers, threats of hell and 
damnation so moving that the men were said to chew grass and bark 
like dogs, while the women jerked so violently that their long hair 
DIVIDING THE BLOODY GROUND 9 
cracked like whips. These revivals helped to implant in early Ken-
tuckians an emotional fundamentalism that for years regarded public, 
nonchurch schools with suspicion and hampered the development of a 
public school system until the current century. Transylvania Universi-
ty, once called "the Harvard of the West," had an outstanding faculty 
and drew students from across the South until churchmen and relig-
ious students attacked the school's nationally respected president, 
Horace Holley, for attending races and balls while neglecting his stu-
dents' religious instruction. Holley was forced to leave the state, and 
Transylvania never recovered its national standing or its position of 
dominance within the state, though in this century it has achieved 
considerable stature. (Neither did higher education in general recover 
during the nineteenth century. Years . later, after the University of 
Kentucky was founded, its development was hampered oy church 
opposition to the spending of tax money on secular education, or as 
some put it, "the Godless university." It took a fevered mind to depict 
the struggling, underfinanced Lexington school as "the country club of 
the south.") 
Transylvania did not suffer alone. Public education was almost 
nonexistent. Kentucky had inherited from Virginia one of its worst 
institutions, the private academy, the influence of which is still strong. 
Across the state these private schools sprang up, many of them board-
ing schools, often church-related or taught by a minister and sup-
ported by fees paid by the parents of students. The more well-to-do 
townsmen and planters sent their children to these academies, some of 
which offered surprisingly good classical training. (As late as the 1890s, 
the father of novelist John Fox, Jr., conducted an academy for both boys 
and girls near Paris.) Most rural dwellers, on the other hand, did not 
care that there were no tax-supported public schools for their sons and 
daughters. . 
It was at this time, too, that Kentucky became the only state to have 
two courts of appeal, a matter of no public pride. With so little hard 
currency on the post-Revolutionary frontier, the need for banks soon 
resulted in a rash of state and national banks, some of them totally 
unsound and offering banknotes unsupported by anything but hope. 
At the same time, the Napoleonic wars were taking European farmers 
from the plow and causing a great inflation of farm prices in America, 
especially in the rich farming country of Kentucky. Bluegrass farmers, 
giddy with profits from goods shipped downriver and across the seas, 
rushed to borrow money to buy more land and plant more crops; when 
the wars ended in Europe-as wars will-and farm prices collapsed, 
they were stuck with loans they could not repay. 
The legislature, responding to demands for relief, passed a law 
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creating a new currency to be issued by the state bank to repay these 
loans; creditors unwilling to accept this questionable currency were 
forbidden to demand payment for at least two years. The creditors, 
naturally, sued, charging that the law was unconstitutional. The Court 
of Appeals, the state's highest court at the time, naturally ruled in their 
favor. This outraged both the debtors and the legislature, which solved 
the problem brilliantly by abolishing the old court and creating a new 
"relief" court. The relief court upheld the relief law, but the old court 
ruled that the relief court, as well as its rulings, was unconstitutional. 
The legislature directed the relief court to occupy the court chambers 
and seize, if necessary, court records. The old court refused to sur-
render them or even to open the door. In the legislature, fist fights 
erupted between advocates of the two courts. One prominent support-
er of the old court was knocked down with a club as he left the capitol 
building. Mobs marched and howled through Frankfort and county-
seat towns. Eventually, prosperity and sanity returned, the old court 
was upheld, the relief court was abolished, and the farmers had to pay 
their debts; but the episode did nothing to dignify Kentucky's image 
nationally. 
The dueling fever that swept Kentucky in these years was not so 
comical. The most picayune disputes became cause for fatal gunfights. 
The slightest disagreement might end in a duel, the smallest jest result 
in death. The toll in human life finally became so high that the next 
state constitution, written in 1849, specifically forbade state office to 
anyone who had been involved in a duel, effectively ending the 
custom. You can accomplish a lot in Kentucky by threatening to keep 
people from the public payroll. 
Why the code duello struck with such virulence in Kentucky is 
hard to understand. Kentucky pride has often reached a stage that 
would have been ridiculous had it not been so lethal. But it was 
becoming apparent that there was a strong strain of violence in Ken-
tuckians. They rushed by the thousands to volunteer to fight the 
British, the Indians, the Spanish-any excuse seemed sufficient. Per-
haps some of this reflected the old frontier dependence on and love for 
the rifle, and the frontier necessity of self-defense and protection. But 
the penchant for killing was fast tarnishing the image of the "paradise 
beyond the mountains." Even before the Civil War, eastern publica-
tions ridiculed Kentucky with cartoons of addled colonels brandishing 
smoking pistols. And the tendency toward violence would later sharp-
en the divisions between regions, parties, and classes. 
Fundamentalist opposition to legal liquor would likewise give 
Kentucky one of the finest and most corrupt bootlegging networks in 
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the country, as Kentuckians persisted in "drinking wet and voting 
dry." Though Kentucky is the world's largest producer of bourbon 
whiskey, 91 of its 120 counties forbid the sale, use, or transportation of 
liquor. The "drys" of the state. find no irony in the fact that Christian 
County is wet while Bourbon County (except for Paris) is dry. The 
collusion-unintended, perhaps, but effective-among bootleggers, 
ministers, and public officials has kept the great majority of Kentucky 
counties legally dry though actually wet; the right to carryon illegal 
liquor sales from under counters and in taxicabs is one of the spoils of 
election victory in many counties, while much time and expense is 
devoted by law enforcement officers to the pursuit and prosecution of 
other bootleggers. And all the while the revenue-hungry county cof-
fers are deprived of the taxes that legal sales of the same liquor would 
produce. 
But a force was at work on the Kentucky frontier that would prove 
far more divisive, and the effects of which would linger for more than a 
century. The institution of slavery from the beginning drove ,wedges 
between groups and regions. The trouble sprang, significantl~ from a 
failure of leadership. The aristocrats around George Nichola,s, who 
dominated the convention that wrote Kentucky's first cons~tution, 
were nearly all slaveowners and strongly proslavery. Not t~tt they 
lacked opposition: such men as James Garrard, who would b~come 
second governor of the state, and the Reverend "Father David" Rice, 
the stubborn frontier Presbyterian, argued and begged for a co~stitu­
tional bar to the importation of slaves; Nicholas'was able to beat back 
their efforts by only a 26 to 16 vote in the convention. 
But the proslavery stand of the first constitution was a signal. By 
1792, when Kentucky achieved statehood, almost 23 percent of Ken-
tucky households kept slaves, an~ the average slaveholder owned only 
four-giving aristocratic planters a wide base of middle-class support 
for their proslavery stance. But most small farmers and merchants 
opposed the institution, as did most churches, especially Presbyterian 
and Methodist. Legend maintains that slavery in Kentucky was rela-
tively benign and that Kentucky slaves were happy and well treated 
compared with those of Deep South states. George Nicholas, who 
declared that "the Negro is fit only for bondage," insisted that Ken-
tuckyslaves were fortunate in their work and treatment, giving rise to a 
myth still reflected in the state song. But the facts do not support this 
rosy recollection. At the time of the Civil War, Kentucky was the sixth 
most populous state in the Union, and almost one-fourth of its popula-
tion was slave. Slaves were bought and sold on the block; families were 
split apart regardless of their anguished screams 'and wails. Those 
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helping slaves escape were whipped in public or thrown into prison. 
The peculiar institution was not pretty. 
During his historic tour of America, the great French social critic 
Alexis de Toqueville insisted that the villages along the northern banks 
of the Ohio River were bright, busy, and attractive, while the southern 
shores appeared to be less industrious, moody, and poor. The reason, 
he declared, was that Ohio was free, Kentucky enslaved by its slavery. 
This was, of course, ridiculous exaggeration: Ohio at the time was no 
more progressive than Kentucky, and its per capita income was less; 
most of the Kentucky region past which de Toqueville sailed actually 
contained few slaves, and much of it was stubbornly antislavery. It is 
also a fact that the section of the state most opposed to slavery and loyal 
to the Union, eastern Kentucky, was the least prosperous and pro-
gressive. 
Yet no one can dispute the terrible effects of slavery on the state's 
economy, its government, and its sense of statehood. If they were not 
divided enough, the issue further divided Kentuckians along moral as 
well as geographical and political lines. Other states argued over the 
issue and went either free or slave; Kentucky brawled about it for more 
than 50 years and split down the middle. There is more than casual 
symbolism in the fact that Kentucky was the birthplace of both Abra-
ham Lincoln, president of the United States, and Jefferson Davis, 
president of the Confederate States of America. 
The Presbyterian church fought stubbornly and courageously 
against slavery. Abolitionists such as Cassius Clay joined the crusade 
with pistols and Bowie knives. Movements to buy and free slaves arose 
and went broke. The recolonizing movement to send the blacks back to 
Africa struggled with the problem lor a while, but the task was too 
great; only 661 blacks were sent .from Kentucky to Liberia, the African 
land set aside for them, and only about 16,000 from the entire country. 
The investment in and dependence on slave labor made owners un-
willing to free their slaves, and the abolitionists did not have enough 
money to buy them. (Sturdy Methodists behind John Fee founded at 
Berea a racially integrated school but were threatened and beaten for 
their efforts, and their school closed during the Civil War. After the war 
it reopened and flourished for a while, only to have its activities 
curtailed in 1912 by the state's infamous Day Law, which forbade 
instruction of white and black students under the same roof.) 
In pulpit, courtroom, and underground railway the sour quarrel 
over the right to own human beings swirled. The results were disas-
trous. Symbolically, it was Kentucky'S great senator, Henry Clay, who 
most persistently and futilely sought a compromise on the slavery 
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question. Symbolically, Kentucky Senator John Crittenden pleaded 
with tears on his cheeks for a decent compromise, but lived to see one 
of his sons become an officer in the Confederate Army and another an 
officer with the Union. Two of Mary Todd Lincoln's half brothers were 
officers in the Union Army, two in the Army of the Confederacy. 
No state was more torn by the Civil War than Kentucky, and no 
state was more torn during the years following. The states to the south 
were united in defeat and misery, and in the knowledge that they had 
fought well; those to the north were united in victory and the promise 
of prosperity. Poor Kentucky had succeeded, at hideous cost, only in 
tearing itself apart and planting the seeds of enduring hatreds, and 
now it turned and tore at itself again. Having stuck to the Union 
throughout the war, once the fighting was over it embraced the Con~ 
federate cause with an addled passion (partly because of the short~ 
sighted and punitive policies of Union military commanders), leading 
one historian to remark that it was the only government in history to 
join the loser after the loss. Rhett Butler, in Gone with the Wind, said 
when he enlisted in the Confederate Army, "I always was a sucker for a 
losing cause." Kentucky was a sucker for one already lost. 
Instead of peace, violence took over as the war ended. Night riders 
and "regulators" harassed blacks and their sympathizers. Veterans 
returning from the opposing armies often clashed, helping to spark 
feuds throughout eastern Kentucky that lasted into the present cen-
tury, further weakening inept county governments and bringing 
ridicule to the region and to the state. A dislike for cities along the 
Ohio-especially Louisville-that had stuck with the Union (partly 
because of recent immigration from the North, partly because of supe-
rior northern markets for river traffic) flourished in areas where the 
Confederacy had been strong. 
This dislike of Louisville was not new. Ever since the days of the 
Revolution, when George Rogers Clark anchored his defenses at the 
falls of the Ohio rather than in central Kentucky, people in the central 
and eastern parts of the state had resented Louisville. Following the 
Civil War, the resentment grew. The town attracted thousands of Irish 
and German Catholic immigrants. Business and civic leaders of 
Louisville in the early years were often Germans and the remnants of 
Old South gentry, an unlikely combination which, it was said, would 
benefit Louisville with the industry of the Germans and the hospitality 
and gracious manners of the South. Many people in the rest of the state 
jeered that, instead, Louisville had inherited German arrogance and 
southern laziness. 
Worse, the city was headquarters for the Louisville and Nashville 
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Railroad. The city for years owned a large block of L&N stock, and 
Louisville legislators helped to fight for the L&N cause in the legis-
lature. During the 1870s and into the 1880s the influence of the railroad 
in the legislature managed to keep forces in Cincinnati, Lexington, 
Chattanooga, and Atlanta from building north-south rail lines through 
central Kentucky, giving the L&N a virtual monopoly and denying 
much of the state the benefit of north-south rail connections. 
Eventually, the Southern Railway built its lines through Lexington 
southward, but the bitterness between Louisville and much of the rest 
of the state continued for years afterward. Following the tragic as-
sassination of Governor William Goebel at the tum of the century, the 
L&N again intruded into state affairs, bringing in hundreds of eastern 
Kentucky riflemen to aid the Republican cause in Frankfort. Its power 
had begun to wane by then; still, it remained an influence in Kentucky 
politics until the 1930s, and although its headquarters are no longer in 
Louisville and its participation in state affairs is minimal, the anti-
Louisville feeling it helped to generate survives. 
During the post-Civil War years a strong Bourbonism arose, 
chiefly in central Kentucky, its leaders generally the rich and reaction-
ary gentry who clung to visions of the Old South, resisted indus-
trialization, despised blacks, and distrusted government in general, 
preferring local arbitration of local matters by local gentlemen. The 
Bourbon influence was strongly resisted by New Departure Demo-
crats, whose spokesman, the noted Louisville editor Henry Watterson, 
begged the state to forget the war and join in the industrial boom in 
process. The coming of a modest prosperity in and around Louisville 
because of North-South trade had an effect on the rest of Kentucky, and 
by the middle 1880s the hard-line Bourbon influence was easing. But 
diehard Bourbons still disliked cities, regarded rural and mountaIn 
residents of the state as inferior, and tended to view public education, 
taxes, and much of progress with suspicion if not outright hostility. 
The better class of people, they maintained, could and would educate 
its own in private schools, and there was little need to educate the rest. 
From their patrician perch they joined the uneducated agrarian in 
regarding the education of farm boys as worse than useless, serving 
only to make them dissatisfied with their rightful lot. Taxes, they felt, 
were the tool of villains, money taken from the rich to buy support of 
the poor. The poor, at the same time, tended to see taxes as the work of 
villains, money taken from the poor to placate and enrich the gentry. 
In this atmosphere of violence and division, the constitution of 
1891 was written. It is significant of their mood that the framers, with 
the federal Constitution to guide them, could produce a charter so at 
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variance with it. The genius of the federal Constitution lies not in the 
meaning it might have had in days long past but in the adaptability of 
its principles to current problems and current needs. Yet it was less the 
work of genius than ofintelligent adherence to principle. 
The 55 men who met in Philadelphia in 1787 did not convene in an 
atmosphere of euphoria. The Revolutionary War had been over for 
some time; economic realities were closing in on the inexperienced 
men attempting to guide the new and competitive states; and there was 
widespread disagreement over the eventual nature of the new govern-
ment. Indeed, the framers met not with the clear intention of writing a 
new constitution but to shore up the Articles of Confederation, which, 
compiled in 1781, had sought and failed to unify the former colonies. 
In the soft glow of patriotic hindsight, all of the men at Philadelphia 
during that hot and crucial summer have become saints and geniuses. 
They were not. Indeed, fewer than a dozen proved to be of more than 
average intelligence or possessed of admirable qualities, Most sought 
to protect their own interests or those of their states. Thomas Jefferson, 
probably the greatest intellect of his era, was not even there. Benjamin 
Franklin contributed little beyond jokes and drolleries. There were, 
however, such men as Madison, Mason, Dickinson; they wrote a 
document that changed history, that permitted a vast continent to 
become a great nation and varied peoples to become a people. Ken-
tucky's charter only hardened the lines of division. One possible 
explanation may be that the men in Philadelphia were guided by 
principle, the men in Frankfort by suspicion. 
Kentucky's constitution is a narrow, rambling document designed 
to curb government rather than to guide it, a collection of restrictive 
statutes rather than anoutline of principles. Kentucky's constitution is 
seven times longer than the Constitution of the United States, and is 
marked by neither its wisdom nor its grace. It contains such trivia as 
the requirement that all public officials take an oath that they have not 
been involved in a duel. It forbade women the vote. It even imposes a 
limit on the number of doorkeepers the General Assembly may hire-
two for the Senate, two for the House. This may have made some vague 
sense at the time: guarding the doors was thought necessary to prevent 
irate citizens from invading the chambers to join debates (though its 
inclusion in a constitution boggles the mind). But it has made no 
earthly sense since the legislature moved from the "Old Capitol," 
where each chamber had two doors, to the new capitol building, where 
both House and Senate have three. Every time the Assembly meets, 
the constitution is automatically violated. 
Incidentally, the constitution was never actually approved by the 
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people of Kentucky. The draft as originally written by the convention 
was ratified by the people. But in the meantime the leaders of the 
convention realized that the first draft was simply not workable, so 
they reconvened and substantially rewrote it. The revised draft was 
never ratified. 
The atmosphere of unsettled, angry division contributed to, if it 
did not actually cause, the assassination of Democratic Governor 
William Goebel in the first days of 1900, launching the state into the 
twentieth century on a wave of anger and bitterness. 
For the first time, Kentucky in 1895 had elected a Republican 
Governor, W. 0. Bradley, as factional fights split the Democrats. The 
dominant Democrats had been, since the Civil War, divided into fac-
tions loosely based on economic interests: Bourbons who longed for 
the past and fought for the status quo, and the advocates of New 
Departure, who wanted to forget the war and rebuild. Beginning in the 
1890s, William Jennings Bryan and the issue of free silver split the party 
into new factions; in 1895, when the pro-Bryan Free Silver Democrats 
refused to support the conservative Parker Watkins Hardin (nick-
named "Polly Wolly" Hardin) of Harrodsburg, the Democratic nomi-
nee for governor, the Republican Bradley won. 
William O'Connell Bradley ("Billy 0 B") was no newcomer to 
politics. He had run and lost races for Congress, the U.S. Senate, and 
the governorship and had declined nomination for state attorney gen-
eral. A hard-money Republican, he followed most of the conservative 
policies of his party, although he differed from many in favoring legal 
(but not social) equality for the Negro. An eloquent speaker of im-
pressive manner, Bradley was in many respects ahead of his times. 
Historians have often spoken of Kentucky'S failure to grasp the chance 
available in 1900 for a new beginning; actually, the state might well have 
found a promising new direction in 1895 had the legislature enacted 
the enlightened and progressive program put forward by Bradley. 
He proposed, for instance, a constitutional amendment giving 
Louisville home rule, asked that the legislature abolish the offices of 
commissioner of agriculture and commonwealth attorney, called for a 
vote on a new capitol building and mansion, and proposed the estab-
lishment of houses of reform for first offenders, an end to the fee 
system for attorneys, and fair and uniform assessment of property for 
tax purposes. In his second session, he asked for sweeping reforms in 
education, including an end to the district board system, adoption of 
uniform textbooks, and tests for school board officers and members; 
stiffer examinations for lawyers and stiffer penalties for unethical con-
duct by them; and repeal of the law requiring separate railway coaches 
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for whites and blacks. It was, in brief, a radical and farsighted program. 
But the Democrats, whose split had elected him, at once turned against 
him, and the legislature spent most of its time squabbling over selec-
tion of a U.S. senator. 
Those bills that were passed provided for two houses of reform, 
authorized free turnpikes and gravel roads, and required all children to 
attend school not less than 12 weeks a year, a law widely ignored. 
Unfortunately, the lawmakers failed to pass a revenue bill, with the 
result that there was no money with which to run the state. Bradley was 
bitterly disappointed by the failure of the Assembly even to consider 
seriously his proposed reform measures. 
In its second session under· Bradley, the legislature at least pro-
vided for a bond issue to give the state operating money. It also passed 
the famous Goebel Law, which paved the way for one of the most 
hurtful episodes in Kentucky history. 
The split in the Democratic party gave impetus to the rise of the 
law's author, William Goebel. In the years following the Civil War, 
impolitic administration of federal laws and regulations by military 
commanders had led the state pell-mell into the pro-southern Demo-
cratic camp, and for a generation it was difficult, indeed almost impos-
sible, for candidates without some Confederate or agrarian ties to win 
public office. Goebel was of another mold. The dour son of German 
immigrants and a state senator from Covington, Goebel came from a 
pro-Union family. He gained attention during the Bradley administra-
tion by shaping and winning passage of the so-called Goebel Election 
Law, a distorted piece of legislation designed to prevent the kind of 
corruption which, Democrats charged, caused the victories of Bradley 
and McKinley. The Goebel Law set up a state Board of Election Com-
missioners to appoint boards to oversee elections and decide disputes 
and contests. Unfortunately, it stipulated that the commission would 
have three members, which made equal representation of the two 
parties impossible and gave tremendous election-day power to the 
party with a. majority in the legislature. 
Goebel hoped to use his support of Bryan, his labor record, and his 
opposition to the L&N Railroad to win the Democratic nomination for 
governor. (lithe L&N Railroad, II he preached across the state, "must be 
made the servant, not the master of the people. II This struck a respon-
sive chord with a lot of people. The L&N had become so domineering 
that, according to legend, a legislator from Lexington arose in the 
House toward the end of a session of the General Assemblyand said, 
"If the L&N Railroad has no other business to conduct,' I. move we 
adjourn. ") Goebel went into the Democratic convention of 1899 the 
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third choice of most politicians but, through shrewd jockeying, came 
out the nominee for governor. Thirty-year-"old }.CW. Beckham, the 
personable scion of a prominent Bardstown family, was chosen to run 
for second spot. 
But Goebel's selection again split the Democrats, who by this time 
were so accustomed to factional divisions that another split seemed 
normal. In a rump convention in Lexington, conservatives calling 
themselves the Honest Election Democrats nominated ex-Governor 
John Young Brown, who called up the ghost of Robert E. Lee; spoke of 
beautiful homes, wives, and daughters; and challenged his listeners to 
refuse to be voted "like dumb, driven cattle." The floundering Populist 
Party made its last real effort to gain a foothold in Kentucky, nominat-
ing John G. Blair of Carlisle. As the campaign for governor became a 
four-sided affair, Goebel rode out to challenge Republican nominee 
W.S. Taylor, Bradley's well-meaning but relatively ineffectual attorney 
general. A western Kentuckian of unprepossessing appearance, Taylor 
was considered "lily white" or anti-Negro, so much so that Bradley at 
first refused to support him. Taylor had as his running mate John 
Marshall, a young Louisville lawyer; and to run for secretary of state, 
the convention picked slender, intellectual Caleb Powers, at 30 the 
superintendent of Knox County schools, who was destined to playa 
central and tragic role in the disastrous events to follow. 
It was a tangled campaign, with both parties seeming to ride off in 
all directions. Goebel actively courted the black vote, the first time a 
Democrat had openly done so since the Civil War. When it appeared 
that he was faltering, he brought into the state William Jennings Bryan, 
the old orator who showed that he could still influence the voters. 
Despite these maneuvers, Taylor at first appeared to have won by a 
slender margin of 2,383 votes, receiving 193,714 votes to 191,331 for 
Goebel, with Brown picking up only 12,140 and Blair 2,936. On De-
cember 12, 1899, Taylor was duly sworn in as Kentucky'S thirty-third 
governor. 
Although he was at first bitter toward the factions that had brought 
about his defeat, Goebel soon accepted the outcome with surprisingly 
good grace for a, man of his temper, though he explained in a letter to 
his brother that, win or lose, he would be the dominant force in the 
Democratic party and a certain favorite for election to the Senate. He 
announced that he planned to visit his brother in the West. But the 
Democrats were not ready to give up. They charged that there had been 
numerous voting irregularities (as there usually were, on both sides) 
and immediately contested the election. The action ushered in one of 
the most tragic episodes in Kentucky history. 
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When it became obvious that the Board of Election Commissioners 
formed under the Goebel Election Law would decide the election, 
bands of Republicans from the mountains of eastern Kentucky began 
sifting into the capital, many of them openly armed and all warning 
that they were not going to have the election stolen from them by the 
Democratic board. Eastern Kentucky newspapers declared that Goebel 
was a serpent, a tyrant, and a monster, and thundered that before "this 
ring of looters" is allowed to steal the victory, "we will shoulder our 
guns." The Kentucky penchant for violence was again boiling to the 
surface. 
To the surprise of almost everyone, the election board quickly 
ruled in Taylor's favor but added that it had no powers in a governor's 
race; . the dispute could be decided only by the legislature. On De-
cember 14,1899, the Democrats met in Frankfort and adopted a resolu-
tion calling on Goebel and Beckham to contest the election. Goebel 
assented, and when the legislature convened, the election was for-
mally contested. Committees were chosen by lot to conduct hearings 
into the election of governor and lieutenant governor. Names were 
written on slips of paper and placed in a box from which a blindfolded 
designee drew 11 names for each contest. Strangely, the names of ten 
Democrats and one Republican were pulled fOr the governor's hearing, 
nine Democrats and two Republicans for the lieutenant governor's. 
The men in charge insisted that the drawing had been fair, but others 
whispered that the slips placed in the box were of tissue paper, and that 
those bearing Democratic names had been crinkled so that the blind-
folded official could be sure he was drawing the right ones. 
The contest committee hearings began on January 15 in the Capital 
Hotel ballroom, but after the first day prominent Republicans met in 
Louisville's Galt House and charged that the hearings were being run 
by and for the Democrats. This was a signal for the men from the 
mountains again to descend on Frankfort, ~d more than 1,000 of them 
poured into the capital-all of them, it was rumored, brought in by the 
L&N without charge. For a while it appeared that open warfare might 
erupt, but Taylor urged all to put down their guns, and the following 
day most of the mountain men went home. Still, some 300 remained, 
armed and ominous, to await the outcome of the election decision. The 
board ended its hearings on January 29 and announced that it would 
have a decision within a few days. 
On the morning of January 30, Goebel, with Colonel Jack Chinn 
and Eph Lillard, warden of the state penitentiary, left the Capital Hotel, 
crossed the railroad tracks, and started across the capitol lawn. Or-
dinarily, the lawn and the walkways leading to the capitol were 
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crowded; this morning they were almost deserted. The three men 
apparently took no notice of that fact, however, and were talking 
casually as they approached the fountain outside the building. Lillard 
went ahead to check the lobby, to make sure that Goebel would 
encounter no trouble. Then suddenly a shot blasted the strange quiet. 
Goebel fell. Chinn rushed to his side. "Goebel!" he cried. "They have 
killed you!" Other, muffled shots were heard. "Lie down," Chinn 
cried, "or they will shoot you again." 
"That's right," said Goebel. 
Goebel later said he saw someone in a third-story window, but 
Chinn said the shot came from the first-floor office of Secretary of State 
Caleb Powers. Lillard rushed out, and he and Chinn helped several 
men carry Goebel to his room in the Capital Hotel. There a doctor 
found that he had been shot through his right lung, the bullet exiting 
near the spine. It was immediately evident that his condition was 
grave. 
Outside, mobs milled through the streets. There were rumors that 
Taylor would be shot in retaliation. Troops hurried to the capitol and 
tried to seal off the mountain men, who still threatened violence. In 
this confused atmosphere, the legislators tried to convene at midafter-
noon but were barred from the Capitol by troops under orders to let no 
one enter or leave the building. Eventually, they met at Frankfort City 
Hall, where former governor Bradley and other Republicans asked the 
committee members to postpone action because of the explosive at-
mosphere. They did, but an hour later they met again, threw out some 
of the contested votes, and declared that Goebel and Beckham had 
received the highest number of votes and were therefore duly elected. 
An hour later Governor Taylor, indicating no intention of surrendering 
the office, declared a state of insurrection and ordered the legislature to 
meet in safely Republican London, seat of Laurel County. Republicans 
agreed; Democrats refused. 
On January 31 the Democratic members of the legislature marched 
to the capitol, hoping to adopt the majority report and declare Goebel 
governor. Troops turned them back. Still in a body, they marched to the 
Opera House, where they were again turned away by troops. They 
tried City Hall and then the courthouse. Everywhere, troops blocked 
the way. Finally (some claim while they were trotting down the street 
followed by troops intent on keeping them from convening), a motion 
was made and adopted to meet in the Capital Hotel. There they went 
singly or by twos, to avoid attracting attention, to a second-floor room 
where 19 senators and 57 representatives declared Goebel and Beck-
ham elected. A few minutes later the two were sworn in by Chief 
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Justice James H. Ha,zelrigg of the Court of Appeals. In his first action, 
Goebel commanded the troops to return home. The troops refused. 
The Dem6crats met again at the hotel and, apparently unsure of the 
validity of their first decision, again declared Goebel elected; again he 
was given the oath of office, this time by Judge J.e. Cantrill, although 
Republicans afterward insisted that Goebel was dead by the time the 
oath was administered. 
The Democrats were obviously gearing up to make a case for 
Beckham in the event Goebel died, though W.S. Taylor remained in the 
governor's office, refusing to accept the decision of the Democratic 
majority in the legislature and trying to conduct the affairs of state. 
While Goebel lay fatally wounded in the Capital Hotel, he is said to 
have asked for some oysters, a favorite food, and to have eaten them 
With a good appetite. They did not, of course, save him. As he was 
dying, he is supposed to have uttered the words now engraved on his 
statue: "Be brave and true and loyal to the great common people." 
Some, however, say his last words were, "Those oysters were no 
damned good" (or, alternatively, "Doc, thatwas a damn poor oyster"). 
Goebel died early in the evening of February 3, 1900. Taylor re-
fused to yield the governor's offke and filed suit to prevent Beckham 
from assuming it. Beckham responded by asking the court to grant his 
right to the capitol and executive offices, and on March 10, Judge 
Emmett Field of the Jefferson Circuit Court ruled in his favor. On April 
6 the Court of Appeals declared the offices of governor and lieutenant 
governor vacant, and on May 21 the Supreme Court refused to over-
turn its decision. Taylor lost his nerve and fled to Indiana. Beckham 
was declared governor; he took office, and things began to settle into 
some sort of routine. 
The nightmare of Goebel's assassination, however, was not ended. 
It was established that the shot that killed Goebel had been fired from 
the office of Caleb Powers, elected attorney general with Taylor. Powers 
later insisted that he was on the train to Louisville when the fatal shot 
was fired, and he had witnesses to that effect. But Democrats contend-
ed that Powers got off the train in Shelbyville and asked a man at the 
station, "Anything happened yet in Frankfort?" indicating that he was 
aware of the plan to kill Goebel and had left town until the deed was 
done. In any event, two days later, dressed in an army uniform, he was 
arrested on a train between Frankfort and Lexington. Since Powers had 
not previously been accustomed to wearing army clothes, his outfit 
seemed suggestive of guilt. At the time of his arrest, he was reported to 
have in his pocket a pardon from Taylor for "any complicity" in 
Goebel's death. 
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Powers was jailed and tried as an accomplice in the murder of 
Goebel, a charge to which he pleaded innocent. He did, however, 
admit that he had helped to arrange with the L&N to bring the 
mountain riflemen to Frankfort. Three times he was convicted-once 
sentenced to death-and once won a hung jury; all the verdicts were 
handed down by juries that were almost solidly Democratic, though 
impaneled in a county that was 40 percent Republican. He was still 
being held in jail when he was finally pardoned, in 1908, by Republican 
Governor Augustus Willson. He was later elected to Congress from his 
mountain district, and it was his boast that he served as many years in 
Congress as he had served in jail. The story is told that during his first 
congressional campaign he was approached by a voter who asked, 
"You killed Goebel, didn't you?" "No, I didn't," Powers replied, to 
which the voter responded, "I'm sorry to hear that. I had intended to 
vote for you." 
Another Republican, Henry Youtsey, was also jailed and con-
victed, but the man who was widely believed to have fired the fatal shot 
was "Big Jim" Howard of Clay County. At the time he was arrested, 
Howard was free on appeal after having been convicted in Clay County 
of killing George Baker, victim in a notorious Clay County feud. When 
arrested, Howard was also said to have in his pocket a pardon signed 
by Governor Taylor, this one for his role in the killing of George Baker; it 
was widely assumed that Taylor had offered Big Jim his freedom if he 
would remove Goebel. Howard was also pardoned by Willson, as was 
Youtsey, in 1908. 
Once more Kentucky's image was blackened in the nation's eyes. 
The incident lent credence to the caricature of the one-gallused, 
bearded, homicidal Kentucky hillbilly; it discredited the Republican 
party and crippled the Republican mountain counties, contributing 
directly to their lack of influence in Frankfort and thus their inability to 
gain needed state money for roads and schools. Kentucky'S shackles 
were still largely self-imposed. And once more the seeds of lingering 
bitterness between Kentuckians had been planted. Republicans in-
sisted for years that "they stole the election." Democrats retorted that 
"they killed our governor." Both were probably right. 
Young John Crepps Wyckliffe Beckham, of Bardstown, elected 
lieutenant governor with Goebel, was now governor. It was to be the 
start of a long though not always distinguished career. 
"My father [Judge Robert Worth Bingham, publisher of the 
Louisville Courier-Journal and Louisville Times] always supported Beck-
ham" said Barry Bingham, "not for any particular policy reason but 
because he felt that Beckham was a gentleman, an honorable man, and 
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would do the right thing. I don't think Beckham ever had any burning 
convictions, actually. It was more a matter of what was popular at the 
tim " e. 
The description is apt. If Beckham had any resounding convic-
tions, they changed frequently. His policy decisions were based largely 
on the advice of Percy Haly, a tough, wily Irishman whose father ran a 
saloon in North Frankfort and who had enjoyed a brief political career 
as House sergeant-at-arms. He was also, incidentally, a trusted adviser 
of Judge Bingham, perhaps accounting for the Bingham-Beckham 
alliance: Haly was what we might today term a pragmatist, a practical 
man. But he was a man of few overriding convictions, and Beckham 
lacked the philosophic principles or the firmness of purpose to keep 
together the Democratic party that was, for the moment, united by the 
death of Goebel. 
In all, not the best possible way to begin a new century. 
___ 2 __ _ 
Happy Days Begin 
Despite the pleas of New Departure progressives such as Marse Henry 
Watterson, editor of the Courier-Journal, that they forget their dif-
ferences and help create a new industrial South, Kentuckians remained 
divided, backward, poor, and largely resentful of culture as the state 
entered the twentieth century. It is remarkable how enduring these 
traits proved to be. The factions, the isolation of eastern Kentucky, the 
sectional differences, the dislike of urban Louisville, the state's failure 
to provide sufficient tax money to develop modem roads and schools, 
and the relative poverty that made the state consistently susceptible to 
opposition to taxes-these handicaps clung like leeches to Kentucky 
throughout the first half of the current century, handicaps worsened 
by the Depression and lessened only by the relative prosperity follow-
ing World War II. 
Even good leaders have had trouble leading Kentuckians very far. 
Henry Clay could not get them to modernize or compromise. Neither 
Father David Rice nor John Fee nor old Cassius Clay could persuade 
them to give up the immoral profit from the odious practice of slavery. 
Watterson could not persuade them to forget the Civil War and go 
forward into the twentieth century. From the early decades of the 
nineteenth century to the second decade of the twentieth, educators 
tried to persuade Kentucky to establish a real public school system, 
with almost no success. For over half a century various leaders have 
called for revision of the state's burdensome constitution, but in vain. 
And just as consistently have Kentuckians resisted taxes to support the 
improvements they have demanded. 
With the assassination of Goebel, Kentucky became in effect a state 
of three factions, two Democratic and one Republican. Had the Repub-
licans been stronger, the Democrats would have had to unite to beat 
them. But Republican weakness tempted the Democrats to squabble 
among themselves for power, though they several times lost important 
general elections when disgruntled primary losers bolted to the op-
Resplendent in morning coat, top hat, and cane is newly-inaugurated 
Lieutentant Governor A. B. "Happy" Chandler, who has already taken 
center stage from Governor Ruby Laffoon, to his right in this 1931 photo. 
Courier-Journal Magazine. 
Happy Chandler and his 
mother, reunited for the 
first time since his 
infancy. He had grown 
up thinking she was 
dead. After his election 
as lieutenant governor in 
1931, he went to Florida 
to find her grave but 
instead found her alive 
and overjoyed to see 
him. International News 
Service. 
Except where otherwise 
indicated, all photos are 
courtesy of the Courier-
Journal and Louisville Times. 
The face of Ruby Laffoon shows the pain of defeat as he attends 
the December 1935 inauguration of Happy Chandler. Laffoon had 
chosen Democratic boss Thomas S. Rhea of Russellville (below) 
as his successor, only to see him beaten in a run-off primarv 
that Laffoon had dr~amed up as a way to stop Chandler. 0 
Governor Chandler 
confers with 
J. Dan Talbott, 
often called the 
conscience of his 
administration, 
in 1938. Chandler 
was trying to un-
seat Alben Barkley 
in the U.s. Senate. 
He failed. 
When President Franklin D. Roosevelt came to Covington to support 
Alben Barkley's reelection bid, Governor Chandler, Barkley's 
opponent, hopped aboard the presidential car, causing some to 
wonder which man FDR favored. Roosevelt dispelled the confusion 
with a strong endorsement of Barkley. 
Baseball Commis-
sioner Chandler 
and Congressman 
Earle C. Clements 
could laugh to-
gether in 1947. 
They weren't 
running against 
each other. 
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A friendly group of Kentucky Democrats-left to right, Earle C. Clements, 
Ben Kilgore, Thomas Underwood, and Harry Lee Waterfield-smile at the 
prospect of burying each other's hopes in the 1947 Democratic gubernatorial 
primary. Clements beat Waterfield and launched a notable Frankfort career. 
Governor Clements and Conservation Commissioner Henry Ward enjoy 
a conversation with Look photographer Bob Sandburg at the 1948 
Derby Breakfast. Kentucky Department of Highways. Below, Governor 
Clements and Lieutenant Governor Lawrence Wetherby, sleeves rolled 
up, tackle the job of drawing up a new state budget, 1948. 
Happy Chandler where he was happiest-on the campaign trail, this time 
running for governor in Owensboro in 1955. He is flanked by his running 
mate, Harry Lee Waterfield (left), and Owensboro Mayor Casper "Cap" 
Gardner, later a legislative supporter (right). Smiling in the front seat is 
Daviess County Judge Norris Vincent. 
A gathering of grinning governors at the Kentucky State Fair. Left to right, 
Flem D. Sampson, Keen Johnson, Happy Chandler, Fair Board chairman 
Smith Broadbent, Lawrence Wetherby, and Earle Clements. 
Gathered in Hazard in spring 1957 to discuss flood control--after floods 
have already swept the town-are (left to right) Governor Chandler, Former 
Governor FIem Sampson, the Reverend Virgil Miller, U.S. Senator John 
Sherman Cooper, Congressman Carl Perkins, U.s. Senator Thruston 
Morton, and Hazard businessman Lawrence Davis. 
Below, Happy Chandler was not a candidate in the 1959 race, but he was an 
issue and the object of a lot of undignified clowning. He had been accused-
falsely---of killing a crippled goose in Ballard Wildlife Conservation Area. 
Frequently enemies but here temporary allies in the 1965 Constitution 
Revision Assembly are political sage and adviser to governors Edward 
F. Prichard and an aging Happy Chandler. 
Home to the victors of the gubernatorial wars-the governor's mansion 
in Frankfort. Kentucky Department of Public Information. 
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position Republicans. It was not concern for party principles that 
bound the factions to the party or kept them divided against each other. 
In a poor state the prize of political patronage, even as poorly paid as 
are most political jobs, kept the factions tearing at each other, and 
politicians tended to.switch back and forth from one faction to another 
as self-interest dictated. 
Bolting, or deserting one's party rather than supporting the other 
faction, became the curse and trademark of Kentucky Democrats. The 
ability of defeated politicians to jump from one party to the other 
showed not only alack of loyalty but the absence of a unifying philoso-
phy. Yet so persistent were the Democratic divisions that in the first 
three decades of the current century, Republicans won the gover-
norship as often as did the Democrats (four each; five Republicans if 
Taylor is counted) and elected four U.S. senators, an impressive show-
ing for a minority party. They did not, however, have to contend with 
the Goebel Election Law; on August 28, 1900, Governor Beckham 
called a special session of the legislature and got the law repealed. 
Republican Edwin Morrow's race against Augustus Owsley Stan-
ley for the governorship in 1915 was long remembered for the unin-
hibited speaking campaign of the two men, who traveled together and 
often roomed together-to save money, some claimed-and debated 
almost daily from the same platform. Both were orators of the old 
school, given to volume and hyperbole, and both were known to take a 
drink. Morrow's campaign focused on his opposition to the law requir-
ing dog owners to buy dog tags. A man's right to own a dog, he 
implied, was God-given, and his attachment to his mutt was not much 
less important than his ties to wife and children. Thus to force a man to 
license his dog was to intrude upon a relationship sanctioned by the 
Almighty, and Morrow could wring tears from his rural listeners by 
describing the tender devotion of the noble dog to his master and the 
manly pleasures of hunting on frosty mornings behind a good and 
trusted canine, and would wind up his long-winded orations with a 
bellowed demand that the state "Free old Ring!" 
On one sizzling late-summer afternoon, while Morrow tugged and 
hauled at the heartstrings of his dog-loving listeners, Stanley dulled 
the pain of the event with more liquor than his stomach could accom-
modate. As the heat bore down he gave up the fight for self-control, 
walked solemnly to the back of the platform, and vomited enthusi-
astically, to the shocked surprise of all concerned. "I realize that was a 
terrible thing to do," he calmly admitted to his astonished audience, 
"but when I hear a Republican talking, it just makes me sick to my 
stomach." 
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Stanley won. He was not only an intelligent and able politician but 
a liberal and progressive governor. But he was a "wet," and his political 
fortunes declined with the coming of prohibition. In his later days he 
said there were two things he did not want again, "the clap [gonorrhea] 
and the governorship of Kentucky." Stanley won election to the U.S. 
Senate and resigned the governorship to his lieutenant governor, J.D. 
Black. Morrow, who had only narrowly lost the race to Stanley in 1915, 
came back in 1919 and beat Black for the office. He then freed "Old 
Ring," a grand victory for the Grand Old Party. 
Stanley and Morrow remained on curious terms. There is a story 
that after Stanley left office, he was walking down the street when he 
spotted Morrow, who started to walk the other way. "Ed," called out 
Stanley, "why are you dodging me? You mad at me?" "Well, yes," said 
Morrow sourly. "I'm tired of hearing the stories you've been telling 
about me." "Hell, Ed," said Stanley, "1 never told anything about you 
but the truth." "Yes," said Morrow, "and it's ruining me!" 
After the Bryan fever abated in the first decade of the new century, 
the Democrats divided into factions headed for a while by Seventh 
District Congressman J. e. Cantrill, who was felt to represent the more 
conservative elements of the party, and J. e. W. Beckham, the more 
liberal elements. The primary concerns of both men actually centered 
on political survival; Cantrill, however, was the darling of the Jockey 
Club and was generally considered the favorite of the bipartisan com-
bine. By 1920 the combine, composed principally of racing, coal, text-
book, and whiskey interests and led by the Jockey Club, was operating 
under full steam. From World War I until the Depression, this loose 
bipartisan group was more integral to Kentucky'S political operation 
than were the political parties. It backed Cantrill against First District 
Congressman Alben Barkley in his try for the nomination for governor 
in 1923, chiefly because Barkley had been a leading advocate of prohibi-
tion, and was then opposing racetrack gambling and proposing a 
severance tax on coal. Cantrill beat Barkley, but then died, and the 
Democratic state executive committee hurriedly named William J. 
Fields of Carter County ("Honest Bill from Olive Hill") as the Demo-
cratic nominee. He won, beating Republican Charles Dawson. The 
combine then turned around and supported Barkley in his successful 
1926 race for the U.S. Senate, figuring that he would do less harm in 
Washington than in Frankfort. It also helped elect the Republican FIem 
Sampson in 1927 by backing J.e. Cantrill against Beckham, who opposed 
parimutuel betting, in the Democratic primary; $eckham won the nomi-
nation, but droves of Democrats-allegedly ihcluding Honest Bill-
bolted, causing Sampson to be elected by a rnargm of 32,131 votes. 
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Beckham's defeat had a tinge of poetic justice about it. Parimutuel 
betting had been sanctioned under his administration in 1906. But by 
1927 he and Barkley had become symbols of opposition to the bipar-
tisan combine, of which the Jockey Club (under the leadership of such 
canny horsemen as Maurice Galvin, Polk Laffoon, and Senator 
Johnston Camden) was an important part. The Jockey Club had gener-
ated opposition because it not only controlled all of the racetracks in the 
state but could enforce its monopoly through the Racing Commission, 
which it controlled and which had to approve any additional tracks. 
More basically, it was seen as the source of corruption, threatening 
candidates and buying votes in the legislature with brazen openness. 
"My father opposed the Jockey Club," Barry Bingham said years later, 
"not because he disliked racing; on the contrary he liked racing very 
much, and was very fond of Churchill Downs. But he couldn't counte-
nance the open corruption that the Club people engaged in." 
FIem Sampson's term was not a happy one. He was a governor 
with the opposition party in control of the legislature and many of the 
elective offices, for the combine had decided to punish only Beckham. 
Sampson had plans for textbook reform and better roads, but the 
bipartisan Highway Commission got credit for what few roads were 
built, and Sampson got caught in a minor scandal when he became 
identified with textbook publishers. 
After supporting Sampson during most of his first legislative ses-
sion, the Democrats controlling the legislature turned on him in the 
spring of 1930 with a "ripper" law (a ripper was a law depriving an 
official of powers) that vested practically all power, including the power 
to name the Highway Commission, in a three-man board consisting of 
the governor, the lieutenant governor, and the attorney general. This 
was fatal to Sampson, for the commission controlled construction of 
roads in the post-World War I years when the automobile was coming 
into its own, and good roads were every American's dream and de-
mand. Kentuckians were no exception. They wanted roads to the point 
where they even accepted road-user taxes. The Highway Commission 
was created to oversee the spending of those taxes, and to make sure 
they were spent where they would do the most political good. Every-
one who wanted a road went hat-in-hand to the commission, and 
everyone wanted a road. Thus, whoever controlled the Highway Com-
mission controlled not just contracts and purchases but a political 
organization with a base in every county. When the legislature de-
prived Sampson of his control of the commission, said the Lexington 
Herald, it "left Sampson shorn of his locks." In the words of a subse-
quent governor, it also left Sampson, who had a wide reputation as a 
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ladies' man, with nothing to do but "produce Kentucky Colonels and 
seduce Kentucky women." 
In 1931 the Democrats gathered in Lexington's Woodland Park 
Auditorium to nominate a governor. It would be their last convention; 
they had for years nominated by primary elections, and in the future 
they would again choose by primary, thanks to an outgrowth of the 
convention they were attending. But with its last gasp, this final con-
vention produced divisions that would plague the Democratic party for 
the next half-century. 
The Democrats had reason to be optimistic as they headed for 
Lexington. Historic forces were at work, and great changes were in the 
offing. Tpe factional divisions of the party seemed to have weakened, if 
they had not entirely disappeared, with the death of Cantrill in 1923 
and the defeat of Beckham in 1927. A coalition of Democrats-among 
them Thomas S. Rhea, Benjamin "Uncle Ben" Johnson, J. Dan Talbott, 
William Klair, Seldon Glenn, and A.B. Chandler-had cooperated in 
passing the legislation depriving Governor Sampson of much of his 
power, and there were hopes that such cooperation might continue, 
that unity might be achieved and harmony prevail. 
The Republicans seemed almost hopeless. "Flim Flam FIem" 
Sampson's Republican administration had been a debacle. With the 
Depression engulfing the country, Herbert Hoover's Republican ad-
ministration in Washington was in even worse repute. Two years of 
plummeting prices and a year of crippling drought had left' Kentucky 
farmers crying for help, and Hoover showed no inclination to help 
them. The eastern Kentucky coalfields were gripped in a bitter war 
between miners and coal operators; indeed, on the day the Democrats 
convened in Lexington, a pitched battle was reported between union 
miners and mine guards in the Harlan County town of Evarts, leaving 
at least six people dead. For the first time, mountain voters were 
beginning to turn to the Democratic party. 
Louisville had been strongly Republican since 1917, partly because 
of resentment of President Woodrow Wilson for getting the country 
into World War I. But the Democratic machine of Michael Brennan was 
gaining strength that would put the city and Jefferson County in the 
Democratic column for three decades. The Democratic organization, 
later called the Fourth Street Organization because of its headquarters 
location at 113 South Fourth Street, had seen rocky days. Louisville had 
been pro-Union during the Civil War. Much of the Democratic strength 
was made up of Irish, German, and other immigrants, most of them 
Catholic and considered somewhat raffish if not actually disloyal by the 
older, more conservative and staunchly Protestant ruling clique. But 
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following the war, Democratic boss Colonel John Whallen, a former 
Confederate officer who had amassed a fortune, seized control of the 
Louisville Democratic organization and built it into a state power to 
reckon with. Whallen, who ran his organization from plush quarters in 
his burlesque theater, the Buckingham, was the classic Irish politician 
who rewarded obedience and punished opposition, was dutiful to the 
Catholic church and saw that the faithful got their cut. He also con-
trolled the Louisville police and many of the local officeholders, and 
usually had at least the limited cooperation of the L&N Railroad. 
But during the 1890s, Whallen overreached himself. In the con-
gressional elections of 1894 he had a compliant county judge purge the 
names of 4,000 Republicans from the rolls, a bit of corruption so blatant 
that even Democrats rebelled. The Republicans won, and Whallen's 
organization was dealt a crippling blow. The Democratic torch was 
passed to Michael Brennan, variously called "Colonel Mike" or 
"Colonel Mickey," who moved headquarters to the Tyler Building and 
made the organization a far more respectable and efficient operation. It 
also became more powerful, as New Deal programs brought more 
blacks and workers into the fold during the hard days of the Depres-
sion, and as Brennan learned the finer points of patronage. Brennan 
died in 1938, and his protege, Lennie McLaughlin, assumed control 
and moved party headquarters to Fourth Street, where it acquired its 
familiar soubriquet. 
As long as Brennan and McLaughlin held the reins, the powerful 
organization tended to support the Democratic faction that grew up 
around Thomas Rhea and was later headed by Earle C. Clements. 
Although Brennan was a Rhea-Laffoon man and at first supported Jack 
Howard in his 1931 contest with A.B. Chandler, many pro-Howard 
people insist that it was Brennan's shift to Chandler that doomed 
Howard; Chandler himself said that "Mr. Ben [Johnson] got Brennan to 
be for me." But when Earle Clements dropped by to test the water in 
1947, he found a welcome mat. 
"I remember that we met with Earl in the Seelbach," said John 
Crimmins (for half a century a Fourth Street stalwart) in a 1985 inter-
view with the author. "Miss Lennie, McKay [Reed], and I, as I remem-
ber. What we wanted to know, first, was who would handle patronage. 
It was that simple. And Earle said, why, there wasn't any question; he 
would depend on Democratic headquarters to do that. Well, you know, 
that sounded good to us. Now Waterfield, running against Earle, he 
never did answer us. So Lennie later on let it be known that we'd go 
with Earle. Leland Taylor and some other people in City Hall were for 
Harry Lee. [So were the Courier-Journal and Louisville Times.] We beat 
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them. Later, Earle had us in and we talked politics. What he said stayed 
that way. We were always close after that. He was a good man. Strong. 
You could talk to him." 
Combs, like Clements, had a solid regard for the Fourth Street 
Organization. "Earle had a lot of respect for Miss Lennie," Combs 
recalled. "He believed, and I believed, that the organization generally 
thought that good government was good politics. And generally 
speaking, governors didn't mess in Louisville affairs much except 
through the organization." 
Personality and mutual interests always bound Clements and 
Fourth Street more than any issue. For the same reasons, relations 
between the Louisville newspapers and the organization blew hot and 
cold. Judge Robert Worth Bingham was known from the beginning as a 
reformer, a quality not always popular on Fourth Street, but his rela-
tions with the organization frequently were good-possibly because 
his political adviser was the wily Percy Haly, who also was not famous 
for reformist tendencies. Both Judge Bingham and, later, his son Barry 
felt that the organization was too concerned with patronage, but they 
often backed organization candidates. And organization leaders, es-
pecially Miss Lennie McLaughlin, always advised her people to "keep 
the papers in mind." 
Both Fourth Street and the papers opposed Chandler after his first 
term. Both supported Neville Miller and Wilson Wyatt in their races for 
mayor, and Wyatt in his abortive Democratic gubernatorial primary 
against Bert Combs, though they supported Combs gainst Chandler in 
1959. After the death of Percy Haly in 1937, relations between the 
newspapers and the Fourth Street Organization deteriorated, possibly 
because Barry Bingham, upon assuming direction of the papers, 
brought in" outsiders" such as Mark Ethridge, who seemed to distrust 
most urban political machines, including Louisville's. (This also ex-
plains in part why Earle Clements and the Louisville papers were cool 
toward each other, though Clements in his congressional years was a 
definite liberal and a sturdy supporter of President Franklin Roosevelt, 
as were the papers.) 
After the shock of losing the governorship to Sampson, the Demo-
crats in 1931 were in a mood to unite for victory, and the Lexington 
convention was marked at first by a degree of harmony. Ruby Laf-
foon-a genial, honest circuit judge from Madisonville who was back-
ed by Thomas Rhea, the powerful western Kentucky boss from 
Russellville-was the overwhelming favorite to take the nomination for 
governor. Lieutenant Governor James Breathitt, Jr., of Hopkinsville 
and Judge W.R. Shackleford of Richmond were considered his most 
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serious opposition, though there was regional support for Rainey T. 
Wells, president of Murray State Teachers College (later Murray State 
University), and state representative William B. Ardery of Paris. None 
of them, however, was given much chance to block Laffoon; the critical 
contest of the convention was for lieutenant governor. 
Rhea, like Laffoon, was said to favor J. Woodford (Jack) Howard, a 
young lawyer and state senator from Morgan County, in eastern Ken-
tucky. But Ben Johnson had other ideas. The wily 73-year-old former 
congressman from Bardstown had already carved out a position of 
considerable power within the Democratic party, partly by surviving 
ten terms in Congress, partly by a flexibility that let him operate in any 
political sphere. He had bolted Beckham and supported Sampson in 
1927, and had been appointed to the Highway Commission as reward. 
Sampson later managed to fire him, but when the legislature stripped 
Sampson of his power over the commission and created a new eight-
man advisory commission, Johnson was chosen chairman. (His job 
carried power, but it included headaches, too. Dan Talbott told the 
story of how a delegation from Estill County, led by a Judge Redwine, 
called on Johnson to ask for a road. Uncle Ben couldn't see his way clear 
to build the road, and tried to get that message across as best he could 
without flatly saying no. But Redwine and his group stood stubbornly 
waiting for a definite answer, and finally Johnson, in an effort to 
change the subject, mentioned the insect infestation that was threaten-
ing the state's bean crop, an important Depression-era commodity. 
"How are the bean-bugs up your way?" he asked, but Redwine just 
looked at him. "They don't bother us none," he said. "The roads are so 
damn bad, they can't get in.") 
Johnson was allied with his son-in-law, J. (John) Dan Talbott, a 
shrewd and somewhat self-righteous but painfully honest Bardstown 
druggist who previously had moved quietly and efficiently behind the 
scenes. Johnson and Talbott had become friends with 33-year-old 
Albert Benjamin Chandler, a Henderson County native and then state 
senator from Woodford County, who had been cooperative in the 
previous session of the legislature, helping with the legislation that 
ripped Sampson. Johnson decided that Chandler could be useful. If he 
could be elected lieutenant governor, for instance, and Johnson's bloc 
could elect its man, Bailey Wooten, to the post of attorney general, his 
group would continue its hold over the Highway Commission and 
thus, for all practical purposes, control patronage and the dominant 
faction of the party. Talbott was less materialistic than Johnson in his 
approach, but he had definite ideas for improving the tenor and 
operation of state government, and he saw in Chandler a young and 
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pliable instrument. To be on the safe side, Johnson and Talbott were 
also backing Laffoon. By the time Laffoon won the office, they had him 
surrounded. 
Tom Rhea and Johnson were cool toward each other. Rhea had 
nominated Beckham for governor in 1927, only to see the prize go to 
Sampson, partly because of the machinations of the bipartisan combine 
with which Johnson was identified. Rhea had not forgotten; he looked 
on Chandler, the protege of Johnson, as the tool of the Bluegrass 
wealthy. There is irony in this, in that Chandler became, in later years, 
the self-proclaimed champion of "the little fella." 
Jack Howard also had powerful supporters, including Con-
gressman Fred Vinson of Louisa (later to become Chief Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court) and Allie Young, Democratic boss of 
Morehead. Vinson had, or thought he had, lined up Billy KIair and 
Mike Brennan for Howard, as well as important elements of the Jockey 
Club; he also thought he had the support of Laffoon. But forces of 
which he had no warning were moving beneath the surface of the 
convention. 
Talbott, according to his biographer Orval Baylor, feared the pros-
pect of a lieutenant governor with whom he and Johnson had no 
influence. He and Johnson called on members of the Jockey Club and 
reminded them that Howard was allied with Laffoon and Tom Rhea, 
who had backed Beckham in his fight against parimutuel betting. The 
state, they argued, needed a man close to the center of power who was 
more sensitive to the needs of racing, a man such as Chandler. The 
horsemen tended to agree. 
The glib, handsome, outgoing, and energetic Chandler, nick-
named "Happy" by his classmates at Transylvania (he was known as 
"Irish" as a boy in Henderson County), was not idle. Though dismissed 
at first by most political observers as a lightweight, he had been 
working the state and later the Lexington political community with 
energy and was beginning to make an impression. According to Earle 
Clements, Chandler went directly to Laffoon, whose endorsement (or 
approval, at the least) would be necessary. It was a conference Laffoon 
would never forget. 
"That fellow came into my room," Laffoon told Earle Clements 
with great bitterness when Chandler later turned against him, "and got 
down on his knees, begging me to let him run with me. And he swore 
he would be loyal and work with me. Begged me." (Chandler, in 
interviews with his son Ben, in 1973, never mentioned this alleged 
meeting.) 
Laffoon, suspicious of Chandler, withheld his support for the time, 
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but the forces were building. Johnson and Talbott called on Mike 
Brennan, and though those close to Brennan say he never went for 
Chandler, Chandler himself said he had Brennan's support. In any 
event, Laffoon knuckled under and approved Chandler, partly because 
he wanted support of the Johnson-Talbott clique, and his support 
turned the tide. Fred Vinson was furious, as were the majority of 
eastern Kentucky delegates, who wanted a man from the mountains 
with influence on the Highway Commission. At one point, Vinson 
stood on a chair shaking his fist and shouting at chairman John Milli-
ken and refused to sit down, despite the boos and catcalls of the 4,100 
delegates jammed into the 2,200-seat hall. But the convention nomi-
nated Chandler, who was elected with Laffoon. Talbott was elected 
auditor, and Bailey Wooten became attorney general. Ben Johnson was 
restored to his place on the Highway Commission. 
With Chandler's nomination the seeds of a new factionalism had 
been planted. Tom Rhea had not only been for Jack Howard; he had 
been against Happy Chandler. His successor, Earle Clements, inher-
ited the division, and it is worth noting that Jack Howard later became a 
law partner of Bert Combs, who eventually brought down the 
Chandler machine. 
Events and enemies began gnawing away the foundations of Laf-
foon's administration from the beginning. Two days after the election, 
Laffoon, Klair, Allie Young, John Milliken, and Dan Talbott went to 
French Lick, Indiana, where a legislative program, allegedly written by 
Talbott and Johnson, was worked out. Laffoon agreed to it. He had said 
earlier that he thought a general sales tax was the only way to payoff 
the state debt and get some money for the schools, but Talbott, 
according to Orval Baylor, told the governor that was out of the ques-
tion; he said the combine could approve a few small taxes on luxuries 
but nothing on necessities or on important businesses. Johnson and 
Talbott were rumored to have chosen the legislative leaders, too. 
I The Laffoon administration was less than a total success; in fact, it 
fell just short of a fiasco. One problem was that Laffoon, like governors 
before him, wanted to do something about the public schools, which 
were regarded as among the worst in the country, but he had no money 
to do it with. The school system was, generally speaking, deplorable. 
Almost 20 percent of the state's grade school students attended classes 
in one- and two-room schools that usually lacked running water, in-
door toilets, or eating facilities. The only heat in winter was provided by 
a large potbellied stove in each room; the only relief from summer heat 
came from open windows. Playgrounds, such as they were, were 
stretches of mud much of the time. One teacher often taught four or 
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five subjects on different levels to four or five grades. Children ate what 
they brought from home, and usually had no more than well water to 
drink. There were no school buses, since the roads were too rough to 
accommodate them, and children living any distance from the school-
house had a long walk, regardless of weather, twice a day. It is little 
wonder that frequent sickness caused a high rate of absenteeism, and 
that the state's dropout rate ranged from first to tenth in the nation. 
Governor Sampson had tried to improve the situation by propos-
ing free textbooks and higher teachers' salaries. But he had been 
elected by the combine, and he was ripped by the combine when he 
appeared ready to do the one thing that had to be done-raise taxes. 
Laffoon did not fare much better. Part of it was his own fault. He 
won passage of a bill reorganizing government and adoption of a new 
code for support of the public schools; finally, he recommended a 2 
percent sales tax. But to pass a sales tax a governor had to be powerful 
and popular, had to prepare his ground carefully and be sure of his 
backing in the legislature. Laffoon was not such a man. His tax plan was 
poorly designed; the proposal came just as the country was reeling 
from the blows of Depression; and he did not prepare his forces in the 
legislature for the battle. Instead, he introduced it, without much 
political spadework, in the final weeks of the first session. One of the 
first to denounce it was Ben Johnson. The legislature rebelled and 
defeated it, and among those rebelling most noisily was Laffoon's 
smiling lieutenant governor, Happy Chandler. Laffoon worked hard to 
mend his fences, but it was not until 1935-after two regular sessions 
and .two special sessions of the legislature-that he was able to win 
passage of a sales tax. Even then, it was a flawed instrument, hard to 
administer, and it cost Laffoon dearly in party unity. Furthermore, it 
had given Chandler the opening he was looking for. 
On the first day of the Laffoon term Chandler had announced that 
he was moving into offices on the executive floor of the capitol and 
would pursue his duties there full time. This was a distinct break with 
the past, since previous lieutenant governors had remained in Frank-
fort only during legislative sessions, when they were required to 
preside over the Senate; the session over, they went home. Chandler 
saw, as others would appreciate later, that the lieutenant governor's 
office provided a perfect springboard to higher things. As history 
would show, he was right. With no official duties or obligations except 
to preside over the Senate when the legislature was in session, he could 
devote his energies and the facilities of his office to full-time politick-
ing. That Chandler did, and after he had shown the way, a long line of 
ambitious men sought the office as a springboard to the governorship. 
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Keen Johnson, lieutenant governor under Chandler, went on to be-
come governor, as did Lawrence Wetherby, second man to Earle Clem-
ents; Wendell Ford, lieutenant governor under Louie Nunn; and Ford's 
lieutenant governor, Julian Carroll. Harry Lee Waterfield, lieutenant 
governor during Chandler's second term (1955-59) ran against Bert 
Combs but lost, as did Thelma Stovall, who served under Carroll but 
lost to John Y. Brown, Jr., in her bid for top spot. On the other hand, 
Martha Layne Collins spent her four years as lieutenant governor in a 
successful campaign for the governor's mansion. It is probably signifi-
cant of the state's tolerance of political waste and its reluctance to effect 
change, no matter how obviously needed, that the legislature has 
never taken steps either to make the office useful or to abolish it. In 
1986 a move was begun in the assembly to abolish the office or cut off its 
funds, but it never gained momentum. The lieutenant governor con-
tinues to take up space, spend money, and do little but campaign for 
office. 
Had the sales tax been passed early in Laffoon's first legislative 
session and efficiently administered, the revenues might have enabled 
him to accomplish enough to withstand the political attacks launched 
against him as the state's economy worsened with the Depression. He 
tried to improve conditions by seeking federal relief funds but was 
handicapped by a lean state treasury that had little money with which 
to match the federal funds. An earlier sales tax might have provided the 
money he needed to match the relief help from Washington. 
In 1933, Laffoon was accused by federal officials of exaggerating 
Kentucky's needs and overstating the state's ability to provide match-
ing funds. The charge was probably justified; Washington had prom-
ised additional help to states lacking matching money, and Kentucky 
needed all the help it could get. By his final year in office, the wolves 
were attacking Laffoon openly. The legislature passed a tax on beer and 
liquor, with the revenue earmarked for relief matching. Among those 
declaring that this would provide enough money was A.B. Chandler, 
who added that he considered Laffoon's statement of Kentucky needs 
exaggerated. A federal relief inspector, Lorena Hickok, disputed 
Chandler's assertion, describing conditions in Harlan, Bell; Clay, 
Knox, and Leslie as "desperate." And relief administrator Harry Hop-
kins reported to state directors of the National Relief Council: "I tell 
you, it isn't any fun. Here's the state of Kentucky. It would not put up 
any money. You say, 'You put up some money, or we won't give you 
any,' and what happens? They do not put it up. Who gets licked? The 
unemployed. Believe me, it's a tough order to give." 
Chandler had more than philosophical reasons for his break with 
36 DIVIDE AND DISSENT 
Laffoon. Laffoon had made it clear, in statements at party meetings, 
that he favored Tom Rhea as his successor, and Rhea had already 
persuaded Earle Clements, who was rapidly emerging as a major 
western Kentucky political power, to serve as his campaign chairman. 
(Clements said later he had no inkling that Chandler wanted to run, 
and that had Chandler asked him first, he might have supported him. 
"I could believe that," Democratic "King Maker" Bill May said later. "I 
don't think any of us took Chandler seriously at first.") 
To underscore his position, Laffoon managed to remove Ben 
Johnson as chairman of the Highway Commission and replace him 
with Rhea. Talbott had managed to alienate Attorney General Bailey 
Wootten, who resented Talbott's criticism of his office methods and the 
combine's obvious effort to rule Laffoon or ruin him. Wootten joined 
Laffoon to throw out Johnson. This was an unmistakable sign to 
Chandler and his followers that the fight was on. Not everyone in the 
Laffoon wing was pleased with the selection of Rhea. "I always thought 
Rhea was a poor candidate," said Tyler Munford, Morganfield pub-
lisher and legislator and a staunch Clements man. "1 begged Clements 
to look somewhere else. But he was sold on Rhea. He was a good guy, 
Rhea, but people didn't warm to him." 
From the start, Chandler had a keen political instinct. He could 
sense the growing unpopularity of Laffoon's sales tax, and in the 
popular dislike of the tax he saw his opportunity. Furthermore, as he 
later told his son Ben, he considered the sales tax wrong, regressive, 
and resting unfairly on the small wage earner. In this he was in the great 
and tragic tradition. Kentucky was still-and would be until the census 
of 1970---a predominantly rural state. Its people still objected to taxes, 
even while demanding the things that only more taxes could provide. 
They didn't see this attitude was hypocritical as long as someone like 
Chandler would promise them he could do the job without the taxes. 
Unfortunately, the federal government, which was playing an increas-
ing role in providing the welfare the states had failed to provide, was 
also taking over income and excise taxes to support the welfare area, 
leaving the sales tax as one of the few possible sources of income 
remaining available to states. 
Chandler would prove to be one of the most popular and powerful 
politicians in the history of his state. The voters would take his word, 
no matter what the factual evidence to the contrary, and support him 
on the basis of promises, no matter how often proven empty, for the 
simple reason that he knew what they wanted to hear and was willing 
to say it. 
Chandler apparently sensed that he might become governor if he 
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could get to the voters. He also knew that, having turned against 
Laffoon, he would never win the nomination for governor at a party 
convention ruled by Laffoon and his supporters. The solution was 
obvious: he had to get the law changed to require a primary instead of a 
convention. The question: how to do it? The answer presented itself on 
February 6, 1935. 
Laffoon needed help with Kentucky's faltering economy, and the 
only hope of help lay in the New Deal relief programs. On the morning 
of February 6, he and Tom Rhea boarded a train for Washington to beg 
more money for Kentucky. They also hoped to persuade Roosevelt, 
who opposed conventions and wanted Kentucky to return to party 
primaries, that Kentucky's convention system was preferable for the 
time being. The night before, Chandler and his closest aides and 
advisers had made their plans: some say Frankfort attorney Clifford 
Smith was the chief strategist; others credit J. Dan Talbott. In the 
memoir dictated to his son, Chandler seems to take credit for thinking 
up the scheme himself. 
When a Kentucky governor leaves the state, the lieutenant gover-
nor becomes acting governor, with all the attendant powers. Chandler 
denied that he had previQusly planned to call the legislature into 
special session, but others say that he had a sentinel stationed in 
Ashland and that when Laffoon's train for Washington rolled across 
the Ohio River, the sentinel raced for the telephone; within minutes 
Chandler had issued a proclamation calling for a special session of the 
legislature to consider a compulsory primary law. With this bold 
stroke, Chandler launched one of the most remarkable political careers 
in state history. 
In Washington, Laffoon heard of Chandler's action and raced 
home, arriving on the morning of February 7. He immediately issued a 
proclamation rescinding Chandler's call for a special session, but 
Chandler forces at once filed suit challenging his action, contending 
that the call was legal and binding and not subject to annulment. On 
February 26 the Court of Appeals, by a vote of four to three, agreed. 
Laffoon was obliged to face a special session and a primary bill that he 
knew would be popular, since many legislators, like their constituents 
back home, distrusted conventions and the "machines" that seemed to 
dominate them. 
Laffoon, Rhea, and their advisers had to find some means to.turn 
this adversity to their advantage. They chose a bizarre way: instead of 
having one primary, they proposed a second, or runoff, in case there 
were several candidates, none of whom received a majority. This 
sounded good to the legislators, who promptly voted the runoff pri-
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mary into being. Why would Laffoon do this? Some people contend 
that he thought former governor J. c. W. Beckham would be the anti-
Laffoon candidate, to face Laffoon's choice, Thomas Rhea, in the 
coming gubernatorial election, and while Rhea might not beat Beck"' 
ham in a field of several candidates, he would come in second; then, 
with the support of the sturdy statewide Democratic organization, he 
would beat him in a runoff. 
This analysis seems unlikely. While Laffoon may have seen Beck-
ham as the probable candidate earlier, he could hardly have so re-
garded him at the time. Judge Robert Bingham had urged Beckham to 
run, but by the time of the special legislative session Beckham had flatly 
taken himself out of consideration. He had not been well and his son 
was ill, he protested, prompting Bingham to turn to Chandler. Further-
more, it is impossible to believe that Chandler and his cohorts would 
have gone to the risk and effort of the special session scheme in order to 
give Beckham the governorship. In his interviews with his son, 
Chandler says that he gave Beckham the courtesy of a call and asked 
him to run, but Beckham declined. The sincerity of such an effort must 
be suspect, however. It is inconceivable that Talbott would have master-
minded Chandler's primary plan for the benefit of Beckham, whom he 
disliked, or that Ben Johnson would have countenanced the candidacy 
of Beckham, his old hometown enemy. It is similarly inconceivable that 
Chandler would have gone to so much trouble for someone else and 
gained such an advantage for himself in order to yield it to a man to 
whom he owed nothing. 
In any event, Laffoon had outsmarted himself. In the following 
primary, Rhea and Chandler were the leading candidates for nomina-
tion: the minor candidates in the lists were Frederick A. Wallis and 
Elam Huddleston, each hoping that the voters would tire of the Frank-
fort bickering and send the lightning his way. That didn't happen, but 
the two minor runners did get enough votes to keep either Rhea or 
Chandler from obtaining a majority, though Rhea outpolled Chandler 
203,010 to 189,575 (Huddleston got 15,501, Wallis 38,410). But after the 
first primary, Huddleston and Wallis threw their support to Chandler, 
who then won the runoff and the nomination, 260,573 to 234,124. 
Laffoon was heartbroken, and his final days in the governor's office 
were lonely and bitter. Until his death in 1946, Tom Rhea never forgave 
or forgot. When the Republicans nominated Lexington's King Swope, 
Rhea openly bolted Chandler and supported Swope. Mrs. Emerson 
Beauchamp of Russellville, widow of longtime Democratic leader 
Emerson "Doc" Beauchamp, has said that on at least one occasion Rhea 
made a radio speech endorsing Swope. Chandler made much of Rhea's 
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radio speech, for years insisting that Clements also bolted; he used 
Clements' alleged bolt to justify his own frequent desertions of the 
party when the Clements wing was successful. But supporters, includ-
ing Tyler Munford and· Doc Beauchamp, said that Clements did not 
bolt, and Clements himself told historian Thomas Syvertsen that he did 
not. Still, there is evidence that he gave Chandler's candidacy a "light 
ride"-that is, lip service only and not much of that. 
It is interesting to note that during Chandler's campaign, he was 
introduced at a speech in Paris by a heavy-set young man rapidly 
becoming known as something of a boy genius. Edward Prichard was 
just finishing college at Princeton and preparing to go to law school at 
Harvard. He had spoken-and brilliantly-for Chandler at the Wood-
land Park convention, and when he came home from school in 1936, he 
went to work for the state department of revenue for $125 a month-a 
"munificent" salary, as he termed it-and he and Chandler became 
quite close. (Prichard's father was a Chandler supporter in the legis-
lature, as well.) But during the 1935 race, Chandler was supported by 
the eastern Kentucky coal operators and the Harlan County sheriff 
they supported, who had become infamous for his brutal mistreatment 
of striking miners. Prichard objected hotly to the operators' influence in 
Frankfort and their ties to Chandler. By 1937 Chandler was showing an 
open preference for Virginia's Senator Harry Byrd over Prichard's idol, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, and relations between them cooled. When 
Chandler challenged ED.R.'s faithful supporter Alben Barkley for the 
U.S. Senate, Prichard left him, and they later became bitter enemies. 
(Actually, Chandler and Byrd had been friends for years, since they 
had met in Virginia when Chandler was courting his wife to-be, 
Mildred Watkins. The two men were of a similar conservative southern 
Democratic mold, and later, when Chandler was in the Senate, he 
voted with Byrd and against Roosevelt on matters of government 
spending.) 
A continuing source of strength and stability for Chandler was J. 
Dan Talbott. "Talbott was a good man, and a good influence on 
Happy," Prichard said later. "Not much of a politician, really, but 
honest, and helped Happy with his fiscal program more than anyone 
else could have. Then, when Talbott ran into personal problems, fell 
out with Ben Johnson and fell on hard times, Happy abandoned him. 
Dan was really hard up, when Charlie Dawson, of Louisville, gave him 
a job." 
This remark is interesting. Talbott was married to Johnson's daugh-
ter, Rebecca. Apparently during the later years of the Chandler admin-
istration, relations between the Talbotts grew strained; they later 
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separated, and Talbott moved to Louisville. It was widely assumed that 
Johnson broke with Talbott because of Talbott's dispute with Rebecca, 
and because it was common gossip that he was involved with a tall, 
striking, and ambitious blonde woman from Bardstown who later 
became something of a celebrity in Democratic political circles. Descen-
dants of Talbott, however, say that the opposite was true: that Talbott 
and Johnson fell out chiefly because Talbott questioned Johnson's 
rough and dictatorial management of highway affairs, and that Rebecca 
defended her father and finally separated from her husband. This split, 
they say, was partIy healed, but later reopened-possibly because of 
the other woman-never to be resolved. This does not sound implausi-
ble. Johnson never hesitated to use the Highway Commission to build 
roads where they would be politically productive, nor did he object to 
enriching allies with purchases and construction contracts. Such fla-
grant abuse of the office might have led the scrupulous Talbott to insist 
that Chandler remove Johnson from the commission. At the same 
time, stories that Talbott and Rebecca parted because of his infatuation 
with the Bardstown woman were never put to rest. In any event, 
Johnson was outraged, and his break with Talbott was never healed. 
--------------------- ~ ---------------------
Strong Man from Morganfield 
Before Chandler's 1935 race, Kentucky campaigns had been marked by 
marathon oratory and practiced pomposity, designed more to impress 
than inform or entertain. Happy gave them something new. Introduc-
ing the sound truck, he tore through Kentucky with flags flying and 
loud-speakers blaring in a nonstop whirlwind of a campaign, name-
calling, ridiculing, promising, sweating, hugging, kissing, speaking 
anywhere at any time, sweeping the crowds along with him, breaking 
into a rendition of "Sonny Boy" at any or no provocation. Alongside 
him, the staid, traditional King Swope was an aging carriage horse 
facing Man 0' War. 
It was not all hoopla, by any means. Chandler promised to repeal 
the sales tax, oppose any increase in property taxes, reduce the gas-
oline tax, and end the practice of assessing state employees a percen-
tage of their salaries. All of these reflect Chandler's philosophy, as he 
told his son Ben, that the best government is the least, and that the sales 
tax is the worst of all taxes. Throughout his career, Chandler believed 
that the duty of government was to provide roads, schools, and 
"charity," and little else, and it is significant that he preferred to see 
welfare as charity given by the rich to the poor and cause for the pulled 
forelock, rather than as an economic and social weapon for rebalancing 
an economy. He was, in brief, a southern conservative, a Republican 
who found himself in the Democratic camp mainly through the acci-
dent of birth and geography. The same, of course, could be said of Dan 
Talbott, who influenced, if he did not actually dictate, Chandler's 
program before and after he won office. To his credit, Chandler kept 
most of the promises. 
The campaign was not all good-natured. When Chandler wrapped 
himself in the stars and stripes and referred to his service during World 
War I, Henry Denhardt, adjutant general under Laffoon (and later the 
victim in one of the state's most sensational murder cases), fired back 
with a circular certifying that Happy had never been an army officer, as 
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some of his campaign literature implied, but only a cadet in the training 
unit at Transylvania College. 
One of Chandler's most popular campaign posters showed an 
ebullient President Franklin D. Roosevelt smiling upon a trim, hand-
some, serious Chandler, and the legend read "Help Roosevelt and 
Chandler get things moving again" -an interesting sidelight in view of 
the fact that Chandler broke with HD.R. hardly more than two years 
later with his race against Alben Barkley. As a matter of fact, Chandler, 
as he admitted later, never cared much for either Roosevelt or his New 
Deal policies and seldom supported his programs, even while taking 
advantage of them. He was strictly a "pay as you go" man and deplored 
the Roosevelt spending. 
Chandler roared to victory in November of 1935 with a solid win 
over Swope-556,573 to 461,104-and surprised his critics, who con-
sidered him reactionary and shallow, by producing two of the most 
spectacular years in the history of the office. To his credit he brought 
into his cabinet a "brain trust" of University of Kentucky professors-
including such recognized authorities on state finances and organiza-
tion as Dr. James Martin and Dr. Clyde Reeves-and listened to the 
advice of Dan Talbott concerning state finances, debt, and policies in 
general. He reorganized the loosely run and uncoordinated depart-
ments of state government into a logical and efficient cabinet, restruc-
tured tax collection procedures, put the state on a sound financial 
basis, launched a modest highway-building program (including the 
first modem road in Kentucky, the four-lane highway from Frankfort 
to Lexington that critics called his "office to swimming pool road"), and 
tried to wrestle with the hydra-headed school problem. In January 
1936, Chandler appointed his old mentor Ben Johnson highway com-
missioner (though eventually their relationship soured, and Johnson 
broke with Chandler, resigned, and retired to Bardstown). 
True to his promise, Chandler repealed the sales tax, which had 
yielded only about $6,000,000 in its one yea,r of life; in its place he 
imposed a production tax on whiskey, a progressive income tax, an 
inheritance tax, and an excise tax on beer artd cigarettes, producing 
about $37,000,000. It was not enough to solve the school problem, but it 
gave Chandler the chance to say to the voters~ "I took the tax off your 
food and put it on their whiskey" -good political strategy. And the 
Chandler luck was with him: the repeal of prohibition put Kentucky'S 
distilling industry back into taxable operation, and the withdrawal of 
warehoused whiskey gave the state a windfall, which Happy used to 
maximum advantage. He afterward claimed that he had found a debt of 
$30,000,000 and paid it off; actually, the state! debt totaled something 
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over $28,000,000, and he reduced it to a little more than $4,000,000, or 
made arrangements for doing so before he left office. He established a 
department of industrial relations, investigated prison conditions, 
passed a minimum wage law for women and children, and started a 
rural road program. 
But inefficiency and a shortage of money continued to plague the 
state, especially in its relations with the New Deal agencies that sprang 
up to cope with the Depression. In the summer of 1936 Washington 
officials complained of the inefficiency of Kentucky's Commissioner of 
Welfare, Frederick Wallis, and when the Old Age Assistance program 
was launched, only 238 Kentuckians received benefits that averaged 
only $7.43 a month. A.Y. Lloyd, director of the Division of Public 
Assistance, announced that same year that the state had anticipated 
25,000 applicants for public assistance but had gotten 76,000, and 
warned that only the most indigent could be helped until more funds 
were available. By the end of the Chandler administration about 57,000 
Kentuckians were receiving monthly checks, but the checks averaged 
only $9, less than half of the national average and less than that 
distributed by Virginia, Tennessee, and Indiana. 
Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt's federal relief administrator, 
complained during both the Laffoon and Chandler administrations 
that Kentucky's refusal or inability to provide matching funds posed a 
threat to the needy and unemployed. Robert Fechner, director of the 
Civilian Conservation Corps, warned Chandler in 1937 that he would 
pull all CCC workers out of Kentucky parks unless the state put up 
more money, and unless Parks Director Bailey Wootten showed more 
efficient management ()f the parks where CCC projects were under-
way. Kentucky also was unable to take full advantage of programs 
offered by the Agricultural Adjustment Act. In general, despite 
Chandler's government reorganization and his efforts to increase reve-
nues, Kentuckians suffered throughout the Depression decade be-
cause of the state's inability to take full advantage of federal programs. 
Chandler made a concerted drive to upgrade the state's roads but 
was handicapped by constitutional limits on salaries that discouraged 
competent engineers. This difficulty was partly overcome when Judge 
Robert Worth Bingham contributed $7,000 a year to the pay of Thomas 
Cutler, an engineer and administrator of national reputation who took 
over the highway department (There is a curious footnote to this bit of 
history: Ben Collings, a Louisville contractor who had received consid-
erable state business, later built a swimming pool for Chandler at the 
latter's Versailles home. This aroused, of course, a storm of criticism 
and charges of corruption and payoff. Orval Baylor, editor of 
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Chandler's Versailles newspaper and his unofficial historian, declared 
that Collings had as much moral right to give Happy the gift of a 
swimming pool as Bingham had to give him $7,000 a year with which 
to hire a highway engineer.) 
Obviously, here was no flash in the political pan, nor was Chandler 
merely a vigorous, instinctive politician. Throughout his career he 
showed no great political philosophy. But he had the good sense to 
bring able people into key positions and, until they landed too heavily 
on sensitive ground, leave them alone. Critics charged, then as now, 
that Dan Talbott was the real architect of the administration and that 
Chandler, after endorsing the Talbott program, seldom worked at the 
job of being governor but played golf and took the bows. It is interest-
ing to speculate on what he might have achieved had he kept the sales 
tax, reformed the state's business taxes, revised the constitution, and 
issued bonds with which to modernize state roads, as such states as 
North Carolina were doing. Considering his popularity at the time, he 
probably could have done all that, and it would have made his admin-
istration historic. 
But the more basic changes of the Chandler years, 1935 to 1939, 
came about as a result of the New Deal programs of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt-ironic in that Chandler was never a New Deal man. The 
Works Progress Administration provided life-saving jobs by the thou-
sands, the Public Works Administration built hundreds of schools, 
libraries, courthouses, playgrounds, and roads, while the Civilian 
Conservation Corps reclaimed and reforested hundreds of thousands 
of acres of cut-over and burned-over land. The Rural Electrification 
Administration brought electricity to farms, more than 90 percent of 
which had never had electrical power before. The Tennessee Valley 
Authority changed the face of western Kentucky with its cheap elec-
tricity, its lakes, its reforestation, and erosion control. 
These New Deal measures, in a Depression atmosphere of fear and 
despair, helped Chandler tremendously, as did his progressive admin-
istration, and he moved to take advantage of his popularity by chal-
lenging the redoubtable Alben Barkley for his seat in the U.S. Senate in 
1938. This was a move of great audacity but faulty judgment. Chandler 
had gauged his state and concluded that he had sufficient support. He 
overestimated. He had already upset party moderates by what many 
considered his betrayal of John Y. Brown in the 1936 Senate race. 
Brown, in 1935 the House Speaker and a politician of considerable 
influence, declared that he agreed to support Chandler for governor in 
1935 in exchange for Chandler's promise to support him for the Senate 
in 1936. But Chandler, according to both Brown and Clements, per-
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suaded J,CW. Beckham to make the race, with the result that Senator 
M.M. Logan retained his seat in the three-way race in which Brown ran 
third. 
Now Chandler again antagonized liberal Democrats by threaten-
ing to rob ED.R. of Alben Barkley, a senior senator and staunch 
supporter. It was a tough, bitter dogfight of a campaign and a typical 
Chandler show. After the 1935 race, Earle Clements said that "many, 
including myself, were either fed up or bitter with the political abuse 
and vilification Happy unnecessarily leveled on Tom Rhea." This was 
to become a Chandler trademark-ridicule, abuse, false charges-any 
fight in which he was involved became a dogfight. There were no holds 
barred. Chandler knew the people liked a show, and he gave them one, 
in the most basic sense of the Roman bread and circuses. 
He ripped into Barkley, ridiculing him as "Old Alben," a pointed 
reference to the fact that Chandler was 39, Barkley 60. He ignored 
Barkley's years of service to the state and his value to President Roose-
velt, insisting that his opponent had been so long out of the state and in 
Washington that he could no longer be considered a Kentuckian. He 
also took credit for the New Deal programs that were easing somewhat 
the pains of the Depression. 
Since there was no merit system to protect state employees from 
political manipulation, Chandler had the state payroll at his command. 
Barkley could fight back with WPA relief rolls. President Roosevelt, 
who had previously written a supporting letter to Barkley addressed to 
"My Dear Alben," came to Kentucky to endorse Barkley, but Happy 
made a remarkable effort to tum the trip to his own advantage. When, 
in Covington, ED.R. and Barkley rode through the streets toward 
Latonia Race Track, Chandler nimbly jumped into the back seat of the 
president's touring car, putting himself between Roosevelt and Bark-
ley. It was customary then, when the president usually rode in an open 
touring car, for him to ride on the right side of the rear seat, where he 
would be next to the crowds lining the street. Chandler did not make 
the mistake of intruding on the right side of the crippled Roosevelt, but 
by jumping in between him and Barkley, he conceivably caused many 
to wonder where the president stood. At the racetrack he mounted the 
speaker's platform, smiling confidently, but Roosevelt chilled him with 
a strong endorsement of Barkley that made Chandler appear green, 
uninformed, and unimpressive. As Edward Prichard said, "Roosevelt 
told him, 'You're a good boy, but you won't do.' " 
Barkley beat Chandler 294,562 to 223,690. (This was not the humili-
ation it might seem; even the formidable Somerset Republican John 
Sherman Cooper was unable to stand against Barkley.) Chandler was 
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obliged to wait until 1939, when Senator Mills Marvel Logan died in 
office. Chandler resigned; his lieutenant governor, Keen Johnson, 
succeeded him (and was shortly elected to a full term) and immediately 
appointed him to the Senate vacancy. As proof that he could still appeal 
to the Kentucky voter, Chandler won the 1940 election to fill the 
unexpired term, beating Charles P. Farnsley in the primary and Walter 
B. Smith in the general election, 561,151 to 401,812. In 1942 he won the 
right to a full term, defeating John Y. Brown in the primary and Richard 
J. Colbert in the general. In 1945 he resigned his Senate seat to become 
commissioner of baseball, a post he held until 1951, when he was 
forced out by club owners. 
In view of his political ambition, Chandler's decision to take the 
baseball job is puzzling. It certainly gained him no political strength, 
took years out of his campaign for higher office, and deprived him of 
the dignity which might have been his as U.S. Senator and which, 
though apparently unnecessary in Kentucky, would have helped him 
nationally. Years later he told his son that Harry Byrd had said his 
decision to become baseball commissioner had been his one big mis-
take. "But then," said Chandler, "I leaned over and whispered the real 
reason to him, and he said, 'That explains it.' "He did not say what the 
whispered reason was. 
Perhaps his decision can be traced in part to the presidential 
nominating convention of 1944, where Harry S. Truman was chosen to 
run as vice-president with ED.R. Chandler had had hopes of winning 
the nomination himself-a peculiar aspiration, in view of his experi-
ence with Roosevelt in his race against Barkley-and was indignant 
when the Kentucky delegation, including Earle Clements, refused to 
support him. His ebullient personality had won him considerable 
favorable notice in the party, and he thought he had enough support 
from other states to make a serious try for the second spot if he could 
make the run as Kentucky's favorite son. Had he succeeded, of course, 
he would have become president when Roosevelt died in 1945, and he 
always blamed those who failed to support him for keeping him out of 
the White House. Some political observers believed that the conven-
tion was the start of the Chandler-Clements friction; Chandler, they 
said, viewed Clements' nonsupport as a bolt, too. 
As the federal government took over the job of providing services 
that the states had not or would not provide, it also took a lot of the 
taxing power, making it difficult for states to finance their own im-
provements or to participate fully in the federal programs. Kentucky 
did not have the matching money or the functioning agencies to 
capitalize on the vast farm, welfare, and educational programs that 
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proved the major impetus for progress after 1932. Once more, for lack 
of money, it fell behind other states. 
Between the Chandler and Clements administrations, relatively 
little happened in Kentucky government, primarily because those were 
the years of World War II, with interests and resources focused on 
national survival. Governor Keen Johnson, a competent, conservative 
newspaper publisher from Richmond, promised honest and efficient 
government and boasted of his frugality, prompting one Democratic 
official to complain that "Old Keen frugaled here and he frugaled there 
till he damn near frugaled us to death." Then, in 1943, the Democrats 
nominated Highway Commissioner Lyter Donaldson of Carrollton for 
governor, to oppose a conservative and respected Republican nomi-
nee, Judge Simeon Willis of Ashland. Donaldson, a lackluster candi-
date at best, beat Ben Kilgore and Rodes K. Myers in the primary but 
lost the general election to Willis, 270,525 to 279,144. The Prohibition 
party candidate, Andrew Johnson, polled 3,239. 
The only almost-bright spot of the campaign for the Democrats was 
the race made by William H. May, the handsome, gregarious nephew 
of Congressman Andrew Jackson May of Floyd CQunty. Bill May had 
first come to public attention four years earlier when he easily won the 
race for agriculture commissioner. In 1943, after defeating newspaper-
man and state legislator Henry Ward and farmer John Whitaker in the 
primary, he lost the race for lieutenant governor by only 533 votes to 
Republican Kenneth Tuggle. 
With the end of World War II, the return of servicemen, and the 
surprisingly rapid resurgence of the economy, the people as well as 
conditions were ready for change and action, and the voters decided 
that Earle Clements-who had gone from county judge of Union 
County to Congress-offered the best chance for action and change in 
Frankfort. Clements, the big, popular son of a substantial Union Coun-
ty family, had gone in 1915 from Morganfield to the University of 
Kentucky, where he played center on the football team and, as a 
member of Pi Kappa Alpha fraternity, dabbled in campus politics. 
During World War I he enlisted in the army, served 28 months, and 
emerged a captain but did not return to Lexington for his degree. 
Instead, he went back home to become county clerk, county judge, 
sheriff, and coach of the local football team-and not just coach but 
winning coach, an addition to the record that did not hurt him in 
subsequent races when he became in turn state legislator, congressman 
in 1944 and 1946, governor, and U. S. senator. In the process he was said 
to have inherited the political organization of Thomas Rhea, when the 
strong man from Logan County died in 1938. It might be more accurate 
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to say that he took control of the Rhea organization because no one was 
able to prevent him from doing so. 
The 1947 primary race between Clements and Hickman County 
farmer and newspaper publisher Harry Lee Waterfield was a fairly 
close (Clements won, 158,196 to 125,276) but not very lively contest. 
Clements could be warm, even charming, in small groups, but on the 
campaign trail his greatest virtues were energy and caution. His 
speeches were masterpieces of mediocrity, punctuated by lame jokes 
and occasional smiles that seemed to be afterthoughts. Waterfield 
showed more honest emotion and more rapport with the voter, but he 
lacked Clements' organization. Waterfield was the champion of the 
farmer and the Rural Electrification Administration cooperatives that 
served them; Clements was considered more friendly toward business 
and the established utilities that were then opposing the spread of the 
co-ops. But Clements had by far the better organized campaign. Nor 
could he be dismissed as a tool of business. In Congress he had been 
known as a supporter of the REA, conservation and wildlife programs, 
Social Security, and federal aid for education. Standing against many 
southern colleagues, he supported bills to ban lynching and the poll 
tax and to disband the House Un-American Activities Committee. He 
also voted against the Taft-Hartley Act so beloved by business. 
He won rather handily in the gubernatorial election, beating Re-
publican Eldon S. Dummit, 387,795 to 287,756, and taking with him as 
lieutenant governor Lawrence Wetherby, former juvenile court judge 
of Jefferson County. Wetherby won the nomination by defeating Bill 
May in a curiously significant campaign that was to have long-range 
repercussions. May had tried to get on the ticket with Clements, but 
Clements had never warmed to him-possibly because May's uncle, 
Congressman A.J. May, had long been an ally of John Young Brown, 
never a Clements supporter. In an effort to curry favor with Clements, 
May went to see Emerson "Doc" Beauchamp (pronounced Beechum, 
in the Logan County tradition), the Democratic boss of Logan County 
and a strong Clements man, hoping that Beauchamp would help him 
break the ice with Clements. He was rudely disappointed. 
"Young fella," rasped the gravel-voiced Beauchamp, "1 want you to 
know you're second on my list." 
"All right," said May, "but who's first?" 
"Any sonofabitch," said Beauchamp, "who'll run against you." 
Wetherby nosed out May, though May carried 106 of the state's 120 
counties. "Miss Lennie [then head of Louisville's Fourth Street Organi-
zation] stole it for Lawrence," May said later. ''I'm not crying; that's the 
way things were done, and I recognized that. Later on, when Lawrence 
STRONG MAN FROM MORGANFIELD 49 
was governor and planning to build the Kentucky Turnpike from 
Louisville to Etown [Elizabethtown], I went to him and told him he 
ought to give me some of the engineering work-I had started Bright-
on Engineering by that time-because he had gotten to be governor by 
stealing that election from me. We laughed about it. I always liked 
Lawrence." 
Clements and May later told how Wetherby came to be chosen to 
run with Clements. The story goes that Clements was talking with 
Miss Lennie McLaughlin in the sidewalk-level coffee shop of the old 
Kentucky Hotel at the corner of Fifth and Walnut in Louisville, and 
making a serious pitch for her support. "You can name the lieutenant 
governor," he told her. That seemed to impress her, and she said as 
much. "You have anyone in mind?" Clements asked, pressing for a 
commitment. Miss Lennie said she didn't, but about that time Wether-
by, then a juvenile court judge, happened to walk by. "There," said 
Lennie, motioning through the window, "there's a good young man." 
"All right," said Clements, "he looks pretty good, Who is he?" And 
that, allegedly, is how Wetherby went to Frankfort. Historian John 
Kleeber insists that the story is not true. Whatever the facts, Lawrence 
Wetherby proved to be an intelligent, hard-working, and politically 
adroit lieutenant governor. He liked Clements, admired his political 
mind and his grasp of the state's many-faceted politics. He and Clem-
ents worked well together. Wetherby knew how to get along with the 
Louisville organization and acted as something of a liaison, which 
didn't hurt him when he decided to run for top spoton his own. 
May never ran for office again but went on to become a wealthy 
and powerful man, largely through highway-building contracts with 
Kentucky and other state governments. He was a prime mover of a 
small group of Frankfort political backers known as the Kingmakers, 
and a principal supporter of Bert Combs. After Wetherby'S term as 
governor ended and he was looking for a job, May made him an official 
of Brighton Engineering; Wetherby later became a vice-president of the 
firm and, with May's help, was elected to the state Senate, where he 
was involved in critical legislative battles in which May had an interest. 
Earle Clements was an unusual governor in many respects. (He 
was once called "the man who dragged Kentucky into the twentieth 
century," although some political scientists credit Chandler with hav-
ing the first truly modern administration.) For one thing, Clements was 
probably the hardest-working chief executive the state ever had. A 
man of tremendous energy, he had no hobbies, seldom took a vacation, 
and had almost no interests outside his work. In all fairness to his 
immediate predecessors, though they had been content for the most 
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part to let the state slip further behind its sister states in education and 
public services while New Deal programs had eased the suffering of 
Kentucky's poor and unemployed, they could not remove the statutory 
and constitutional barriers that held Kentucky back. 
Clements tried to break free of some of the restrictions imposed by 
the state constitution. For example, the constitution forbade the state to 
pay any employee-and this included the governor, presidents of 
colleges, doctors at state hospitals, and the like-more than $5,000 a 
year. A handsome salary in 1891, when the constitution was adopted, 
the $5,000 ceiling threatened to shut down state government in the 
surge of inflation following World War II. Clements set out to get rid of 
the salary limit. 
It has been charged that Clements had his political faithful steal the 
referendum on repeal of the salary limit. There is the story, for in-
stance, that on the day before the election he called his good friend 
Circuit Judge Ervine Turner of Breathitt County, who, with his wife 
Marie, superintendent of county schools, wielded considerable politi-
cal control over Breathitt and surrounding counties. 
"Judge," Clements is supposed to have said, "I'm hoping you can 
help me with this little amendment." This request put Turner on the 
spot. Several years before, there had been some embarrassing gunplay 
during a dispute over the composition of the Breathitt County school 
board; an opponent of the Turner faction had been shot, and threats 
had subsequently been made against the judge. So there had been 
some relief when Clements, then a member of Congress, managed to 
get Turner appointed to a temporary post with a federal agency in 
Chicago, safely out of the line of fire. So the judge owed the governor, 
and both men knew it. They also knew that under ordinary circum-
stances the voters of the tough, conservative mountain county 
wouldn't touch a constitutional amendment for love, money, or free 
whiskey-the traditional rewards in the hills for voting correctly. 
"Lord, Earle," said Turner, "I could make hogs fly before I could get 
people here to vote for that thing, and you know it." 
"Oh, now, Judge, I know you can do it if you put your mind to it," 
said Clements, and his voice was flat and hard. "And let me say to you I 
need, I say I NEED, your help." 
Ervine Turner had not gained power through inability to recognize 
necessity. The next day the voters of Breathitt County, in an impressive 
display of enlightened thinking, cast a heartwarming majority of their 
votes for the amendment. The voters of other counties, including 
populous Jefferson (Louisville), likewise surprised people by their 
strong support of the amendment. The people had seen the light, 
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Clements had his victory, and this single accomplishment literally 
saved Kentucky government. 
Clements circumvented the constitutional provision limiting state 
debt to $500,000 by issuing bonds with which to erect new state 
buildings, the bonds to be retired by rentals paid by the occupying 
agencies. The capitol annex, which still houses many executive depart-
ments and legislative offices, is an example of his use of this bonding 
power. He also converted the old highway patrol into the modernized 
Kentucky State Police, drew the blueprints for the state fairgrounds in 
Louisville, and made a start on the first modem facilities in state parks. 
He brought into government such men as Felix Joyner, Robert Bell, 
Guthrie Crowe, and Henry Ward, men whose influence would be felt 
in Frankfort for the next generation. And he began a long overdue rural 
road program, financed by earmarking two cents of the tax on each 
gallon of gasoline, and run by a commissioner of rural highways. 
Several men have been given the title of "father of the state parks," 
among them Clements, Combs, and Ward. Actually, the parks were 
begun in 1926 by Willard Rouse Jillson, the crusty and egotistical state 
geologist, who was given the magnificent budget of $1,100 for his first 
year but managed nevertheless to incorporate four parks into the 
fledgling system. But it was still a clutch of undeveloped nature sites, 
with a couple of lodges and some cabins and roads built by the CCC, 
when Clements took over. 
It is to his credit that he chose as commissioner of conservation (the 
parks department was then a division of conservation) Henry Ward, a 
staunch parks man but not a Clements supporter. Ward's outspoken, 
almost belligerent honesty had gained him more respect than friends 
in his years of political infighting; he could say yes to people and still 
make them mad. A Paducah boy who went from high school to become 
a reporter on the Paducah Sun-Democrat and then a crusading colum-
nist, the short, stocky Ward happily took on all comers, from local 
gamblers to the private utilities-which, he charged, kept rates high in 
his part of the state and failed or refused to take power to remote farms 
of the region. It was largely his utility battles that got him elected to the 
state legislature and attracted the attention of Alben Barkley, of whom 
he became a devoted follower. "I loved the old man," he said, "loved 
him." 
Ward also became an ardent New Dealer. On the strength of his 
western Kentucky support, he ran for lieutenant governor in 1943 but 
lost in the primary to Bill May. He jumped into the fight to bring REA 
cooperatives to western Kentucky and to make TVA power available to 
them. In the state Senate he introduced a bill to permit cities to deal 
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directly with TVA for power without having to buyout the private 
utility already serving them, as the law then required. None of this had 
put him in the Clements camp. In fact, Ward had backed Harry Lee 
Waterfield, Clements' opponent, in the 1947 primary and was not 
looking forward to an easy time in the 1948 session of the legislature. 
"Earle surprised a lot of people, including me, when he asked me 
to take the job of Conservation Commissioner," Ward said later. "And I 
wasn't sure I wanted it. After all, I was a newspaperman, and this 
meant giving up my job to become a bureaucrat. But Ed Paxton, 
publisher of the Sun-Democrat, said I could have a leave of absence if I 
would take it, and I was always interested in parks. I had sponsored the 
bill to put $800,000 into the budget for Parks just before Earle picked 
me; before that, Parks had gotten $35,000 a year and what receipts they 
took in, which wasn't much, and it was a bad way of doing business, 
inefficient and probably corrupt. So I took the job. And never regretted 
it. It gave me a chance to move into other areas that interested me-
water pollution control, forestry. And it put me close to Earle Clem-
ents, and I never regretted that, either." 
In 1950 Clements ran for and was elected to the Senate-after 
Barkley had been elected vice-president-and Wetherby became gov-
ernor. Four months later, when Senator Virgil Chapman died (on 
March 8, 1951), Wetherby thought of going to the Senate himself, but 
after talking with Clements and other party powers, he decided in-
stead to wait and run for a full term as governor. (It is interesting to 
speculate on what might have happened had Wetherby become a 
senator. He and Clements together might have been able to build a 
constituency that would have held off the later attacks by Republicans 
Thruston Morton and John Cooper.) Wetherby brushed aside Howell 
Vincent and Jesse Cecil in the primary and then rolled over Republican 
Eugene Siler by 58,000 votes in the general election. 
His running mate was Doc Beauchamp, who had long had his eye 
on higher office and hoped that his elevation to lieutenant governor 
would pave the way to his selection as top runner the next time around. 
Beauchamp was a man who, had he had just a couple of breaks, might 
have gone far. Affable, shrewd, and possessed of a natural feel for 
politics, he was handicapped by a gravel voice and a rotund, unim-
pressive figure. He had a way of looking disheveled, his tie just slightly 
askew, his hat always crumpled. A gentle, temperate, humorous man, 
he resembled a slightly bottle-worn Irish ward heeler more than the 
home-loving, small-town businessman and farmer he was. 
But he had a way with small groups. He could work a crowd. He 
had been in politics practically all of his life, starting as a legislative page 
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in Frankfort at age 13. He was twice bill clerk of the state Senate, then 
assistant senate clerk, six years clerk of Logan County, six years sheriff, 
and a member of the State Tax Commission under Governor Laffoon; 
he was elected commissioner of agriculture and state treasurer, became 
director of personnel and rural highway commissioner under Gover-
nor Oements, and was for five years secretary of the state Democratic 
central committee. Between times, he was an army private in World 
War I and a captain in World War II. Asked once what the vote in a 
certain Logan County precinct would be, Doc said, "Oh, they ought to 
vote about 314 to 28." The precinct voted 314 to 28. 
Doc was something of a trencherman. He also had what might be 
described as a commonsense view of political ethics. As governor, Bert 
Combs announced in 1960 that he didn't want anyone in state govern-
ment accepting any gift worth more than ten dollars. The ruling sorely 
tried Doc's ingenuity when a friend from western Kentucky, who 
admittedly had had some dealings with the state, presented Doc with a 
fine country ham for Christmas. Doc was tom by indecision, not 
wanting to violate Combs's edict but determined not to give up a 
delicious western Kentucky ham. "What's that thing worth?" asked 
Doc. "Oh," said the man, "about twenty dollars." Doc thought for a 
minute. "Tell you what you do," he said finally. "Why don't you take 
that downtown and have them cut it in two and give it to me in two 
pieces?" 
The Wetherby-Beauchamp race was not spectacular. Unless Demo-
crats fallout, the Republicans don't have an awfully good chance, and· 
in 1951 nobody bolted. Siler ran a slow, stubborn, unimaginative race; 
the Democratic victory, 346,345 to 288,014, was never in doubt. 
Outwardly, Lawrence Wetherby seemed to some Frankfort obser-
vers a little too jovial, a little too casual, too easygoing. Tall, dark-
haired, and handsome, Wetherby liked a few drinks after work, was 
fond of dancing, parties, and social life, and enjoyed hunting and 
fishing trips with political friends-traits that made some people re-
gard him lightly. The appearance was deceptive. Lawrence Wetherby 
was a serious, determined, and hard-working governor but one who 
preferred diplomacy and friendly tact over confrontation. A Wetherby 
trademark was his booming laugh, and his rich baritone voice seemed 
to carry for miles. During his administration a popular (and accurate) 
anecdote made the rounds noting the contrasting ways in which Oem-
ents and Wetherby conducted affairs of government. When Clements 
wanted to confide a secret to a trusted aide-the story went-he would 
take him into the governor's office, then through a"conference room, 
out a side door, and into the men's room; behind the closed door of a 
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stall, he would whisper the information to the aide. Wetherby, on the 
other hand, would whisper the information across his desk-and the 
whisper could be heard in the corridor outside. 
The accomplishments of his administration were substantial, 
though in the heat of attacks later launched against him by Happy 
Chandler, many of his achievements were for a time obscured. Wether-
by generally carried on the Clements policies, and finished several 
projects, including the state fairgrounds, that Clements had begun. 
Following the Supreme Court school desegregation ruling in the 1954 
case of Brown v. Board of Education, Wetherby issued a strong state-
ment supporting the ruling, effectively quieting segregationist critics 
who were seeking to arouse opposition to school desegregation. "We 
will do," he declared in a brief statement, "whatever it takes to obey the 
law." 
Wetherby founded the Department of Mental Health, and the 
Youth Authority, and wrote his name into history by building Ken-
tucky's first superhighway-then called the Kentucky Turnpike-
which ran from Louisville to Elizabethtown. But his administration 
was more distinguished by the fact that it was probably the most open 
administration up to that time, honest, morally and legally impeccable, 
with no whisper of scandal. As his term drew to a close, Wetherby 
joined Clements in the search for a successor. There was some logic in 
their choice of Appellate Judge Bert T. Combs. 
__ ~ ______ 4 __________ _ 
Not a Great First Act 
Bert Thomas Combs didn't become governor of Kentucky easily. In-
deed, it's a wonder he made it at all. In a state accustomed to the 
flamboyant tactics and histrionics of a Happy Chandler, he was a 
sincere and likable but rather colorless judge of the Court of Appeals. 
At the same time, he was considered a liberal, hard-working jurist, had 
been praised in the pt;ess for the moral courage of his votes on the 
court, and had acquired a reputation for almost painful integrity. Doc 
Beauchamp once said that Combs had an "affidavit face." He was a 
handsome man, especially when he smiled, but except in small groups 
he seldom smiled. On the other hand, he had defeated a former 
governor, Simeon Willis, in his one race for public office and had 
shown some ability in conducting that campaign. His speeches invaria-
bly made sense and impressed thoughtful listeners with their honest 
approach to Kentucky's lingering problems. But in the summer of 1955, 
when Combs made his first try for the governorship, that may have 
been a handicap. 
Kentucky was caught, then as now, in its historic bind: it was a poor 
state; its people had incomes below the national average and were 
consequently reluctant to support programs that cost new taxes, no 
matter how much they were needed. Thus starved for money, Frank-
fort could not deliver the services that might have brought Kentucky 
into the national mainstream and raised the educational level and 
living standards of its people. The further Kentucky lagged behind, the 
more money it had to have just to catch up and the less likely it was to 
get it. This cycle of despond-a poor people keeping poor a govern-
ment that helped to keep them poor-produced repeated pleas for 
more progressive government. But progressive government meant 
more money for such things as schools; that meant higher taxes; and 
the voters had long ago gotten into the habit of baying along behind 
politicians who promised to "cut out the waste," trim the state payroll, 
and produce honest government-all of which would miraculously 
improve their lot without raising taxes. 
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Nothing in Bert Combs's background gave any hint that he might 
be the man to break this cycle. In fact, there was little to indicate that he 
had a political philosophy of any kind. For one thing, his background 
was limited. Men who run for governor usually begin by running for 
mayor, county judge, sheriff, or the state legislature. At the time he 
declared for governor, Combs had run for office just once. He had not 
come from a particularly political family, nor was anyone in his imme-
diate family then involved in politics. 
This does not mean that he entered the race without advantages. 
He had the support of Earle Clements and of the Wetherby administra-
tion. Theoretically, the Court of Appeals-at the time, Kentucky's 
highest tribunal-had always been above the political battle; in prac-
tice, it had always been in the thick of the fight, since its justices are 
elected and therefore personally interested in politics. In Combs's race 
for the governorship, the justices made no bones about where they 
stood: they stood with Combs. 
Combs had a clean record. He was a member of a large family from 
the mountains of eastern Kentucky, though few people outside the 
judicial system had heard of him. Even some people who later became 
his most devoted followers wondered aloud, as they watched him beat 
the campaign trail in that long, hot summer of 1955 when he chal-
lenged the redoubtable Happy Chandler, "What is he doing here?" 
It was a question to which a casual review of his life provides no 
persuasive answers. The family of Stephen and Martha Combs, into 
which Bert was born on August 13, 1911, was a solid but undistin-
guished mountain family, living at the time on Town Branch near 
Manchester, the county seat of Clay County, deep in the Cumberland 
Mountains of southeastern Kentucky. The Combs family was one of 
the oldest in Kentucky, or for that matter in the United States, John 
Combs having arrived in Jamestown, Virginia, on the English ship 
Marigold more than a year before the Mayflower brought the Pilgrims to 
Plymouth Rock. In 1775 a Benjamin John Combs pushed westward into 
what is now Clark County, Kentucky, and in 1790 three other Combs 
brothers followed, two of them settling in Perry and Clay counties. One 
of these, another John Combs known as Jack, became the grandfather 
of Stephen Combs, Bert's father. 
In authentic political tradition, Bert lived in a log house on Beech 
Creek (but only while his father was bulding a home· nearby). He 
attended the Beech Creek grade school for six years and then went to a 
boarding school in Oneida for high school. The Combses were experi-
encing lean years, and Bert was obliged to work after school and on 
weekends; this was not unusual, and he did not regard it as a hardship. 
NOT A GREAT FIRST ACT 57 
Isolated by bad roads and with a reputation for violence as a result of its 
numerous lingering feuds, Clay County was relatively poor, and there 
was no stigma attached to a boy who had to work; most boys did. Bert's 
jobs didn't prevent him from graduating first in his class, and they 
helped to prepare him for earning most of his way when he enrolled at 
Cumberland College in nearby WIlliamsburg in 1929. 
Working as a janitor at Cumberland, though, didn't enable him to 
save enough to pursue his plan to become a lawyer, an ambition that 
had sprung from noting the influence and affluence of lawyers around 
the courthouse in Manchester. He wasn't sure what lawyers did, but he 
noticed that they talked big, wore white shirts, and drove cars. But that 
took money, so after two years at Cumberland, where he finished near 
the top of his class, he got a job as a clerk with the Department of 
Highways in Frankfort, making $125 a month; As a matter of curious 
fact, Combs, a Democrat, was able to get his highway department job 
because of the ripper bill that took the department away from Republi-
can Governor Sampson and gave it to Democrat "Uncle Ben" Johnson. 
That was not a bad salary for a young man in 1931; the Depression was 
beginning to make any kind of salary look good, and Combs was able 
to save enough in three years to enter the University of Kentucky 
school of law in Lexington in the fall of 1934. 
The job with the highway department had given Combs his first 
knowledge of Kentucky. Law school and Lexington began his introduc-
tion to people who would be important to him later. He became 
managing editor of the Kentucky Law Journal and a member of the Order 
of the Coif, and graduated second in his class. And at the university he 
began to develop from the basically quiet, shy young mountain boy 
into the more sociable, quietly humorous man he was to become. 
Yet when he returned to Manchester in the summer of 1937, 
Combs was still basically a mountain man. As was said of him then and 
years later, he kept his own counsel and accepted stoically the work-
ings of fate. Mountain accents clung to his speech and would for many 
years. He would slip into the use of "ye" instead of "you," reflecting the 
old English dialect of the early mountain settlers whose speech pat-
terns had been little affected by time and outside influence. His wit was 
the wry, quiet type of the general store or courthouse steps rather than 
the back-slapping joviality of the urban politician. And his inflections, 
considered backwoods in the more urban areas of the state, made some 
people tend to take Combs lightly during his early years in public life. 
In a politician, a certain rustic veneer may be acceptable, even an asset, 
when it is obviously affected, hinting that the speaker has risen above 
his humble beginnings; it is likely to be a liability ifit is genuine. 
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"Combs always had a bad case of mountain boy, you know," said 
Bill May. liThe rest of us, we made a little money and moved down to 
the Bluegrass, learned how to talk and wear clothes, but Combs always 
had a handful of mountain boys that he had to get together with every 
now and then and drink a little whiskey, play a little poker, tell 
mountain stories." 
Combs stayed in Manchester a little more than a year before 
moving to establish a law practice in Prestonsburg. The reason for the 
move, he explained later, was not the dissatisfaction of a returning son 
with his hometown but an understandable desire to make a living. "I 
had too many kinfolks and friends in Manchester," he recalled, II and 
they all expected me to handle little things for them as a favor. They'd 
say 'Go down and see cousin Bert. He's a lawyer now; he'll handle that 
for you.' Then they'd get their feelings hurt if I charged them. I was 
taking in a lot of cases, but not sending out many bills. II 
He had an added reason to seek greener financial pastures. He 
now had a wife to support: before leaving the Bluegrass he had married 
Mabel Hall, a Knott County girl then living in Lexington. Fortunately, 
the relatives were fewer and the fees more numerous in Prestonsburg, 
and Combs was building a respectable practice when World War II 
broke out. Had he been keeping a more calculating eye on his future, 
he might have gained a commission in the legal branch of one of the 
services. Instead, he enlisted as a private in the army and went through 
the traditional rigors of the footslogging soldier before the army spot-
ted his legal qualifications and sent him to Officers Training School and 
then to the staff of General Douglas MacArthur as chief of investigation 
of Japanese war criminals. He emerged from the war with the rank of 
captain, the Bronze Star and the Philippine Medal of Merit, and a 
record he could build on. 
Back home in Prestonsburg, things began to happen in fairly rapid 
order. His daughter Lois Ann had been born in 1943, and his son 
Thomas George two years later, while he was still in uniform. The year 
he came home, Combs was appointed city attorney of Prestonsburg, 
and two years later was appointed commonwealth's attorney of Floyd 
County. His reputation as a young man on the rise began to spread 
beyond county lines. Still, there was considerable surprise in political 
circles when, in 1951, the justices of the Court of Appeals, then the 
state's highest court, unanimously recommended to Governor Law-
rence Wetherby that Combs be appointed to fill the vacancy on the 
court created by the death of Justice Roy Helm of Hazard. Wetherby 
followed the recommendation. Combs was not quite 40 years old. 
Combs had climbed a good distance up the ladder without having 
to run a campaign for office, but now he was obliged to make a race if he 
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wanted to fill out Judge Helm's full unexpired term, since state law 
requires that persons named to unexpired terms serve until the next 
general election. And so, in the fall of 1951, Combs decided to run, 
though his announced opponent was the highly respected former 
governor, Republican Simeon Willis. In the 27 coun.ties of the Seventh 
District, Combs won, 73,298 to 69,379; by defeating the former gover-
nor, he vaulted into the public eye. But only for the moment. The court 
is seldom a magnet for public attention, nor has it proved a dependable 
springboard to political office. And Combs was not the type to attract 
public attention easily. . 
But for several reasons the campaign had been important. It had 
given Combs his first taste of elective politics, and he found, somewhat 
to his surprise, that he liked it. He also found within himself a consid-
erable lode of political philosophy; he had more ideas about the nature 
and operation of the state than he was called on to reveal in a race for a 
judgeship, a philosophy that had been slowly forming, based more on 
his studies of history and his personal experiences at the courthouse 
level than on his legal training and practice. 
Equally important, he had met politicians of the highest order the 
state had to offer: Governor Lawrence Wetherby, Congressman Carl 
Perkins (who had been a key force in getting Combs appointed to the 
court and whose help had been vital in the campaign for election), and 
Earle C. Clements. It would not be accurate to say that he had gotten to 
know Clements; the big, quiet man from Morganfield was too com-
plex, too secretive, too guarded of his own counsel to be easily or 
quickly understood. Neither would it be correct to say that the two men 
had become friends; Clements made friends carefully and slowly, and 
Combs-always a man of reserve-was quicker to take the out-
stretched hand than to offer it. But each man came to see and appreci-
ate the qualities of the other. Clements sensed the potential, the tough 
resiliency beneath Combs's reserve, and Combs had his first encounter 
with one of Kentucky'S great political intellects. 
Clements and Chandler were by this time recognized as the lead-
ers of Kentucky'S two Democratic factions. And they were opposites as 
well as rivals. Thoughtful, cautious, almost taciturn, Clements had 
built-through the careful use of political power to help friends and 
frustrate enemies-a tight, tough organization based in western Ken-
tucky but with strongholds also in the mountains of eastern Kentucky. 
The Chandler faction had strong points, especially in central Kentucky, 
and as long as Happy remained active, he had the allegiance of able 
leaders in many counties. But the organization was built around his 
personality and tended, in cult fashion, to wither without him. 
It has been said, and with considerable truth, that Clements didn't 
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care who was governor of Kentucky as long as he could run the state, 
while Chandler didn't care who ran Kentucky as long as he could be 
governor. Oements saw campaigning as a necessary burden; Chandler 
gloried in it. Oements preferred to move quietly behind the scenes; 
Chandler fed on the applause of the crowd. He was a master of ridicule 
and sarcasm, of finding a wound on the body politic and rubbing salt in 
it. Once the campaign was over and the clash and tension of the 
legislative session subsided, he often appeared bored. 
It is significant that throughout his peripatetic political career, 
Chandler was one of the stubbornest defenders of Kentucky'S constitu-
tion. For the constitution was designed to curb the function of govern-
ment, state and local, and Chandler maintained an emotional rapport 
with his fellow Kentuckians partly because, like them, he believed in 
limited government. Similarly, Kentuckians responded to him be-
cause, vocally at least, he opposed taxes, especially sales taxes. Indeed, 
while representing the traditionally conservative faction of the party, 
Chandler cultivated a populist image, though his was not a populist 
record. For these reasons and because he was a strong, personable man, 
Chandler never lost the affection of masses of Kentuckians, despite the 
fact that he regularly quit, or appeared willing to quit, offices to which 
Kentuckians had elected him in order to seek higher things. 
For a relatively unknown judge of the Court of Appeals to enter the 
arena with such time-toughened fighters as Clements and Chandler 
seems in retrospect a rash step. Yet there was Bert Combs, a rather 
quiet, thoughtful mountain lawyer, without a single statewide race 
under his belt, preparing to run for the state's top post. 
"I guess you could say I got it by a process of elimination," Combs 
said later in typically self-deprecating fashion, for he was not the only 
hopeful in the fall of 1954. Doc Beauchamp was casting about for 
support. So were Henry Ward, former Adjutant General Jess Lindsay, 
and Frankfort attorney Louis Cox. But Beauchamp opposed Ward, 
Oements was cool toward Lindsay, and Cox took himself out of consid-
eration for personal reasons. And Oements told his friend Beauchamp 
that he could not support him "at this time." 
"Lawrence Wetherby called me at my home in Prestonsburg one 
night about eight o'clock," Combs recalled later, "and asked me to 
come to the mansion next day. When I arrived I found Lawrence, Earle, 
and Doc sitting around a dinner table where the dishes had not been 
cleared, and either Lawrence or Earle, I forget which, said they had 
decided that I should run for governor with the support of the three of 
them. I told Doc I wouldn't run without his approval. It was a very 
painful time for him. He wanted so badly to run himself. But he finally 
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said; with tears in his eyes, "No, go ahead and run. You were always 
my second choice. I was my first." 
Not everyone was overjoyed at the selection of Combs. "George 
Kerler, who was Lawrence's press secretary, came to me and said 
Lawrence wanted to see me," Bill May remembered. "I'd been doing 
some work on the Kentucky Turnpike, you know, what's. now Inter-
state 65, and had gotten pretty close to Wetherby, so I went to see him, 
and when I got there he told me they had picked Bert Combs to run. I 
told him he was crazy. I knew Bert had come back to Prestonsburg after 
the war, but he hadn't built much steam. I told Lawrence, I said, 
'Wetherby, that dog ain't going to hunt.' I told him Combs didn't know 
anybody and, worse, nobody knew him. But he said they'd figured it 
out. So I worked with them, raising money." 
But the irrepressible Happy Chandler was back home, fired from 
his job as baseball commissioner by club owners, restless and eager to 
get back to his search for high office. He announced that, out of the 
goodness of his heart, he was ready to take over the governorship again 
and declared that he was just in time to save the state from the 
chicanery of Clements and Wetherby. With customary zest, he took 
aim not only at Combs but at the whole Clements wing. He declared 
that Combs, whom he called "the Little Judge," was "an innocent 
bystander" brought into the picture by "Clementine and Wether-
bine" -his nicknames for Clements and Wetherby-who, he hinted, 
had evil reasons for wanting to put the naive Combs into the governor's 
office. As usual, Happy was discovering hideous waste in Frankfort, 
and promising economy and reform as soon as he could get back in. As 
an example of Wetherby's criminal extravagance, Happy charged that 
he had bought a $20,000 rug for his office and had spent countless 
thousands on unnecessary air conditioning. He promised that when 
he regained the office he would cool it by opening the windows to the 
sweet Kentucky air, and he invited all Kentuckians to come to the 
Capitol and walk on "that $20,000 rug." 
When Wetherby produced invoices showing that there was no 
"rug," and that carpeting for the entire first floor of the capitol had cost 
only $2,700, Chandler ignored the facts and continued his charges. (At 
the end of the campaign, Courier-Journal reporter Allan Trout asked 
Chandler why he had persisted in this charge after being shown the 
truth. Chandler replied that the lie "didn't hurt anybody, and people 
liked to hear it.") He also charged that Wetherby had gone "clear to 
Africa" to find "some fancy wood to panel his office with," and 
promised that, if elected, he would use good, honest Kentucky wood. 
(A minor official in the Wetherby administration had approved a 
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contract including paneling of African mahogany, supplied by a Ken-
tucky contractor, for the governor's office.) Ironically, after he was 
elected, Chandler spent $35,000 on carpeting, draperies, and other 
interior decoration for the capitol. It was familiar Chandler technique; 
before one charge could be refuted, he would launch another. He 
would make any charge, it appeared, that would catch the public 
attention. And he succeeded in making Combs appear almost a minor 
character in the battle by ignoring him and centering his fire on 
"Wetherbine and Clementine." 
Combs was by no means without advantages. He had the support 
of the administration, strong roots in the mountains, and the backing of 
the Louisville organization. But on the, campaign trail he was simply no 
match for the free-swinging Chandler, whose unsubstantiated charges 
kept Combs and his allies almost constantly on the defensive. 
It was brilliant strategy, if distilled in demagoguery. As Allan Trout 
said later, "Combs was ready to discuss issues, but he wasn't prepared 
for a dogfight, which is what he got." Combs insisted on sticking to the 
high road. In his announcement of his candidacy he promised to "wage 
a vigorous campaign, confined to the issues," and he did just that. It 
was a fatal error, and one that Chandler did not make. Honesty may be 
the best policy, but in Kentucky political campaigns it is often poor 
strategy. The truth was that Kentucky schools were in trouble, and that 
it was going to take considerably more money than the state then had 
to make the improvements that both Combs and Chandler admitted 
were needed. That raised the specter of new taxes, a hazard for any 
Kentucky race. 
Combs made what was a minor tactical error by failing to resign 
from the Court of Appeals upon announcing his candidacy, and 
Chandler and Harry Lee Waterfield, Chandler's running mate, lost no 
time in taking him to task for it. Actually, he had notified Governor 
Wetherby and Chief Justice Brady Stewart of his intention to resign but 
had not yet done so when former Attorney General Hubert Meredith, a 
Chandler supporter, demanded that he do it; thus, when he did resign, 
it appeared as though he had been forced to do so. It was a minor 
sensation but not a good note on which to begin. 
Picking a slate to run with the candidate for governor was often a 
delicate business that could cost the top candidate more than it gained 
him. A well-known candidate for minor office was often reluctant to be 
aligned with a specific candidate for governor. It could lose him the 
votes of the other candidates' supporters without gaining him much. 
The gubernatorial candidate tried to pick a lieutenant governor and 
runners for other spots-secretary of state, treasurer, superintendent 
of public instruction, commissioner of agriculture, clerk of the Court of 
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Appeals, attorney general-who were, if not famous, at least not 
infamous, and who could show some vague qualification for the office 
desired and were from various parts of the state, so as to offer a 
"balanced" ticket that would presumably represent all areas of the state 
and as many elements of the party as possible. 
The trick was to avoid slating popular incompetents who would 
win and then come back to haunt you, or slating seemingly sound 
candidates who got instant ambition and stabbed you in the back. All 
these officers, of course, should be in the governor's cabinet, helping 
him to carry out the program for which the people elect him. But as 
long as Kentucky clings to its constitution, which makes too many 
offices elective, the governor is always at the mercy of men who run for 
these minor posts and then are free to operate without consideration 
for the governor's programs, policies, or principles; 
The value of a slate was uncertain. A slated candidate who was 
strong in his home district could wind up hurting the ticket in others. 
Sometimes county leaders would support an unslated local candidate 
and the remainder of the slated ticket. But once the primary was over, it 
was seldom that the lesser candidates-unless there was a truly poor 
runner among them-materially influenced the outcome. It has hap-
pened; so has the reverse. J.C.W. Beckham, running for governor in 
1927, was the only loser on his ticket. Henry Ward lost the race for 
governor in 1967 to Louie Nunn; his running mate, Wendell Ford, won. 
One thing, however, was usually true: a relatively unknown candidate 
gained by being slated. He shared in the strength and the publicity of 
the top runner, and even if he lost, he had gotten experience and name 
recognition that would be of advantage in subsequent races. 
Combs and his strategy people talked it over and decided not to 
slate anyone. As it turned out, it was probably just as well. 
The formal opening of the Combs campaign took place at the 
Shelby County fairgrounds on the evening of June 2, 1955. It was a 
grand occasion in the old tradition. Almost 10,000 people were on 
hand, many of them state employees who had been urged to swell the 
crowd and lend an impression that the Combs candidacy was already 
hugely popular. The platform sagged with the· weight of prominent 
party members-everyone from Wetherby and Clements, Jefferson 
County Judge Bert Van Arsdale and Louisville Mayor Andrew Broad-
dus to Congressmen Carl Perkins and John Watts, Doc Beauchamp, 
state party officials, wives of former officials, and even Stephen 
Combs, Bert's father. Bands played, people drank and ate; localof-
ficials welcomed and warm-up speakers lavished praise on the candi-
date. Then the candidate himself rose. 
"Bert had written this speech," recalled Henry Ward, who was 
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working in the Combs campaign, "and when I saw it, I said, 'Hell, that 
won't do.' It was too long. It was too heavy. And it just about called for 
new taxes; didn't say so exactly, but made it plain he would ask for 
more taxes for schools. Somebody in headquarters got it and rewrote it 
some, but when Bert saw it, he changed it back to the way it was. He 
knew what he wanted to say, no matter what the rest of us thought." 
Combs spoke for 38 minutes, earnestly and intelligently. And 
killed his campaign. 
"Combs opened and closed his campaign on the same night," said 
Hugh Morris, chief of the Courier-JournaI's Frankfort bureau. Said Clay 
Wade Bailey, Frankfort correspondent for the United Press, "Bert 
really kicked himself in the ass." And in the car with Earle Clements, as 
they drove back toward Louisville's Seelbach Hotel, where Combs had 
his campaign headquarters, Doc Beauchamp leaned toward the former 
governor and said in his rasping whisper, "Goddamn, Earle! And you 
said I couldn't run because I couldn't make a speech!" 
Actually, Combs's opener was not a bad speech. Anyone reading it 
today would probably consider it a good cut above the average. It 
explored issues. It suggested problems to be faced and their possible 
solutions. And therein lay the trouble. What Combs had done was to 
state the truth: to do anything substantial about state schools-the 
minimum foundation program (to assure a minimum per-pupil expen-
diture), teachers' salaries, teachers' retirement, building funds-was 
going to take money. The figures he quoted indicated that he would 
need about $25,000,000 in new money for these purposes. And if that 
was not enough, he then added: 
"I believe the people want improvement in education, in attacks on 
mental illness, and in many other state services, and that they are 
willing to pay for these benefits ... [which] can be made only by 
increasing state taxes or by finding new sources of revenue." 
That was all it took. In a story in the next morning's edition of the 
Courier-Journal, Hugh Morris wrote that Combs had proposed pro-
grams calling for $25,000,000 in new taxes. This was not quite accurate; 
Combs had implied that he would improve education, and that educa-
tion needed money. He had not proposed any specific tax or any 
specific amount of new tax revenues sought. But the story hurt Combs 
deeply, perhaps fatally. 
Chandler lost no time exploiting the situation. "The taxers are after 
you!" he warned in an address two days later, declaring that Combs 
was preparing a sales tax. In an address at Greensburg on July 12, he 
summed up his whole campaign message and strategy: 
"Do you want four more years of the tax-crazy, spend-crazy, and 
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waste-crazy dictators, or do you want an administration that knows the 
value of a dollar? There must be a halting some place, some time. The 
people are taxed to the limit. I intend to give you some relief." 
"Look at me!" Chandler would cry to his courthouse crowds. "I'm 
the only man in the history of Kentucky that ever cut your taxes!" The 
Courier-Journal studiously pointed out that while Chandler in his first 
administration had repealed a sales tax that produced $6,000,000 in its 
only year of collection, he had enacted 14 new or increased taxes. But 
Chandler had a good issue and knew it. "Combs says he's going to 
raise your taxes. I promise you I'll cut them," he declared in a speech in 
Jessamine County. "Which do you want?" 
The answer was foregone. Senator Alben Barkley gave Combs a 
fairly strong endorsement, charging that Chandler had deserted him, 
had tried to undermine his campaign for the vice-presidency in 1952, 
and had "three times deserted his party." But Combs felt that the 
Barkley endorsement, coming only two weeks before the election, was 
too late to be of maximum help. Henry Ward hit Chandler some telling 
blows, flourishing checks that had been given to Chandler during the 
war by distillers, allegedly for getting them permission to release 
warehoused whiskey. Ward and the Lexington and Louisville news-
papers demanded an explanation of the checks. Chandler ignored the 
demands. Instead of an explanation he gave a glowing account of his 
heroics during the war and attacked Ward, whom he called "nasty, ugly 
little hatchet-faced Henry." 
More than 400,000 Democrats voted in the primary. Chandler won 
by a margin of 18,121 votes. 
It was a bitter blow for Combs, who had hoped to the last that he 
would win. He took a few days off and went to the rustic cabin on Lake 
Cumberland belonging to Appellate Judge John Moremen to rest and 
decide about the future. 
"Bert was just beat," recalled John Moremen, Jr., years later. "He 
would sit in a rocking chair on the porch and read, then doze off 
awhile, then wake up and rock awhile, and then nap again;" 
At the end of the brief rest, Combs went home to Prestonsburg. He 
had been in public life for almost ten years and had decided it was time 
to get back to private life and work. Strangely, he found the months 
following his defeat a time of relief and satisfaction. 
"That was probably the happiest time of my life," he said later. "We 
set up a little savings and loan association, and I reestablished my law 
firm. Kilmer Combs was my partner. We had a pretty good practice, 
and it was good to be out of the tension of politics. Mabel and I had built 
a home. Normal living for a change." 
5 __ _ 
Brawls in the House 
of Factions 
After the hurly-burly of campaigning, life in Prestonsburg was tame for 
Bert Combs but not entirely nonpolitical. Officeholders, politicians, 
and reporters continued to call on him. He was frequently asked to 
address civic and political clubs, and he accepted enough of the invita-
tions to indicate that he had not completely lost interest in public life. 
When a Kentucky politician turns down invitations to speakings or free 
meals, he has either made a lot of money or lost interest in politics. 
Combs continued to eat and speak. 
And events in Frankfort gave him plenty to talk about. It early 
became evident that Chandler was going to have trouble with the 
legislature. Again, he had won the governorship largely with his attack 
on the sales tax, but once in office that old bugbear, a lack of money, 
handicapped him. This time he could not make a big impression by 
reorganizing government or improving state finances. Furthermore, 
Clements and Wetherby had instituted programs-highways and rural 
roads, the state fairgrounds and exposition center, the Kentucky Turn-
pike, the Youth Authority, new park facilities-that had to be carried 
on. He had either to raise taxes or to eliminate some of the necessary 
functions of the state; there simply was not enough money to run an 
efficient government. 
Chandler was obliged to cut social programs. He abolished the 
Youth Authority created by Lawrence Wetherby to bring all children's 
welfare programs under one agency, and thereby infuriated a large 
welfare constituency. During the campaign he had promised the Lex-
ington community that he would build a medical school at the Univer-
sity of Kentucky, though he had soft-pedaled the matter in other parts 
of the state. Now he set in motion plans for the A. B. Chandler Medical 
School, despite a poll conducted among Kentucky physicians showing 
that they opposed a second medical school by a margin of 1,303 to 190 
BRAWLS IN THE HOUSE OF FACTIONS 67 
(there was already one at the University of Louisville) and a legislative 
study indicating that it would cost between $24,000,000 and 
$30,000,000. Chandler's support of the Lexington school was popular 
with people throughout the eastern and central parts of the state who 
Were poorly served by their own hospitals. And it served again to 
underscore the governor's Bluegrass identity. He also found money to 
expand the UK College of Agriculture. To make sure the public was 
aware of its blessings, his public relations department published a 
pamphlet entitled Kentucky on the Move, which referred to the governor 
as "Kentucky'S greatest living citizen" and "an unfolding genius, a rare 
and unusual man, thoroughly matured, God-fearing." 
Happy worked hard to identify himself with Lexington, where he 
loved to play golf and eat lunch with friends, and with the University of 
Kentucky. Though he had been an undergraduate at Transylvania, he 
managed to become identified with the university, repeatedly getting 
himself appointed to both the UK and the Transylvania boards of 
trustees. He was also one of the most vocal supporters of UK athletic 
teams. He loved to sit on the bench at football games, rush to the locker 
room after basketball victories, and have himself photographed with 
the players. Once, in a beautifully timed piece of theater,he dashed 
onto the court and hammered a nail into the spot from which basket-
ball star Joe Hagan had sunk a last-second shot to defeat Notre Dame. 
He made it seem spontaneous but did not explain why he carried a 
hammer and nail in his pocket to basketball games. (Bert Nelli, in The 
Winning Tradition, a history of UK basketball, says that Chandler sent 
for the hammer and nail. If so/he got remarkably fast service.) 
When he was in his 80s, Chandler loved to appear at alumni 
functions and sing liMy Old Kentucky Home." This may be significant, 
for the Kentucky of the song is of another age, no longer exists even in 
memory, and has little relevance to the modem Kentucky and its 
problems. Yet the nostalgic appeal made it good politics all the way. Far 
more than the University of LouisVille or any of the other state colleges, 
the University of Kentucky is the sentimental heart of the state, just as 
Lexington is the sentimental heart of Kentucky for much of its popula-
tion. UK alumni 100m large in the political and economic life of every 
part of the state and are influential even in Louisville, despite its 
traditional rivalry with Lexington. Political hopefuls have done well to 
attend UK or develop a bond with it. 
Early in the 1956 legislative session, it became evident that 
Chandler's programs were going to cost more money than the state 
was taking in, a· fact that should have caused some slight embarrass-
ment to a man who had assured the voters that he could carry out the 
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promised programs without raising taxes. On June 25, 1955, he had 
told an Ashland audience: "I promise you I can take the money we now 
have, put the minimum foundation program into effect in its entirety, 
provide adequate support for health, welfare, old-age pensions, and 
other services. . . without a sales tax and still have money in the bank. 
We will just put aside $55,000,000 for schools first. We can live on the 
other $45,000,000. It will be simple." It soon became obvious that it 
would not be simple. 
But Chandler employed an unusual technique. After getting rid of 
the usual departmental and technical legislation during the regular 
session, he called four successive special sessions. In the first, he 
presented his budget, which called for spending $248,350,000 for the 
coming two years; this was at least $48,000,000 more than he had said 
he would need to run the state and at least $46,000,000 more than 
revenue officials were estimating the state would take in. Where was 
the money coming from? asked the legislators. Pass the budget, 
Chandler said, and I'll present my tax program at the later session. It 
was, in its way, a rather painless method, giving the legislators a chance 
to approve money for any number of desirable purposes without 
having to impose any repulsive taxes to finance them. 
But the day of reckoning arrived, and Chandler was obliged to 
unveil the magical tax package with which he would finance his 
program. It proved an eye-opener. For example, it increased personal 
income taxes by putting on the rolls 150,000 new taxpayers; it put a 
surtax on income taxes, raised corporate taxes from 4.5 percent to 5 
percent, and cut tax credits; it transferred the assessment and collec-
tion of the tax on intangibles from local to state government, put new 
taxes on deeds and life insurance premiums, put a 5 percent produc-
tion tax on whiskey, and added two cents per gallon to gasoline for 
trucks. Chandler also proposed a $100,000,000 bond issue for roads 
and promised that the first would be an improved highway from 
Frankfort to Versailles, his hometown. The new taxes were expected to 
raise an additional $40,000,000 a year. 
The legislature included a lot of Democrats who had been identi-
fied with the Clements wing of the party, and rumblings of discontent 
grew as the first year's sessions ended. Allan Trout of the Courier-
Journal pointed out that Chandler could not have passed several parts 
of his budget and tax program had he not been able to gain the support 
of a sizable number of the minority Republicans. 
But. the Eisenhower years were a time of relative calm and pros-
perity, in Kentucky as in the nation; an aura of good feeling prevailed. 
The Korean conflict had ended (though in a compromise that was alien 
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to the American spirit); the economy, fueled by postwar demand that 
was again producing inflationary pressures, was humming along; and 
there was a general air of optimism. The most disruptive development 
stemmed from the 1954 Supreme Court ruling in the case of Brown v. 
Topeka Board of Education which, in effect, ended the practice of 
separate-but-equal school facilities for whites and blacks. Throughout 
the South the decision produced official as well as emotional turmoil, 
and though Kentucky on the whole accepted the decision calmly, there 
were scattered instances of resistance. On one occasion, Chandler was 
obliged to send National Guard troops into the town of Sturgis to 
compel compliance. In all his actions concerning implementation of the 
integration decision, Chandler refused to play the Dixiecrat, despite 
possible political gain and even though many of his friends from other 
states were making political hay with resistance to the Supreme Court 
ruling. While many, perhaps even a majority, of Kentuckians were not 
enthusiastic about racial integration, most acknowledged the moral 
correctness of Chandler's action. 
In this, as in affairs generally, the Chandler luck was holding, as he 
seemed to assume it always would. It was the belief of most capital 
newsmen (and was borne out in his interviews with his son later) that 
Chandler had an almost mystical conviction that he was destined for 
great things, a confidence so total that he tended to view people who 
stood in his way as not only wrong but evil. Just as he had ridden the 
wave of New Deal reforms in his first term, he now profited by the 
relative prosperity and complacency of the Eisenhower era. Lexington, 
and to a lesser extent Louisville, enjoyed an industrial boom. Along the 
Ohio new power-generating plants were pushing smokestacks into the 
sky, and the state's coal industry was experiencing a modest re-
surgence to supply them. At the University of Kentucky in 1958, the 
Wildcats of Coach Adolph Rupp won another NCAA basketball cham-
pionship. 
But as in Bourbon France, troubling pressures were building be-
neath a serene surface. Kentucky'S roads were bad-two thin lanes of 
blacktop winding up and down the hills, crumbling under heavy 
trucks, blocked by flooding creeks, continuing Kentucky'S detour-state 
reputation. They were a handicap to state farmers, manufacturers, and 
coal operators. They complicated the task of school consolidation and 
efforts to develop a tourist industry. (Both Chandler and Combs em-
ployed the witticism that the roads "would crumble under a fat boy on a 
bicycle," and some probably would have.) The postwar "baby boom" 
that in a few years would swamp the nation's school systems was 
already crowding elementary and high schools. The state's mental 
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hospitals were crowded and backward in their methods. A modest 
recession during Chandler's final years would reveal some of the 
state's structural weaknesses. 
A revolt of "rebels," a group of chiefly younger, more liberal 
lawmakers, began to take shape in the final days of the first legislative 
session, and by the time the second session convened it had become a 
recognized force, led by Democrats John Breckinridge, Foster Ocker-
man, Paul Huddleston, Pat Tanner, and Gil Kingsbury. The session 
almost became a shambles, as governor and legislators snarled and 
bickered. Indeed, as his split with members of his own party widened, 
the Democratic governor was able to pass measures only through the 
help of Republicans. In the spring of 1958 the Courier-Journal reported 
that Chandler had been obliged to meet with the caucusing Republi-
cans and promise to build or repair roads in their districts in return for 
their help in enacting his program. 
Near the end of the 1958 session the Democratic rebels asked 
Chandler to call a special session of the Assembly to deal with several 
problems, including the need for more money for schools and indigent 
relief. Chandler agreed to do so only if the legislature would promise in 
advance to approve any measure he put before the special session and 
to consider no others. The rebels refused; the special session was not 
called; and Chandler went into the final year of his term at odds with 
some of the most influential members of his party. 
The failure of Chandler, a man of such infinite persuasion on the 
hustings, to win the support of a legislature containing a majority from 
his own party is another bit of evidence of the extent of factionalism. 
Many of the Democrats in the Assembly were Clements-Combs people 
and not eager to cooperate. Others, especially the rebels, had genuine 
philosophical differences with Chandler over such matters as taxes, 
roads, welfare, and appropriation of school funds. But Chandler chose 
to deal with opposition Republicans rather than make the concessions 
or compromises that might have won him the support of his own party, 
chiefly because he found himself more comfortable with them. The 
opposition of the well-publicized and well-regarded rebels, and their 
support of opposition candidates, would come back to wound the 
governor before many months had passed. 
Early in the term, Chandler made what appeared to be a remark-
able gaffe for a man of his political sophistication when he bluntly told a 
group of Farm Bureau leaders to go home and tend to their own 
business. He later conceded that he had misunderstood the purpose 
behind their visit, and he and bureau leaders patched up their dif-
ferences, at least on the surface. But he then brought the executive 
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branch of government into direct confrontation with the judiciary 
when he challenged the right of the Court of Appeals to name its clerk. 
Charlie O'Connell, a veteran officeholder who had served alter-
nately as secretary of state and clerk of the Court of Appeals for two 
decades, died on January 10, 1957, while serving a term as clerk; the 
court appointed his deputy, Doris Owens, to fill the vacancy. Chandler, 
protesting that the constitution gave the governor power to fill all 
vacancies of statewide offices, named instead a Boone County farmer, 
Walter Ferguson, and threatened to remove State Treasurer Henry 
Carter from office if he paid Owens her salary, Chandler's resentment 
probably stemmed from the fact that the justices had supported their 
fellow judge, Bert Combs, against him in the primary, and feelings 
between governor and court became bitter-so bitter that at one point 
mild-mannered Appellate Judge James Milliken was said to have writ-
ten Chandler a letter challenging him, or threatening to challenge him, 
to a duel if he persisted. Combs later said he could not believe Milliken 
would do such a thing, but Judge John Moremen insisted it was true. 
Eventually Chandler backed down, and Owens kept the job. But 
she had to run in the special election called to fill the vacancy, and 
Chandler threw the weight of his administration and his personal 
prestige behind J. L. "June" Suter, a northern Kentucky car dealer. With 
Chandler's support, Suter was heavily favored, but then Chandler 
made a mistake. "We'll beat the old maid world without end!" he 
chortled, referring to the fact that Ms. Owens was single. This was poor 
judgment. Indeed, it was poor politics, which is worse. Kentuckians do 
not mind abusing women, but they do not like to hear others abuse 
them. The voters objected to this mistreatment of a woman, and in the 
May balloting Owens beat Suter by almost two to one.·1t was a stunning 
upset and a jarring setback for Chandler. Two years later, he would try 
to even the score. 
Another conflict developed in Jefferson County, after Chandler 
threatened to cut appropriations for the state fairgrounds and exposi-
tion center (at one point he hinted that he was prepared to sell the 
fairgrounds if he could find a buyer, and even said he had a prospect) 
and moved the Health Department from Louisville to Frankfort. This 
latter was a defensible move; an argument can be made for grouping 
state offices in the capital. But to many Louisvillians it seemed a way of 
punishing the city for failing to vote for Chandler. There was another 
reason for the hostility between Louisville and Chandler: in his first 
administration, Chandler had bypassed the Fourth Street Organization 
in matters of patronage. The organization did not forget; it opposed 
Happy in his later races. 
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But perhaps Chandler's toughest fight erupted in June 1956 over 
control of the state Democratic party apparatus. For years, control of 
the party machinery had been allowed to pass quietly from the hands 
of one Democratic governor to his successor (as long as the successor 
was also a Democrat); when Chandler defeated Combs in 1955, he had 
reason to expect that to the victor would go the party spoils. Indeed, 
there had not been an all-out party fight for control since 1928, when a 
faction led by Thomas Rhea, Elwood Hamilton, and Seldon Glenn won 
over an opposition wing of Allie Young, Fred Vinson, William "Honest 
Bill" Fields, and Billy KIair. 
But in the meantime Chandler was handed another defeat when, in 
the Democratic senatorial primary of May 1956, Earle Clements beat 
Chandler's candidate, Joe Bates, 218,353 to 136,533. It was not much of 
a contest. Bates was a lackluster candidate and was probably not helped 
by Chandler's open support, which seemed to the voters designed to 
assist Chandler more than Bates. Clements, on the other hand, waged 
a hard, careful, and skillful campaign. Encouraged by the victory, the 
Clements-Combs faction decided that perhaps the voters preferred 
them, after all, and prepared to make a fight to keep party control. 
And a good old hot-summer, throat-cutting, backroom, court-
house fight it turned out to be, with as many as 5,000 Democrats 
turning out in some counties (Fayette, for example) to choose delegates 
to the state convention. Chandler had a double stake in the outcome: 
control of the state machinery would not only ease his job for the next 
three years but make him almost certain to go to the national Demo-
cratic presidential nominating convention in 1956 as Kentucky's favor-
ite son. Chandler regularly promised the voters of Kentucky that he 
had no earthly desire for any office other than the one he was running 
for at the moment, but just as regularly he felt his resolve weaken when 
a chance at higher office presented itself, a trait that illustrated his 
preference for campaigning over administering. 
The party conventions across the state were unprecedented for 
their participation and tough infighting. At first, it appeared that the 
Clements-Combs forces had a majority of delegates to the state con-
vention. But Chandler, catching his opponents off balance, got his 
man, Robert Humphrey-a Frankfort druggist and longtime Demo-
cratic wheelhorse-named chairman. It was a crucial victory. He began 
contesting every Clements delegate put forward and, with Humphrey 
as chairman, managed to throw out enough Clements delegates to 
carry the convention. Chandler thus gained the right to select the new 
Democratic executive committee, winning control over the delegation 
to the national convention. 
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In the meantime the party~ like the nation, had been shocked by the 
death of Senator Alben Barkley, who dropped dead while speaking at 
Washington and Lee University in Lexington, Virginia, on April 30, 
1956. His death did not allow time for voters to choose a successor in 
the May primary, and it fell to the state Democratic Central Committee 
to name a party candidate to run in the general election to succeed him. 
The committee chose Lawrence Wetherby, with explosive results. 
The choice of Wetherby infuriated Chandler, who had reason to 
consider himself party leader and the man to be consulted in such 
matters. He had favored his long-time supporter and adviser Joseph 
Leary for the spot. So, strangely enough, had Earle Clements, 
according to a statement by Bert Combs some years later (in an inter-
view with the author). Clements, said Combs, liked Leary, and while 
he doubted that Leary could win, he thought that having him on the 
ticket would keep Chandler from bolting to the Republicans. 
But with his two party enemies on the ticket, Chandler launched a 
bolt against both Clements, who was locked in a tough battle with 
Republican Thruston Morton, and Lawrence Wetherby, who was fac-
ing the thankless task of running against the formidable John Sherman 
Cooper of Somerset. 
This complicated substantially the task facing Clements and Weth-
erby in that critical summer of 1956. Even with a united party, Wether-
by would have been an underdog against Cooper, who was becoming 
almost invulnerable. Under ordinary circumstances Clements would 
have been easily favored over Thruston Morton, a Louisville silk-
stocking runner whose only experience was in the Third District Con-
gressional seat he had won from Democrat Emmett O'Neal. But cir-
cumstances were not ordinary. Dwight D. Eisenhower was running for 
reelection, and it was apparent that little short of a direct act of heaven 
could defeat him. War hero Eisenhower had not been an outstanding 
president, but his inherent decency and devotion to duty and country 
gave him an invincible aura. A Republican tide was running. 
And now Chandler was bolting. He had much to gain. At best, he 
would have a delegation at the national convention that might, should 
lightning strike, make him president. If he lost at the convention, he 
would have at least defeated the opposing faction, possibly removing 
obstacles to his control of the legislature, easing the tasks of his admin-
istration, and making it likely that he could choose his successor. 
Things didn't work out quite the way he planned. True enough, he 
went to the convention as the state's favorite son, but the national 
Democrats, desperately searching for someone of sufficient stature to 
challenge the man sometimes referred to as "Daddy Warbucks," were 
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not eager to choose a man who had failed to support the party in 
several state races, had just bolted his party's senatorial nominees, and 
had once quit the U.S. Senate to become involved with baseball. 
Neither were his policies likely to set the national party on fire. In a 
letter responding to a question about his beliefs, Chandler told Joel 
Millikan, of Oberlin, Ohio, "We need a balanced budget and lower 
taxes more than anything else." Then he proceeded to add, "My 
program calls for increased teachers' salaries, new educational build-
ings, better highways, more aid to the aged, and more efficient treat-
ment of the mentally incompetent." 
Yet Chandler insisted on holding onto the Kentucky delegation 
long after his own campaign foundered, thus depriving the state of a 
place in the decision-making process. Mike Barry, editor of the Louis-
ville Irish-American and an inflexible Chandler foe, who regularly pen-
ned and published scathing denunciations of the man he castigated as 
"old blubber boy" and "the fat fraud from Versailles," wrote that "the 
phrase 'Kentucky's favorite son' is an unfinished sentence." 
In the fall of 1956, Clements and Wetherby went down to defeat. 
Perhaps the revenge was sweet for Chandler, but it was costly, too. 
Stung by the loss of two senate seats and frustrated by the way the 
governor had used the state delegation at the convention, pro-Clem-
ents forces made life miserable for Chandler during his second legis-
lative session, helped to spark the "rebel" revolt, and forced Chandler 
to make deals with Republicans. 
For example, by any measu~spectaCular fight in the 1958 
session of the legislature-occUrred when administration forces intro-
duced a bill to rip State Treasurer Henry Carter of his power to choose 
which banks state funds would be deposited in, and to decide when 
they would be transferred from one bank to another. It was Chandler's 
chance to get even with Carter, who not only was a member of the 
Clements wing of the party but had sided with Doris Owens in her 
fight to hold her job with the Court of Appeals. And the attempt to rip 
him turned into one of the bitterest, loudest, and at times silliest fights 
of Chandler's term. 
The episode offers another example of the divisive and limiting 
nature of the state constitution, which deprives a governor of his logical 
control over key figures of his administration. It can certainly be argued 
that Chandler, as the elected chief executive of the state, had every 
right to decide where state funds would be deposited. Instead, the 
authority rested with an official elected independently of the governor, 
and a member of the rival faction. So once more Chandler launched an 
attempt to evade-in fact, ignore-the constitution, ironic in view of 
his consistent support of the charter and his resistance to its revision. 
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Chandler did not attack Carter on the grounds of philosophy or 
efficiency. Rather, he accused him of drinking too much, calling him 
"an adulterous, drunken old man" (to which Carter replied, "Hell, I 
. ain't fucked no more'n him"). This was characteristic of Chandler, who 
always made a great point of the fact that he drank sparingly, if at all. In 
his race against Combs, he had frequently implied that Lawrence 
Wetherby drank too much, and had borne down heavily on the word 
"sober" when he promised that "I will make you a sober governor." 
In a state that hiccoughs its abhorrence of liquor, this was sound 
politics, though it sounded a little strange when advanced as an 
argument in the Assembly, where the drinking habits of many mem-
bers could easily be called into question. Indeed, when one member 
declared that Carter drank too much, another arose to demand that he 
explain how much whiskey was too much, and how the accuser knew. 
Actually, however, the sessions of Chandler's second term were 
not as rowdy as those immediately following World War II, when at 
least one member had to be disarmed in the House, and the old Capital 
Hotel was regularly the scene of fist fights and near orgies. During 
these years, the liquor industry kept a suite of rooms, known as the 
Snake Pit, in the hotel where weary legislators might find compatible 
company and relief from thirst at any and all hours, day or night, and 
frequently did. One mountain senator practically made the Snake Pit 
his living quarters; he would drink each night until unable to drink 
more, whereupon he would collapse on the sofa and sleep until his 
fellow lawmakers· collected him next morning on their way to the 
Assembly. One night, for reasons never explained, he went to his own 
room and went to bed. Upon awakening the following day he did not 
recognize his surroundings, leaped up screaming, and had to be 
tranquilized; meanwhile, his friends, not finding him in the Pit, sent 
out a general alarm and had the Frankfort police somewhat concerned 
until he finally wandered back to the more familiar and friendly am-
biance of the Snake Pit. 
Another solon, who wore sunglasses to protect his eyes from 
sunlight (and others from the sight of his eyes), delighted his friends 
when he turned up on the floor carrying a quart milk carton from 
which he sipped frequently. Alas, they discovered that the carton 
contained two parts of vodka for each part of milk-the better, he said, 
to soothe the ulcer within. 
Whatever its improvements, however, the legislature had not 
transformed itself into an ethical paradise by the time Chandler set out 
to rip Henry Carter. In the course of .debate, Banjo Bill Cornett of 
Hindman complained that he had been harassed by lobbyists-"I 
guess that's what you call them, as ladies are present" -but threatened 
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to shoot anyone who said his vote was for sale. Pat Tanner of 
Owensboro openly charged on the floor that the administration was 
attempting to bribe legislators. "The turkey money brought in here for 
other purposes," he charged, "was being used last night to pass this 
bill." Turkey, in the lexicon of the legislature, was money spent by 
special interests to buy votes, and a turkey bill was one for which 
lobbyists spent unusual amounts. 
Incidentally, one of the sturdiest turkeys to fly through the Assem-
bly was proposed repeatedly during the postwar years, when members 
of successive sessions proposed changes in the laws regulating barbers 
and beauticians. One year they would introduce a bill outlawing the 
sale of materials for home permanents, a bill that would have forced 
women to get their permanents in beauty shops (or shoppes). By the 
dozens, operators of beauty shops would troop to Frankfort to lobby 
for this obviously judicious and fair proposal, and the Capital Hotel 
would ring with the happy sounds of the resulting conferences be-
tween legislators and lobbyists. The bill would, of course, eventually 
be beaten, and at the next session one would be introduced to outlaw 
beauty shop permanents. Again, the beauticians would flock to the 
capital to protest this beastly attempt at restraint of trade, and again 
they and the legislators would enjoy the workings of representative 
democracy until, again, the bill was beaten. 
On one rather famous occasion, Frederic C. "Fritz" Lord, the tall, 
craggy-featured, distinguished-looking political writer for the 
Louisville Times, and a Courier-Journal photographer (whose name has 
become mercifully lost in the mists of time) were sitting in the lobby of 
the Capital Hotel when they were approached by two women desiring . 
to discuss the home permanent bill and asking if the two gentlemen 
were legislators. "Certainly," said Lord, "I am Senator Lord, and this is 
Representative Smith [or whatever]. Let's step into the bar and talk this 
over." After a while, both couples retired to the gentlemen's rooms for 
more direct consultation. Lord and his lady had been ensconced for 
only a few minutes when the lobbyist burst from the room, barefoot 
and in her slip, raced down the hall and beat on the photographer's 
door. "Mary!" she hollered. "If you ain't done it, don't do it! That 
sonofabitch is from the Courier-Journal!" 
During the attempt to rip Henry Carter, Representative T. Fowler 
Combs of Pembroke declared that the ripper bill was only an honest 
effort to keep the state's money out of the grasp of a drinker. Actually, it 
was a power grab, and few made any attempt to pretend otherwise. 
Mrs. Ann Hall of Bypro dished up some of the best oratory of the 
episode when she compared Chandler and his weak-kneed legislators 
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to the man who had a team of mice that moved a piano up three flights 
of stairs. "How could they do it?" another man asked him, to which he 
replied, "I laid the whip to them." 
Mrs. Hall went on to charge that "Happy has already had his white 
biscuits, and now he's come back for the gravy. Having been governor 
twice and senator once, it ill behooves him now to feed his madness for 
power on a few little duties stripped from the treasurer." One by one, 
members of the rebel faction rose to denounce the bill-Paul Hud-
dleston, Pat Tanner, Gil Kingsbury, Harry King Lowman. Charles 
Williams of Paducah summed up their charges when he declared on 
the floor, "Henry Carter's only sin was in defending Doris Owens." 
But Chandler was still governor; he had power and knew how to 
use it. It was an embarrassing bill, but it took 12 roll calls and five hours 
of parliamentary maneuvering before opponents managed to beat it by 
two votes, 46 to 44. To show the strength that the rebels had accumu-
lated, 28 Democrats and 16 Republicans voted for it; 40 Democrats and 
6 Republicans voted against it. This does not mean that Chandler had 
lost his appeal for the Kentucky voter, despite a record that seemed 
designed to lose popular support. By the end of 1958, his third year in 
office, he had, as has been shown, antagonized major segments of his 
party, contributed to his party's loss of two Senate seats, made a try for 
the Democratic presidential nomination after having assured the voters 
he would be governor for four years, fought with members of his own 
party in the legislature, offended judges of the Court of Appeals, urged 
enactment of taxes after declaring himself opposed to new taxes, 
alienated the state's largest city, and managed to insult farmers and 
women voters. Yet, as later election results were to show, he remained a 
formidable political power. 
While such clashes and controversies were echoing around Frank-
fort, Bert Combs was quietly floating trial balloons by speaking before 
civic clubs, teachers' groups, and chambers of commerce, mainly in 
mountain towns. On March 19, 1958, he solemnly told a reporter in 
Prestonsburg that he was not ready to say whether he would make 
another run for the governorship, but this was a smoke screen. He had 
made up his mind what he wanted to do if conditions were right and 
was just debating how best to proceed. He knew he couldn't very well 
move in any direction as long as there was a chance that Earle Clements 
might get into the race. 
"Then Earle came to the Seventh District and stayed with me," he 
recalled late:';. "That was along about the last of March, I guess, 1958. We 
visited several counties, talking to people. I don't know that we ever 
said it in so many words, but it was understood that he wanted to run, 
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but if it didn't work out, he would be for me. And that was the way we 
left it. My loyalty to Earle, who had been my good friend, would have 
kept me from running if he had decided to. 
"What really got me into the race was the rebels. During the last 
legislative session of Chandler's term some of these rebels-Foster 
Ockerman, John Breckinridge, Hoppy Hopkins--called and asked me 
to come down to Frankfort and talk to them. They were looking for a 
candidate to run against Happy's man, who everyone assumed would 
be Harry Lee [Waterfield]. I met with them and told them I would run if 
I had Clements' blessing, but that I wouldn't consider it if Earle wanted 
to run." 
After consulting with some of the rebel legislators in Frankfort, 
Combs met with Clements in Lexington. "He told me he had decided 
he wouldn't run, and that he would be for me, and that was about it," 
Combs recalled. "I felt bad about it in a way. It was a traumatic decision 
for Earle. Actually, one reason that he finally concluded he couldn't 
tun was that he was having some trouble with taxes; there were rumors 
about it at the time. 
"Then we started talking about who would make a good running 
mate, and Clements suggested Smith Broadbent. I agreed, but told 
him I thought Smith wanted the top spot, wanted to run for governor, 
and Earle said we'd have to talk to him. And from then on we knew 
what we were working for." 
The next day, March 29, Combs announced to the press that "I'm 
sharply interested in the governor's race. We have a job of house..; 
cleaning to do in Frankfort If someone else can do it better than I can, 
I'm for him. Otherwise, I'm for Combs." 
Though it was 19 months before election time, it was a foregone 
conclusion in Frankfort that Lieutenant Governor Harry Lee Water-
field would run for governor with Chandler's blessing, and it was 
assumed that he would be a strong candidate. Tall, likable, quick-
smiling, conservative in manner, Waterfield had a firm base in 
Hickman, in far western Kentucky, and had run a good race for 
governor against Clements in 1947. He had built a good record in the 
legislature before becoming lieutenant governor and had kept out of 
most of Chandler's more publicized fights, though he inevitably bore 
the mark of the man who would support him for the top job. 
There were plenty of anti-Chandlerites willing to run. Among 
those discussed in the press were former Mayor Wilson Wyatt of 
Louisville, western Kentucky political power Smith Broadbent, Jr., 
Rumsey B. Taylor of Princeton, Lexington Mayor Shelby Kinkead, state 
legislator Foster Ockerman of Lexington, and Dr. Adron Doran, presi-
dent of Morehead State College. 
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"It was about the first week in April [actually April 9]," Combs 
recalled later, "and everybody was talking about getting into the race. 
A few of us met down at Doc Beauchamp's in Russellville. Earle was 
there, and Doc and Smith Broadbent. Smith wanted to run. I wanted 
him to run for second spot with me, and he wanted me to run for 
second place with him. We weren't getting anywhere. It was getting 
along in the afternoon, and Doc went into the kitchen for a cup of coffee 
or something, and came puffing back in, said he'd just heard over the 
radio that Wilson Wyatt had just announced. I was really surprised, 
because I thought I had an understanding with Wtlson. We had talked, 
and I had told him I wouldn't run if Earle wanted to, and he told me he 
wouldn't run if I wanted to. At least that was my understanding. I had 
met the night before with Dick Moloney and Lawrence Wetherby, who 
were for Wilson, and I had understood from them that neither of us 
would announce without further consultation. So the announcement 
took the wind out of our sails. We all went back to the Seelbach [Hotel, 
in Louisville] and started trying to figure out what we were going to do 
now." 
(Combs did not think, however, that he had been deceived by 
Wyatt. "I think maybe I was double-talked a little by Moloney," he said 
later, "but not by Wilson. He was always straight with me. That's one 
thing that you can say-we never had a cross word." Years later, he and 
Wyatt joined forces to. establish the state's largest law firm. Wyatt, 
incidentally, had a somewhat different version of the matter. In his 
autobiography, Whistle Stops, he says: "In the course of considering the 
race, I had a long, friendly meeting with Bert Combs and ended the 
session in the belief that he was not going to make the race again.") 
Combs had to take Wyatt seriously. Intelligent, urbane, and articu-
late, with a fine speaking voice and a contagious enthusiasm, Wyatt 
had a lot going for him, including the support of the Louisville news-
papers and many of the state's more liberal and reform-minded Demo-
crats. He had made an outstanding record as the youthful mayor of 
Louisville, partly because of his success in getting his Louisville pro-
gram passed in the legislature. He had been active in every presidential 
nominating convention since 1944, had served as housing expediter 
under President Harry Truman, was personal campaign manager for 
Adlai Stevenson in. his run for the presidency, and was one of the 
founders of the liberal Americans for Democratic Action. Though he 
was basically a conservative, with a profitable legal practice based 
chiefly on corporate accounts, these activities gave political opponents 
the chance to label Wyatt an ultraliberal or leftist, an image that would 
prove a handicap in his campaigns for office. 
There was a general optimism in the Wyatt camp. He named J. 
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David Francis of Bowling Green his campaign manager and opened 
headquarters in Louisville. "We thought we could get enough mo-
mentum to cool the Combs people off," said state Senator Richard 
Moloney of Lexington, one of Wyatt's more prominent advisers. But 
the Combs backers, while worrying about Wyatt's move, were not 
about to be scared out of the race. In a deliberate attempt to carry the 
fight into Wyatt's camp, Combs opened his headquarters in Louisville 
on June 30 and put Edward "Ned" Breathitt, a highly regarded young 
state legislator, in charge. Throughout the fall months the imperturba-
ble Clements, who had made public his support of Combs and his 
opposition to Wyatt, continued to work on uncommitted Democrats 
who were opposed to Chandler but unhappy at seeing the split in the 
anti-Chandler ranks. 
For his part, Chandler beamed his satisfaction. "The more the 
merrier!" he told a press conference, and he heaped scorn on Wyatt, 
whom he dubbed "Ankle Blankets" -a rustic term, or so he said, for 
spats, implying that Wyatt was a citified dandy who could not repre-
sent the good down-to-earth people of Kentucky. Wyatt said that he 
had never worn spats and challenged Chandler to supply proof, but 
the irrepressible Chandler simply laughed and repeated the charge. As 
a matter of fact, Chandler did not invent the term Ankle Blankets. As 
far as it can be traced, it was apparently the brainchild of Ruby Laffoon, 
who used it in his gubernatorial race against Louisville's Billy Harrison. 
Curiously, Wyatt later concluded that Chandler had done him a 
favor. "Happy was most helpful to me, though quite unintentionally," 
he wrote later. "He was rollicking crowds with charges that I wore 
spats .... I was never privileged to see this show, but Happy has 
always been a great showman, and I am sure I would have been 
laughing, too, had I been in the crowd. But [in campaigning] I found 
that Happy had really prepared the way for me. I encountered thou-· 
sands of people who one by one would respond, 'Well, if it isn't ole 
Ankle Blankets. I didn't think you'd come to see us.' I grew very 
comfortable with the ... nickname. Long after the campaign was over, 
Harry Davis, a close friend of Happy's, presented me with the fur-
lined ankle blankets Happy had waved from the hustings, and I retain 
them as a treasured memento." 
This statement tells a lot about Wyatt's ebullient, positive nature 
and his unfailing courtesy in the face of provocation. Happy never 
reciprocated in like vein, nor was Combs able in later years to regard 
Happy with the tolerance shown by Wyatt. 
Waterfield said simply that he didn't care whether he ran against 
one or both, but it was obvious that a three-man race improved his 
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chances tremendously. (Actually, a fourth man soon entered the con-
test: Hubert Carpenter, a quixotic Louisvillian who billed himself "the 
Poor Man's Candidate.") 
Most of the candidates for statewide office turned up on August 2 
for the picnic and politicking that is held each year at Fancy Farm, a 
small hamlet in Graves County in far western Kentucky. Traditionally, 
following lunch on the grounds-which usually consists of such rural 
staples as barbecue, cornbread, potato salad, fresh vegetables, water-
melon, ice cream, and lemonade-the candidates gather on a raised 
platform and traipse to the microphone one by one to extol their own 
virtues and belabor their opponents, with whom they have just been 
sitting. Fancy Farm has seen and heard some fine political perform-
ances in the past, but both the Louisville and Lexington papers gave 
the 1958 show only lukewarm reviews. Wyatt got fair marks for his 
"statesmanlike" speech, but Combs was judged to have come closest to 
a firebrand oration. Waterfield got a solid welcome from the western 
Kentucky crowd, but few people seemed to recognize Carpenter or 
understand what he was doing there. 
The Combs camp was considerably encouraged by their man's 
performance on the stump. He seemed more confident, more at ease 
with his audience and more sure of his material than he had been 
during his previous race. He tore into Chandler and his record, using 
some ridicule of his own which got a hooting, hollering reception-the 
kind that campaign managers like to hear. But at day's end the basic 
problem remained: with both Combs and Wyatt in the race, Waterfield 
had the advantage and everyone knew it. The knowledge colored the 
contest as it drifted into fall. 
It was a ticklish time. Combs and Wyatt were rivals but not en-
emies. They had a common enemy-Chandler. They also had, to a 
considerable extent, a common political philosophy. More frustrating, 
they had something of a common constituency. Most of the people 
who were working for Wyatt had been ardently for Combs four years 
earlier: Rumsey Taylor, Richard Moloney, Barry Bingham, Golladay 
LaMotte, Ben Adams, Tyler Munford, Thaxter Sims. And there were 
people in both camps who realized that the two men had to get 
together sooner or later, preferably sooner; they could not afford to 
waste time, money, and effort running against each other. And as the 
campaign heated up, the relatively polite words the two camps were 
exchanging were sure to become more pointed, creating wounds that 
would not heal easily. The trouble was that each man wanted the other 
to run for lieutenant governor. Both saw, or professed to see, signs that 
the other was weakening. Charges and rumors flew between the two 
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headquarters. Polls were taken, and the results leaked to the press in 
hope they would nudge the other man into accepting second place. 
On November 5, Combs surprised and puzzled people in both his 
own and opposing camps by filing for governor, four and a half months 
before the filing date for the primary. The reason, he explained, was to 
clarify his position so that he could talk to the people every day 
. between then and the election, but no one took this seriously. He could 
as easily have talked to the voters every day without having filed. His 
real reason for filing was obvious; he wanted to send a signal to Wyatt 
that he was not going to get out of the race or accept second spot on a 
Wyatt ticket. He emphasized the point by filing again on January 6, 
1959, to make sure he was in compliance with the law and to demon-
strate once more his determination. 
On the same day, Combs followed another honored political tradi-
tion by making public the platform of principles on which he intended 
to run, as Wyatt had done two weeks earlier. It was, and still is, 
something that candidates do, though it means little. Unions expect a 
pro-labor plank, minority groups demand a minority rights plank, and 
business groups sometimes look for pro-business sentiments, but the 
average voter-probably even members of a candidate's campaign 
organization-cannot at any given time recite two or more planks in the 
candidate's platform. Were it not for the media (newsmen love to point 
later to promises implied in the platform that were not carried out), 
there would probably be no platforms. Which would be just as well. 
The purpose of a platform is to make the candidate appear as pure 
and idealistic as possible without committing him to anything drastic 
or making him look naive, and Combs's met these requirements. He 
promised to rid the state of Chandlerism, take full advantage of federal 
funds available to Kentucky, enact a merit system, protect government 
against those who would use it to their own evil advantage, promote 
Kentucky products, improve schools and roads, energize the depart-
ment of aeronautics, and go all out to attract industry. 
This last is a must. No candidate worth a campaign button would 
go before the electorate without a promise to attract industry; it has 
been traditional behavior since World War I. Every contender for 
public office is expected to imply that he has influence and contacts that 
will bring to the state vast and numerous industrial plants. If the plants 
later materialize, he will issue bugle-blast announcements claiming 
credit for the new jobs thus created. If they do not, he will let federal 
offices report the bad news. 
But the time for such shadow-boxing was running short. Wyatt and 
Combs met in Cincinnati and talked amiably. "We agreed," said Wyatt, 
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"on everything except who should run for governor." It was time to 
begin serious campaigning. Money had to be raised, and contributors 
wanted to know which of the men would be the candidate. As long as 
both stayed in the race, a lot of smart money would either dry up or go 
to Waterfield. In fact, two prominent regional leaders had warned 
Clements that unless either Combs or Wyatt withdrew, they would 
have to "rethink" their position, which meant that they would protect 
their future by jumping to Waterfield. 
"We had a good organization," Bill May recalled later, "good head-
quarters. Bob Martin was chairman. John Keck was there, Ruth Mur-
phy. Of course, Earle was running things-Earle couldn't be in 
something and not run it-but he and Bob Martin got along. Clements, 
[Louis] Cox, Wetherby, and I were called the Seelbach Foursome. I was 
supposed to be raising money, and I was working at it, don't get me 
wrong. I had become emotionally involved in the campaign, which I 
never had been in the '55 race. And we were having some trouble along 
that line, no doubt about it. As long as Wyatt and Combs were both in 
the race, we were going to face trouble." 
Something had to give, and quickly. Something did. 
During the final weeks of 1958, Clements had a poll made by a 
national sampling firm, and it showed about what he suspected and 
feared: the three-way race was going to elect Waterfield. According to 
the poll, adjusted to include the undeci,ded voters, Waterfield was 
favored by 44 percent, Combs by 39, and Wyatt by 17. Clements began 
applying the pressure, showing the poll results to Dick Moloney, who 
discussed them with Wyatt. Wyatt asked Robert Burke, a prominent 
Louisville attorney and Democratic activist, to check the findings of the 
poll. Burke did, and reported that he could find no error in the 
methods employed. Wyatt discussed the situation with Barry Bing-
ham, and the two reluctantly acknowledged the unpleasant facts. It 
was time to talk and probably time to act. 
"On the night of January 19th I initiated a call to Earle Clements in 
Washington," Wyatt wrote in his autobiography. "Without asking any 
questions, he said he would catch the next plane. All sessions with 
Earle are lengthy; this one especially so. We met just before midnight at 
the Standiford Airport Motel, and our conversations continued until 
eight the next morning. There was one way to compel a merger-make 
an offer that could not be refused. I would be willing to run for 
lieutenant governor jointly with Combs if the principles on which I had 
been running would be fully embraced by Combs. I further stipulated 
that no punitive measures would be taken against leaders who had 
supported me, but that they would receive equal treatment as support-
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ers of the joint team. . . . I agreed that I would work full time in 
Frankfort as lieutenant governor. . . in a fruitful way by my handling 
of the work of economic development on which I had placed such great 
emphasis in my campaign." 
Combs was campaigning at Mount Sterling but rushed back to 
confer with Wyatt and Clements. Bingham, Moloney, Burke, and 
Martin were in an adjoining room during the evening. 
"I had gotten a call from Earle at headquarters," Combs recalled 
later, "saying that Wilson was prepared to meet with us and that things 
looked promising. Earle and Dick Moloney had called a lot of their key 
people to be there, wanted them to be satisfied with what happened, 
and through the day people kept coming and going, talking, con-
sulting." 
"They must have had 50 sessions," says Bill May. "Earle was 
playing the statesman, and he was playing it all the way-'Just want to 
be of help to my party and my state; help settle this matter between two 
fine men' -all that. I was called into the room with Bert, Earle, 
WIlson-I think maybe that was all-Dave Francis, who was Wilson's 
chairman, and Bob Martin, Bert's chairman, were there, but not in the 
room. I told Wilson I had asked to be on the Racing Commission, and 
understood I would be, and he said he had no problem with that." 
"Actually, there wasn't a lot for me to do once I got there," said 
Combs in a typical understatement. It was a very tense occasion; 
everyone present was nervous, excited, aware of the importance of the 
moment. Combs seemed to feel that since the crisis was apparently 
over, there was no benefit in making a big to-do about it. 
"Moloney, Burke, Bingham had pretty well convinced Wilson," he 
recalled. "I knew, and I think Wilson knew, that we both had some 
people who were close to defecting to Waterfield. As soon as he agreed 
that we had to merge, there wasn't much to be done. He didn't ask 
much; he wanted me to take care of some of his people, such as Dave 
Francis, which was no problem, of course, and he wanted me to agree 
that there wouldn't be any reprisals against the people on his campaign 
staff. Of course, that was easy. We made Dave a co-chairman, sifted the 
other people into headquarters. And we agreed to issue a statement of 
principles, which we did that night." 
The next day at a joint press conference, Combs and Wyatt an-
nounced that they had merged their campaigns. Combs would run for 
governor, and Wyatt would run as "a full partner," with assurances that 
as lieutenant governor he would devote a major part of his time to 
industrial promotion. 
"That was about it," said Combs. "After the merger, we traveled 
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together for several weeks, to show people that we really were together 
in the effort, and that it wasn't a shotgun marriage. Then Wilson went 
out on his own, and so did 1. We could cover more ground, reach more 
people that way." 
There was, naturally, disappointment within the Wyatt ranks but a 
great deal of relief in both camps. Waterfield declared that the merger 
made no difference to him. Chandler claimed that he had" scared old 
Ankle-Blankets out of the race" and exulted that it was good to "get the 
birds in a bunch where they're easier hit," but no one was fooled. It was 
a new race. 
Chandler had more than a casual stake in the outcome. It would be 
to his advantage, of course, to have a successor of his own choosing in 
the mansion. It would' enhance his political image and future and, 
equally important, make it almost certain that he would have the 
Kentucky delegation behind him at the 1960 Democratic national con-
vention, when once more he hoped to make a bid for the White House. 
___ 6 __ _ 
Sounds of a Different Drum 
So now the race began. Combs and Wyatt waged a tough campaign. So 
did Waterfield, and he gave notice early on that he was going to be no 
pushover. His opening at Murray on February 25, 1959, drew an 
enthusiastic crowd that overflowed the local auditorium. Knowing that 
Combs and Wyatt were going to tie him to Chandler, Waterfield sought 
to blunt their attack by tying them to Clements, whom he painted as a 
scheming dictator, seeking to regain power through his puppet, 
Combs. He depicted Combs as a man without qualification or experi-
ence, spurred on by hatred and resentment over his 1955 defeat. He 
also had some shots for Wyatt, the "big city candidate" and "tool of the 
Courier-Journal. " 
Still, it remained a fairly high-level contest. Both Combs and 
Waterfield were men of dignity and manners; they referred to each 
other as Judge Combs and Lieutenant Governor Waterfield. But during 
the last week of April, Chandler announced that he was ready to go out 
and campaign for Waterfield, assuming that Waterfield wanted his 
help. Waterfield had little choice in the matter; Chandler was raising 
money for him, primarily through assessments on state employees. It 
probably would have been impossible to keep Happy out of the fight, 
though in light of the returns it appears that Chandler hurt as much as 
he helped. Where Waterfield needed assistance most-in Louisville 
and Jefferson County, the populous Third District where Combs and 
Wyatt were strong-Chandler could be of little use: he was notedly 
unpopular in Jefferson. 
With Chandler's active entry, the campaign took on a somewhat 
more carnival-like atmosphere. He still referred to Wyatt as "Ankle 
Blankets" and Combs as "the Little Judge," "an innocent bystander," 
"this little fella," attempting to make him appear the incompetent tool 
of Clements and Wetherby, whom he again ridiculed as "Clementine 
and Wetherbine." But this was familiar stuff, and Combs was no longer 
the shy, inarticulate mountain lawyer. The ridicule did not seem to fit as 
well. 
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The Combs camp got into the act with some ridicule of its own. A 
sure laugh-getter was what became known as the Crippled Goose, a 
term that Combs invented. During his second term, Chandler had 
been charged with shooting a game bird after sundown in the Ballard 
Wildlife Preserve in western Kentucky, although he protested that he 
had not been told he was hunting after the legal hour of sundown, 
which the law forbade. But as such things tend to do, the story grew 
into an account of how Happy shot a goose on the ground, a goose that 
had been crippled by another hunter. People speaking for Combs made 
snjde references to Chandler's prowess with firearms, linking it with 
his failure to serve in either of the world wars. Cartoons showed 
. Chandler clubbing a terrified, wounded goose. Once, during a Water-
field rally, someone loosed a frightened, squawking goose, its wing 
bandaged and painted red, down the aisle of the hall where he was 
speaking. 
Combs also had what headquarters referred to as his "Castro 
speech," which was aimed at Chandler rather than Waterfield and 
usually drew a good laugh from anti-Chandler audiences. At the time 
of the campaign the state had no merit system to protect state workers; 
the governor had a constitutional right to hire and fire state employees, 
and as.a result he could usually persuade people on the state payroll to 
vote for his choice. The governor also could, and usually did, assess 
state workers a percentage of their pay for a campaign chest, a fact that 
gave the incumbent an almost insurmountable advantage. Using the 
votes of thousands of state workers and their families and the slush 
fund built from their payroll deductions, a governor could often choose 
his successor. 
Chandler, Combs charged, had squeezed millions of dollars from 
the defenseless workers by a 2 percent assessment on their paychecks, 
a practice that he, Combs, promised to end with a properly legislated 
merit system. (Chandler had imposed a merit system of sorts in the 
final year of his administration by executive order. But, as Combs 
pointed out, a merit system created by executive order could be can-
celed by a similar order.) Not wanting to put these funds into a state 
bank, where they could be traced, Chandler allegedly had cabinet 
member Vego Barnes (known as Virtuous Vego) deposit the money in a 
Cuban bank. There, with the revolution, it fell into the hands of Castro, 
who allegedly pocketed it as the spoils of war. Combs painted a piteous 
picture of Happy standing on a Florida beach, peering out over the 
ocean with tears running down his cheeks, crying, "Castro! Castro! 
Send back my 2 percent!" 
This, like the more serious talks, bore the mark of Edward Fretwell 
Prichard, Jr., the brilliant Frankfort attorney who was working at head-
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quarters and trying to rebuild a shattered career. From being some-
thing of a boy genius in his native Paris, Prichard had achieved an 
enviable reputation in Kentucky and in the national Democratic party. 
Entering Princeton at 16, he became a campus celebrity, graduated first 
in his class, and created a furor among the faculty when he entered 
Harvard Law School, where again he graduated at the top of his class. 
He became a clerk to Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, was 
hired as an assistant to Sidney Hillman in the White House, and by the 
time he was 24 was a wartime adviser to President Franklin D. Roose-
velt. 
After the war he had come home to Kentucky and established a 
promising law career in Lexington when, in a pointless and arrogant 
prank, he helped stuff 233 ballots into 11 Bourbon County ballot boxes· 
in the 1948 election. He was subsequently tried, found guilty, and sent 
to federal prison. Though he was pardoned by President Harry 
Truman after serving a few months, the incident blasted his hopes of a 
political career, and he was only beginning to regain his equilibrium 
and plan a future when Earle Clements recruited him to help in the 
Combs 1955 campaign. It was Prichard's first step in establishing 
himself as one of the foremost political intellects in the state. 
"Prich had worked some in the 1955 campaign," said Combs, "and 
we were glad to see him when he came in in '59. I don't know that I ever 
talked to him about it. He just wanted to come to headquarters, be a 
part of the campaign. He knew he was welcome. I don't know what we 
paid him. Not much. Paid his expenses, of course, and enough for 
walking-around money. 
"Prich hung around headquarters in '55 doing research, writing 
speeches, doing P.R. At that time he was almost an outcast. No one 
running for office wanted anything to do with him. If he stuck his head 
above water they would holler 'jailbird!' He was still battling himself, 
disappearing sometimes for three or four days or longer. He just 
seemed to want to hole up, hide until he got over his black mood. But 
he could turn out a good speech almost any time, and he knew who he 
was writing for. In the '59 race, he was very valuable. He worked with 
Clements, Bob Martin, Ruth Murphy, June Taylor, Jo Westpheling. 
Everybody said he was worth his pay just for keeping Geneva Blue and 
Jo Westpheling from coming to blows. Jo and Geneva were co-chairper-
sons for women. Geneva was the cheerleader sort, would sing 'God 
Bless America' at meetings. Westpheling was a back-room operator, 
and a damned good one." 
The venom with which many Democrats, as well as Republicans, 
lashed out at Prichard reflected more than a moral revulsion at his 
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political crime. The fact is that Prichard, an avowed liberal identified 
with the more liberal elements of the national Democratic party, threat-
ened the conservative hold on the state Democratic party if he should 
gain influence in the governor's office. The more fundamentalist ele-
ments of the party were secretly delighted at his downfall, and were 
intent on seeing that he did not recover enough to regain power. 
Significantly, one of the more vocal critics of Prichard was 
Chandler, who later, during Combs's effort to call a convention to 
revise the state constitution, lashed out at Prichard as a jailbird. In 
tones of scorn, Prichard replied: "It is true that I have served time in the 
federal reformatory. I have associated with murderers, robbers, rapists 
and forgers, criminals of all kinds, and let me say, my friends, that 
everyone of them was the moral superior ofA.B. Happy Chandler." 
Combs was waging what is usually called a vigorous campaign, 
which meant that he traveled a lot, spoke a lot, huddled with local 
politicians early in the morning and late at night, ate whatever the local 
committees put before him, and slept when schedule permitted. It was 
a grueling regimen, hard on him, hard on his drivers-Dix Winston of 
Paducah and Johnny Green of Sandy Hook-and hard on his nephew 
Buddy Combs, who traveled with him to handle arrangements, public 
address systems, and the like. 
He had decided to center his fire on Chandler, though his strategy 
board at headquarters warned him that if he wanted to beat Waterfield, 
he would have to fight Waterfield. Combs knew that ordinarily this was 
proper operating procedure, but in this case he figured that Chandler 
was an easy target, whereas Waterfield was a pleasant man with a 
generally good image who had not been too closely identified with 
Chandler's more unpopular moves. It is also likely that Combs was 
taking a little revenge. Chandler had ridiculed Combs in their previous 
encounter in a way that a sensitive man was not likely to forget. 
Wyatt, meanwhile, had been obliged to change his tactics radically; 
before the merger he had been attacking factionalism in the state 
Democratic party, since Combs and Waterfield represented the two 
traditional factions, the Clements and Chandler wings of the party. But 
now he was a standard-bearer for one of those factions, and he had no 
choice but to join Combs in the attack on the other, though usually he 
tried to take the high road and emphasize the promises inherent in the 
platform. 
Whether he had, or could have, made any headway with the 
factionalism issue is questionable. The fact is that Kentuckians have 
long had a suicidal affection for their factions, which permit them to 
stay in their old party without paying any attention to its principles. 
90 DIVIDE AND DISSENT 
Perhaps for this reason, Kentucky Democrats fight their internecine 
primary battles with relish and ferocity, and often it seems that the 
hotter the primary the better the party showing in the general election. 
Since the Civil War, the factions have been the natural outgrowth of 
political and economic forces in a poor state, as well as the political 
expression of a highly divided state. Kentucky often gives its support 
to Republican presidential candidates and frequently sends Republi-
cans to the U.S. Senate, at the same time electing a Democratic gover-
nor and legislature, demonstrating the fact that the conservative wing 
e>f the Democratic party can (and often does) easily accommodate itself 
in Republican ranks. The Chandler faction, like the Johnson or Cantrill 
factions before it, appealed emotionally to Democrats and philosophi-
cally to Republicans. But the basic pattern of Democratic dominance 
prevailed throughout the early years of the current century and was 
intensified when Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal cut deeply into 
Republican strength in the mountains of eastern Kentucky and in 
Louisville. 
Just as the Democratic party-and, indeed, the state's politics in 
general-was basically southern in structure, so was it southern in 
nature until well into this century, occasionally liberal in national 
elections, often agrarian and conservative in state races. Fiscally, it was 
conservative. Its candidates preached the sanctity of pay-as-you-go 
financing, opposing bond issues and deficit financing, and denounc-
ing taxes and strong government as instruments of the devil. Thus, 
though the Democrats did obeisance to the virtue of good roads and 
good schools, the state was cursed with some of the nation's worst 
roads and schools because it would not impose enough taxes to mod-
ernize them. 
In this respect, Happy Chandler was firmly in the tradition of the 
great southern politicos-a colorful orator with a keen understanding 
of people's emotions, prejudices, and sense of place, appealing to their 
love of tradition and fear of change and their resentment of heavy 
taxation. Chandler boasted of his ability to cut taxes-though he usual-
ly raised some as much or more than he cut others-and excoriated 
those who would plunge the state into debt. As a result, Kentucky had 
fallen behind the southern and border states that issued bonds with 
which to modernize roads and universities, thus attracting the indus-
try that Kentucky so badly needed. 
Earle Clements made several breaks with this tradition when he 
instituted his two-cent gasoline tax to finance rural roads, adopted a 
bond-and-rental technique for financing buildings to house state of-
fices, and managed to raise the state salary limit. But the tradition of 
SOUNDS OF A DIFFERENT DRUM 91 
southern politics lived on during Chandler's term and was still alive 
when Bert Combs took to the hustings for the first time. More by 
instinct than by deliberate design, he was trying to change the pattern. 
He failed in that first attempt. But in the four years between his first 
and second tries at the governorship, he had time to study the historic 
record and its implications, and when he began his second race, he was 
determined to move the state out of the old southern tradition and into 
the modem era. Fortunately for his chances, he did not say so; he had 
learned much about the nature of Kentuckians during his first race for 
governor, and, as he later said, there is no education in the second kick 
of a mule. 
Rather, he was adopting something of the Chandler technique of 
personalizing the campaign. Instead of pegging away at the state's 
needs and his plans for meeting those needs, he devoted much of his 
effort to an attack on Chandler. It was a negative campaign that he did 
not particularly like and that Wyatt had frequently criticized before the 
merger, but it was effective. Furthermore, as long as he stayed on the 
attack, his opponents were forced to spend a lot of their time answering 
him and thus found it harder to push him into a comer on such matters 
as taxes. 
And taxes were still a very sore point. The 1958 legislature had 
voted to put on the ballot a proposal that the state pay a bonus to 
veterans of the Spanish-American War, World Wars I and II, and the 
Korean confliCt, to be financed by a state sales tax. The referendum did 
not specify the amount of bonus to be paid or the size of the tax to be 
levied for its support, and it was thus a doubly ticklish issue for the 
candidates. Both Combs and Waterfield tried to ignore the whole 
matter, bonus and tax. It was not on the primary ballot. But it loomed 
large in the minds of many voters and in press commentary. Congress 
had opted earlier for the G.!. Bill-which offered veterans training, 
education, and low-interest loans to help them get started on a civilian 
career--calling a bonus a poor way to reward the men who had fought 
for their country, a handout that would soon be frittered away without 
materially compensating the veteran for the years lost from his career 
or improving his ability to deal with the future. But Kentucky veterans 
were hungry for cash, and few voices other than those of some news-
paper editorialists were raised against the bonus plan. 
It was especially tough for .Combs because he was receiving fire on 
the matter from two sides. Out on the campaign trail, Chandler and 
Waterfieldwere baying at his heels, warning the voters that Combs was 
planning to ruin them with unnecessary taxes. And from his campaign 
headquarters in the Seelbach, Combs was getting regular and in-
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creasingly urgent demands that he come out in flat opposition to the 
sales tax. 
"The newspapers and the radio were carrying these stories, big 
headlines, of Happy and Harry Lee charging that Combs was going to 
put all sorts of taxes on people," recalled Ed Prichard. "They were 
saying that the bonus was just a trick of his to get the people to vote for a 
sales tax. That was silly, of course, since Happy and Harry Lee were in 
office when the referendum was voted, and Bert wasn't even in Frank-
fort. But it was getting a lot of attention, forcing Bert onto the defensive, 
and people in headquarters were getting worried. They wanted Bert to 
come out and oppose the sales tax. Ruth Murphy and Cattie Lou Miller, 
and to an extent Bob Martin, the campaign manager, were getting all 
excited. 
"Well, they finally got to Clements, convinced him it was a crisis. 
Earle had a tendency to see everything as critical anyhow, so they held 
a big strategy meeting. Big meeting. Bob Matthews was there, Henry 
Ward, Martin, Clements. They were all saying what they should do 
about the sales tax, when old Ernest Thompson came loping down the 
hall. Ernest had been on the public teat most of his life, half a century, I 
guess, sheriff, jailer over in Lexington, whatall. He had been a Clem-
ents man until he saw Happy was going to win in '55 and jumped to 
Chandler. Got a job on the ABC [Alcoholic Beverage Control Board]-I 
think he was commissioner-but then he thought Harry Lee was going 
to lose so he hopped over to Combs. (Ernest, said Combs, was like an 
old coon dog-he'd hunt with anybody who carried a lantern.) Well, 
Earle pointed to him and said, 'Now, here is our good friend Ernest, 
who knows more about politics than any of us,' which of course wasn't 
true, just knew enough to know how to jump from one slippery log to 
another without falling off .... Went on like that for a while, and then 
said, 'Now, Mr. Thompson, what would you advise in a case like this?' 
"Well, Ernest sat there paring his thumbnail with this little pen-
knife-he had a double thumbnail, peculiar-looking thing, and he 
would whittle at it. So he sat there whittling at it for a minute, then he 
looked up and said in this very important voice, 'Don't let 'em hang it 
on ya.' That was it; that was the wisdom of ages-'Don't let' em hang it 
on ya.' But everyone nodded his head and looked thoughtful and said 
yes, that was the solution. After a while, of course, someone said, 
'Hell, that doesn't make any sense,' and everybody said that's right. So 
they still had to decide what to do, so they got on the phone and called 
Bert and begged him to disavow the bonus and the tax, or at least the 
tax." 
This Combs refused to do. Instead, he issued a statement, which 
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he later incorporated into his speeches, saying that he didn't want to 
impose a sales tax or any other tax but that he wasn't going to disavow it 
until he saw how people voted on the bonus, that he had heard other 
governors swear they wouldn't raise taxes and then be embarrassed by 
the disavowal once they got into office, and that he wasn't going to do 
it, wasn't going to lie to the people. "It was the best statement made 
during the campaign," said Ed Prichard. "People credited me with it, 
but he wrote it himself." Prichard's statement is significant: more and 
more, Combs was making up his own mind, setting his own policies, 
issuing his own statements. 
It was a hard campaign. Waterfield, a decent, intelligent, sincere 
man who later amassed a fortune in the insurance business and be-
came a prominent civic leader in Frankfort, ran a good race. He had the 
usual advantages of an administration candidate: a campaign chest 
compiled from assessments on the paychecks of state employees, 
support of at least a majority of state workers, and a ready-made 
organization in every county. He was an earnest, able speaker with a 
strong following in the western part of the state (known as the Gibraltar 
of Democracy). He also had the support of Chandler, though in retro-
spect he might have done better without it. Frequently, when introduc-
ing Harry Lee, Happy would get carried away and usurp the occasion. 
A campaign crowd drew him as inexorably as swift water draws a 
spawning fish; it was instinctive. But some observers wondered if his 
appearances did not make it seem that he, not Waterfield, was the 
candidate, just as he had previously charged that Combs was no more 
than a puppet for Clements. And the more Chandler orated, the better 
target he presented for Combs and the more he invited the charge that 
Waterfield was only a stooge. 
It was not the most intellectual campaign ever waged. An undue 
amount of time was spent on references to crippled geese, Castro, 
ankle blankets, and the little judge. During the last week of the race 
Waterfield's Jefferson County officials, apparently without Water-
field's knowledge, ran an ad in the Courier-Journal so scurrilous that the 
newspaper published an editorial apologizing for having to print it. 
Briefly, it tied Combs and Wyatt to the Courier-Journal, which supported 
them and for which Wyatt was general counsel; the paper had once had 
in its employ Carl Braden, a reporter who had been accused of Com-
munist sympathies and who had been convicted of sedition before the 
state's sedition law was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court. Somehow the ad managed in this way to tie Combs and Wyatt to 
the Communist forces that had killed American men in Korea, con-
cluding: "Remember-it may be you or your son who is called next to 
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make the supreme sacrifice in another Korea." This was undoubtedly 
the low point in the campaign and probably hurt Waterfield. 
In the closing days of the race, both sides made the usual predic-
tions of lopsided victory, all of which proved wrong. On May 27, 
559,700 Democrats voted in the primary, a record total, and gave 
Combs a winning margin of 33,001 votes-292,462 to 259,461-29,624 
of which came from Jefferson County, where Combs undoubtedly 
benefited from the popular dislike of Chandler, the appeal of Wyatt, 
and the work of the Fourth Street Organization. Outside the county his 
edge over Waterfield was 3,377 votes. Hardly a landslide. (Incidentally, 
Bracken County, which had a record extending over half a century of 
voting with the winner, again picked the winner, casting 1,289 votes for 
Combs and 1,070 for Waterfield.) Wyatt rolled over his chief opponent, 
J.B. Wells of Paintsville, by more than 150,000 votes. Republican John 
M. Robsion, Jr., rode to an expected victory over only token opposition 
in his race for the GOP gubernatorial nomination, as did Pleas Mobley 
of Manchester for second spot. 
It was in many respects a curious election. A pattern, a persuasive 
indication of voter attitudes toward competing factions or philoso-
phies, was hard to find. For example, Wendell Butler, a nonaligned 
candidate for superintendent of public instruction, beat Carlos Oakley, 
who was slated with Combs. Emerson "Doc" Beauchamp, a strong 
Combs man, swamped a handful of rivals for commissioner of agri-
culture, as did pro-Combs Henry Carter in his race for secretary of 
state. But pro~Chandler Thelma Stovall won over Pearl Runyon, of the 
Combs slate, for state treasurer. 
Furthermore, except for Jefferson County (Louisville), Combs and 
Waterfield had almost divided the state evenly. Waterfield carried the 
First, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Districts, Combs the Second, Third, 
Fifth, and Seventh. But, as a Kentucky candidate must to win, Combs 
carried the cities-Louisville, Bowling Green, Owensboro, Paducah, 
Covington, Newport, and Ashland. Waterfield carried Henderson, 
Frankfort, and Lexington. Waterfield had counted on and seemed 
likely to get an overwhelming vote of support from his home First 
District; Combs had hoped for the same from the Seventh. Neither got 
it. Waterfield carried the First by only 6,161 votes; Combs carried the 
Seventh by 11,72l. 
The outpouring of Democratic votes for the primary gave the 
Republicans little room for optimism. Republican Senator Thruston 
Morton, citing the bitterness of the Combs-Chandler split and ac-
knowledging the importance of Chandler's help to him in his suc-
cessful race against Earle Clements in 1956, declared that another 
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Democratic split was possible. Harry Lee Waterfield, however, soon 
put a damper on such hopes with a generous and courteous statement 
of concession and congratulations, which he sent to Combs before the 
vote-counting had been completed. His campaign manager, Frankfort 
Attorney Joseph Leary, paid a visit to Combs headquarters the day 
after the election, was warmly welcomed, and set about laying the 
groundwork for a unified campaign. Chandler was stunned by the 
defeat, which was, in effect, the second handed him by the voters of 
Kentucky, though he had not himself been the candidate. Combs had 
made him the chief issue of the campaign and had won on it, but 
Chandler would not, could not, admit it. "It looks like the Little Judge 
blew in on Ankle Blankets' coattails," he said, referring to the heavy 
vote in Jefferson County. He said he would do "something the others 
haven't done" and support the nominees, although before he "could 
be enthusiastic for them, they would have to take back some of the 
vicious lies the Little Judge told about me." But he refused to send a 
message to Combs, complaining that he had never received congrat-
ulations from Combs in 1955 (Combs disputed this). 
Still, Chandler did not see the vote as an indication that things had 
changed. On the contrary, he issued a straight-faced statement that the 
outcome of the voting "look!'; like an overwhelming approval of what 
we have given the people." This ability to interpret the enemy's victory 
as a victory for himself tells a lot about the resiliency of the man. He 
told reporters that he still had a good chance to be the state's favorite 
son at the approaching presidential nominating convention. And he 
warned that he might" come back in 1963 and clean them all out-if I'm 
not busy doing something else. [This was probably a reference to the 
rumor that Senator Thruston Morton was planning to retire and devote 
himself to Republican National Committee matters, opening the door 
to let Chandler resign the governorship and take appointment to the 
Senate, as he had .done before.] The people will be tired of them by 
then." But a tide was running that Chandler would not be able again to 
withstand. 
Combs ignored the Chandler remarks; to the inner circle of his 
campaign workers, he appeared more amused than irritated by the 
governor. As he headed into the· general election campaign, Combs 
remained, to the public and to much of the press, an enigma. In some 
ways, he seemed the same quiet, reticent man he had always been; in 
others, he seemed considerably different. As Richard Harwood, politi-
cal analyst for the Louisville Times, wrote late in the campaign: "This 
year. . . he was a new Combs in terms of style and platform manner. 
But in terms of basic personality he was still the Combs of 1955. He 
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never lost the reticence and reserve that keep both the public and the 
people with whom he works at arm's length. If he has ever bared his 
innermost thoughts to political associates, it is not recorded. If he has 
any favored confidants, they are unknown. He keeps a tight rein on his 
emotions. He took his licking in 1955 without a flicker of pain. And he 
won over Waterfield this year with no more show of emotion." 
The campaign of the fall of 1959 was a lackluster affair. John M. 
Robsion, Jr., was an affable man and able lawyer. The son of a legend-
ary mountain congressman, Robsion had himself served in Congress, 
compiling a record of consistent support for Republican causes. He was 
well liked by Republicans and waded into the race with energy. But he 
was a rather colorless candidate, offering little that was new or unusual 
to attract the attention of the voter, and as the summer wore away, there 
were no signs that he or the other GOP candidates were making 
inroads on the Democrats. To their credit, both Robsion and Combs 
agreed in the early days of the campaign that racial integration was not 
an issue between them and not a matter for debate, thus removing a 
question that could have marred the campaign while injecting some 
fireworks. Like Chandler, Robsion insisted that Combs had plans to 
impose a sales tax and promised that he would oppose all tax increases. 
He warned that Clements would become highway commissioner, were 
Combs elected, and would have undue influence in state affairs. And 
he demanded that Combs explain where he would get the money to 
finance the increased spending for the parks, schools, and roads that 
he said he would provide. 
The redoubtable John Sherman Cooper campaigned vigorously for 
Robsion. President Truman came to Paducah to urge support for 
Combs. But the nearest thing to real fireworks was produced when 
Chandler, on October 23, refused to go to Paducah to welcome 
Truman. Instead, Chandler, who had promised to support the party 
nominees "as I always have," unleashed a blistering attack on Combs, 
Wyatt, and Clements. In a letter to the president, he charged that 
Wyatt, who had served in the Truman administration, was not a Demo-
crat and had tried to betray Truman by helping found the Americans 
for Democratic Action, and that Combs and Clements were "bolters." 
Clements, he said, was "a bolter and liar and always has been," and 
"Combs is the biggest liar I ever met," adding that "the salvation of the 
state might well depend on his getting beat." 
The venom of this attack on his party's nominees, which officials in 
the Combs campaign condemned as an open bolt, was an indication of 
the pain Chandler felt in defeat. It was also evidence of the almost 
mystical way in which he viewed his political destiny. When Combs 
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and Clements were lukewarm in their support of his gubernatorial 
campaign in 1955, they were bolters. When he, Chandler, denounced 
Combs and Clements and called for Combs's defeat, he was a loyal 
party man; 
Truman, whose wartime Senate investigating committee had ex-
amined Chandler's wartime dealings with local contractors, did not 
mention Chandler's blast in his Paducah address. The Democratic state 
committee, made up almost entirely of Chandler appointees, failed to 
put any money into the Combs campaign. And Robsion used the 
Chandler denunciation to warn that a Combs administration would be 
torn between Democratic factions and devoted to higher taxes. 
Robsion might have had a strong issue in the tax charges had the 
ballot not contained the proposed constitutional amendment authoriz-
ing a veterans' bonus and a sales tax to finance it. That pretty well took 
the teeth out of the charge that Combs was the one planning to impose 
a sales tax. Neither did the other proposed amendment-to permit 
sheriffs to succeed themselves-offer either candidate an advantage, 
since neither had endorsed it and it was believed likely to lose in any 
case. 
So the results of the November 4 voting followed predictions. 
Combs beat Robsion by 180,093 votes, 516,549 to 336,456, a record for a 
governor's race in Kentucky and second to the all-time record set in 
1932 when Franklin D. Roosevelt swamped Herbert Hoover in their 
race for the presidency by 185,858 votes. The bonus amendment was 
approved by 38,039 votes; the sheriff succession amendment lost by 
7,008. Robsion beat Combs by 338 votes in his home county of Jeffer-
son, one of the 27 counties he carried (to Combs's 93), while Wyatt in 
Jefferson was beating Mobley by 11,722. The fact that Combs lost 
Jefferson County to Robsion, after carrying it so substantially over 
Waterfield, probably showed Chandler's unpopularity more than Rob-
sion's popularity. 
Combs was in no mood to let one county ruffle him. Asked by 
reporters about his reaction to the Jefferson loss and to Chandler's 
preelection statement that a Combs defeat would help Kentucky, 
Combs merely said, "I never argue with my Governor. He may have a 
point. He's had a lot of good programs." 
The jubilation at Combs headquarters was noticeably less than it 
had been after the primary election, partly because of awareness of the 
job ahead. Combs and Robsion exchanged cordial messages of congrat-
ulations and condolence. Combs began a series of meetings with the 
leaders of the approaching legislative session and with people he had 
in mind for his administration. One of the most interesting meetings, 
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however, took place in the Rathskeller of the Seelbach on the morning 
after the election. 
"Clements and I met with a group of engineers who had worked 
with me on the [Mountain] parkway," recalled Bill May. "I can't claim 
credit for the idea of the parkway. People for 50 years had been wanting 
a road from the mountains into Lexington. When I was a boy in 
Prestonsburg, we didn't know anything about Lexington or Louisville 
because you couldn't get there. Today you go to Lexington and the 
shopping centers are full of people from the mountains. The parking 
lot at Bluegrass Field is crowded with cars of people from the moun-
tains flying out of there. 
"But the idea for the parkway belonged to Henry Spalding, up at 
Hazard. Years before, he had drawn the lines for a highway from the 
Big Sandy to the Bluegrass, and was always trying to promote it. When 
Bert began running the second time, in '59, I talked to him about the 
parkway, and he committed himself to the idea in a rough way. Noth-
ing formal. But I went ahead with plans for it just as if it was going to be 
built, and at a rally in Prestonsburg, two or three days before the 
primary, he promised to build it. 
"So in August I got with Henry Spalding and persuaded him and 
Hazlitt and Erdahl, another engineering firm that had had experience 
here in Kentucky, and together we got three or four firms to gamble 
that Combs would be elected, and together we started the preliminary 
work on the parkway, making the maps, surveys, marking the route. It 
was a big gamble. If Bert hadn't been elected, or if he had changed his 
mind about the road, we would have been out a lot of money; we'd had 
a lot of men working a lot of months on those plans. By the time Bert 
was elected we had the route pinned down. The morning after the 
election, we all met in the Rathskeller, and we thanked them for their 
faith, and asked them to keep on working. Which they did. I'd say it 
saved us about a year when we started building it." 
"A lot of the credit for the parkway should also go to B.F. Reed," 
Combs said later. "He was at that time chairman of the East Kentucky 
Regional Planning Commission, and a mountains-to-Bluegrass road 
had always been part of their plan. John Whisman, who was in on the 
commission, and Reed sold me on the idea, although May and his 
people went ahead with it." 
Combs took a brief vacation. He had been campaigning hard for 
almost two years and needed the rest. But by the middle of November 
he was working on a budget, choosing people for his administration, 
preparing for the critical first session of the legislature. And already, 
storm clouds were forming. Associated Industries of Kentucky (AIK), a 
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state industrial lobbying group, had announced with a blast of pub-
licity that it would challenge the constitutionality of the veterans' 
bonus and the sales tax to finance it. The suit caused Combs to 
announce that he would delay submitting his proposed budget to the 
legislature until the others could rule on the constitutionality of the 
amendment. 
The Ducks Line Up 
The inauguration of Bert Thomas Combs and Wilson Watkins Wyatt on 
a cold, cloudy December afternoon was more a demonstration of the 
raucous, rowdy nature of Kentucky's Democratic party than a display 
of governmental dignity and pageantry. Frankfort, with its twisting, 
steep streets, is not an ideal place for a parade, but no inauguration is 
complete without one, and Combs's was no exception. Democrats, an 
estimated 40,000 of them-representing a wide range of philosophic 
persuasions, all parts of the Commonwealth, and varying degrees of 
sobriety-shivered, shuffled, and shouted their way along the line of 
march. An open car bearing Combs and Chandler was followed by a 
similar vehicle carrying Wyatt and Waterfield, protocol demanding 
that the erstwhile enemies pretend, for a little hour, to be reconciled 
under the mellowing banner of the party. The charade was to last little 
longer than the parade. 
It is customary for the departing governor to give a valedictory of 
sorts, expressing the hope that history will treat him gently and wish-
ing his successor well. Happy Chandler was not one to let such an 
opportunity pass, nor was he content with a mere hail and farewell. 
Apparently still smarting from the Combs victory, he mounted the 
inaugural platform as though it were a campaign stump, claimed that 
he had given Kentucky an administration to light the ages, declared 
that he had left the state in splendid fiscal condition, with a huge 
surplus at Combs's disposal, and generally implied that a mistake had 
been made by the voters. The pro-Combs crowd, angry at having such 
a sour note played during their victory march, responded in a raucous 
fashion, and when he warned that "I may just be back" if things did not 
go to suit him, there was a storm of derision, hoots, and cries of "No! 
No!" "Go home, Happy!' and other shouts unbefitting the departure of 
a chief of state. (During the ceremonies, Combs was approached by a 
worried-looking state trooper who whispered that the police had re-
ports of a man who" says he's going to shoot that sonofabitch." Combs 
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looked at him with a poker face. "Which sonofabitch is he talking 
about?" he asked.) 
But that was the only sour note in the inaugural song. In recogni-
tion of the "team victory" of Combs and Wyatt, the latter became the 
first lieutenant governor to give an inaugural address, a brief but 
eloquent contrast to Chandler's remarks. "Happy, of course, was seat-
ed on the platform," Wyatt wrote later. "I started my remarks by 
turning toward him and saying, 'Happy, this is a report from Ankle 
Blankets on the condition of the plowed ground.' He took the ribbing 
as a compliment and joined in the roar of the crowd." (Apparently, 
Wilson Wyatt is one of those blessed souls who view the past through 
rose-tinted glasses. Others who recall that chilly occasion of which he 
writes will remember that Mr. Chandler responded to Wyatt's remarks 
with the smile of a man being told a joke on the gallows.) Wyatt then 
declared that "the secret of a campaign is how to win without proving 
oneself unworthy of it. By politics we win our victories, by states-
manship we deserve them. There is no greater obligation than that 
imposed by democracy on those chosen to lead. Only through our best 
efforts, our best intellect, our best conscience, will we prove equal to 
our task." 
Next, Combs gave the crowd cause for rejoicing when he spoke of 
the fine victory behind and the bright days ahead. He noted with wry 
humor that his reading of the figures of the state's treasury condition 
was somewhat different from that of Chandler (prompting another 
round of catcalls), but he promised to do, generally, the things he had 
promised to do during the campaign. Then he and Wyatt placed their 
hands on the Bible, swore that they had not fought or taken part in a 
duel, vowed to uphold the laws of state and nation, and were sworn 
into office-Combs as the forty-sixth governor of the Commonwealth 
and the first World War II veteran to hold the post. The throng broke 
up and began preparations for the inaugural ball and the dozens of 
parties that would consume the night and usher in a new regime. Then 
it was time for Combs and Wyatt to get down to business. 
The first order of business was a press conference. Combs and 
Wyatt faced a battery of about 75 reporters, but if either man was 
reluctant or uneasy, it was not noticeable. On the contrary, Allan Trout 
of the Courier-Journal and Richard Harwood of the Louisville Times 
commented the next day on Combs's composure and seeming famil-
iarity with the procedure. There was, noted Harwood, none of the 
diffident mountain judge about the new governor, who acted as 
though "he had long been accustomed to the governor's chair. Relaxed 
and seemingly confident, Combs fielded questions with the ease of an 
102 DIVIDE AND DISSENT 
old pro, answering most questions forthrightly, casually admitting 
when he did not know an answer or had not made up his mind on a 
matter. Yes, he said, he intended to fire some people, and hire some 'in 
whom we have faith,' in other words, political allies. He pointed out 
that legislative action on the sales tax and veterans' bonus would 
depend on whether the courts upheld the referendum approving the 
bonus and the enabling tax. He announced a dozen appointments, 
promised to operate the A. B. Chandler Medical Center at the Universi-
ty of Kentucky according to plan, and said that he had in mind a broad 
plan of roads, parks, and other things still being designed for the 
improvement. of the economy of eastern Kentucky." In all, Combs got 
good reviews on his first performance, and seemed rather pleased with 
it himself. 
Combs was determined to do something about Kentucky's consti-
tution-that crippling document written in 1891 when farmers dis-
trusted townspeople and banks and business, businessmen distrusted 
the farmers, Democrats and Republicans distrusted each other, eastern 
Kentucky distrusted the Bluegrass and most of the rest of the state, and 
the Bluegrass resented Louisville, which considered the rest of the 
state backward. Agricultural western Kentucky and mountainous east-
ern Kentucky:felt left out of government programs, and to an extent 
their feelings were justified. Eastern Kentucky was still tom by feuds. It 
is not surpris,ing that a constitution written at such a time was a 
collection of la;ws designed to curb the power of Frankfort rather than a 
blueprint for the efficient functioning of representative government. 
And the men who had written the constitution had made sure that 
it would not Qe changed suddenly. Two separate legislatures had to 
approve subnUtting to the voters a proposal to call a convention to 
revise the con~titution; the following session could make the call. Or 
the constitution could be amended by popular vote after the amend-
ments were approved and submitted by the Assembly, but only two 
amendments could be voted on at one time, making amendment a slow 
process. So suspicious of each other were Kentuckians that these 
laborious processes seldom succeeded. Voters had refused for 68 years 
to approve an amendment that would permit sheriffs to succeed them-
selves; only 19 amendments had been approved; and twice-in 1931 
and 1947-voters had turned down proposals for a convention. No 
matter how drflmatically the constitution was shown to handicap gov-
ernment, the people rushed to its defense. 
Reform elements within the state had for 20 years been clamoring 
for a convention, and it had been part of Bert Combs's plans; now he 
sought a way to hold such a convention within his four-year term. It 
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was the opinion of his lawyers that it would require two separate 
sessions of the General Assembly to put before the voters a proposal to 
call a convention. So on December 19 Combs sent out a call for a special 
session. Since the legislators were not expressing approval or disap-
provalof a convention but simply agreeing to let the following regular 
session put the matter to a popular vote, the proposal was quickly 
approved. It was a minor victory, but it set a positive tone for the 
approaching regular session. 
With that out of the way, Combs turned his attention to a task that is 
always a complicated and important one for a new governor: finding 
people for his cabinet, the men who will run the departments of 
government and whose performance will do much to set the tone of the 
administration, determine the level of service the people get, and help 
shape the governor's image. Finding good men for these jobs is not 
easy. The offices are demanding, pay little, and seldom earn the official 
much credit. Worse, they are temporary; at the end of four years the 
officials find themselves looking for jobs. Department heads are al-
ways under pressure to hire and fire, to give orders or contracts to the 
politically faithful. All other things being equal, if all qualifications are 
roughly the same, there is nothing wrong in choosing a political ally 
over an outsider or opponent, but any loading of the scales is likely to 
bring down the media or an investigation. And if a department head 
stumbles and a scandal erupts, the. governor is tarred along with him. 
As Combs would discover. 
Where does a governor find competent men and women willing to 
take the risks of such temporary employment? A lot of them come from 
the campaign force; others are recommended by supporters and con-
tributors. Some are young, bright, ambitious, eager for media ex-
posure and reputation; some are veterans who know where bodies are 
buried. Political savvy is a prime virtue. For example, Combs chose 
Cattie Lou Miller, who had been secretary to Clements and Wetherby 
and had worked at Combs headquarters, as executive assistant-not 
just because she was a loyal Democrat but because she knew Kentucky 
politics, knew legislative routine, knew which person should be per-
mitted to see the governor and which one should be given an excuse, 
which phone call was really urgent and which one was a nuisance. 
Later Combs would appoint her commissioner of public information, 
the first woman to hold a commissioner's post in Kentucky. 
He called on Robert Matthews, a former assistant attorney general 
from Shelbyville, to be a top assistant; and Wendell Ford, Owensboro 
insurance man, to be his administrative assistant. William Scent, of 
Paducah and Louisville, would serve as revenue boss; Dr. Robert 
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Martin, previous superintendent of public instruction, became finance 
commissioner; Dr. Arthur Y. Lloyd became adjutant general; Foster 
Ockerman, Lexington lawyer, was named motor transportation com-
missioner; and Edward Breathitt, a young Hopkinsville lawyer, legis-
lator, and descendant of a governor and lieutenant governor, was 
named personnel commissioner. Marshall Qualls accepted the post of 
conservation commissioner, to be succeeded later by]. 0. Matlick, who 
pioneered in shaping strip-mine control regulations. Frankfort news-
man Philip Swift became aeronautics commissioner. Carlos Oakley, a 
Clements ally, was named welfare commissioner, an appointment that 
proved controversial. (Oakley had run for superintendent of public 
instruction and had lost in the primary to Wendell Butler, much to the 
chagrin of Clements. He had depended on Dr. Robert Martin to line up 
teachers in support of Oakley; when the returns came in, he turned 
and said to Martin, "Doctor, your influence, I say, your influence with 
the school people is onionskin thin.") 
As part of his drive to clear the decks before the legislative battle 
began, Combs issued two executive orders. He abolished the merit 
system that Chandler had created by executive order, announcing that 
he would ask the legislature to enact a legislative merit system that 
could not be abolished or altered by the governor; at the same time he 
announced that he would aim at reducing the state payroll by 15 
percent and asked all department heads to submit plans for the reduc-
tion. And he abolished the Highway Advisory Commission that 
Chandler had created in 1956, a group of politicians whose chief 
purpose was to decide patronage and to assure that roads were built 
where they would do the most political good. 
There were few tears shed over the demise of either agency. Nor 
were there many misgivings when Combs canceled four boat-dock 
leases made by Chandler in the closing days of his administration. 
There was some question whether he had a legal right to cancel the 
leases, but, he said, "I thought they were so smelly my action wouldn't 
be tested in the courts. It wasn't." The leases were not unusual; in fact, 
it was customary for governors to hand out such plums to allies in the 
closing days. But Chandler's management of the parks had not been 
his best performance. 
"Happy left the parks in a mess," said Henry Ward, who at the 
time was general manager of the Louisville Area Chamber of Com-
merce but had supervised the parks as conservation commissioner 
under Clements. "He had given out concessions to his political friends 
for almost everything-beaches, those little paddle boats, docks, ice 
cream stands. The parks weren't his idea so he wasn't too interested in 
them, let them slide." 
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Combs had decided that there should be no private enclaves within 
the state parks over which the state had little control and from which it 
got little return. His plan, which he announced on December 29, was to 
move the parks out of the Department of Conservation into a separate 
Department of Parks, and to develop them with a special issue of 
revenue bonds. 
Meanwhile, Wilson Wyatt was getting his own troops in line. There 
was much discussion over whether he should live in the historic 
mansion on High Street that had been refurbished for the lieutenant 
governor. Some people considered it an extravagance; indeed, a lot of 
people thought the lieutenant governor might just as well stay home 
except when the Assembly was in session and he was required to 
preside over the Senate. Wyatt had other ideas; he wanted to upgrade 
the office and image of the lieutenant governor, to be a full-time 
second-in-command, with substantial duties that would take some of 
the load off the governor and be of real service to the state. "I suggested 
to Wilson that for his political image he shouldn't live in the lieutenant 
governor's mansion," said Combs. "It had acquired a controversial 
image under Waterfield. But it was Wilson's decision to live there." 
Wyatt chose the mansion as a step toward upgrading the office. He 
had reason for his attitude; he and Combs had run as a team. He had 
insisted on a partnership status as a provision of the merger and had 
been assured a free hand in his role as industrial promoter for the state. 
He had more experience, as an administrator and as a politician, than 
Combs: he had served as mayor of the state's largest city and as Federal 
Housing Expediter in Washington. He did not want to be relegated 
now to ribbon-cutting. The trouble with the lieutenant governor's 
office as set by the constitution is that it is about as much as the 
lieutenant governor wants to make it; he can work at it, or he can use it 
as a handy and well-financed office from which to run for governor. 
Most do the latter, and the office will never be of much value to the state 
until it is changed by altering the terms under which it was created. 
The mansion may have served for as many social functions during 
the next four years as the governor's mansion; the Wyattswere more 
social than the Combses and loved to give parties (though they decided 
not to keep prison trusties as servants, as had long been the custom at 
the governor's mansion). Wyatt charged out on a campaign to sell 
Kentucky to industry, encouraged by the appointment of Bruce Ken-
nedyas commissioner of economic development. But before undertak-
ing active industrial promotion, Wyatt, like Combs, had to turn his 
attention to the approaching session of the legislature. 
A sickly treasury and an outdated constitution were only two of 
many handicaps facing Combs as he took control. The state was not in 
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good shape; it was regarded as backward by other southern and mid-
western states. As fast as Kentucky educated teachers, for example, 
they left for other states because of the higher pay; fast-growing, 
prosperous Florida sent recruiters to Kentucky each spring and hired 
graduates by the hundreds. Kentucky was second only to Arkansas in 
the number of one-room schools. Fewer than half of its high school 
graduates went on to college, and it had the highest rate of dropouts in 
the nation. 
A 1958 report by the Automotive Safety Foundation charged that 
two-thirds of the state's trunkline (federal aid) road mileage was below 
standards for existing traffic demands; that half of its secondary roads 
were inadequate for modem industrial traffic; that 20 percent of major 
city streets were substandard and in need of modernization, and that 
another 55 percent would soon be substandard because of increasing 
traffic. 
The choice of a commissioner of highways, therefore, became a 
first priority, and it was here that Combs made a selection that 
eventually caused him as much grief as any decision he would have to 
make during his administration. In 1959 the highway department was 
the largest in state government, had the most employees, spent the 
most money, and was by all measure the most politically sensitive. 
City, county, and state political careers rested on the ability to get 
needed roads and bridges built, and terrific pressure was exerted on 
the commissioner. The office required a man of integrity, political 
acumen, and administrative ability, a man with great knowledge of the 
state and total loyalty to the governor. 
Combs's appointment of Earle Clements was therefore by no 
means illogical, but it disturbed and surprised Kentuckians of all 
stripes. Some papers openly charged that Clements had demanded the 
office in return for his support. Others wondered why Oements 
would take such a job after having been governor and U.S. senator; 
many concluded that he wanted to use the office to organize the state 
for his friend Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, who was reportedly running 
for the Democratic nomination for president. 
"We had a meeting over in my office on the farm," recalled Bill 
May. "I think it was the Sunday after election, but I'm not sure. Bert was 
there, Earle, I don't think Wilson was, maybe Lawrence. Anyhow, 
Earle said to Bert, 'If there isn't some reason that would keep you from 
it, I would like to be your highway commissioner,' and Bert said, 'Well, 
no, I can't think of any reason I couldn't appoint you.' And that seemed 
to satisfy everybody." 
Combs remembers the incident somewhat differently. "I think Bill 
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confused two different meetings," he said. "What Earle said, as I recall, 
was something like, 'I think I know of a good highway commissioner 
for you,' and I said, 'Who would that be?' and he said, 'How about me?' 
And I said, 'I'll be happy to appoint you. I can't think of a better one. 
I'm just glad you're willing to take it.' I had already decided to ask him 
to take the job because he had a great record as a road builder-first as 
Union County judge, then as governor. Furthermore, Earle and I knew 
the news media speculation about his influence on my administration 
would be a sensitive area for both of us, and we both thought that if he 
became highway commissioner, answerable directly to me, that that 
would be the best way to handle his role. And, to be frank, it put him in 
a position where I could sort of keep an eye on him. 
"In any event, I asked Earle to take the job. I know a lot of people 
think he demanded the job as the price of his support, but that isn't so. 
After all, roads looked like they would be the most important single 
factor in my administration, and nobody knew more about Kentucky 
roads than Earle. He was the father of the rural road program. He had 
gotten the tax passed that created the program. And he was tough 
enough, had enough stature, that he could handle the pressure. No 
backroad county judge was going in and buffalo Earle Clements. And 
he knew how to operate a big department like that. He knew the federal 
officials involved. He was just a natural for the job." 
. Whatever the facts, the appointment aroused loud grumbling. The 
press generally was suspicious; some editorials asked if Clements was 
stepping down to the commissioner level in order to organize Ken-
tucky for Lyndon Johnson. Others wondered who would be the real 
governor. 'The question was not unreasonable; Clements was a power-
ful and dominating personality, accustomed to giving orders, not 
taking them. He was a man who liked to run things, not a team player. 
He set his own course and kept his own counsel. And he had been 
largely responsible for making Bert Combs governor. There was every 
real reason to wonder whether Combs could control him, and whether 
the politicians of the state would tum to Clements if they did not get 
what they wanted out of Combs. 
Further, there was little warmth between Clements and Wilson 
Wyatt, and the Wyatt wing of the administration was openly suspicious 
of the big man from Morganfield. Barry Bingham, powerful publisher 
of the Courier-Journal and Louisville Times, a friend and ally of Wyatt and 
a key supporter of the Combs-Wyatt ticket, was flatly opposed to the 
Clements appointment. 
"'That's true," Combs said later. "Barry Bingham was very opposed 
to the appointm'ent. He called and told meso, said he would have to 
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criticize the appointment editorially. I don't know where or when the 
hostility between the two men started. It went back to a time before 
Clements ran against Harry Lee Waterfield for governor. Bingham 
backed Waterfield in that race, but I don't know why." 
Suffice it to say, the appointment was suspect. People believed that 
Combs had named Clements because he couldn't avoid doing so. Earle 
wanted it, he had a right to ask for it, he asked for it, and he got it. At 
one of his first press conferences, Combs was asked bluntly if he could 
"stand up to the man who had helped make you governor." 
"If I am not strong enough to keep Earle Clements from taking 
over, I wouldn't be strong enough to keep somebody else from taking 
over," Combs said. The answer was not convincing. And as long as 
Clements was highway commissioner, there were stories of people 
who, unable to get what they wanted from Combs, would say, "Let's 
go across the river [to highway department headquarters] and see the 
man." 
But it is unrealistic to expect government to be apolitical. People are 
elected by people who like them, believe in them, or want something 
from them, and they must please all three types if they wish to keep on 
being elected. If the Clements appointment was political, only slightly 
less political was the naming of Ted Marcum as rural highway commis-
sioner. Marcum, a quiet, flat-eyed, tough mountain man from Clay 
County, was a cousin of Combs. But he also knew the rural road system 
of Kentucky, and he knew especially well the beat-up roads of eastern 
Kentucky. His appointment caused hardly a ripple but would later 
prove controversial when he complained about having to follow the 
orders of the highway commissioner who, he felt, had no authOrity 
over him. 
But if the Clements appointment dripped politics, others were 
noticeably nonpolitical. Combs rejected the resignation of Safety Com-
missioner Don Sturgill, one of the earlier Chandler appointees, and 
asked him to stay on for the time being. Sturgill, a Lexington busi-
nessman popular with the press, had guided the state police through 
four difficult years without major criticism and had managed to attract 
such able assistants as J.E. "Ted" Bassett, a Lexington horseman who 
later became commissioner and brought the police to an unprecedent-
ed level of efficiency and public acceptance. A tall, tough ex-Marine 
officer, Bassett insisted on meticulous performance by the troopers, 
and, in tum, fought in the legislative halls for higher pay, more authori-
ty, and better equipment for his "thin gray line." The troopers were 
devoted to him, and it is doubtful whether the force ever again attained 
the levels of morale and performance achieved under Bassett (who 
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went on to become president of Keeneland, the famed Bluegrass race 
course at Lexington). 
Politics did have a voice in the selection of the racing commission, a 
prestigious post always highly desired. Bill May was given the chair-
manship, which he had asked for and been promised during the 
campaign. Millard Cox of Louisville was given another seat, as were 
Merle Robertson, Louisville banker; Leslie Combs, Lexington horse-
man and owner of the famed Spendthrift Farm of Fayette County; and 
Frankfort attorney Louis Cox, a longtime personal friend of Bert 
Combs. John Dugan, of Louisville, another Democratic stalwart, was 
named secretary of the commission. 
The Kentucky Education Association, meanwhile, was demanding 
a $50 million increase in the school budget, though Combs reminded 
them that schools were already getting 63 cents of every general-fund 
dollar. What the school people did not know was that they were about 
to get more money than they had ever expected, and that Combs 
would make more improvement in schools than had any administra-
tion in history. 
One headache facing a new governor is the constitutional provi-
sion limiting the General Assembly to one 60-day session every two 
years, and ordering it to convene a few weeks after the governor is 
elected. The fact that the legislature is in session so little of the time puts 
the major portion of governmental power in the hands of the governor, 
who is in office all the time, and the quality of the legislative session 
depends to a considerable degree on the program the governor puts 
before. it. Yet he is required to face the first session of his term, and to 
propose to it a program of new laws and a budget that will control state 
spending for the next two years, only a few weeks after he takes office. 
The creation of interim committees with powers to investigate, hold 
hearings, and prepare legislative proposals has increased somewhat 
the power of the legislature, but the substantial share of the power still 
resides with the governor. 
The days before the legislature convenes are tense for people 
around the governor. Before the session opens, there is a meeting of 
the legislators at which new members are briefed and leaders are 
chosen for both houses. The governor has a vital interest in the pro-
ceedings and keeps a close eye on what goes on. He is usually on the 
program and tells the legislators in general what he is going to recom-
mend to them. The legislators have a fair idea, from the tenor of the 
campaign, what the governor is going to propose, and there is typically 
a great deal of after-hours discussion of possible legislative action. 
The governor needs to know how the legislative winds are blow-
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ing, because if he is going to be successful, he must have the under-
standing and support of the legislature. If his party, and particularly 
his wing or faction of the party, has a majority in the Assembly, an 
incoming governor can usually control things during the early going; 
he has enough power, in his control of the budget and the admin-
istrative departments, to keep in line even some members who would 
not otherwise be for him. Legislators who are going to submit contro-
versial bills of their own, or who want projects and appointments for 
their home districts, are not likely to buck the governor until they have 
to. 
But no governor likes to use all of his ammunition early. That is 
why he wants his House and Senate leaders to be strong, politically 
knowledgeable, personally loyal, and competent in parliamentary ma-
neuvering-just as he wants his own people in the chairmanships of 
the various committees that shape, approve, or block bills. 
New Year's Eve was cold but dry. The Wyatts said farewell to 1959 
with a large and very festive party, the Combses with a somewhat 
smaller one. It had been a momentous year, but both men knew that 
the new year would be crucial. Combs was in his office by eight 0' clock 
on the first day of 1960, "getting my ducks in line" for the legislative 
session. Two days later the legislators began moving into town, and on 
January 4 both parties elected officers for the session. There were no 
surprises. Democrats outnumbered Republicans 80 to 20 in the House; 
as expected, Harry King Lowman was elected speaker, and Thomas L. 
Ray of Fairdale, majority leader. In the Senate, Alvin Kidwell was 
elected president pro tern, and James C. Ware was chosen floor leader. 
These selections did not solve all the personnel problems Combs faced. 
"One of the most sensitive problems I had to deal with before the 
session was Dick Moloney," Combs recalled later. "Moloney wanted to 
be House speaker or majority leader, but I was already pretty well 
committed to Harry King Lowman for speaker and to Tom Ray for 
majority leader. Moloney may have been the most able man in the 
legislature. But Harry King was a good speaker. Very sound. Knew 
every twist and turn of procedure and understood the political proc-
ess. Moloney always thought like a political boss, though he was a 
good public servant. He always wanted to come to me through Earle. 
He was hurt, I know. I don't think he ever got over being passed up for 
majority leader." (Prior to 1980 the Democratic governors handpicked 
legislative leadership; since then, with the declaration of legislative 
independence, their influence is less noticeable and infrequently ap-
plied.) 
On January 5, Combs appeared before the customary joint session 
to set the legislative wheels in motion. 
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"I had two big issues to put before the legislature before the budget 
was introduced," said Combs, "the constitutional convention and the 
$100,000,000 bond issue. I had to have that bond issue. Just had to have 
it. If we didn't get it, we weren't going to build the roads we had in the 
works. Now, part of the money that I wanted for parks was in revenue 
bonds, and we could issue them without approval of the voters. But 
that big bond issue for roads was critical. A lot of it was to be used to 
match federal funds. The interstate highway program was just getting 
started well, and it would have ground to a halt in Kentucky without 
the 9 to 1 money we got from the federal government. As it turned out, 
with the bond issue money we finished our interstate system much 
sooner than most of the surrounding states, including Tennessee and 
VIrginia." (Some critics said that completing the interstate network 
ahead of schedule was of no great importance, but as Combs pointed 
out, it would have been a major matter had Kentucky lagged behind 
neighboring states and been a highway bottleneck.) 
Although it did not sound like it, Combs's address to the Assembly 
was a historic one. It did not set the legislators on fire; they sat quietly 
throughout his speech, applauding only at the beginning and end. But 
afterward their comments, and those of reporters, showed a realization 
of the importance of the address. Combs had announced that the 
legislature had a moral obligation to pay veterans a bonus, since the 
voters had approved one, and to levy a sales tax to finance it. He 
proposed more home rule for cities, a merit system for state employ-
ees, a law to protect state workers from assessments for political 
purposes, agricultural research, and new emphasis on conservation. 
He proposed an authority to oversee building for schools, a separate 
parks department, new truck taxes, new laws to control oil and gas 
production, and "more adequate provision for higher education, men-
tal health, transportation, and services to senior citizens and depen-
dent children." But he added that until the courts ruled on the validity 
of the referendum that had approved the veterans' bonus and support-
ing sales tax, some of his tax proposals would have to wait. 
The address was, in brief, a general outline. Combs was telling the 
legislators what he was going to tell them. The real meat and potatoes of 
his program were not put on the table until he presented his budget 
message on February 16. And in the meantime his sales tax and bonus 
bills sparked the beginning of a fight between Combs and Chandlerites 
that would continue throughout the session. Senator Ed Richmond of 
Owensboro threatened a new "rebel" group against Combs if other tax 
cuts were not made to offset the sales tax. Richmond, along with 
Senator Rex Logan of Smith's Grove (and, after the 1961 senatorial 
elections, Senator Casper "Cap" Gardner, also of Owensboro), led 
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these attacks. But Combs had the votes; he was in a strong position on 
both tax and bonus. 
Richmond, Gardner, and Logan, however, were to be the core of a 
tough and vocal opposition. Logan, especially, would continue to be a 
problem, attacking Combs-Wyatt programs on the Senate floor and at 
one point launching such a venomous attack on Wyatt that some 
senators considered offering a proposal to censure him. 
"Rex was a very erratic guy, to put it kindly," said Combs. "He just 
didn't seem able to be moderate. He was for me at first, but I think he 
turned against me when I wouldn't make him patronage man for 
Warren County. He just wasn't the type for it. It would have hurt me, 
and it would have destroyed him. He just didn't have the temperament 
for it." 
It was an open secret that Combs would ask for a 3 percent sales 
tax, and opposition to both bonus and tax proposals came immediately. 
Private interests, most represented by the state chamber of commerce, 
did not oppose the sales tax but insisted that it be balanced by cuts in 
existing taxes, especially the personal and corporate income taxes. No 
one wanted to vote against the bonus, but sporadic efforts were made 
in the House to limit the supporting sales tax to 1 or 2 percent. Other 
efforts, especially by legislators from eastern Kentucky, sought to make 
the bonus more generous than the $500 maximum payment proposed 
by Combs. Some wanted the bonus paid only to veterans living in 
Kentucky; others protested that Kentuckians who had moved to an-
other state deserved payment also. 
Organized labor, which opposed the sales tax in its entirety, de-
manded that food, at least, be exempted. Railroads asked the legis-
lature to recognize the peculiar nature of their operations by exempting 
materials to repair and build rail equipment, and diesel fuel for loco-
motives. The thoroughbred industry insisted that horse sales be ex-
cluded lest the industry move to another state. The coal companies 
urged that machinery and materials used to produce coal, oil, gas, and 
other minerals be exempted as manufacturing equipment. Farm lob-
byists wanted to exempt things the farmer bought that were necessary 
for farm production. Chambers of c-Ommerce sought exemptions for 
raw materials used in manufacturing. And so on. 
"Everybody who has testified on it says it is a good bill," said 
Combs a week after the bill was introduced. "But then they suggest just 
one little bitty amendment. If we accepted even half of the amend-
ments, we wouldn't have any bill at all." 
8 
Tax Money Makes the Mare Go 
A. B. Chandler did not wait for the Combs administration to get under-
way to begin denouncing it. In this, he was typical of the factional 
divisions that have made Kentucky politics so harmful. After presiden-
tial primaries, a losing candidate who attacked his party's nominee 
would be considered an apostate or worse. Indeed, candidates losing 
the race for the presidency traditionally temper their criticism of the 
winner and his programs, even if he is of the opposing party, at least 
until another campaign arrives. But Chandler attacked Combs even 
before the new governor took office, and once the Combs program was 
announced, it became the object of Chandler's ridicule and abuse. 
It was inevitable now that Chandler should get into the act. It had 
to be painful for him to see so much going on in Frankfort while he was 
forced to sit and watch. It was especially galling to see his enemies 
ready to put into motion his old bugbear, the sales tax. He announced 
that he was still opposed to it, and that the bonus could be paid without 
the tax. "They've made their first serious mistake," said Chandler. 
"They've betrayed the people, just like I said they would. The people 
approved only enough tax to pay for the bonus, and that wouldn't be I 
percent. But Combs will put the rest on because he has always wanted 
a sales tax, you understand. I tried to warn the people of this." 
Combs stuck to his guns. He knew that, as critics were charging, a 
3 percent sales tax would yield far more than was needed to pay the 
proposed bonus, but he wanted the excess for the programs he was 
getting ready to propose to the legislature in his budget message. He 
knew he had to keep the bonus small and the exemptions few. 
Two days after his address, Combs asked the legislature to approve 
a 43-mile, four-lane, limited-access $30,000,000 toll road from Win-
chester to Campton, the first stage of the ISO-mile East Kentucky 
Turnpike that Henry Spalding and Bill May had envisioned. It would 
have been a shock had the project not been approved, for the first 
phase of it was already well underway, and Combs had committed the 
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state to considerable expenditure on it. Fortunately, only a few offered 
any opposition; eastern Kentucky had historically been neglected in 
the matter of roads, and the Assembly recognized the need. 
The Eastern Kentucky Turnpike (or Mountain Parkway, as it be-
came known) was unusual. Before its creation, a toll road-such as the 
Kentucky Turnpike from Louisville to Elizabethtown-had to show 
that it would be used by a certain amount of traffic before it could 
justify a bond issue to finance its construction or improvement. The 
Mountain Parkway couldn't begin to qualify for bond assistance on a 
traffic-count basis. 
"That was one of the inequities that eastern Kentucky suffered, as 
both Wilson and I had pointed out to federal road officials," said 
Combs. "You couldn't get federal money unless a road carried a lot of 
traffic, but in east Kentucky there weren't any roads to carry a lot of 
traffic, so there wasn't a lot of traffic. We couldn't get roads without 
traffic, and we couldn't have any traffic until we got roads. 
"So we built the Mountain Parkway on the theory that it would 
generate enough traffic to justify its cost. And, of course, it did, and the 
formula became part of the Appalachian Regional Commission con-
cept of generative aid to depressed or backward areas." 
Combs had other political skirmishes. He had long thought that 
the state needed a separate circuit court in Franklin County to handle 
the numerous cases coming before state governmental agencies, and 
now he asked that such a court be created._This removed Franklin from 
the circuit of the highly respected Judge' William Ardery of Paris, 
whose friends (and others who used the move as an excuse to attack 
Combs) charged that the new-court bill was intended as a ripper. But 
the state Judicial Council, on December 11, 1959, had recommended 
the new circuit, and Combs carried the day on its recommendation. 
Combs employed Felix Joyner, a government technician who had 
served in the administration of Earle Clements, as a consultant on 
government reorganization, a significant act, since it kept Joyner, who 
would become one of the most valuable officials in his administration, 
in Frankfort. Mark Frische, another young "brain truster," was named 
to help Joyner with the reorganization plan. 
In keeping with his pledge to practice strict economy, Combs 
bought a medium-priced Buick as his official car instead of the custom-
ary Cadillac limousine. That was probably a mistake. No one seemed 
impressed by the economy, and there was some criticism, especially 
when it was revealed that he had bought the car from a Prestonsburg 
supporter, Ed Music, though he got it at cost. The governor, said the 
critics, should maintain some dignity of office; a cheap car made the 
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office seem cheap. Later, still stubbornly refusing to indulge in the 
luxury of the traditional Cadillac, Combs would buy a Chrysler Imperi-
al. Again, the economy impressed no one. 
There was grumbling in the press when it was revealed that Mrs. 
Troy Savage, sister of Mrs. Combs, had been hired as housekeeper of 
the governor's mansion. Actually, the hiring of Mrs. Savage was 
nepotism, plain and simple, and Combs admitted as much. But she 
was in reality less housekeeper than companion to Mrs. Combs, who 
was never completely at ease in the mansion and was frequently 
homesick. Mrs. Combs was not the first governor's wife to view life in 
the mansion with something less than affection. Before its most recent 
renovation at the direction of Phyllis Brown, wife of Governor John Y. 
Brown, Jr., the mansion was not a particularly comfortable or conven-
ient residence, or a very handy place in which to entertain personal 
friends. The basement is occupied by a rather extensive command post 
for the Kentucky State Police troopers who guard the mansion and its 
occupants, and drive and guard the governor when he is away from the 
mansion. The beautiful first floor is designed for formal entertaining 
but hardly for informal family life, and the governor's family spends 
most of its time in the second floor residential quarters-which were 
not, until recently, particularly attractive or comfortable. 
Mrs. Combs, an unpretentious woman from Knott County, view-
ed the mansion as stuffy and demanding. In Prestonsburg, she had 
had just about what she wanted in life-a handsome, successful, 
respected husband who was home much of the time; a comfortable, 
attractive house; her children around her, and plenty of neighbors and 
friends. She didn't have her husband's ambition, his habit of looking 
far down the road. Formal entertaining and large crowds, such as those 
that swarmed over the mansion at Derby time, unnerved her. It is 
doubtful that she was ever really happy after she left Floyd County. 
The cities handed Combs a couple of additional hot potatoes. 
Louisville wanted authority to impose an occupational tax; unions and 
taxpayer groups were hotly opposed. Rural forces and suburban repre-
sentatives were also opposed to bills giving cities home rule, putting a 
five-cent limit on parking meters, making it easier for cities to merge or 
annex, exempting city water companies from regulation by the Public 
Service Commission, and allowing cities to garnishee wages to collect 
delinquent taxes. Nearly all of these powers are enjoyed by cities in 
other states, but the inability of Kentucky cities to manage their own 
affairs reflects the anti-city bias of the framers of the 1891 constitution, 
and the refusal of rural legislators to give up a mechanism for forcing 
urban support of rural measures in the Assembly. 
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There was a measure of irony in Combs's experience with his 
proposal for a merit system that would protect state workers from 
political firing and payroll assessment. It was a plan every official, 
employee, and student of government could be expected to applaud. 
But no sooner had he introduced his bill than the Legislative Research 
Commission complained that it was a branch of the legislature, and 
putting its employees under the system would make them answerable 
to the executive branch; the Department of Safety protested that the 
state police required classification and standards not applicable to 
other employees; the Personnel Board argued that it should have 
jurisdiction over enforcement. LRC employees and state police were 
eventually exempted from regulations covering other employees, and 
the House finally passed the bill, 86 to 7, on February 24; the Senate 26 
to 6, on March 6. 
Combs encountered a similar problem with his efforts to create a 
unified program of child welfare services. Former Governor Lawrence 
Wetherby had created a Youth Authority, which had included nearly 
all of the functions Combs wanted to see coordinated by a single 
agency, but the Authority had been shattered by an executive order 
from Chandler. Now there was disagreement among child welfare 
forces as to whether the governor should take children's services out of 
the Department of Economic Security and put them in the Department 
of Welfare with children's institutions; take the institutions out of 
Welfare and put them in Economic Security; or take children's services 
out of Economic Security, take the institutions out of Welfare, and 
make a new, separate department of government. Combs chose the 
third plan. 
Disagreement over the bonus erupted as soon as House Bill 85 was 
introduced on January 20. It specified a bonus to all veterans of the 
Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, and the Korean 
War who had lived in Kentucky for at least six months before going into 
service, who had served for at least 90 days, and who were living in 
Kentucky on November 3, 1959, the day the bonus proposal was 
approved by state voters. Veterans who had served only in the conti-
nental U.S. were to get a maximum of $300, based on $9 per month of 
service; those who had gone overseas were to get a maximum of $500, 
based on $15 a month for overseas duty. 
No one seemed happy with the bill. Eastern Kentucky represen-
tatives demanded more money and wanted the bonus paid to men who 
had gone into service from Kentucky and then moved away-reflecting 
the fact that thousands of eastern Kentuckians had left for jobs in the 
North as soon as the war ended. Veterans' organizations demanded 
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that the residency requirements be dropped, opposed the 3 percent 
sales tax, and asked that all tax receipts be earmarked to pay the bonus. 
Republican members of the legislature offered their own bill, calling for 
flat payments of $300 and $500. 
Eventually, Combs agreed that heirs or dependents would get the 
bonus if the veteran had died, that a majority of the members of the 
review board set up to handle appeals would be veterans, and that 
Adjutant General A. Y. Lloyd, who was to administer payment of the 
bonus, would be instructed to interpret generously sections of the 
bonus law dealing with residence and service. Even so, Republicans in 
the House boycotted the measure when it came to a vote on February 
10, apparently in the belief that the law would eventually prove un-
popular. The bill passed easily, however: 78 to 0 in the House, 24 to 13 
in the Senate. 
Combs also signed a bill calling' for a referendum on a constitu-
tional convention, and announced that it would be tried immediately 
in the courts to see whether its first passage in a special session was 
constitutional, or whether the constitution required passage of a refer-
endum proposal only by regular sessions. 
Wyatt was personally pleased when the legislature repealed the 
income surtax, enacted under Chandler, which he had criticized dur-
ing his separate campaign and promised to repeal. This effected a 36 
percent reduction in the personal income tax and took about 140,000 
low-income people off the tax rolls. Whether this was a wise move can 
be debated. Kentucky needed every penny, and once a tax is repealed it 
is hard to get it back. 
Combs signed another bill raising the marriage age for females 
from 14 to 16, and asked the legislature for $4,500,000 to start a health 
care program for welfare recipients, one of the first of its kind in the 
nation. He created a board of transportation to check on use of state cars 
and halt reported abuses. And he proposed a flat 50-cent fee for 
parking at the state fairgrounds and exposition center in Louisville, a 
fee the fair board had wanted for some time but had been afraid to 
impose. 
State parks posed other problems. Kentucky had built a good basic 
system of 10 major and 16 smaller parks and shrines, most of the land 
having been given to the state. But the parks had never been regarded 
as a major state function. With the exception of aging lodges at Natural 
Bridge, Cumberland Falls, and Pine Mountain, and some housing at 
Kentucky Dam Village-left by the Tennessee Valley Authority when it 
had finished building Kentucky Dam-facilities in the parks provided 
little lure to vacationers or tourists. 
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Combs had plans to change all that. After the legislature approved 
his proposal for a separate department of parks, he named Edward 
Fox, once business manager at Kentucky Dam Village and assistant 
director of parks under Henry, to launch the parks expansion program. 
Combs envisioned a chain of expanded parks offering people in every 
part of the state a vacation spot near home, and serving as the heart of a 
drive to build a tourist industry. With $10,000,000 from the proposed 
bond issue and another $10,000,000 in revenue bonds, he proposed to 
build modern lodges and cottages, golf courses, tennis courts, swim-
ming pools, boat docks and marinas, playgrounds, gift shops, riding 
stables, museums, and amphitheaters, at the same time preserving the 
nature trails, preserves, and camping areas for nature lovers. He didn't 
see the new parks as money-makers but hoped that they would draw 
so many people that motels, stores, boat docks, and other tourist 
facilities would spring up around the parks to accommodate the over-
flow. In this he was disappointed. Tourist development near the parks 
never met expectations, partly because tourism in Kentucky tends to be 
seasonal, and privately owned tourist facilities can seldom operate 
profitably on a single-season basis. Furthermore, all state parks are in 
dry territory where alcoholic beverages, demanded by tourists, cannot 
be sold. 
But in general, the parks themselves were an outstanding success, 
not only bringing modern vacation accommodations close to every 
Kentuckian but producing millions of dollars every year from out-of-
state visitors. Tourism is Kentucky'S third largest industry, bringing in 
more than $3 billion a year from 15,000,000 travelers, of whom approx-
imately 9,000,000, or 60 percent, are from out of state and 40 percent are 
Kentuckians traveling or vacationing within the state. State parks ac-
count for 1,041,000 overnight visitations-with out-of-staters account-
ing for 53 percent of the visitations-and take in $28,000,000 a year. 
Before the Combs administration was over, out-of-state visitations to 
the parks more than doubled over the preceding four years. 
Eventually, tourist use became so widespread that Kentuckians com-
plained that they could not get reservations in their favorite parks 
during vacation months, and there was agitation in the legislature for a 
limit on out-of-state visitors or a system under which Kentuckians 
would get favored treatment. Nothing came of it. 
But the major attention in the early weeks of the session was 
centered on the budget bill Combs was preparing. Kentuckians had not 
had time to judge either Combs or his program before Happy 
Chandler, on February 13, decided that he had seen enough to satisfy 
him and loosed a blast at the entire Combs program. "Combs has lost 
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the support of the people after two months in office," he declared, 
adding that the sales tax was" a fraud against my people. II (Happy had 
a penchant for claiming the population of Kentucky as his own, re-
gardless of their expressed sentiments regarding that ownership.) The 
harangue showed that Chandler still believed-like the girl in the 
song-that if he wished long enough, wishing would make it so. 
The fact was that Combs was getting pretty much what he wanted 
out of the Assembly. Both his strength and his methods were dramat-
ically demonstrated on the morning of the bonus bill vote in the House, 
when he breakfasted with House members at the mansion. The bonus 
bill was, he knew, the severest test he faced; if the lawmakers approved 
the bonus, they had to approve the sales tax to support it, and it was 
the sales tax that held the key to Combs's program. But Combs did not 
mention the bonus bill at the breakfast. The next day, when the Senate 
was to vote on it, Combs left Frankfort to make a speech. There was a 
great deal of speculation about Combs's ways of dealing with legis-
lators, but he has insisted that he chose leaders on whose honesty and 
intelligence he knew he could depend, maintained a close and con-
stant contact with them, and kept a close head count of votes. 
"They knew what lwanted them to do," he said later. "I didn't have 
to spell it out for them. They knew they would have to call on me for 
things they wanted for their constituents, and they knew I could 
remember their voting records. I had also pretty well sold them on the 
idea that the people had given me-and them, too---a mandate to 
improve state government and the state, and a lot of them sincerely 
agreed, people like Kidwell, Ware, Mitch Denham. These were not just 
ordinary politicians. They really wanted to improve things. II 
Other administration business had been cleaned up before the 
budget was introduced. The bill establishing the Business Develop-
ment Corporation of Kentucky, to promote new industry and help 
existing business, whipped through the legislature without a negative 
vote. House Bill 273, establishing the Kentucky Public School Authori-
ty-principally an agency to help local school districts finance school 
construction-passed with only two opposing Senate votes. Such leg-
islation was prelude. The legislators knew that the real work would 
come with the budget. It was the main topic of discussion in the lobby 
of the Capital Hotel. Lawmakers met in tense little groups along the 
corridors of the capitol building to discuss it. Lights burned late into 
the night in the governor's office, as the all-important document was 
shaped and sharpened. 
On the morning of February 17, 1960, Combs rose early, ate his 
usual quiet breakfast in the family quarters on the second floor of the 
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mansion (he seldom ate breakfast in the formal dining room on the first 
floor unless he had company), and walked quickly from the mansion to 
the capitol. He showed no signs of nervousness as he entered the 
elevator shortly after ten 0' clock and rode to the third floor, where the 
lawmakers awaited his address. He knew he was going to shake the 
state as he stood before the joint session in the House chamber. 
His speech was a blockbuster. It proposed a 3 percent sales tax, 
with exemptions only for car sales and such farm items as the machin-
ery, fuels, and equipment used in producing crops, which could log-
ically be considered manufacturing machinery. And it called for greatly 
increased spending for almost every state service, especially for educa-
tion. Combs described his $1,024,025,723 biennial budget, the first 
billion-dollar budget in Kentucky's history, as a means of "lifting 
Kentucky from her old depressing place at the bottom of the ladder." 
Actually, Combs's budget offered few innovations or new depar-
tures for the state. Rather, it raised the level of state services and 
support for its institutions to the point where the resulting structure 
appeared to be new. The Kentucky Education Association had been 
readying its weapons for an assault on the legislature, where it planned 
to demand an increase of almost 50 percent in school funds; suddenly, 
here was the governor asking $271,130,530 for public education for the 
1960-62 biennium, $102,714,63~2 percent-more than was being 
spent for the current biennium! Furthermore, almost half of the mas-
sive increment was earmarked for increases in teachers' salaries. 
Another $25,000,000 increase was tagged for transportation and 
new school buildings. State colleges would get $5,325,000 for new 
buildings; the University of Kentucky and its A. B. Chandler Medical 
Center, an additional $10,522,000. The latter brought loud grumbling 
from the Combs Democrats in the legislature because of the tongue-
lashing Chandler had given the sales tax that would make such an 
appropriation possible, and the leadership in both houses proposed 
changing the name of the school to the University of Kentucky Medical 
Center. Combs resisted the temptation, but the name galled him. 
"Chandler had obligated the state for the medical school, but he hadn't 
given it much money," he said in 1984. "He blasted the sales tax that 
produced the money for the school, but was perfectly willing to take 
credit for the school it built and put his name on it when we dedicated 
it." (In 1973 Chandler told his son Ben, as an example of the efficiency 
of his administration, "They didn't want us to build the medical center, 
you understand, and said we couldn't pay for it. Well, we built it and 
we paid for it.") 
Additional funds for education included $5,614,000 to raise bene-
At seventeen, Bert Combs got his first real job, as clerk for 
attorney Murray L. Brown (foreground) in his Manchester law 
offices. Combs does not appear to be overjoyed with his 
prospects. Courtesy of Bert T. Combs. 
Below, Bert Combs takes to the campaign trail in 1955, running 
against Happy Chandler in the Democratic gubernatorial 
primary. Earnest, honest, sincere, he was no match for the 
flamboyant Chandler. Royaltone Studio, Russellville. 
Again a candidate for governor, a more seasoned Combs campaigns in 
1959. Here, he and running mate Wilson Wyatt hit the porches in the 
days before television. 
Some of the foolishness expected of candidates in a farm state. 
Except where otherwise indicated, all photos are courtesy 
of the Courier-Journal and Louisville Times. 
President Harry S. Truman came to Paducah to endorse Combs and Wyatt. 
Governor Chandler, smarting over the primary defeat of his candidate, Harry 
Lee Waterfield, refused to welcome the president. 
Below, Combs, Wyatt, and their wives and campaign workers savor victory 
on election night 1959 in Louisville. Kentucky Department of Public 
Information. 
The victors, 
November 1959. 
Governor Combs entertains some of his younger supporters in his office. 
Kentucky Department of Public Information. 
Above, Combs rides with presidential candidate John F. Kennedy, cam-
paigning in Lexington in 1960. Photo by Lou Fain. Below, he accom-
panies Vice President Lyndon Johnson and Robert Martin, president 
of Eastern Kentucky University. Johnson was in Kentucky to attend the 
dedication of new buildings at EKU. Photo by Daniel Webster. 
, 
Three small-town boys who left their marks on Kentucky: Governor 
Bert Combs, Colonel Harland Sanders of Kentucky Fried Chicken fame, 
and Edward T. "Ned" Breathitt, who succeeded Combs in the 
governorship. Kentucky Department of Public Information. 
Combs jokes with 
Democratic war-
horse Emerson 
"Doc" Beauchamp 
in Beauchamp's 
Highway Depart-
ment office in 
1961. 
Royaltone Studio, 
Russellville. 
William H. "Bill" May, an old mountain boy and Combs stalwart, 
did all right for himself in the Bluegrass. 
Below, Governor Combs delivers the State of the Commonwealth 
address to a joint session of the legislature on January I, 1962. 
Governor Combs 
-the man in the 
white raincoat-
on the Capitol 
grounds in 
January 1960. 
Former Governor Combs stands before his beloved floral clock, for which 
the state garden clubs honored him, on May 6, 1966. 
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fits for retired teachers from $750 to $1,200 a year, $3,140,000 more for 
free textbooks, and $2,000,000 more for vocational education. 
For roads, Kentucky's other sickly service, the budget asked a 
record $139,825,000, plus $30,000,000 in bonds that had not then been 
sold, and proposed another $90,000,000 bond issue to finish up the 
interstate highway program. Roads, of course, are financed not from 
the general fund but from the highway fund, into which road-user 
taxes are funneled, but in this instance they would also get the addi-
tional bond money. 
Combs went on to announce that work had begun on the mountain 
toll road, and added that another toll road was planned for western 
Kentucky and possibly a third for the central area. Record sums were 
also provided for new construction in the state parks (which would 
also be included in the planned bond issue), and Combs asked that 
parks be taken out of Conservation and given their own departmental 
status. 
The budget carried record appropriations for almost every aspect 
of government: dormitories for every state college and the University 
of Kentucky, new beds for Central State Mental Hospital, more money 
for crippled children, general welfare payments, public safety, eco-
nomic development and industrial promotion. It proposed an agri-
cultural research center and new farm facilities at the university, new 
airports. Before the governor's opponents in the Assembly could re-
gain their balance, HB300, containing the heart of his program, was 
introduced in the House by Majority Leader Thomas Ray. 
Combs's "first 100 days" had begun, and they would leave their 
mark on the state. 
9---
The Calm Revolutionaries 
Even before Combs delivered his budget message, reporter Richard 
Harwood had warned, in the Louisville Times, that a "calm revolution" 
was brewing. 
"The first 100 days of the new administration in Frankfort may be 
an epochal period in the modern governmental history of Kentucky," 
he wrote. "There is a whisper of revolution in the wind-revolution in 
the political structure of the state, revolution in the public service at 
Frankfort, revolution in the status of Kentucky's cities, revolution in 
basic relationships between the state government and the people in 
critical areas of life." 
And, as in most times of revolution, there was an undercurrent of 
excitement around the capital, a feeling that great things were about to 
happen, things talked about for years but always out of reach; that 
there was going to be new school money; that teachers and professors 
were going to be paid as much as their counterparts in other states; that 
the colleges were going to get money for modernization and expan-
sion; that new roads and parks were going to be built; and that state 
agencies dealing with dependent children, the poor, and the mentally 
retarded were finally going to get money that would let them modernize. 
Press reaction to the Combs budget proposals was generally good, 
although some pro-Chandler editors complained that the budget was 
extravagant and proved Chandler's contention that only a small part of 
the sales tax revenue would be used for the bonus. On this point they 
were correct: Combs had planned to use the major share of the tax for 
his program-and even that, he knew, would not be enough. 
Despite its size and complexity, the budget bill glided through the 
House 96 to 0, and the Senate 35 to O. After the session ended, Happy 
Chandler inveighed against Combs's reckless spending, his bloated 
budget, and the cruel burden of his sales tax. But when it came time to 
vote, the Chandlerites, like the Republicans, had fallen into line. 
Combs signed the bill on March 10, and the stage was set. He had been 
given the state's first billion-dollar budget. 
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On the surface, the first months of the Combs administration were 
hectic, with a flood of bills in the legislature, new appointments an-
nounced almost daily, and a steady drumbeat of political charges and 
countercharges echoing in the press. But the administration, as well as 
its program, was taking shape in rather calm fashion. Dr. Robert Martin 
resigned as commissioner of finance to become president of Eastern 
Kentucky State College; he was succeeded by Robert Matthews, who 
was later succeeded by Felix Joyner. Wendell Ford stepped up to be top 
assistant, and Fontaine Banks, a blunt, fireplug ex-Marine moved into 
the executive offices to become liaison man with local officials and 
politicians. It was a relatively young group, able to work the long hours 
required during the early phase of an administration. 
In his dealings with the legislature, Combs had from the beginning 
adopted a policy of walking and talking softly. "Whereas Chandler 
hugged and flattered, thundered and threatened in order to get the 
votes, Combs leaves the legislature to the legislative leaders," wrote 
Richard Harwood. "If he uses any force, it isn't evident." 
At the same time, Combs kept in close and constant touch. 
"Almost every morning during the session," he explained later, 
"the party leadership would come down to my office before the houses 
convened, and we would talk about what should be done that day. We 
would take checks to see where we stood on votes, who we could count 
on, where we might be in trouble. We pretty well knew where we 
stood. They'd tell me if they were getting any special pressure, and I'd 
do the same if I thought it was important. 
"Each of them hadhis own grapevine, of course, and when they 
left the office each grapevine would begin to work, so that every 
member who was with us knew right away what was going to happen 
that day, which bills would be brought up, what to expect. We had such 
a majority that there was seldom much doubt about things, about 
votes. Leonard Hislope or Rex Logan would get up and make windy 
speeches, but they got nowhere. If we didn't feel fairly sure we had the 
votes, we wouldn't bring a bill up. We'd work on it. 
"I relied on Harry King Lowman, Tom Ray, Dick Moloney in the 
House, and on Wilson [Wyatt], Kidwell, and Jim Ware in the Senate. 
Several times during the session I would have the Democrats over for 
breakfast, and if they had complaints or questions we would bring 
them up and work it out. I had the Republicans over once or twice, too. 
I always tried to remain on friendly terms with the opposition, and a lot 
of them were actually personal friends. We understood that we were 
just after different things. 
"Reporters talked constantly about arm-twisting. It didn't happen. 
There just wasn't any. The press never did believe that, I think, but it 
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was a fact. It just wasn't necessary. Once or twice during the whole 
session I had to call a man in and remind him that we had done things 
for him or were going to help him, and that we expected his help in 
return. But we usually knew if there was something back home that 
made things difficult for him, and we tried to take that into considera-
tion. 
"People would come in and ask for things-a road, a bridge, some 
little thing here or there, usually something perfectly legal and ethical. 
If it wasn't, they would usually try to go through someone else. But 
when they asked for something, they more or less knew, acknowl-
edged, that they owed us support in return. In politics you don't have 
to spell things out; you shouldn't have to say, 'If you don't vote for my 
bill, you'll get no road.' They know that. 
"Of course, this unspoken understanding of how things work 
doesn't always work out the way you intend. Henry Ward was always a 
great one for being Mr. Clean. He always made a big show of refusing to 
play politics; made a lot of politicians mad that way. I remember once 
when he was highway commissioner, he called in Bill Cooley, one of Bill 
Leonard's boys, an old hand in the Highway Department. Got him on 
the carpet. Said to him, 'Cooley,' you know, bellowing at him like Ward 
did, 'I'm told you've been hauling campaign literature in a state vehi-
cle. What about it?' And Cooley said, 'Yeah, I guess I've hauled a ton.' 
Ward bellowed at him, 'Who told you to do that?' And Cooley said, 
'Why, nobody, Commissioner. I knowed the time had come. I know 
what I'm supposed to do.'" 
An example of this mutual understanding came when Combs 
vetoed a bill to raise legislators' expense allowances from $10 to $25 a 
day. "I'm opposed to any public official increasing his own compensa-
tion," he explained. But he showed no upset when, the next day, both 
houses overrode his veto. He had told his people that he would have to 
veto; they understood that and didn't resent it when he did. He, in 
turn, knew that his people were going to override his veto, and they 
understood that he would not be offended if they did. 
His veto of the milk bill was another matter. That highly controver-
sial measure would have set a minimum price that could be charged for 
milk. While consumer groups saw it as a means of squelching competi-
tion, the milk industry generally favored it, as did most retailers, who 
saw it as a means of ending price cutting and bringing some order to 
the milk trade. Combs was attacked angrily for the veto. He was also 
attacked by Jefferson County officials for vetoing a bill that would have 
let Louisville and Jefferson County collect all taxes, state and local, on 
the installment plan. Louisville Mayor William Cowger accused Combs 
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of "blocking an effort to make the payment of taxes easier for the small 
taxpayer," but Combs retorted that localities had no business collecting 
state taxes (actually, he had no intention of letting state tax revenues get 
out of state hands). 
While the budget and the sales tax were undoubtedly the most 
important issues facing what was probably the most important legis-
lative session of the century, they were not the only critical ones. The 
practice of strip mining was becoming the subject of major controversy, 
and the fight echoed in the Assembly. Strip (or surface) mining had 
been practiced in Kentucky for half a century, but only since 1950 had it 
become a major industry-and a major villain to the environmentalists 
of the state. In strip mining, earth and rock are removed from the 
surface of the coal seam and the coal is then scooped out, without the 
need to sink a shaft to reach the coal. This avoids the danger of having 
men underground, but the damage to the earth, unless the disturbed 
rock and topsoil are restored to their original site, is enormous, es-
pecially in the mountains. 
And it was in the mountains of eastern Kentucky that the real battle 
over strip mining erupted. Several big companies had been stripping 
for several years on the fairly flat or rolling land of western Kentucky, 
where restoring the terrain was relatively simple. It was another matter 
on the hillsides of eastern Kentucky, where the disturbed earth slid or 
was washed down the steep slopes to clog and pollute streams, cover 
roads, and ruin homes and farmland. The huge gashes left on hillsides, 
as well as the muddy spoilbanks below, were an aesthetic affront as 
well as an ecological threat. People were beginning to insist that the 
strip miners be forced to repair their damage to the land. 
The environmentalists and other anti-strip-mine forces formed 
around Harry Caudill, a tall, drawling young lawyer-author from 
Whitesburg who would soon achieve fame with his book Night Comes 
to the Cumberlands, a furious indictment of mining, especially strip 
mining, and the ravages done by mining to his native hills. Caudill was 
championing a bill to require coal operators to repair some of their 
damage. It was, actually, a rather mild proposal that promised to be 
hard to enforce, and the penalties it carried were light compared to the 
damages being done and the money being made by the industry. But 
coal operators saw it for what it was, the first step of many, the camel's 
nose under the tent, and they moved to block it. 
This put Combs in a ticklish spot. Through his fight against 
Chandler and his efforts for roads, schools, parks, and reforms in 
general, he had acquired something of a "Man on a White Horse" 
image, enjoying the support of an admiring corps of do-gooders and 
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editors. Aside from enjoying the role, Combs recognized its political 
value. At the same time he had to keep in mind that the base of his 
political strength lay in eastern Kentucky, where coal put money into 
the pockets of thousands. And he was a personal friend of many of the 
coal operators directly concerned with the control legislation. 
Combs did not exactly bite the bullet on the strip mine bill; indeed, 
he hardly nibbled it. He did not oppose the original bill, but neither did 
he defend it when the coal lobby began to move. The Assembly finally 
passed a bill that was at least an improvement over the existing weak 
control regulations. Harry Caudill was pleased, though later, when he 
saw the law in operation, he condemned it as "damn near worthless" 
and said he regretted his part in its passage. The usually supportive 
Courier-Journal sneered editorially that "Governor Combs. . . knuckled 
under to the strip mine lobby with all the bold courage of emasculated 
hummingbirds." Combs replied blandly, "I relied on Harry Caudill. He 
helped write it." 
Caudill was more pleased with his role in an investigation of state 
education by the House Investigating Committee on Education, of 
which he was a member. Years later he said, "I am proud of what we 
did, prouder, I think, than of any other thing I had part of." On March 
10, 1960, while the Senate was considering a bill to create a continuing 
commission on public education, the investigating committee released 
a report that was scathing in its criticism of practically every aspect of 
state education and the educational hierarchy. The committee report 
declared that much of the education budget would be wasted if reforms 
were not made in a system "riddled with politics, waste and incompe-
tency." It went on to charge school officials with" greed and inefficien-
cy, nepotism, political selection of teachers who were hired, fired and 
transferred according to their support of the local superintendents, 
misuse of school buildings and vehicles, and the granting of contracts 
to political favorites." 
The report questioned the fitness of teachers and administrative 
educators to educate the children of Kentucky. The hand was the hand 
of the investigating committee, but the indignant voice was the voice of 
Harry Caudill denouncing "self-serving paragons of mediocrity who 
can twist to their ungodly advantage the best laws ever written" and 
including in its condemnation "professional educators in the Depart-
ment of Education, the 212 school superintendents, the ruling clique of 
the Kentucky Education Association and the presidents and deans of 
the state's colleges." 
The report came too late in the session to spur any real reforms or 
long-range probe of school spending, nor did it seem to influence the 
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Senate, though the Assembly appropriated funds with which to run 
the committee on public education for two years. Actually, the legis-
lature, like Kentuckians in general, has never known how to go about 
improving the state school system. The legislators have sensed, 
vaguely, that there is something basically wrong in funneling more and 
more money to the same educators who got the state into its mess in the 
first place, but they have never been able to decide on an alternative. 
The system of local school boards and powerful county school superin-
tendents has been shown to be unprogressive, mired in politics, and 
often corrupt. County school superintendents are-almost have to 
be-politicians first and educators second, if at all. They work to elect a 
school board whose members will elect them; loyalty, not fitness, is the 
first virtue. Frequently, especially in small and rural counties, the 
school system is the largest employer, the largest purchaser, and the 
largest contractor in the county; naturally, the superintendent is politi-
cally powerful-and active. Teachers are often given the day off on 
election day so they can work the polls. Those who do not vote 
properly often find themselves out of a job or in unwanted schools. 
Suppliers and contractors are also chosen for their politics as well as 
their products, and it is not rare to find the superintendent or members 
of the school board owning or having interest in firms that do business 
with the county schools. 
The system of local control was instituted in the nineteenth cen-
tury, not to assure quality education but to make sure that the schools 
did not teach dangerous or suspicious doctrines, and to see that they 
did not cost too much and thus force local officials to raise taxes. The 
system has perpetuated provincialism. School boards have been more 
concerned with observing local mores than with exploring new areas of 
thought or methods of education; more interested in athletics than 
academics, since winning teams tend to keep taxpayers happy without 
frightening fundamentalist citizens. Boards and superintendents are 
seldom equipped to decide optimum school hours, course require-
ments, grading methods, promotion and graduation standards, or 
selection of teaching materials, textbooks, and library books. Until 
ways are found to bring informed judgments to bear on these deci-
sions, and to make standards and requirements uniform throughout 
the state, Kentucky is going to continue to waste huge amounts of 
money on its schools. 
Combs had an illustrative experience with the school lobby toward 
the end of the 1960 session. As the final weeks of the session ap-
proached, he found himself a hero with the school people. He had 
given them more money than they had ever dreamed of getting. 
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Teachers' salaries had been markedly increased, new classrooms built, 
new buses ordered. A community college system had been launched, 
new classroom and dormitory buildings raised on every college cam-
pus. Everyone was ecstatic. 
But then Combs, at the behest of some of the legislators who had 
issued the school report, backed a bill that would have prohibited 
athletic contests on nights before classes or examinations, so that 
students could be alert to study. You would have thought he had 
advocated free sex and compulsory Communism. Coaches, principals, 
superintendents, parents, and students all rose up to denounce him. 
The idea of putting studies before basketball games was un-American, 
un-Kentuckian, probably un-Christian. Combs backed down. Within 
two years, the same people were moaning for more money for the poor 
kiddies of Kentucky. 
The investigating committee's work did serve Combs a warning 
that he was up against more than a historic lack of money in his drive to 
upgrade Kentucky schools. And it would be recalled vividly a few 
months later when a major scandal erupted in the schools of Carter 
County, one of the horrible examples of a politically run school system 
cited in the report. 
As a matter of fact, the legislature, like the state it represented, was 
not exactly a hotbed of liberalism. After a torment of bad oratory, it 
passed a conflict-of-interest bill aimed at improving the ethics of the 
legislators. When it tackled a bill to reduce the work of firemen in cities 
of the second class from 60 to 56 hours, it ran into a tidal wave of tears, 
as officials from Lexington moaned that such a move would bankrupt 
their city. (It didn't.) When Combs proposed a modest workers' com-
pensation bill to increase benefits to disabled workers, which meant 
increasing employers' contributions to the account financing the bene-
fits, Associated Industries of Kentucky and the state chamb.er of com-
merce screamed as though they were having their tonsils removed 
through their ears. Like the bill to establish a prevailing wage for state 
construction projects, it barely squeaked through. 
Combs had easier going with a group of what might be called 
reform measures, including one requiring voting machines in every 
county by 1963. On the other hand, the legislators passed a truck-
weight bill increasing maximum truck weights so much that Combs 
refused to sign it, letting it become law without his signature. And in 
the closing days of the session it approved a proposal for submitting to 
the voters a bond issue including $10,000,000 for the new parks pro-
gram, a $7,500,000 omnibus tax bilt and $2,035,000 for the "Little 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation" industrial lending agency, which 
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had been saved when the court of appeals reversed JudgeW.B. Ard-
ery's ruling that the agency was unconstitutional. 
The conduct of the Frankfort press corps during Combs's first 
session was curious. Although most of the predominantly liberal corps 
liked Combs and were enthusiastic about his program, a number of 
reporters made a habit of prophesying doom for him. When the House 
rules committee took over in the first week of March, deciding which 
bills would go to the floor for consideration, there was a great sighing 
among reporters that the governor's program was in trouble. Every 
windbag speech on the floor, every mumble of discontent, every 
criticism of an administration bill was automatically ominous. Combs 
was "in trouble." "A possible revolt" was brewing. His "control was 
challenged." Any time-consuming speech by Rex Logan or Cap 
Gardner created," chaos." Readers must have imagined the poor gover-
nor slinking out of Frankfort in despair and defeat. Actually, he was 
confident, fairly relaxed, and in good shape in his legislative dealings. 
Most of his big bills had already been passed, and few of the rest were 
in real difficulty. The bill to permit Jefferson County to impose an 
occupational tax gave him some temporary trouble, mainly because 
eastern Kentucky legislators were resentful of Louisville for voting 
against the veterans' bonus. But Combs gave it a quiet nudge, and it 
squeaked through the Senate on a day when 22 bills were passed in less 
than four hours. 
In the final rush, the Assembly also approved measures creating a 
turnpike authority empowered to issue bonds for toll road con-
struction, banning billboards within 600 feet of the new interstate 
highways, and adding two professors to the University of Kentucky's 
board of trustees. It authorized a state employees' merit system free 
from control by the governor, and it made several changes in tax laws. 
In all, the legislature enacted more than 300 bills into law, more than 
200 of which were signed by Combs. He vetoed only 18, the remainder 
becoming law without his signature. 
But a nagging little issue was beginning to attract increasing atten-
tion in the press, and though it did not directly concern Combs or his 
new administration or reflect unfavorably on him personally, he knew 
it was the kind of nasty political spat that might easily escalate into a 
major scandal. And eventually it did. During the last week of February 
1960 the Courier-Journal published a story describing a squabble in 
Carter County between county school superintendent Heman 
McGuire and a group of citizens who charged that McGuire had 
exceeded his authority in handling school personnel and had mis-
managed school funds The citizens wanted McGuire out. McGuire 
130 DIVIDE AND DISSENT 
refused to quit, and he was supported by members of the county board 
of education, most of whom had been elected with his help. 
The Carter County situation was one ofthose that had prompted 
the blast at school politics contained in the report of the investigating 
committee. But when the legislature did nothing about the report, 
McGuire and the Carter County board relaxed, assuming that the 
worst was over. It wasn't. The press took up where the committee left 
off, and it soon became apparent that it was on the trail of an interesting 
character in Mr. McGuire. A professional educator who had come up 
through the slippery ranks of school politics, Heman McGuire could 
playa county school system the way a country man can playa banjo. 
He reward,ed those who supported him with purchases, contracts, or 
jobs. School board members who opposed him were not reelected. 
Teachers who questioned his orders found themselves in remote and 
difficult schools, while those who did as they were told and asked no 
embarrassing questions got good assigrtments. When the teachers 
were given a holiday on election day so that they could work at the 
polls, they did not have to ask for whom they were working. Heman 
told them. 
The situation did not stop at the county line. McGuire was nomi-
nally a Republican, possibly because Carter was a Republican county, 
but he was not averse to using his political influence on behalf of 
Democratic candidates for state office. For example, he was a friend to 
Wendell Butler, the Democratic state superintendent of public instruc-
tion. Butler had once sold him school supplies. Under Kentucky's 
constitution, the superintendent, who heads the Department of Edu-
cation, is an elected official, a requirement that has produced superin-
tendents whose education did not extend to a knowledge of good 
English or an appreciation of ethics but whose political instincts were 
impeccable. 
In 1947, when he was president of the Kentucky Education Asso-
ciation, McGuire made no effort to hide his use of his office to help 
political candidates. Or to hurt them. Of Carter County's Earl Bellew 
(who was running for state representative), McGuire said, "Certainly 
he should be for me because I have taken care of his wife in one of the 
best school positions in the county." Other statements were similar: "I 
saw he and Charlie Johnson [this from the county's top educator] 
talking .... Now, just a few years ago Charlie Johnson and his wife 
were in bad financial condition. . . . I gave him and his wife both 
schools." "An indictment was approved by the Carter County grand 
jury against him . . . the case was coming up for trial. I got the 
prosecution stopped against him." "The Catholics are trying to get 
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control of the public schools in Kentucky. . . there will be a move in the 
legislature to permit Negroes to go to school with white children. . . I 
am against that ... . I am against allowing communism from Russia 
being taught in our schools." 
When the citizens of Carter County finally rebelled in the winter of 
1959-60 and charged McGuire with embezzlement, tax evasion, irreg-
ularities in handling school funds, and unethical personnel policies, 
Wendell Butler refused to remove him, investigate the charges, or even 
call for an audit of county school finances, declaring that in America 
people are innocent until proven guilty and that he would not impose 
state authority over local control until the courts had found McGuire 
guilty. 
It took more than two years for the wheels of bureaucracy and 
justice to grind Heman McGuire from office. In the meantime McGuire 
was proving an embarrassment to Combs. People thought Combs had 
the power to remove McGuire from office and wondered why he 
didn't. But thanks to the constitution, the governor has no authority to 
remove a county superintendent; neither could he order Wendell 
Butler, head of the state's school system, to remove McGuire. About 
the best he could do was to call on McGuire to resign, which he did. 
McGuire, of course, had no intention of resigning and said so. He had a 
good thing going; he was indisputably the political power in his coun-
ty, had friends in both parties, and made about as much in salary as did 
the superintendent of Jefferson County schools. 
Combs called Attorney General John Breckinridge and suggested 
that he go to Carter County and take a look at the schools. "While 
you're there," he said, "you might want to count school buses." 
Breckinridge did just that and found that the county had fewer school 
buses than it had paid for and fewer than were listed on its inventory. 
In other words, somebody had gotten money to buy buses and hadn't 
bought buses, or had paid for buses the county didn't get. That, 
actually, was the error that led to McGuire's downfall. 
On May 25, Attorney General Breckinridge told Combs that while 
the governor could not oust McGuire, he had the power to order the 
state auditor to audit the Carter schools. Combs sent State Auditor Joe 
Schneider to make the audit, but Schneider had hardly started when 
Roy Hammond, chairman of the Carter County Citizens League for 
Good Government, wrote him a letter saying that people figured a state 
audit would be a whitewash. This angered Combs, who said, in effect, 
"All right. You asked for an audit, and we were giving you one. If you 
don't want it, we won't do it." There was no sense spending state funds 
for the audit, he said, if the outcome was going to be suspect. 
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Hammond quickly recanted; a committee called on Combs to ask 
that the audit be resumed; and Schneider returned to work, announc-
ing that an outside firm would assist. He found pretty much what the 
citizens group had charged: that McGuire had used school funds for 
personal purposes; that he had charged the county for school buses 
which, if purchased, were never delivered; and that he had used his 
office to punish those who did not support him politically. 
Combs asked the state board of education to investigate these 
charges. The board agreed and named Judge James Stites of Louisville, 
a highly respected former chief justice of the Court of Appeals, to head 
the investigation. Stites's findings implicated not only McGuire but 
four members of his county board. The state board removed the four 
members, and new members were named who tossed McGuire out. 
The case was not settled until the fall of 1961. Then, in March 1963, 
McGuire was found guilty of evading payment of U.S. income taxes, 
fined $5,000, and sentenced to a year and a day in prison. He was also 
ordered to repay to the Carter County school system some $36,000 in 
misappropriated funds. 
Combs came out of the episode in pretty good shape. Heman 
McGuire was out, and Combs seemed to be the man who had foiled the 
villain. Yet the legal and constitutional weaknesses that had let 
McGuire operate for so long were still on the books. It was still possible 
for a Heman McGuire to get control of a county school system and use 
it for his own power and profit. The superintendent of public instruc-
tion could still refuse to remove a McGuire, and still had so much 
power that he could defy the governor's reform efforts. The 1891 
constitution was still a millstone around the neck of Kentucky. 
But while the Carter County mess was becoming an irritant, a far 
more serious scandal was brewing within the Combs administration, 
and it would prove hurtful. During the final days of the legislative 
session, however, Combs wanted only to bring it to a successful close, 
and this, everyone but Chandler and a few of his followers conceded, 
he did. He not only got from the legislature practically every measure 
he asked for but enjoyed the overwhelming support of his party 
throughout. Whereas Chandler as governor had managed to pass bills 
only with Republican help in both houses, Combs almost invariably 
had more than 80 percent of the Democrats with him. James Ware 
sponsored 51 bills in the Senate, losing three. Tom Ray sponsored 68 
bills in the House; none that came to a vote was defeated. 
On February 25, Richard Harwood reported that "in the legislative 
session of 1958 Gov. A.B. Chandler got 80 percent of Republican votes 
as against only 40 percent of the Democratic votes. His program was in 
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constant trouble. In the crucial tests thus far, House and Senate Demo-
crats have cast 81 percent of their votes for the Combs program. As a 
result, Combs's batting average with the Assembly thus far is 1,000." 
But early in March 1960 the Department of Highways had repor-
tedly contracted to lease 34 used dump trucks from an associate of 
Thurston Cooke, the Louisville automobile dealer who had served as 
finance chairman for the Combs-Wyatt campaign. Before this "truck 
deal" was finished, it would cast suspicion on the administration and 
cause a rift between Combs and Earle Clements that would never be 
totally healed. 
10 __ _ 
Of Trucks, Clocks, 
and Varmints 
As the legislators packed to go home, Combs was hailed by the press as 
a master politician, a man in cool control of his office. The Louisville 
Times called him "a Kentucky Truman, surprisingly tough when neces-
sary, courageous, humorous, willing to take responsibility, and with a 
firm grasp of the historic and political realities of the governorship." 
This view was not, of course, unanimous. Happy Chandler announced 
that Kentuckians were ready to revolt against the sales tax and declared 
that the Combs administration had a "bad moral tone." A spokesman 
for the Associated Industries of Kentucky called Combs a "labor lob-
byist." 
The truth was, however, that neither the Chandler faction nor the 
Republican party had offered an alternative program or countered any 
of Combs's major bills with substantial substitutes. Kentucky factions 
still battled over power, not programs. 
But Combs had little time to savor his victory. On March 27 he 
signed the bill taking Franklin Circuit Court from Judge W. B. Ardery's 
jurisdiction, with a new judge and commonwealth's attorney to be 
named on September 1 to serve until the November 1961 elections. The 
new court made some sense, since so many important cases con-
cerning state agencies originate in Franklin County, where Frankfort is 
located. But Bill Ardery was popular, and the action, which was inter-
preted by many of his friends as a move to strip him of influence, was 
not forgotten for years. 
There were kind words from business leaders when it was an-
nounced on Apri14, 1960, that the state had cut payrolls by 7 percent. 
(Some newsmen said it was only 5 percent, but it is hard to tell at any 
given moment how many peple are on the payroll. At all times there 
are hundreds, even thousands of employees applying, quitting, or 
being hired.) "Cutting the fat" out of government is a hallowed tradi-
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tion; all governors do it. Even those who load the payrolls with friends, 
relatives, and drones who can be depended on to vote correctly invaria-
bly rustle up some figures to show that they are squeezing the tax-
payer's dollar. Yet somehow the state payroll always seems to be bigger 
than before. Anyhow, the objective is not to get fewer people on the 
payrolls but to get fewer drones and more competent workers, but this 
bit of common sense seldom appeals to the voter. 
For the moment, Combs's chief objective was to save the sales tax 
from groups that wanted to slash it. This, he knew, would not be easy; 
the best way to defend the tax would be to show people what they 
would get in return. But parks, schools, and improved services could 
not be produced overnight. He needed time. And he needed some way 
to persuade the people to approve a convention to rewrite the state 
constitution. 
On April 10, Combs made what many people-including a lot of 
his own--considered a mistake by taking $50,000 from his contingency 
fund to build a floral clock on the lawn of the capitol building. He had 
seen one in Edinburgh, Scotland, and thought a similar one would be a 
colorful addition to the capitol grounds. It sounded unusual, to put it 
kindly-a large, raised concrete clock face on the slanted surface of 
which flowers would be planted seasonally and large hands would tell 
the time, the whole thing to be surrounded by a reflecting pool. Critics 
protested "littering the dignified lawn" of the capitol. Happy Chandler 
chortled that "instead of the time being 11 o'clock, in Kentucky it is two 
petunias past a jimson weed." 
But time proved the critics wrong. The "flower clock" became one 
of the most talked-about and popular tourist attractions in the state and 
the most visited spot in Frankfort. The cost was more than covered by 
the coins people tossed into the reflecting pool. 
But stories about a "truck deal" appearing in the Louisville and 
Lexington newspapers were beginning to worry Combs. Theyap-
peared to involve Earle Clements and his official dealings with 
Louisville Ford dealer Thurston Cooke, and Combs knew that the 
press would blame him for any wrongdoing involving Clements, for 
whose appointment he had already been widely criticized. And from 
the first story, reported in the Courier-Journal by Kyle Vance, it was 
obvious that there was something very unusual about the agreement 
under which 34 dump trucks were leased from the Louisville Equip-
ment Rental Company for Highway Department work. 
Whether the "truck deal" was as bad as it was painted at the time is 
a matter for debate. Earle Clements protested as long as he lived that it 
was a bargain for the state (although he also said at one point that he 
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had been prepared to cancel it). In essence, it was an effort, hallowed in 
political tradition, to throw some business to a friend. Thurston Cooke 
was a heavy-set, jovial Ford dealer from Louisville whose personal 
charities and company slogan-"Thurston Cooke Is the Place to 
Look" -were widely known. He was respected as a leader in the 
Baptist church and had served as finance chairman for the Combs-
Wyatt campaign. Later, he encountered financial troubles when he was 
forced to reclaim a number of heavy-duty trucks whose new owners 
could not meet their payments. He leased the used trucks to Lloyd 
Harris, a Kentuckian operating at the time in Alabama, but Harris, 
basically a small-time operator, found that he could not efficiently 
operate a fleet of 50 trucks and asked Cooke to help him get rid of most 
of them. 
Cooke called "someone in the Highway Department," and a few 
weeks later the department leased 34 of these heavy-duty, tandem-axle 
trucks from the Louisville Equipment Rental Company. Who or what 
was the Louisville Equipment Rental Company? asked the press. Good 
question, but no one seemed to have an answer. It appeared to be a 
firm based in a vacant building next door to Cooke's Ford agency on 
Louisville's Frankfort Avenue. Officially, it was operated by E.R. Van 
Meter, a Louisville contractor and alleged associate of Cooke, and 
Robert Grubbs, Cooke's attorney. 
Harris had sent 15 of the trucks from Alabama-ten to the High-
way Department and five to Louisville Equipment for repairs-when 
Kyle Vance published his story questioning the lease arrangement. 
The state had never before leased such equipment, he pointed out. 
Some Highway Department employees complained that the beds of the 
big trucks were too high to be loaded with existing department equip-
ment. Furthermore, reported Vance, it would cost more to lease the 
trucks than to buy them outright for their "bluebook" or used-truck 
value. 
Newspapers began asking embarrassing questions. What was this 
lease business? Who was Harris? Why was the Highway Department 
going to Alabama to buy secondhand trucks for what new trucks 
would cost in Kentucky? Who owned Louisville Equipment Rental 
Company? Were the trucks in poor repair? Director of Purchasing 
Harry Klapeke and others claimed that one advantage of the big trucks 
was that they could hold far more than the smaller trucks then being 
used by the department. But Vance charged that if they were loaded to 
capacity, they would violate state load limits; and if they were loaded 
only to the legal load limit, they would hold no more than smaller, 
cheaper trucks. Was Clements involved, editorials asked? Was Combs 
protecting Clements by failing to investigate or cancel the deal? 
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As a matter of fact, Combs didn't know the answers to most of 
these questions. The whole thing had mushroomed into a front-page 
scandal while he was involved with the legislature. But the press 
expects the governor to learn and reveal the facts once suspicious 
circumstances are exposed, and it appeared that Combs was failing to 
act in order to protect his old friend and mentor. Or was he part of the 
thing? 
On April 12, Combs asked Clements about the lease arrangement, 
reminding him that the newspaper stories were beginning to hurt. 
Clements assured him that everything was legal, ethical, and beneficial 
to the state. Combs, though worried, decided to wait and see whether 
additional facts being revealed in the press would clear up the con-
fusion and quiet suspicions. They didn't; on the contrary, press crit-
icism grew louder. On April 15 , Combs asked Clements for a full report 
on the lease contract, a request that angered Clements, who viewed it 
as a slur on his integrity. His report next day made no mention of 
Thurston Cooke, but by that time stories were beginning to appear in 
the press about Lloyd Harris and his ties to Cooke. 
Combs began his own investigation. He and Dr. Robert Martin met 
with Clements to discuss the matter, but Clements repeated that the 
deal was a good arrangement for the state and blamed criticism on the 
press, which had oppo~ed his appointment to begin with. Signifi-
cantly, Martin, a great friend and admirer of Clements, disagreed and 
urged Clements to find out what was going on and get it cleaned up. 
What Clements did not say was that Cooke was in deep financial 
trouble because of his failure to sell the trucks and needed time to raise 
enough money to head off collapse. Had this been made public, it is 
conceivable that Combs might have been able to mollify public opinion 
and give Cooke time, for until then Cooke had tried only to extricate 
himself from a bad business deal. 
But the press and political foes were demanding to know why 
Combs did not act. Actually, Combs was not sure, then or later, that he 
had the authority to go over the head of the commissioner of highways 
in the matter of equipment. But on April 19 he did, canceling the deal. 
That did not end the matter. Clements took Combs's action not only 
as a personal affront but as an act of ingratitude. He felt that his 
integrity had been impugned. On the day after the contract was can-
celed, he addressed the chamber of commerce in Louisville and later 
held a news conference at which he defended every aspect of the truck 
lease, insisting that it saved the state money, that no trucks in ill repair 
would ever have been accepted, that the trucks under lease were not 
too big to be loaded with state equipment, and that they would not 
have had to carry illegal loads in order to justify their cost. And he did 
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not resign his post as highway commissioner, as some had expected. 
Not then. But a noticeable coolness began to develop between him and 
Combs. 
Friends later speculated that Combs might have done better to 
persuade Clements to cancel the deal rather than do it himself. They 
were probably right; that might have avoided a clash that hurt the state 
as well as Combs. But persuading Clements to back do~n when he felt 
his honor was inv6lved was no easy matter. He was a proud and 
stubborn man. 
"I never knew Cooke very well," Combs said later. "Actually, 
Wyatt knew him better than I did. But he was Earle's man-partly, of 
course, because he had raised money for us in the campaign. None of 
us thought he would do anything unethical, being one of the top 
Baptists in the state. He had a fine reputation. But, you know, the real 
reason Earle got into the deal was because of Prich [Edward Prichard]. I 
don't think anyone knew that at the time. I doubt that many people 
know it now. Earle and Prich were always very close. Prich's attach- , 
ment to Earle began when he came home from Washington and backed / 
Clements against Waterfield for governor, though Phil Ardery, Prich'sj 
law partner, was for Waterfield. Cooke had put Prich on a retainer~ 
counsel for the company, no doubt at Earle's request. Prich was s . 
having his troubles and needed the money. That was the biggest reaso 
Earle didn't want to hurt Cooke, that and the fact that Cooke rated a I t 
of respect." I 
In retrospect, the episode seems hardly worth the uproar. k\s 
Combs pointed out, the state had spent and lost no money; it had 
accepted no questionable merchandise; and no unethical conduct ,had 
been proven. But the aroma of suspicion clung to the entire transaction 
long after it had left the front pages; reminders of it surfaced again the 
following year when Thurston Cooke was found guilty of financial 
juggling, which he undertook to save his auto empire when the truck 
deal fell through. It was, in all, a rather tragic affair-for Cooke, a kind, 
friendly, generous man who was undone by bad luck; for Clements; 
and in the end for Combs, who, though he had committed no wrong, 
saw a shadow fall across his previously clean image. This was in the old 
tradition. The reputations of more Kentucky governors have been 
damaged by the conduct of their appointees than by their own mis-
deeds. 
The truck deal was a setback, though at the time more annoying 
than critical. So was the rift between Combs and Clements. Some 
political writers declared that the inexperienced Combs and Wyatt 
could not have managed the political maneuvering of the legislative 
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session so successfully had it not been for the advice of the canny 
Clements. But this was not the case. The presence of Clements in the 
administration no doubt helped to keep some legislators cooperative, 
but Combs seldom asked him for advice. And Clements, to his credit, 
seldom offered it. 
His support gave the administration the benefit of great expertise 
in a critical department of government, and a great political intellect 
that could be called upon. But there was also a negative aspect to his 
presence in the office: as long as he was in the Highway Department 
there would be doubts in the minds of some about who was actually 
running the administration. The image of an inexperienced governor 
operating under the influence of the wily, powerful politician who had 
done much to create him did not help Combs or allow him the stature 
that his handling of the legislature had merited. The fact that Combs 
had not fired Clements did nothing for his image; on the other hand, 
the fact that he had canceled a contract so stoutly defended by Clem-
ents did give him the appearance of a strong and capable leader. 
And for the fight ahead Combs needed a favorable image. His first 
legislative session had been a great success. It had given him the 
program he wanted and the money to carry it out. Many observers, 
including some of his own officials, thought he would rest easy for a 
while, content to see the construction of roads, parks, schools, and 
hospitals; the impact of better pay for teachers; and the increased help 
to the elderly, the sick, the mentally ill. 
But Combs wanted more. Far more. It took a while for people to 
realize that what he had in mind was a complete, fundamental restruc-
turing of the nature, shape, and quality of state government. The sales 
tax had been a crucial first step; it had given the state money with 
which to operate a modern government on a level of service similar to 
that of other states. But Combs knew that Kentucky government would 
never be a truly modern operation as long as it was shackled by the 
constitution of 1891. The constitution simply had to be revised. 
A comparison of Kentucky's constitution and that of the United 
States does not flatter Kentucky. Indeed, it is remarkable that the 
Kentuckians of 1891, given the example of the U.S. Constitution, could 
have written such a wordy, rambling monument to suspicion and 
distrust. The aims of the two documents were as different as the mood 
of the times in which they were written, and thereby may hang the 
whole unfortunate story. 
Kentucky in 1891 was a state still divided by emotions and interests 
echoing from the Civil War, divisions of white against black, farmers 
against townspeople, small farmers against big planters, agrarians 
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against urbanites, Bluegrass against Ohio River cities, pro-Union Re-
publicans against Democrats still burdened with southern memories, 
central Kentucky against the L&N Railroad, and small towns against 
each other in competition for railroads. 
The framers of the U.S. Constitution designed it not only to install 
liberty but to forestall tyranny. The danger of government, they real-
ized, even one in which power rests with the people, is that it con-
stantly risks giving people the power to destroy the liberties that permit 
them to govern. In brief, it is the people, through government, who 
threaten government by the people. So government must be curbed, 
but not so much that it is not free to provide for the people the rights to 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, which entail national se-
curity and individual welfare. James Madison saw the danger of 
powerful people working through the agencies of government against 
the democratic foundations of government. And so he proposed a 
system wherein the branches were made powerful enough to endure 
but not so powerful that they could not be checked by one another. 
Kentucky went about it more or less in the reverse. It protected the 
rights and liberties of the people simply by giving government too little 
power to threaten those rights and liberties. Instead of empowering 
government to act and limiting its power through checks and balances, 
it made government weak through constitutional curbs. The legis-
lature could meet only once every two years, and then for only 60 days. 
It could amend the constitution to give itself more power only through 
a laborious process that could not be accomplished during the lifetime 
of any legislature. It could not resort to other than pay-as-you-go 
financing to fuel progress. Governors could not succeed themselves 
and could therefore bring to fruition during their terms only short-
range programs. They did not have control over their own administra-
tions, since many of the most important officers serving during their 
terms were elected and outside their influence or control. The judiciary 
was a hodgepodge of political and appointive posts that assured only 
that judges would be subject to the caprice of politics. Government 
could pay employees only limited salaries, geared to the time at which 
the constitution was written and quickly outmoded by changing eco-
nomics. 
The state constitution curtailed the operating efficiency of towns 
and cities by giving them power to act in many critical instances only 
with approval of the legislature (infrequently in session) and the con-
currence of the governor. Sheriffs could not succeed themselves, 
though other county officials could. The government could not incur 
debt of more than $500,000. And so on. The checks, in brief, were 
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embodied in the constitution, which was designed to curb rather than 
guide the operation of government. 
The state could not, Combs realized, operate freely and efficiently 
until these curbs were relaxed and the constitution was revised to 
provide a general statement of principles and guidelines, as did the 
federal charter. He was hoping that the success of his program and its 
apparent popularity would persuade the voters to take the next step, 
just as it would encourage political leaders to lend themselves to a vote-
getting cause. Most of all, he saw it as an integral part of a program to 
give Kentucky a modern framework of government that would reas-
sure the people of Kentucky and involve them in the mood, the 
enthusiasm of a new day. 
Charter revision was the major item but not the only one Combs 
was trying to sell to the Kentucky voter that summer. He wanted 
approval of the proposed bond issue for building roads and parks. He 
wanted a new, intermediate court to lighten the load of the Court of 
Appeals. He hoped to convince the people that the improvements 
made possible by the sales tax were worth the cost, and persuade them 
to resist those politicians calling for repeal or reduction of the tax. 
Combs also wanted to do something about the chronically weak 
economy of eastern Kentucky. It was a disheartening problem. Noth-
ing undertaken by state or federal government had seemed to get to the 
heart of the nagging weakness that plagued the eastern and south-
eastern areas of the state. By the time of the Civil War, the hill counties 
were already a cultural and economic backwater, falling steadily behind 
the Bluegrass in schools, roads, public services, industrial investment, 
personal income. The violence that tore and divided families during 
the war, the feuds that divided and crippled its communities later, 
served to keep eastern Kentucky mired in its isolation and poverty, 
regarded by the rest of the state and country as backward, violent, and 
ignorant. The mountains were Republican, and when the Republicans 
fell into disfavor with the Goebel episode, the mountains lost stature 
and influence in Frankfort. Furthermore, more than any other section 
of the state, eastern Kentucky became the province of outside corpora-
tions who profited from the mountains' coal, oil, gas, silica, and timber 
but cared little for the welfare of the people, plowed little of their gain 
back into the counties, and bought and corrupted city and county 
governments to prevent them from enacting a tax system that would let 
the mountain people share in the wealth of their land. 
The East Kentucky Turnpike would be the first modern highway 
reaching the eastern third of the state. No section would benefit more 
by the new spending for schools and the establishment of community 
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colleges. The new parks and small lakes were calculated to attract 
tourists. New or improved airports at Paintsville, Hazard, Pikeville, 
Middlesboro, and London would help tie those areas closer to the rest 
of the state. But these measures, Combs knew, would not be enough. 
The region needed new industrial investment and new jobs to enable it 
to break away from its dependence on coal, with its boom-and-bust 
cycles and resulting unemployment. 
His concern with the Appalachian region of the state led Combs to 
appoint John Whisman, slender, studious executive director of the 
Eastern Kentucky Regional Planning Commission, to represent Ken-
tucky at a meeting of representatives from six Appalachian states who 
would urge the establishment by Congress of a regional authority to 
seek cures for Appalachia's old ills. Both Combs and Wyatt believed 
that the area's troubles could not be relieved without federal funds and 
federal power. At graduation ceremonies at Whitesburg High School 
that spring, Wyatt called for changing the formulas under which road, 
dam, and work projects qualified for federal assistance so as to give an 
advantage to depressed mountain areas. 
In late April, Combs announced with obvious pleasure that the 
state had been given a $754,000 grant by the Kellogg Foundation, to be 
spent-along with matching state funds-to seek solutions to the 
economic puzzle of eastern Kentucky. Combs called it a "breakthrough 
in the psychology of gloom" of the 30-county region and chose Dr. 
Frank J. Welch, dean of the University of Kentucky College of Agri-
culture and former director of the Tennessee Valley Authority, to head 
the study. Combs then met with Governor Millard Tawes of Maryland, 
and the two of them hatched the idea for an organization to focus 
federal attention on the Appalachian region. On May 20, he attended a 
meeting of six Appalachian governors in Annapolis, Maryland, out of 
which came the Appalachian Governors' Conference, the forerunner 
of the Appalachian Regional Commission. Combs served as chairman 
of the conference for its first two years and, with the help of Seventh 
District Congressman Carl Perkins, urged Congress and President 
John F. Kennedy to establish a permanent agency designed to meet 
Appalachia's specific needs. The Appalachian Regional Commission 
was part of Kennedy's program to help Appalachia, though it was 
enacted into law after his death. 
At a national governors' conference at Glacier Park the following 
month, Combs told the meeting that a special federal policy was 
needed for road funding in such depressed areas as eastern Kentucky, 
along the lines of his financing of the Mountain Parkway. This 
"imaginative use of the bonding power" to provide financing for roads 
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that would· generate traffic needed to justify their cost seemed an 
obvious alternative to the traditional, and deadening, formula of pro-
viding money on the basis of existing traffic counts. The federal of-
ficials gave Combs's proposals a cool reception. The course of 
bureaucracy quickly becomes a rut. 
There are always social functions that a governor must attend or 
preside over-the Governor's Derby Breakfast, for example. The Derby 
Breakfastwas an old Kentucky custom, usually featuring country ham, 
eggs, grits, beaten biscuits, and various fruits and preserves, all served 
with and after traditiortal mint juleps properly offered up in silver 
goblets. Actually a sort of early luncheon for late-rising Derby guests 
who had been partying the night before, the Derby.Breakfast or,. 
dinarily began some time before noon and ended in time for the guests 
to get to Churchill Downs for most of the afternoon's races and the 
climactic Derby itself. It didn't hurt the social or political status of public 
officials, politicians, horsemen, and other citizens to be asked to bring 
their guests to the governor's house for a drink and some food before 
the race; beginning with Happy Chandler's first term, the Governor's 
Derby Breakfast had become an increasingly popular event. 
Combs decided, in what may have been intended as a Jacksonian 
gesture, to add a lot of old friends and just plain people to the guest list; 
he made preparations for 250 guests at the mansion. More than that 
showed up. People who were not supposed to bring guests, family, 
friends, or kinfolk brought guests, families, friends, and kinfolk. State 
troopers on guard duty complained, "You can't stir 'em with a stick." 
People wandered around the mansion as if on a sightseeing tour; 
security was impossible. Combs decided that the next breakfast would 
be held on the lawn, and in succeeding years what had been a small, 
rather elite gathering became a mob scene, with thousands of Ken-
tuckians from all comers of the state standing in line from around eight 
0' clock in the morning until past noon, to file past and shake the hand 
of the governor and move on into huge tents filled with food-laden 
tables, bands, and hard-working politicians. From an elegant social 
occasion, the Governor's Derby Breakfast became a popular gathering. 
It lost something in elegance. 
Combs also initiated the custom of having a state employees' 
picnic; naturally, he was expected to attend, take part in various ac-
tivities, judge contests, and eat all manner of food. In addition, he 
journeyed to Hopkins County to hear a plea for state help in control-
ling salt marsh mosquitoes-apparently breeding in old strip-mine pits 
filled with water-which were becoming so thick that cattle could not 
graze in pastures and farmers could not work in the fields. He sched-
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uled a conference on the problems of aging, to which 4,000· persons 
were invited, and presided over the opening session. 
Combs also launched a "Keep Kentucky Beautiful" campaign 
which, at first glance, looked a lot like every other governor's clean-up 
campaign. He saw it as something more. The state put on a big 
publicity drive, its symbol a youngster called Daniel Broom-pat-
terned, of course, after the old scout but equipped with a broom 
instead of the historic long rifle. Though it seemed rather routine at the 
time, and certainly less important than Combs's more substantial 
beautification projects, it was the forerunner of Ladybird (Mrs. Lyndon 
B.) Johnson'S "Keep America Beautiful" campaign. It brought Combs 
praise from state garden and conservation clubs, but it yielded sub-
stantial results only when backed up with laws to get junked cars off 
the road and screens around roadside junkyards. 
"We had contests all over the state," recalled Combs, "between 
regions and counties, giving awards to those thinking up and carrying 
out the best ideas. Connie Quinn developed the program and made it 
work. We gave plaques to county judges and Jaycees. I remember 
when we gave a plaque to this one old judge, and he got his words 
mixed up and said, 'I don't appreciate this great honor, but I want you 
to know I deserve it from the bottom of my heart.' " 
On August 14, Combs observed his forty-ninth birthday, and 
shortly thereafter organized another of Kentucky'S colorful (if that is 
the word) eating occasions. This was in the state tradition, for Ken-
tuckians are prone to strange feasts. In eastern Kentucky they have a 
Poke Sallet Festival, at which is featured a salad made of the young 
shoots and leaves of the poke bush (the only parts of the weed that can 
be safely eaten, since the mature leaves and berries are poisonous). 
There is also in the mountains a day given to eating-or pretending to 
eat and thus leading naive outsiders to eat-ramps, which are a wild 
and vicious offshoot of the onion family. In other parts of the state 
people make great to-do over various types of fish, pork, and barbecue, 
all of which are likely to induce stomach distress, and in Fulton they 
observe a Banana Festival featuring a banana pudding so huge that 
citizens who have misplaced small children or dogs immediately be-
come uneasy about the pudding's contents. 
Combs originated the Varmint Supper. (Some say this questionable 
practice was first obserVed during the administration of Governor 
Lawrence Wetherby, but it first came to public attention, at least, 
because of Combs.) "Varmint" is a rural corruption of the word 
"vermin," which provides an idea of the menu, one that was never 
given the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval or hailed by the 
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gourmets of America. Possum, raccoon, squirrel, groundhog, and 
even-some say~snake were served up and supposedly eaten by the 
gathering of friends, political cronies, hunting companions, govern-
ment officials, and an occasional newsman-all of whom, it is safe to 
assume, had been given enough to drink so that they could pretend to 
enjoy the fare. As a matter of fact, the groaning board also groaned 
with quail, dove, rabbit, duck, goose, venison, and more customary 
game, along with a good variety of vegetables, breads, and desserts. 
But it was the varmints that earned for the supper its reputation. The 
varmint tradition was carried on for years after the Combs era-
because of the fellowship, it may be assumed. 
11 
The Shackles of Tradition 
It is curious to note how the "Three C's" of Kentucky-Chandler, 
Clements, and Combs-dominated the politics of the postwar period, 
and how frequently they seemed to share the stage. Possibly because 
he was following a Chandler administration that had left considerable 
political debris in its wake, Combs seemed to encounter the shadow of 
Chandler at every turn. For example, in the fall of 1960 he raised 
another small dust storm by stopping payments to the architectural 
firm of Meriwether, Marye and Associates, which was supervising the 
construction of the University of Kentucky medical center, after a state 
audit indicated t1;lat the state had overpaid the firm by more than half a 
million dollars. His action raised an immediate political outcry, since 
Meriwether and Marye had not only been employed during the 
Chandler administration but had designed Chandler's new home, only 
recently completed in Versailles. 
"I don't see what that has to do with the medical center," said 
Chandler. "They are just trying to smear me. But I'm used to that. As 
far as my house is concerned, I can assure you that it was built with my 
own money, and I'll be glad to show you the records on that." 
However, H.G. Wittenberg, a Louisville contractor who was then 
chairman of the state fair board, told reporters that he had supervised 
construction of the house for Chandler and had not been paid for his 
services. And State Auditor Joe Schneider said that the state had first 
contracted, during the Chandler administration, with Meriwether and 
Marye for a fee based on the medical center's cost of construction but 
had then changed it to a fee based on estimated cost of construction, 
which resulted in the alleged overpayments of $520,265. Hugh Mer-
iwether, head of the firm, said the charges were "a mass of lies and 
innuendo" aimed at him because he was a friend of Chandler's and had 
served as best man at Happy's wedding. He said he would meet with 
Combs and explain the situation. 
"He did," said Combs. "He just didn't explain it to my satisfaction. 
We changed the contract." 
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Anothe~, even darker storm Was brewing. Like a hurricane that is 
born as a ripple of air over the mountains of Africa and slowly grows to 
dangerous proportions as it swirls its way across the Atlantic, a wordy 
battle had erupted between officials of the city of Newport and Camp-
bell County and a group of ministers who charged that city and county 
officials were not enforcing the vice laws. On May 25 the ministers 
visited Combs and for 90 minutes complained that prostitution, gam-
bling, illegal liquor operations, and violence were being ignored by the 
police, sheriff, and judges of Newport and Campbell County, and 
asked the governor's help. 
Nothing does less to brighten and lighten a governor's day than a 
complaining visitfrom reform or purity groups. These worthies invar-
iably want the governor to do something that will earn him the grati-
tude of the moral element (which will forget it before the next election) 
and the hostility of much of the political and economic structure of the 
town (which will remember). 
Newport was a town with a juicy reputation, not unusual for a 
small town located across a river from a metropolis. Situated on the 
Ohio River just opposite Cincinnati, it lured the more adventurous 
after-hour customers to its night spots, many of which offered girls and 
gambling as well as liquor and music. The fact that the law was not 
enthusiastically enforced in Newport was hardly news. It had long 
been a good-time town, with a strip of gambling and striptease joints 
where visiting firemen could always find a girl or a game. Butexact1y 
what the ministers wanted Combs to do about it-or what he had the 
power to do-was not clear. It was Combs's belief that he could remove 
the local officials only if a hearing found them guilty of misfeasance or 
neglect of duty. No such hearings had been held; in fact, there were no 
formal charges against the officials and no concrete evidence against 
them other than the testimony of the ministers. He could not send the 
state police into Newport, as the ministers asked, since the law stipu-
lated that the state police could assume jurisdiction within a city only if 
asked to do so by city officials. But he promised the ministers he would 
do what he could. 
They left feeling that they had found an ally. Combs called Attor-
ney General John Breckinridge to see what could be done. Like the 
squabble in Carter County between Heman McGuire and the citizens' 
committee, the Newport mess was not something Combs would have 
chosen. He had other, more important, statewide concerns. But there 
was no avoiding these situations once they had been brought into the 
open. There is nothing newspapers love more than a vice expose, and 
the Louisville, Lexington, and Cincinnati papers jumped on the plaints 
of the ministers like hounds loosed on a fox trail. Reporters swarmed 
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into Newport and happily loaded their expense accounts to prove that 
vice was, indeed, rampant. Girls stripped down to nothing. Booze 
could be had at all hours. There were places where gambling went on 
and prostitutes sold themselves for the money of evil and lustful men, 
while enforcement officials turned their backs and, it was alleged, 
profited from their lack of vigilance. 
The reporters tore themselves away from Newport long enough to 
go home and expose the shocking conditions. The decent element of 
Kentucky quivered with shock and indignation. What, the papers 
thundered, was the state going to do about it? The answer, it soon 
became apparent, was-for the time being-very little. Combs had 
other things to do. 
Among his more pressing concerns was the approaching 1960 
National Democratic Convention in Los Angeles. It was certainly no 
secret that Earle Clements had been working tirelessly to line up 
support for his longtime ally, Senator Lyndon Johnson of Texas, and 
hoped to deliver Kentucky's 17 votes toward Johnson's nomination for 
president. This posed a problem: Wyatt and Combs had run on a 
platform that promised to abolish the unit rule, which gave all the 
state's votes to the candidate having the majority of delegates. Many 
members of the State Central Committee concurred, and at the precon-
vention meeting of the committee it was agreed that there would be no 
unit vote. But Combs had promised Clements to back his support of 
Johnson; once in Los Angeles, Combs passed the word that, while 
every delegate had a right to vote for his choice, he was for Johnson. He 
also made it plain that he was putting no pressure on anyone. He told 
the delegates to notify his assistant, Wendell Ford, how they wanted to 
be recorded so that the delegation could be announced, but added that 
he did not even want to know what the individual votes were. 
"Earl had asked me early on to be for Johnson," Combs recalled, 
"and I said fine. I couldn't see any reason why not. We didn't know 
who would be running, and Johnson was a good liberal, an F. D. R. man 
and a southerner, so I made the commitment. Then when the Johnson-
Kennedy contest began, Johnson called me, since I had control of the 
delegation, and I told him yes, I have promised Earle and you can 
depend on it. But I told him we had a problem, that Wyatt and I had 
been against the unit rule and couldn't back out on it. I told him there 
would be four or five Kennedy and Stevenson votes, and that he could 
count on 27 or 28 of the delegates-each had half a vote. Wilson was for 
Stevenson, of course, made a seconding speech for him. Happy was 
one of the solid votes for Kennedy in the delegation. He was a friend 
and admirer of old Joe Kennedy, Jack's daddy. I couldn't control him, 
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and didn't want to. Anyhow, that's the way it went, and that kept 
everybody reasonably happy. We had a caucus, but that was just a 
formality. We just had half votes. We split all the votes into halves, so 
that more people could be recognized. 
"After Kennedy was nominated, we decided to go for Stu Sym-
ington for vice-president because we didn't think Johnson would take 
it. Most people didn't. He surprised a lot of people, including Sam 
Rayburn and Bobby Kennedy, when he did. He accepted over their 
protests. Earle didn't think he would take it, and we got caught off 
balance when he did. 
"But the one thing Earle was maddest about wasn't Johnson or 
Kennedy. The convention people had put us in this fleabag hotel. A 
real one. Clements and some of the others got there early and the man 
assigned them their rooms, and when Earle saw his, he called the 
manager and demanded a better one. He said, 'There must be some 
mistake. I'm Senator Clements. I'm sure I'm supposed to have another 
room.' And the manager said, 'Yeah, you're right. You're in the wrong 
room. That's the governor's room. You'll have to move.' And he put 
him in a smaller room. An even worse one. It griped hell out of Earle." 
Wyatt had worked hard for Adlai Stevenson, as had John 
Breckinridge. Dick Moloney of Lexington was for John E Kennedy, as 
were Chandler and several Jefferson Countians. Kennedy won on the 
first ballot. After Kennedy's nomination, Bill May led the move for 
Stuart Symington for vice-president, and Johnson won. As May said 
later, "We didn't cash a ticket." Back home in Frankfort there was a 
general feeling among some Democrats that "we spent our time feed-
ing hay to a dead horse." 
"I didn't agree with that," said Combs. "I still don't. I was gen-
uinely for Johnson. I knew him personally and didn't know Kennedy. I 
thought it would be good for the country to have a president from the 
South. If we had wanted to be expedient, we could have switched to 
Kennedy after we arrived in Los Angeles. But the one thing our 
conduct there proved is that once a Kentuckian gives his word he 
stands hitched. We didn't strike out. We came home with a friendly 
vice-president. The press, especially Harwood, ridiculed our perform-
ance, but by objective standards we did all right." 
But the convention did little to strengthen the party, especially the 
Combs wing, which needed all its strength for the fall senatorial 
campaign in which it was backing former Governor Keen Johnson to 
run against the formidable Republican Senator John Sherman Cooper. 
John Y. Brown, former state legislator and congressman and unsuc-
cessful candidate for governor, had also entered the primary race, and 
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in a switch of historic proportions Happy Chandler was backing him. 
Keen Johnson had been Chandler's lieutenant governor, and had 
named Happy to the Senate, whereas John Y. Brown and Chandler had 
long been political enemies. It was Chandler who had gotten J.C.W. 
Beckham into the Senate race that Brown had hoped to win against 
M.M. Logan and had thus cost Brown his chance. Brown had always 
been an advocate of the sales tax that Chandler so hotly opposed, and 
he had once accused Chandler of double-crossing him in his effort to 
win the governorship. Factionalism made strange bedfellows. 
But even had Keen Johnson been supported by a united party, he 
would have had an uphill fight. A strong Republican tide was running 
nationally, and John Cooper had always been a strong candidate. 
"We knew Keen didn't have a chance," said Combs. "He knew it. 
He just ran because we needed someone to make a race, a respectable 
race, against Cooper. We really didn't do much for him. Keen was sick 
during most of the campaign." 
Whether the convention weakened further the Combs-Clements 
relationship, as some have charged, is questionable. Relations between 
the two men continued to be proper, though both seemed to realize 
that a change was about due. A temporary embarrassment arose on 
August 17, when the Civil Service Commission announced in Wash-
ington that it was investigating whether Clements, as highway com-
missioner, had been in violation of the federal Hatch Act forbidding 
those on federal payrolls or handling federal funds from taking part in 
federal elections. (The investigation was later dropped.) But that was 
not the important factor. Clements and Combs had already been talk-
ing,and Clements had told him that he wanted to resign and join 
Lyndon Johnson's campaign. "In fact," said Combs, "Johnson himself 
had called me to talk about it. Now, it's true that a tension, a coldness, 
had developed between us. But Johnson's nomination gave us, you 
might say, an out, an excuse. So Earle came to me and said he wanted to 
go to Washington to work for Johnson, and we went so far as to talk 
about a successor. I asked him how about Henry Ward, and he said that 
was fine. So Henry came over and we talked, and then we had a little 
luncheon for Clements. I forget whether Ward was there, but it was 
understood that he would be the man. There was agreement. And 
there was nothing sudden about Earle's resignation." 
On August 18 Combs called a press conference and announced 
that he had talked with Clements in Washington the night before, and 
that Clements had decided it was time for his resignation and thought 
the announcement should be made in Frankfort. The resignation, said 
Combs, would become effective September 1. 
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Oements' departure was something of a milestone in state politics. 
It marked the beginning of the end of the Oements wing of the state 
Democratic party and the coming of age of the Combs wing. Further-
more, it was something of a tragedy. Earle Clements was a man of 
sensitive pride and great ego; he was also an innovative, hard-working, 
and progressive governor. But despite the provocation his .conduct 
posed, he viewed Combs's action in canceling the truck deal as not only 
disloyalty but a rebuke, and Earle Oements was not a man to take 
lightly a public rebuke. He hid beneath his calm, courtly, almost cold 
demeanor a fiery temper that he often kept barely in check. 
I had experienced his anger myself during his tenure as governor. I 
was walking down the capitol corridor beside the Senate chamber one 
day during the legislative session of 1948, shortly before the legislature 
was scheduled to reconvene following lunch. I fell into step with 
Governor Oements and, at the suggestion of Senator Richard Mo-
loney, asked him why he had erased from the House orders of the day a 
bill that would have removed REA co-ops from the jurisdiction of the 
Public Service Commission. Earle had his arm around my shoulder in 
friendly fashion and had just addressed me as "Podnuh." But in a 
second he stiffened with anger, his face flushed, and the veins in his 
temples stood out as if he were being choked. Grabbing me by the 
lapels, he almost lifted me off the floor and slammed me against the 
wall of the corridor. "You sonofabitch!" he growled, and with each 
phrase banged me against the wall-"You've been-trying-to gut 
me---ever since-last-November" -in a demonstration of rhythm the 
artistry of which I did not fully appreciate at the moment. 
I wanted to protest that the accusation was false, as indeed it was, 
but was too occupied to coin witticisms appropriate to the occasion. 
Fortunately for me, Attorney General Jo Ferguson and a state trooper 
were standing a few feet away. The poor trooper seemed more horrified 
than I, not being eager to lay hands on the governor nor yet eager to see 
him demolish a member of the press. Ferguson was more decisive. 
"Governor!" he shouted, "Governor!" and jumped between us, to 
my intense relief. Without another word, Oements whirled and 
stalked away. He did not speak to me for several years. I continued to 
write about him, of course, and years later, when he was running for 
the Senate, I encountered him in Madisonville, where he was working 
Main Street. To my surprise, he greeted me warmly and introduced me 
to a man whose identity I have forgotten, saying, "This is a friend of 
mine, a fine writer. I say, a fine writer. I once did him an injustice, I'm 
afraid, but he has never held it against me." 
That, I think, was the most complete apology Earle could muster, 
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and I appreciated it. After that we became friendly again; I enjoyed 
some good talks with him and two pleasant visits to his home in 
Morganfield before he became angry once more at the newspaper (not 
without cause, I fear) and included me in his resentment. I had not 
been part of the incident that aroused his anger, but I had called 
editorially for his resignation as highway commissioner during the 
episode of the truck deal, and I understood why he resented that. Our 
differences were healed only shortly before his death. I regret those 
periods of hostility. They were my loss. 
After his resignation his temper erupted in a cold fury and during 
the ensuing 20 years became legendary, as Clements seized, shook, 
cursed, or struck opponents, former friends, or even people with 
whom he was having a casual discussion. He became so bitter toward 
Combs that he made an alliance with Happy Chandler-who had 
ridiculed and reviled him and opposed almost everything Clements 
had tried to do-and opposed candidates associated with Combs, the 
man with whom he had been so pleasantly and productively associ-
ated for so long. 
This was painful for Clements' friends, most of whom were also 
Combs supporters. Historically, the factionalism dividing the domi-
nant Democratic party has bred a bitter brand of politics, for the 
winning faction usually gains control of the state, and some losing 
Democrats have found it easier to make common cause with Republi-
cans than with the winning faction. During his years in office, Combs 
remained on fairly good terms with most Republican legislators. It was 
the followers of Happy Chandler who proved to be the bitter foes. 
In the final five years of his life Clements mellowed considerably 
and patched up his disagreements with practically all of his old en-
emies, but he never entirely forgave· Combs. In 1984, only a few 
months before his death, a dinner was given in Clements' honor at 
Louisville's Seelbach Hotel, the headquarters of so many of his great 
old political campaigns. He spoke courteously to Combs, who had 
insisted on attending, but did not mention him in his remarks. 
Chandler was not present at the dinner. 
But painful as it was, the departure of Clements could not be 
allowed to disrupt the operation of state government. Combs and 
Clements had already agreed on Hemy Ward as a successor, partly 
because of his broad experience. He had served five terms as a state 
legislator, had been a candidate for lieutenant governor, had served on 
the staff of Earle Clements in Washington when Clements was in the 
Senate, and was general manager of the Louisville Area Chamber of 
Commerce when Combs asked him to be highway commissioner. He 
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had a reputation for integrity, and enjoyed a sound rapport with the 
press. Equally important, he had the confidence and support of Clem-
ents. And he brought into the Highway Department such expert aides 
as Robert Bell, who had served previously with Ward in the Depart-
ment of Conservation and as assistant to Lieutenant Governor Wyatt. 
(Bell was to become one of those men who, like Felix Joyner, would be 
almost indispensable to state government; he would serve as commis-
sioner of parks and of revenue before a change in party control re-
moved him from Frankfort.) 
"I went to see Earle and talked to him, and he urged me to do it," 
Ward explained later. "I wanted to be certain that he wouldn't object. I 
was very fond of Earle. He had been good for Kentucky. I learned a lot 
from him." 
There was no single program more importantto Kentucky or to the 
success of the Combs administration than the massive highway build-
ing program that encompassed interstate highways, turnpikes, two-
and four-lane federal roads and thousands of miles of new or improved 
state roads. With Ward in charge, Combs could feel safe in turning his 
attention to other concerns: the approaching November elections, the 
referendum on the proposed constitutional convention, and the 
$100,000,000 bond issue. 
Aside from the primary responsibilities of a governor, though, 
there are dozens of little ceremonial duties he is expected to perform. 
One that Combs was obliged to face was the Governor's Tour, the value 
of which is not subjected to speculation by generous people. The tour, 
sponsored by the state chamber of commerce, took the governor, 
together with administration figures who had nothing pressing to do 
and business and civic leaders from Louisville and Lexington, on a bus 
tour of a dozen or so smaller towns. These tours had at least the virtue 
of making the small-town officials and business people feel that they 
had not been forgotten by Frankfort and helped them realize that the 
officials and business people of bigger towns had problems much the 
same as theirs. Often businessmen in one town would board the bus 
and travel with the entourage for a few hours or for a day or two. There 
was usually a good deal of drinking, loud talk, and hackneyed jokes, 
rather like an outing of overripe collegians. 
One of the most enthusiastic of the tourists was Colonel Harland 
Sanders of Corbin, who would later achieve fame and fortune as the 
founder of the Kentucky Fried Chicken empire. The tour invariably 
stopped at the Colonel's roadside restaurant on U.S. 25 just north of 
Corbin for a lunch of fried chicken, mashed potatoes with gravy, rolls, 
salad, and at least a dozen side dishes. Although Sanders scorned 
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whiskey and insisted that he was and had always been a teetotaler, the 
touring dignitaries were always treated to a series of mint juleps or just 
plain bourbon before the traditional Kentucky feed. Whenever possi-
ble, the Colonel seized the opportunity to say a few (or more than a 
few) words. He was never noted for shyness. 
Combs endured these jaunts and tried mightily to be one of the 
fellows, but to accompanying newsmen it seemed that his heart was 
never in it. He was by nature a rather thoughtful man with a quiet 
humor; he loved small poker games or gatherings of political friends 
but found the boisterous atmosphere of the bus boring after a few 
hours. 
More to his liking was his practice of "taking government to the 
people," a tactic he developed for finding out what people were saying, 
what they were interested in, or what they wanted of government. 
Beginning with a trip to Mayfield, Combs set up a temporary gover-
nor's office in 33 Kentucky towns during his term in office. It proved a 
popular practice. 
It also proved strenuous. He could not simply drive into town, set 
up shop in the courthouse or city hall for a few hours, talk to a few 
people, and then leave. The visit of the governor is and was an event for 
the average small town. Notices appeared in the local newspaper; radio 
stations announced the occasion; officials and civic leaders, even if of 
the opposing party, had to be on hand to greet him. There were 
pictures to be made, speeches to be given. It was a rare day when the 
governor and his party were not dragged off to a civic club luncheon. 
Sometimes he had a hard time getting to hear the plain citizens he had 
come to see and listen to. 
This meant 14-hour days for a large staff. Most of the advance work 
fell to Ed Easterly, the former head of the Associated Press in Louisville 
who was Combs's press secretary, and his assistant, Christa Finley. 
Administrative assistant Wendell Ford-later, Ed Fossett-usually 
went with Combs to see that he was briefed and to act as liaison with 
the locals. Dix Winston or Fontaine Banks kept track of patronage 
questions. Sometimes Cattie Lou Miller, later commissioner of public 
information, would go along or send someone from her office, as 
would Bruce Kennedy or Jim Nutter from the Department of Economic 
Development. There was nearly always someone from the Highway 
Department or its local office. 
But Combs was convinced that the project was worthwhile. More 
people, he found, were interested in roads and jobs than in anything 
else, but hundreds came simply to see the state's chief executive. It was 
their chance to shake hands with the governor, and they often brought 
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the children along. Occasionally, a few would stand in line to complain 
about the sales tax or failure to get a relative into a state hospital, but 
more came just to say they thought he was doing a good job (or a poor 
one). Easterly learned early to take stacks of photographs along, and 
Combs invariably did a brisk business in autographed copies. 
During the first week of September, Combs surprised most people 
by naming Republican Henry W. Meigs judge of the newly created 
Franklin Circuit Court. A New York native and University of Kentucky 
law graduate of 1949, Meigs had married Sally Willis, daughter of a 
judge and former governor, Simeon Willis. (It was ironic that Willis was 
the man Combs had defeated for appellate judge in his first political 
race.) Friends of Judge W. B. Ardery and the Chandler wing of the party 
had expected Combs to appoint someone from his own political group 
and were prepared to denounce the appointment. The selection of 
Meigs, who went on to a distinguished career, killed the criticism 
before it could sprout. Combs also calmed some minor grumbling 
before it could develop by naming an II-member Human Rights Com-
mission-the first such created in a southern state-with Canon Robert 
W. Estill, Rector of Lexington's Christ Church Episcopal, as chairman. 
Throughout the summer of 1960, however, Combs had been get-
ting reports of discontent with the veterans' bonus program. Relatives 
of veterans who had moved out of state to find jobs after World War II 
felt that these veterans were still Kentuckians and as deserving as those 
who had been fortunate enough to find jobs at home. Combs had to 
admit to a certain logic in their complaints. He knew, furthermore, that 
if the resentment grew it could endanger Democratic chances in the 
approaching fall elections, as well as the chances for winning the 
referendum on constitutional revision. During the first week of Sep-
tember, Combs issued a call for a special session of the Assembly to 
consider expanding the bonus. It was something that had to be done. 
The special session convened on September 19. Combs asked the 
legislators to extend bonus payments to Kentuckians who had lived in 
the state when they enlisted but had since left, and to appropriate 
$925,000 to match $2,800,000 in federal money for an expanded pro-
gram of medical care for the aged. With little oratory, the legislators 
approved both measures and, on September 24, adjourned. 
In retrospect, Combs probably made an error in omitting out-of-
state veterans from his initial act. Paying them did not make a serious 
dent in sales tax revenues, and leaving them out had created a lot of ill 
will toward Combs even among eastern Kentuckians who were greatly 
helped by his programs. By October 1963 a total of $126,573,196 had 
been paid to 400,219 veterans and their beneficiaries, an average pay-
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ment of $316.26. Of this, approximately $36,000,000 was paid to 
100,000 out-of-state veterans. 
Combs then turned his attention to the constitutional revision 
referendum scheduled to appear on the 1960 ballot. From all signs, the 
issue was in good shape. As soon as the legislature had approved the 
referendum in the spring, Combs had gone to work to build the 
broadest possible organization to support the call. To the Constitution 
Revision Committee, authorized by the legislature, he named Thomas 
Ballantine of Louisville, Dr. Rufus Atwood of Frankfort, Earl Bellew of 
Olive Hill, Dr. Herman Donovan of Lexington, Parker Duncan of 
Bowling Green, Robert Ruberg of Covington, and Judge James Stites of 
Louisville, with Attorney General John B. Breckinridge as an ex officio 
member. Ed Jackson of Louisville was elected executive director by the 
committee; Patton G. Wheeler was chosen research director, and Carl 
Chelf, research analyst. 
Throughout the summer months of 1960 an impressive array of 
speakers had crisscrossed the state urging voter approval. Dean W.L. 
Matthews of the University of Kentucky Law School threw his prestige 
behind the proposal. John Y. Brown endorsed it, as did Keen Johnson 
and Republican leader Louie B. Nunn. So did the Joint Alumni Coun-
cil, representing UK and the four regional colleges. The great majority 
of state newspapers, induding the Lexington and Louisville dailies, 
campaigned editorially for it. Sam Ezelle, AFL-CIO spokesman, spoke 
for it. So did Philip Ardery, counsel for the rural electric cooperatives; 
I.E. Reeves, political science professor from the University of Ken-
tucky; and representatives of the University of Louisville. On August 
26 the Bipartisan Committee for Constitutional Improvement, under 
the leadership of co-chairmen Edward Breathitt and Jefferson County 
Judge Marlow Cook, opened headquarters in Louisville. 
Combs himself made more than 30 speeches for revision, aided by 
the brilliant, moody Ed Prichard, who wrote speeches on all aspects of 
the matter though he had privately expressed to Combs his reserva-
tions. (He would have preferred, he said, to have presented the voters 
with a revised constitution and had them vote on it, rather than ask 
them to approve a convention where unnamed delegates would make 
unspecified revisions.) Wyatt, too, was a frequent speaker and was 
heavily counted on to help carry the all-important Louisville and 
Jefferson County vote. Earle Clements gave the proposal his approval. 
Curiously, there was relatively little organized or even vocal op-
position. Happy Chandler, as expected, came out against revision, in 
part probably because Combs was for it. Besides, he had nothing to 
gain by supporting it; if it passed, it was Combs's victory. If it should 
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fail, he might as well take advantage of Combs's loss. Allied with 
Chandler in opposition was the aging, colorful and courtly Edward C. 
O'Rear of Frankfort (who was described by friends as "resenting every-
thing from the outcome of the Civil War to the advent of the twentieth 
century") and a few Republican legislators such as Harlan County's 
Senator Nick Johnson. O'Rear attacked revision on constitutional and 
legalistic grounds; Chandler tore into it with his usual free-swinging 
oratory, calling it a "fraud against my people" and insisting that once 
the delegates gathered to revise the charter, nothing could keep them 
from junking the whole thing and bringing chaos to the Common-
wealth. Late in the summer a Committee of 1,000 with Paris news-
paperman J.M. Alverson serving as chairman, was formed to 
spearhead the opposition, but aside from Chandler and O'Rear it 
seemed to have little muscle behind it. 
Yet a strange feeling of uncertainty and concern hung over the 
campaign. The feeling among audiences didn't seem quite right. All 
the right people were making all the right statements and expressing 
the right sentiments, but there was little apparent enthusiasm behind 
the drive for a convention. Late in October, Ned Breathitt, who had 
been hard on the speaking trail, reported to a meeting chaired by 
Combs that "I get a very bad feeling here in Frankfort. Something 
needs to be done." As a result of the meeting, "Truth Squads" were 
sent out to follow speakers for the Committee of 1,000 and correct their 
misstatements. But the existence of the squads was an indication that 
the committee was having some effect. 
Actually, the approaching election day did not look very promising 
for the Democrats. John F. Kennedy was encountering strong opposi-
tion because of his Catholicism. From the beginning, polls showed 
Keen Johnson trailing John Sherman Cooper, and the only poll con-
ducted on the chances of constitutional revision showed the conven-
tion just squeaking by. Combs threw himself into the final week of 
campaigning tirelessly, knowing how much modernization of the old 
1891 constitution meant to the state and to his efforts to leave a modem 
governmental structure as his mark on Kentucky history. On the eve of 
the voting he was worried but believed that the convention would win. 
It didn't. 
Indeed, the November 1960 elections were a debacle for Kentucky 
Democrats. John Kennedy, while squeaking into office, lost the state to 
Richard Nixon by 80,752 votes, shrinking to almost zero any influence 
Kentucky might have had in Washington. Keen Johnson lost decisively 
to John Cooper. Out of 667,278 votes cast, constitution revision lost by 
17,724. Perhaps the worst aspect of the loss was the vote of Jefferson 
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County. The Combs forces had expected to carry Jefferson for revision 
by a minimum of 20,000 votes and hoped for a margin of 40,000. They 
lost by a margin of 10,000. 
It was a shock to the Combs group and to the more liberal wing of 
the Democratic party as well: revision had carried handily in Republi-
can precincts of eastern Louisville while losing in traditionally Demo-
cratic ones. Chandler, of course, exulted that the people, given a 
chance, had repudiated Combs and all his works, but it was not that 
simple. The same precincts that voted against revision voted strongly 
for the highway and parks bond issues that also appeared on the ballot 
and were backed by Combs. 
Combs took the blame on himself. 
"We should have won it," he said years later. "We could have won it 
if we had been together on it. But Earle wasn't for it. He said he was, but 
he never gave it the support he could have. He was still highway 
commissioner when the battle began, and he thought it would hurt 
chances for the bond issue, which included all that money for roads, 
and after he got out as commissioner, he didn't do anything. And he 
thought it would hurt Kennedy and Johnson. He thought that Ken-
nedy could carry Kentucky with the right climate, but I doubt that he 
could have. 
"And Prich was against it, although he wrote and talked for it. He 
thought it would be better to write a revision and submit it to the 
people. They finally did that, in Breathitt's term, and the people beat it 
in every county. 
"And Miss Lennie [McLaughlin, Secretary of the Louisville Demo-
cratic organization] and McKay Reed [Democratic chairman] set 
Louisville against it. Wilson was supposed to see them about it, and I 
guess he thought he had it arranged, but they were never for it. They 
passed the word against it. I should have gone to see them myself. That 
was my fault." 
But there were others than Combs at fault. Many people, including 
political writers and editorialists, expressed shock and puzzlement 
that Louisville and Jefferson County had voted against revision, but 
the reason was quite simple. Revision didn't win because Democratic 
leaders didn't want it to win. McKay Reed and Lennie McLaughlin 
never passed the word to precinct workers to support it, and the rank 
and file, knowing that silence was negative, passed the word against it. 
Reed and McLaughlin and other Democratic leaders had no real stake 
in revision; they were content with what they had, didn't know what 
revision would do to their operation of the county machine, and saw no 
reason to take chances. Furthermore, they didn't want to give too 
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much encouragement to the young liberal Democrats who were in 
favor of revision and who might use a victory to gain influence within 
the Fourth Street Organiiation. 
Actually, it was the closest the state ever came to approving a 
revision of its antiquated charter, but it was still a loss. And the loss 
hurt. After his "revolutionary" legislative session, Combs had taken a 
series of beatings. The truck deal was not his fault, and he had moved to 
stop it at considerable cost to himself and his political strength, but it 
was a blot on the record of his administration. The Heman McGuire 
scandal in Carter County was surely not his fault, since he had no 
authority to remove McGuire or clean up the mess in the schools, but it 
had erupted during his term. The same applied to the vice scandal in 
Newport and Campbell County. And now his favorite cause, constitu-
tional revision, had been turned down by the people, largely through 
the defection of Democrats. 
The man who had seemed invulnerable a few months earlier now 
looked vulnerable indeed. Rumors started circulating that Combs 
would resign as governor to take a federal judgeship. Others said he 
would quit to run against Republican Thruston Morton for the U.S. 
Senate. Wyatt had already said, privately, that he planned to run 
against Morton in 1962, but now there was political speculation that 
Combs would resign and turn over the governorship to Wyatt, opening 
the way for Wyatt to run for governor in 1963. Chandler, already 
planning his return to the state house, crowed about his victory over 
the Little Judge and declared that he would like nothing better than a 
chance to run against" Ankle Blankets." 
It was a gloomy way in which to approach a new year. Yet not 
everything was negative. On December 20, Frankfort correspondent 
Allan Trout wrote in the Courier-Journal that "the Combs-Wyatt admin-
istration is something new for Kentucky in that it is. actually modern, 
not in the narrow sense of governmental techniques, but in that it is 
dedicated to the task of making Kentucky a modern state, the equal of 
its sister states in the social, cultural and economic areas by which the 
excellence of a state is measured." It was some solace. Combs felt that 
he had lost a battle but not a war, and at a meeting held in the House of 
Representatives in Frankfort, a Constitution Revision Study Commit-
tee was formed amid vows that the fight would go on. It did, but it 
never managed to revise the constitution. 
Outsiders have never been able to understand the refusal of Ken-
tucky to get rid of this handicap to modern government. The fact is that 
few Kentuckians know much about the state constitution (newspaper 
surveys have shown that many confuse it with the U.S. Constitution 
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and feel a patriotic urge to defend it), and because of its length and 
complexity, few care to study it. But Combs saw in the close vote 
indications that the voters, given enough information and leadership, 
might yet be ready to change the charter. Perhaps in a more enlight-
ened age, it will happen. 
On December 17, Combs announced a program almost as dear to 
him as charter revision and roads: a parks program to cost between 
$10,000,000 and $20,000,000. It would include five new parks-at 
Rough River, Buckhorn Lake, Greenbo Lake, Falmouth Lake, and Big 
Bone Lick-and Kentucky would join with Virginia in the creation of 
their first interstate park at Breaks of the Sandy, near Elkhorn City in 
Pike County. Pine Mountain, Jenny Wiley, and Lake Cumberland were 
to be greatly expanded. Natural Bridge facilities were to be rebuilt. In 
all, there would be eight new lodges, cottages would be added at nine 
parks, and 16 new picnic shelters would give every park picnic facili-
ties. Nine parks would get boat docks, 11 would get golf courses, and 
15 would be given bridle paths and either riding stables or access to 
stables. 
In addition, approach roads and roads within the parks would be 
improved. Swimming pools, tennis courts, basketball courts, game 
rooms, and playgrounds would be built along with the lodges. Grocery 
stores would be added to accommodate campers, fishermen, and 
visitors staying in cottages with kitchens. Snack bars would cater to day 
visitors. 
"We are in the tourist business in earnest," said Combs, though it 
was his plan to draw tourists not only to the parks but to the recrea-
tional facilities he hoped that private investors would build around the 
edges of the parks. He planned to keep rentals and charges in the parks 
reasonable enough so that all Kentuckians could use and enjoy them 
but not so low that private facilities nearby could not compete. And, as 
much as anything else, he saw the parks as sources of jobs and places of 
healthful recreation for people living nearby, places where families 
could come and have a good time for little or no money. Though the 
lodges and other income-producers might make money, Combs never 
visualized the parks system as a money-maker but as a public service 
that would, by making the state a tourist haven, help its economy. 
As he began his second year in office, Combs could take considera-
ble satisfaction in what had been accomplished. He had taken some 
hard licks, and at a party for state workers he joked, "I got a cake today, 
which shows I have at least one supporter left." Actually, he was better 
off than he appeared to be, and the pendulum of public opinion would 
soon begin swinging back. At a small gathering following the party, he 
ticked off what he thought were "some little steps we've taken": 
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Improvements in the schools. 
The huge highway program. 
The sales tax and a 40 percent cut in income taxes. 
The parks program and the establishment of the Department 
of Parks. 
The merit system and the abolition of assessment of state 
employees. 
The Department of Child Welfare. 
Reform of election laws, with voting machines required. 
Conflict-of-interest laws. 
Taking government to the people. 
Expanded programs in health, agriculture, and conservation. 
Programs to help depressed areas. 
New industrial investment and expansion of existing industry. 
(Wyatt had announced that Kentucky'S economy had ex-
panded by $8,000,000 a day during the second quarter.) 
161 
Of course, one of the big ones, constitutional revision, had gotten 
away. Combs tried to view it philosophically, and prepared for a new 
year. 
12 __ _ 
Win Some, Lose Some 
A conventional man on the surface, Bert Combs seemed at times to 
take an adverse pleasure in being unconventional in his attitude to-
ward the legislature, patronage, the state payroll. Sometimes it ap-
peared that he was purposely encouraging an image, creating a 
character. At a "taking government to the people" day in Louisville, he 
heard that some boys were having an air rifle contest nearby; leaving 
his official party straggling behind, he strode over to the gathering of 
boys and borrowed an air rifle from one of them. "1 used to be a pretty 
good shot with one of these," he told the bemused youth, and pro-
ceeded to plunk eight out of ten shots in the bullseye. "That's really the 
governor?" asked the boy. "He's pretty good." Combs sighed and went 
back to the office where a line of people awaited him. 
As is often the case with governors, a mystique of sorts began to 
spring up around Combs. People repeated and enlarged on his re-
marks if they contained a scintilla of humor, as though they were 
monuments of wit. His nicknames for members of his inner circle-
Field McChesney became "Field Mouse"; Felix Joyner, for some rea-
son, was "Yogi"; Ed Prichard, "Philosopher" -were seen as the work of 
a creative genius. Assistants imitated his accent, exaggerating his 
mountain twang; his most mundane remarks, repeated with proper 
accent and gestures, became examples of insightful folk wisdom. He 
became known as the "Gray Fox," and his graying hair and white 
raincoat became trademarks. Like Wyatt, he was on the go a great part 
of the time, wetting the palms of staffers by insisting on flying into and 
out of postage-stamp hillside airports at any hour of day or night and in 
any kind of weather in his twin-engine Beechcraft. 
Combs began 1961, however, in a very traditional way by announc-
ing that he and Wyatt had set a goal of 50 new industries for 1961. 
Promising industrial growth has long been as customary for politicians 
as praising Kentucky women and horses. Henry Clay promised to lure 
business to Kentucky when he was campaigning for the U.S. Senate in 
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the 1820s. Combs and Wyatt had been more specific than most in 
vowing to bring in job-producing plants, and Wyatt had been devoting 
to the task almost every moment not consumed by legislative and 
ceremonial duties. But this goal was rather lofty (where they got the 
figure of 50 industries is anyone's guess). 
Just how successful was their drive for new business, new plants, 
new jobs is uncertain. State economies depend on, are tied to, the 
national economy. When the country is in a recession, the state feels it, 
and in 1961 the country was in a recession. Capital spending was 
down. A slumping market hit hard those things that Kentucky pro-
duced---coal, whiskey, tobacco. Mechanization of coal mines had cost 
the state 48,000 jobs since World War II. The Louisville area alone had 
lost 21,000 jobs in government offices and installations. The gradual 
disappearance of the small family farm had taken 8,000 jobs a year. 
These were factors over which the state had little influence. 
In some respects Kentucky had done better than the nation as a 
whole. Between 1946 and 1960 the number of factory workers grew by 
14 percent nationally, while Kentucky gained 30 percent. During the 
Clements administration, 1947 to 1951, the state's industrial labor force 
grew by 8.6 percent and nonfarm employment by 14.2 percent. During 
the Wetherby years, factory jobs increased 20 percent and nonfarm 
employment 11 percent. In Chandler's term, 1955 to 1959, factory jobs 
rose only 1.8 percent and nonfarm jobs only 3.6 percent, but it would 
be unfair to blame Chandler for this; the recession that took 14,000 
nonfarm jobs from Kentucky played a role. 
That there was a Kentucky rebound in 1960 is beyond dispute, 
though the end of the year still found 124,000 people without jobs and 
a quarter of a million living on surplus food distributed by the federal 
government. In 1960 new industrial investment, actual or planned, 
amounted to $376,000,000. New investment in factories alone 
amounted to $164,000,000, compared with less than $50,000,000 in 
1959. Wyatt reported 10,000 new industrial jobs in 1960, which ~reated 
another 10,000 jobs in construction. At this rate, not only was Kentucky 
ahead of the nation, but its rate of investment and job growth were 
running at a record rate. How much of this could be attributed to the 
Combs-Wyatt program and how much would have come about in any 
case is, again, a matter for conjecture. State administrations tradi-
tionally take credit for economic gains and blame the national economy 
for economic slippage. 
Since the matter of the constitution was sticking in his craw, Combs 
named 28 people to a group to recommend reforms in the state consti-
tution. He knew it was the one historic step he needed and had so far 
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failed to take, and he wanted desperately to do something about it 
before he left office. 
But the first weeks of the new year of 1961 were given over to low-
key, low-profile matters. The Court of Appeals made the governor's life 
a little easier by approving, four to three, the legislative act of the 
special session giving the bonus to both resident and out-of-state 
veterans. He got further good news when Bowling Green attorney Paul 
Huddleston, who had filed suit on behalf of two Warren County 
doctors charging that the bonus itself was unconstitutional, had 
dropped the suit. It had not worried Combs, but it was good to have it 
out of the way. 
Then on February 26, Combs realized an old ambition when he 
broke ground for the long-awaited East Kentucky Turnpike. The first 
section of 44 miles would extend from Interstate 64 at Wmchester to 
Campton. One branch would then run from Campton to Salyersville 
and on to Prestonsburg, while the southern branch would extend from 
Campton through Hazard and on to Whitesburg. It was a gratifying 
day for Combs and for backers of the road. 
As a matter of fact, Combs was feeling pretty good about things 
during the first months of 1961. He had taken a beating in the fall 
elections; the loss of the constitutional revision referendum had hurt; 
and he knew that his image had been damaged, too. Some predicted 
that in the upcoming primaries he might lose control of the legislature 
to candidates backed by Chandler and Clements. Chandler was al-
ready claiming victory and preparing to run for governor in 1963, 
declaring that the people had "caught up with the Little Judge." But 
Combs had a feeling that things were not that bad. Everywhere he 
went, people seemed friendly. His programs were being well received. 
If political writers bemoaned his fortunes, editorialists praised his 
actions. 
He decided that it might be advisable to have a responsible pollster, 
such as Lou Harris, come to Kentucky and take the public pulse. But 
before he could take any comfort from the poll, here came the Newport 
ministers again, asking him to remove eight public officials in Newport 
and Campbell County. When they had asked him, the year before, to 
help them kick out the officials, Combs had told them he would need 
more solid information than they had given him. Now they gave him 
more than he had asked for. In a 31-page affidavit, the ministers 
charged that Circuit Judge Ray Murphy, County Judge A.J. Jolly, Sher-
iff Norbert Roll, Newport Mayor Ralph Mussman, Newport Police 
Chief George Gugel, Newport Detective Leroy Fredericks, County 
Police Chief Harry Stuart, and Detective Gordon Reed had allowed 
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gambling, prostitution, and illegal liquor sales to flourish in the town 
and county. 
Combs and Attorney General John Breckinridge were trying to 
figure out how to get a handle on the Newport situation when Combs 
was again called to testify before alegislative investigating committee 
about the truck deal. There wasn't much that he could add to what was 
already known. He admitted that he had told Clements that they were 
obliged to do something for Thurston Cooke if it could be done prop-
erly. He could recall meeting Cooke on two occasions but said the 
purchase of trucks had not been discussed. He felt later that he had told 
the truth and been less than convincing. 
Then, suddenly, mass demonstrations erupted in Louisville, re-
sulting in the arrest of 177 blacks demanding admission to stores and 
restaurants. Owners protested that they would be put out of business if 
they let blacks in. Mayor Bruce Hoblitzell declared that his integration 
committee was working to gain admission for the blacks but that he had 
to proceed cautiously; actually, he was stalling. Restaurant owners 
seriously believed that if they let blacks in, whites would stay out, and 
they were putting heavy pressure on City Hall. A committee of blacks 
came to Frankfort to ask Combs for help, and Combs didn't make 
anyone very happy by announcing that he and the state's Human 
Rights Commission were taking a wait-and-see stand on the Louisville 
protests. Kentucky actually didn't know what to do about the civil 
rights movement. It had always been wishy-washy on the black ques-
tion; it had been unable to make up its mind about slavery. Now it was 
having a hard time deciding how to view protesting blacks. 
To top things off, Combs and Senator John Cooper, in an effort to 
get economic help for depressed eastern Kentucky counties, asked 
President Kennedy to send four cabinet members to the mountains to 
see for themselves the depressed conditions of the area. They didn't 
get much encouragement. Combs then asked the Tennessee Valley 
Authority to build its projected new steam plant in Kentucky-if 
possible, in eastern Kentucky. TVA officials announced that they 
would build it on the Clinch River in Tennessee. A group of Campbell 
County businessmen announced that they were forming a Committee 
of 500 to combat vice in Newport, and again asked Combs to investigate 
the lack of law enforcement in the county. 
Suddenly it seemed that everything was coming unglued. Combs. 
began to worry about the legislative elections coming up in May. 
Chandler was talking loudly of his intention to "take it away from 
them," and Combs knew that he could not afford to have a Chandler-
controlled legislature dealing with the sales tax, budget, school, and 
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road legislation. There were nine seats that Combs wanted to win in the 
Senate, 32 in the House, but newspapers were warning of "rumblings 
of discontent" among Democrats and "signs and sounds of revolt 
against the sales tax" that threatened Combs's hold on the legislature. 
Ordinarily, the more liberal newspapers of the state deplored the 
power of the governor over the legislature and called for changes giving 
the lawmakers more independence. They were singing a different tune 
now, realizing that a Chandler-controlled legislature could jeopardize 
the progress made by the 1960 session. 
A governor's influence over legislative races is always a matter of 
question. Usually there is less popular interest in legislative races than 
in races for governor, Congress, or the presidency, and if a governor's 
local people-his patronage man, highway people and other state 
workers, and friendly local officials-get out a reasonably good vote, 
the governor can carry it for legislators friendly to him. At the same 
time, lack of popular interest and a resulting small vote can be dan-
gerous; a well-organized opposition making a strong effort can tum 
out enough votes to give the governor a setback. 
It is in such situations that the time-honored drama of politics 
shows its efficiency. According to the traditional scenario, a local 
official (county judge, patronage mal'\, magistrate) is visited by the 
leaders of a county community who are in need of a road, a bridge, a 
playground for the school. The judge or magistrate tells them (usually 
in all honesty) that though he wants desperately to help them and 
knows the reality of their need, he does not have the money. They 
insist that something be done. He finally says he will go to Frankfort 
and see the highway commissioner. The commissioner tells him that 
his road (bridge, etc.) is not budgeted, tha. money is tight, and that he 
will just have to wait. 
The judge goes home and reports to his constituents, who reiterate 
the emergency nature of their need. The judge then bravely announces 
that he will take the final step: like a Daniel approaching the lions' den, 
he says he will go see the governor. He returns to Frankfort and finally 
gets to see the governor, who is deeply touched by his situation, 
though he obviously cannot go over the head of his commissioner and 
promise money that is not available. But, he says in tones dripping 
crisis, he knows that the judge has been a good friend, the kind that can 
be counted on in the approaching elections. He will see what can be 
done. 
The judge goes home. The next day the governor calls to tell him 
that he has performed a near miracle: he has taken enough money from 
various other projects to finance the judge's needed road. The judge 
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calls in the road-needing citizens and tells them that he has performed 
a miracle, gone right to the top for them, and, sure enough, the 
governor himself is going to get them the road. The people are be-
holden to the judge. The judge is beholden to the governor. The party 
is strengthened in the community involved, and the governor can 
count on a little help on election day. 
Combs was not above using this well-established procedure. He 
began to call his people across the state, checking on the critical races, 
seeing where he could afford to promise a road or a bridge, making 
sure that any available jobs were being used to produce the desired 
results. Putting on the screws, but gently. Actually, Combs preferred to 
work directly with the legislators, but he had to elect the legislators 
first. 
"You hear a lot about how governors pour money into these 
legislative races;" Combs said later, "but there's not much to it. You 
can't. There are too many. I tried to help people that were with me and 
were in a tight race. I'd go in and speak for them, and of course we'd 
see that what could be done was done. There's notan awful lot you can 
do within the law nowadays." 
And first, there was Newport to deal with. Tension there was 
growing. The Committee of 500 had drafted George Ratterman, a 
former professional footballer living in Fort Thomas, to run for Camp-
bell County sheriff. Ratterman, immediately dubbed" second stringer" 
by the opposition because he had played backup quarterback to the 
famed Otto Graham of the Oeveland Browns, promised to clean up 
vice if elected. His opponent was G. W. "Hoot" Gibson, Alcoholic 
Beverage Control agent under Chandler. When asked by reporters 
about the reform movement, Gibson said he had not heard of any 
reform movement. Asked if he favored a cleanup of vice and gambling, 
Gibson recoiled as if he had been confronted by a rattlesnake with 
wings. "Vice?" he cried. "Where? I haven't seen any!" 
Combs sent special Alcoholic Beverage Control agents into New-
port on April 21. They cited six bars for liquor law violations. This 
didn't satisfy the Committee of 500. But the committeemen shortly had 
a problem of their own, and this time it rubbed off on the Combs 
administration-in a rather ludicrous way. George Ratterman, their 
White Knight for sheriff, was found in an apartment over Newport's 
Tropicana nightclub (the apartment belonged to Tito Carinci, manager 
of the club) in what is usually referred to as a compromising situation 
with a young lady billed as April Flowers. Ms. Flowers was a striptease 
dancer in the Tropicana. Actually, as she later explained, her name was 
Juanita Jean Hodges; she had taken the name of April Flowers to 
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advance her stage career, such as it was. As to what she was doing in a 
bedroom with Ratterman, well, she said, that was a long story, and 
involved. 
Ratterman claimed that he had been framed; so did Ms. Hodges 
(aka April Flowers), who said she had been asked by Carinci to cut 
short her strip act and go up to his apartment. There, to her shock and 
amazement, she found the unconscious Ratterman on a bed, and while 
she was trying to rouse him, four men broke in and carried him to the 
police station. Ms. Flowers said that as the men, who identified them-
selves as police officers, bore the befuddled Ratterman away, one of 
them winked at her-indicating, she surmised, that he assumed she 
was a party to the event. She insisted that she was not. Eventually, the 
courts agreed that Ratterman had been framed, and the forces of evil 
were foiled again, though both Ratterman and the forces of reform 
were left looking rather silly. They and the public did gain, however, at 
least one chuckle from the affair when, at a hearing in Lexington, Ms. 
Flowers flourished a Kentucky Colonel's commission which, she re-
vealed, had been signed by Wilson Wyatt as acting governor. 
Embarrassing. 
Instead ofJaughing it off, as he might well have done, the rather 
straitlaced Wyatt appeared more shocked and amazed than Ms. 
Flowers, nee Hodges. He had no idea how this had come about, he 
insisted, and instituted a full investigation to find out. Kentucky Colo-
nel commissions, which cost nothing, involve no obligation, and look 
nice framed on the office wall, are highly prized, and the average 
governor hands out dozens, if not hundreds. The commissions are 
supposedly given to people who have rendered valuable services to the 
state, but in actual practice anyone with influence in the governor's 
office can usually get a commission for someone he wants to impress or 
to whom he owes a favor. How did Ms. Flowers happen to get one? 
Simple: someone had asked a secretary in the office of Secretary of 
State Henry Carter to get a commission for one Juanita Jean Hodges, 
who had-the applicant testified-performed admirable and valuable 
services for the state (and who is to say she had not?). Ms. Flowers said 
her benefactor was a Lexington judge who was a good and great friend, 
but some in state government blamed Henry Carter himself, an afi-
cionado of the dance who had been seen in the Tropicana on at least 
one occasion watching Ms. Flowers reveal all. In any event, Carter 
approved the commission and sent it on to the governor's office to be 
signed; the governor happened to be out of town; and Wyatt, as acting 
governor, signed the nefarious document. 
Assistants to Wyatt said that Carter, who was not a Wyatt enthusi-
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ast, had planned the whole thing to embarrass the lieutenant governor. 
The secretary was also known to take a drink upon occasion, and upon 
such occasion to develop a pixieish sense of humor. In any event, 
someone had sneaked one past, and Our Lady of the Flowers became, 
so far as is recorded, the first Kentucky Colonel to wear a G-string. 
Wyatt immediately ordered that she be stripped, this time of her 
commission, but it was not clear that he had this power, since only a 
governor or acting governor giveth a commission and only a governor 
or acting governor taketh it away, and by this time Wyatt was neither 
governor nor acting governor. As newspaper headlines declared, jus-
tice bumped and ground its majestic course, but Ms. Flowers had her 
commission, the public had a good laugh, and the reform forces had a 
temporary embarrassment. 
This did nothing, of course, to clean up the situation in Newport, 
and before Combs could give it his full attention, there was the matter 
of the May primary elections in which legislators would be chosen. He 
approached these with more confidence than some thought justified,. 
partly because the Harris Poll he had authorized showed that he was 
more popular than political writers thought. At the same time, he 
realized that he had a lot riding on the vote, which would be something 
of a referendum on his first year in office and especially on the vital 
sales tax. 
At the end of the primary election day, Happy Chandler declared 
from Versailles, "If I were in Combs' shoes, I'd be nervous at this stage 
of the game. When he gets the noses counted, he may find he's like 
Little Bo Peep, he's lost his sheep." But when the votes were counted, 
the voters had confounded the experts by giving Combs a smashing 
victory. In nine key Senate races, Combs forces won seven. 
Chandlerites had won two, but one of those two had assured Combs of 
his cooperation on key issues. 
In 32 key House races, Combs men won 25, Chandlerites seven. In 
no section of the state was there any indication of a revolt against the 
sales tax. In northern Kentucky, where anti-tax feeling was supposed 
to have been strong, the pro-tax delegation made a clean sweep. Frank 
Bassett of Hopkinsville, Chandler's majority floor leader in the 1958 
Senate, was badly beaten by Combs-backed JohnM. Dixon. In 
Louisville, longtime Chandlerite Leo Lucas was soundly beaten by 
Michael Ascolese, a Combs supporter. Combs men fared well, in fact, 
in all urban areas, where anti-sales tax sentiment was supposed to be 
strong. Spencer Cobb of Nicholasville not ony beat longtime Chandler 
ally Sam Sternberg. but outpolled him in Chandler's home town of 
Versailles. 
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Overnight, Combs evolved from political sad sack to popular hero 
and political genius, a veritable mountain phoenix, risen from the 
ashes of failure to soar on the wings of victory. Suddenly the Combs 
program was seen to be a thing of brilliance. Political writers decided 
that the fall election, in which he had not been directly involved, had 
been misleading. 
As it probably had been. John Cooper, approaching the status of an 
institution, would have had trouble beating Keen Johnson only had the 
Democratic candidate for president, John F. Kennedy, run a very strong 
race in Kentucky. He had not. Just as Kentucky Democrats had voted 
for Republican Herbert Hoover in 1928 over Catholic Democrat AI 
Smith, so did they bolt this time to the Protestant Republican Richard 
Nixon. And while Combs's constitutional convention had lost, it was 
by the narrowest possible margin; it might well have carried had a few 
Democratic leaders not quietly gutted it. 
So now Combs could tum his attention back to Newport and other 
details of government. Shortly before the primary, he had broken again 
with tradition by establishing a formula for distributing rural-road 
money. Historically, money for secondary roads had been divided 
among the counties by the rural highway commissioner partly on the 
basis of need, partly by the rule of political convenience. The commis-
sioner's home county usually did well. So did most of the counties 
where the voting went correctly, where administration officials lived, 
or where political wheels needed grease. It was accepted practice. But 
now, Combs decreed, after dividing a fifth of the road funds equally 
among the 120 counties, a fifth would be distributed on the basis of 
rural population, a fifth on the basis of rural road mileage, and two 
fifths on the basis of rural area. 
There were, apparently, few repercussions, though it was a historic 
move. It marked, for all practical purposes, the disappearance of the 
last vestiges of the old bipartisan commission that divided road funds 
according to personal choice and political need. Politics had not been 
removed from the department; it is doubtful that that will ever happen. 
Nor was the internal arrangement of the department completely effi-
cient. Rural Highway Commissioner Ted Marcum had stubbornly 
maintained that he was legally independent of Highway Commission-
er Henry Ward, a policy which, had it stood, would have made coordi-
nation of highway systems difficult if not impossible. But more impor-
tant, sociological changes were taking place that would soon alter the 
position of the Highway Department as the state's largest department, 
with the largest payroll, the largest budget, and the greatest political 
influence. Welfare agencies were reaching deeper into the social econo-
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my of Kentucky as federal laws extended aid of various kinds to more 
and more people, and the regrouped and renamed Department of 
Human Resources would gradually become the state's largest agency. 
But in June, Combs got some gloomy news· to balance the rosy. 
State revenues for the fiscal year were $3,000,000 less than anticipated, 
$211,000,000 instead of $214,000,000, and the state was obliged to 
cancel $1,495,000 in building contracts, including repairs on the capitol 
and other state buildings. 
Combs set in motion machinery to bring some resolution to the 
Newport issue, naming John L. Davis-former Kentucky Bar Associa-
tion president from Lexington-as special commissioner to conduct 
ouster hearings against four Newport and Campbell County officials 
charged with failure to enforce the laws. Attorney General John 
Breckinridge was directed to conduct the prosecution. Davis an-
nounced that the hearings would be held in Frankfort and gave the 
defendants 20 days to prepare their defense. 
It was the beginning of the end for the good times in Newport. 
Charges that George Ratterman's civil rights had been violated in the 
April Flowers case brought federal Attorney General Robert Kennedy 
and his Department of Justice into the case and sent federal agents 
swarming through Newport. When a former prostitute told of payoffs 
to officials, Circuit Judge Ray Murphy (one of those so tagged) quickly 
called for a special grand jury. But just as the Ratterman case enabled 
Kennedy to move in, so did the payoff charges open the door for 
Attorney General Breckinridge, who got Murphy to step down and 
replaced him with tough Judge Ed Hill. 
In the end, Combs barred Police Chief George Gugel and Chief of 
Detectives Leroy Fredericks from office for four years. Sheriff Norbert 
Roll resigned and left town. Combs later removed County Police Chief 
Harry Stuart. The ministers and businessmen were jubilant, and for 
the time, at least, Newport was nothing more than a rather unexcep-
tional river town across the Ohio from Cincinnati. April Flowers, 
commission and all, wiggled off into the purple dusk of history. 
So far, Combs had a perfect average. He had gotten Heman 
McGuire removed from his office as superintendent of Carter County 
schools. He had slain the dragon of vice in Newport. He had blunted 
criticism, for the time being at least, of his role in the truck deal. He had 
turned back the Chandlerites and had come through an election with a 
comfortable majority in both houses of the next legislature. He had also 
promised to try to bring peace in the Louisville racial trouble, and on 
July 8 he presided over the opening of the Governor's Conference on 
Human Rights, which went on record in favor of a law outlawing 
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discrimination by race, religion, or national origin. The sales tax was 
yielding about what had been projected. The Eastern Kentucky Turn-
pike was under construction, bonds for a Western Kentucky Turnpike 
had been sold, and bonus applications were being processed at the rate 
of 1,400 a day. 
Federal park officials were discussing the possibility of a large 
national park in the land lying between Kentucky Lake and Lake 
Barkley, which was just beginning to fill. The 170,000-acre strip reach-
ing from near the Ohio River south into Tennessee had formerly been 
known as the Land between the Rivers, a region famed for the produc-
tion of moonshine whiskey, said to be among the nation's finest. The 
area would eventually be made into a national recreation area called 
Land between the Lakes, under control of the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority, and become an outstanding tourist attraction. 
In July, Combs accepted 640 acres of scenic mountain land in 
Harlan County for Raven Rock State Park, named for a great granite 
outcropping at the summit of a ridge. (The name would later be 
changed to Kingdom Come State Park, after the valley lying to the west 
and featured in the famous novel by John Fox, Jr., The Little Shepherd of 
Kingdom Come.) The park was a nice counterpart to the Little Shepherd 
Trail, a spectacular road stretching along the Pine Mountain ridgetop 
from Harlan into Letcher County-most of it blacktopped but some 
fairly rough-of£ering some of the finest scenery in the state and 
containing nearly every species of mountain tree, shrub, and flower. 
The development of the trail was of particular satisfaction to Wilson 
Wyatt, who had promoted it almost from the day of his inauguration. A 
few days later Combs broke ground for a new lodge at General Butler 
State Park near Carrollton. And put out a beehive on the grounds of the 
governor's mansion. As far as is known, that was a first. 
In Kentucky there is, of course, no vacation from politics. The 
summer of 1961 had hardly begun when the rumor went around that 
Clements was studying a comeback and had an eye on the Senate race 
for which Wyatt was preparing. Harry Lee Waterfield, it was said, was 
also a possible candidate-raising the question of which man Happy 
Chandler, who was about to launch his campaign for the governorship 
in 1963, would support. 
There was also talk that Combs might jump into the race; the Harris 
Poll of March had indicated that he could beat Senator Thruston Mor-
ton and possibly anyone else on the horizon. He could not succeed 
himself under constitutional restrictions, and it did not seem reason-
able that a man with so much political muscle would choose not to use 
it. Combs scotched the rumors by announcing that he was supporting 
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Wyatt and predicted that Wyatt would win easily. He also stated that he 
had made no choice for governor. (Actually, he was leaning toward 
Ned Breathitt but had earlier said that a governor should not try to 
dictate the choice of his successor. He would change his mind on that.) 
John Breckinridge responded that he was going to run for governor 
regardless of whom Combs supported. State Treasurer Thelma Stovall, 
one of the few surviving Chandlerites in state government, announced 
that she would accept the new merit system but only under protest. 
She also threatened to file suit to have it declared unconstitutional. She 
didn't. 
The economic situation in eastern Kentucky, meanwhile, refused 
to improve. Despite work beginning on roads, parks, dams, schools, 
and airports, unemployment in the distressed 37-county region ex-
ceeded 20 percent in some places. Approximately 150~000 people in the 
region were eating government-distributed surplus foods. Combs cre-
ated a new office to handle federal area development programs with 
John Whisman, his authority on Appalachia (himself a mountain 
native) as its director, in order to bring the region under President 
Kennedy's new redevelopment program, which could mean as much 
as $394,000,000 for the mountains. 
In the months immediately after sales tax revenues started rolling 
in, it had seemed, as Finance Commissioner Robert Matthews said, 
that "we had more money than we knew what to do with." This feeling 
didn't last long. As the summer of 1961 burned itself out, it became 
apparent that the new programs enacted in 1960 were stretching the 
treasury. Budget studies showed that it would take $236,000,000 to run 
the state in 1962-63, and $246,000,000 for 1963-64---about $13,000,000 
more than anticipated income. Combs had to ask for a 5 percent cut in 
all agency requests for the upcoming legislature. 
In steamy September weather, Combs made surprise visits to five 
state parks "to see them in normal operation." The visits were not 
always totally satisfying. At one park he sat in a beautifully decorated 
dining room overlooking a cool lake surrounded by dense forest, while 
soft music filled the air-conditioned room. Then a waitress arrived to 
take his order. Combs shook his head. "You spend a million dollars to 
build a dining room with a great view," he said wearily. "You put in 
expensive carpets. You air-condition it. You pay experts to come and 
decorate it. You train cooks and cashiers, you pipe in music, you fix 
good food. Then here comes a waitress with a toothpick in her mouth 
and says 'Whut kin I getcha?' Blows the whole thing. Might as well be 
in a greasy spoon." 
His experience was somewhat similar to that of Henry Ward who, 
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while commissioner of conservation (in charge of parks) asked for 
pancakes for breakfast one morning in the dining room at Kentucky 
Dam Vtllage. He was told the dining room didn't serve them. Ward, not 
a patient man, blew up. He called for the manager and told him in 
unmistakably clear language that the dining room would start imme-
diately to serve pancakes. The manager promised that he would. And 
did. A few months later Ward was once more at the park and again 
ordered pancakes, only to be told by the waitress that they didn't have 
any. "We served them for a while, but we don't anymore," she said. 
Ward demanded to see the manager. Again the poor manager, called 
on the carpet, said yes, they had served pancakes for a while. "But they 
were so popular," he said, "it was just hard to keep the ingredients in 
stock, so we just removed them from the menu." Ward didn't know 
whether to laugh or cry. Looking at the man, he shook his head and 
said, "Oh, hell!" 
But there were always little political battles to fight. For example, 
on September 15, Mrs. Joyce Weddington of Prestonsburg filed suit in 
Franklin Circuit Court asking that the state be forced to honor leases 
that would permit her to drill for oil and gas in both Carter Caves and 
Natural Bridge state parks. Mrs. Weddington's husband, Joe, was a 
business associate of Happy Chandler's; the leases, issued in the clos-
ing days of the Chandler administration, would have permitted drillers 
to mar large sections of park land. It took a court battle to block them. 
They were typical of a handful of such leases issued by Chandler and 
canceled by Combs, probably without legal authority, in the early days 
of his administration. The day after the Weddington suit was filed, 
Heman McGuire introduced Chandler at a Carter County gathering, 
praising him as having "the courage to tell the Courier-Journal to go to 
hell." Happy then defended the oil and gas leases in state parks, 
explaining that he had advertised for bids as the law required, and that 
his friends had made the highest bid-$350! 
Politics seemed to rear its head at every possible juncture, even on 
a project so apparently nonpolitical as the Eastern Kentucky Turnpike. 
When Combs and Wyatt toured eastern counties during the first week 
of October to investigate the need for more road improvement, Hazard 
banker and regional Republican power Dewey Daniel called the turn-
pike "the best thing that has happened to us in our lifetime," adding 
that "everybody should get down on his knees and thank God for Bert 
Combs." But Democrat Happy Chandler declared in Frankfort, "That 
road, that toll road Bertie gave them, it wasn't needed. It starts no-
where and goes howhere. If you get on you can't get back off, and if you 
get off you can't get back on. It won't pay for itself, mark my words. 
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[Actually, its bonds were retired and tolls were removed in 1985, paid 
off ahead of schedule.] 1 could have done just as well by straightening 
out the roads we had." Chandler used the same words to ridicule the 
Kentucky Turnpike, now part of Interstate 65. 
Throughout the fall, Combs and various members of his cabinet 
were busy breaking ground, dedicating things, announcing contracts. 
In one day-in nine and a half hour8-'-he and Wyatt dedicated nine 
airports (at Cynthiana, Olive Hill, Harlan, Campbellsville, Eliz-
abethtown, Greenville, Elkton, Murray, and Fulton). He and Ward 
attended the beginning of work on the Western Kentucky Turnpike 
and on November 1 opened the stretch of Interstate 64 between 
Louisville's Outer Loop and Kentucky 55 near Shelbyville. He and 
Wyatt opened the annual Shakertown Fall Festival, praising the restor-
ation as a boost for historical preservation and for the tourist industry. 
On December 17, 1961, an appointment was announced that glad-
dened the Christmas season for Wilson Wyatt. In his efforts to sell 
Kentucky to technological and other sophisticated industry, he had 
long been intrigued by the experience of North Carolina, where the 
existence of the "Research Triangle" had reportedly persuaded many 
industries to locate. This research complex consisted of the facilities of 
the University of North Carolina, Duke University, and North Carolina 
State University, all located within a few miles of each other and 
offering technical firms a variety of talents and installations not usually 
available close at hand. 
Wyatt foresaw such an installation in Kentucky as part of a drive to 
letthe state catch up with others in job-producing plants. He fought for 
and won funds to convert grounds of Spindletop farm, on Ironworks 
Pike just north of Lexington, into headquarters for such a research 
center. And he regarded it a feather in Kentucky'S cap when he an-
nounced that Beardsley Graham, the former manager of Lockheed 
Aircraft Corporation's missile and space program, had been employed 
as president of the Spindletop Research Corporation. Graham took 
over at the beginning of 1962 and at once set about designing a building 
to house the research facilities. In the next two years he had put 
together the core of a first-rate research plant. In the end, unfor-
tunately, Graham experienced frequent clashes with members of the 
administration. The research center was never used as fully as Wyatt 
had hoped. Demands for its services were not as great as he had 
foreseen, and subsequent legislatures were hesitant to appropriate the 
money that would have let it grow and function as planned. 
But the real task at hand for Combs was to prepare for the coming 
session of the legislature. It was bound to be rough. The second session 
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of any governor's term poses problems, if only because he often has 
trouble controlling or even influencing the legislature. The average 
governor has fewer members of his own party or faction in the Assem-
bly in the second session. He has already committed himself to a 
program during the first session and cannot woo or bully lawmakers 
with threats or promises to give or withhold such plums as roads, 
bridges, buildings, regional offices, vocational schools, and so on. 
Members with ambitions of their own are more likely to oppose the 
governor or lead rebellions with an eye on the cameras and headlines. 
Happy Chandler, for example, faced an outright rebellion during his 
second session and had to scramble for Republican votes in order to 
pass any kind of program. 
Combs appeared to be in better shape than most and was confi-
dent that he would be able to organize both houses, but he felt he could 
not afford to risk unnecessary fights. He was going to have to ask the 
Assembly for a budget even larger than his record budget of 1960. He 
was going to have to present the legislators with the involved and far-
reaching plan for the reorganization of state government proposed by 
the commission headed by Felix Joyner. 
The plan was significant. It proposed the creation of three depart-
ments out of what had been rather minor divisions of state government 
but whose functions were becoming increasingly varied and impor-
tant. For example, a health and welfare agency would deal with child 
welfare, economic security, handicapped children, health, mental 
health, tuberculosis control, and mental retardation. A natural resourc-
es agency would encompass conservation, mines and minerals (and 
the increasingly important surface-mining control), fish and wildlife 
resources, and parks. A business and professional agency would over-
see the departments of alcoholic beverage control, banking, insurance, 
motor transportation; occupations and professions, and the Public 
Service Commission. Only a few major departments would be left 
independent, a proposal bound to stir objections inside the bu-
reaucracy as well as within a legislature accustomed to doing business 
with existing agencies. 
But educational matters promised to be the thorniest the governor 
would face. In a sense, this was ironic. Combs had done more for 
education than any governor in history. He had given more money for 
teaching, created more community colleges, built more school and 
college buildings. Yet now he was facing the prospect of an all-out 
attack by the professional educators, the superintendents, school 
board members, college presidents, and-first and foremost-the su-
perintendent of public instruction. 
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Combs's relationship with Wendell Butler had been extensive and 
uneven. In 1955, when Combs ran against Chandler, Robert Martin ran 
on his ticket for superintendent of public instruction. Combs lost, but 
Martin won and faced an uneasy relationship with the victorious 
Chandler-especially because he had asked Butler for his support and 
had promised him a job should he win. But when Butler asked Martin 
for the job, Chandler warned Martin that he would have to get rid of 
Butler or face slim pickings at budget time. Martin didn't want to back 
down on his promise, yet he knew he had to protect his department. 
He tried to explain to Butler, but Butler reminded him that a promise 
was a promise; when Martin failed to deliver the promised job, the two 
men became nonfriends if not outright enemies. 
The coolness continued through the Combs years, when Dr. Mar-
tin became president of Eastern Kentucky University. When word hit 
the grapevine that Butler, after having served as superintendent of 
public instruction, was going to run for commissioner of agriculture, 
Martin surprised friends by declaring his support. "I'm all for him," 
Martin explained. "He can do the hogs of Kentucky less harm than he 
can do the children." Butler's reply is not recorded. 
Combs's commission on public education had proposed that the 
constitution be amended so that the superintendent of public instruc-
tion would be appointed by the state board of education and subject to 
removal for cause. The commission also thought that the Council on 
Public Higher Education should include more lay members and should 
concern itself with matters other than teacher-training programs and 
the division of funds among the colleges-such matters, for example, 
as duplication of graduate programs by the colleges, tenure and 
qualifications, and the question of individual colleges' lobbying in the 
legislature for budgets. 
The commission also proposed that the state superintendent 
should be removed from the state board of education, that the state 
board should be able to recommend that local superintendents or 
board members be removed for misconduct or to remove them if the 
state superintendent failed to do so, and that the state board should 
have power to order audits of local boards. 
The commission's proposals outraged the educators, especially 
Wendell Butler, who was said to be "mad as hell and ripe for a fight." 
The college presidents, too, were said to be ready to bolt Combs in the 
legislature if he backed the commission's recommendations. Their 
threats, of course, underlined the old axiom that you don't necessarily 
help state educators by helping state education. And vice versa. Es-
pecially vice versa. 
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Combs didn't relish the thought of having the education lobby 
against him. He needed their help to hold the line on the sales tax, and 
he would need them, too, when the candidate of his choice began 
running for governor. He went to a meeting of the Kentucky school 
administrators and made peace. He embraced Butler's view on the 
limited role of the state board of education in local school matters. He 
said he would not push for an appointive superintendent. Butler, in 
the audience, smiled broadly. "Sounds almost like I wrote it, doesn't 
it?" he said to a reporter. 
That galled Combs, but he wasn't one to let pride bring about a 
legislative fall. "After all," he said, "1 got just about what I wanted. You 
can't have everything." 
13 __ _ 
The Delicate Balance 
Ideology tends to be a vague commodity at the state level. The terms 
liberal and conservative, radical and reactionary, have less distinct 
meaning in the governor's office than in the president's---though since 
the days of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, liberalism at the state 
level, as at the federal, has indicated a willingness to tax and to spend 
for social purposes; conservatism, the restriction of governmental so-
cial activity and thus less need to impose taxes. But it is risky to attach 
these tags to Kentucky parties at any particular time, partly because 
factions are most often to be built around personalities rather than 
policies. Like the national party of New Deal days, the state Democratic 
party tends to be a conglomerate, and its philosophy is that of the 
reigning governor, if indeed he has a philosophy. The Republican party 
is something of a conglomerate, too, though it usually presents itself as 
a conservative monolith. 
It is also often hard to categorize a party by the conduct of admin-
istrations. Democrats are expected to b~ more willing to intervene in 
the private sector on behalf of the less privileged, Republicans on the 
side of business, if at all. In Frankfort, such stereotypes are frequently 
misleading. Happy Chandler pleased conservatives when he sent the 
National Guard into Harlan County, where they curbed union pickets 
and allowed mines to reopen; he cheered liberals when he sent the 
Guard to Sturgis to quiet anti-integration forces. Democrat Wendell 
Ford cut the sales tax; Republican Louie Nunn raised it. Chandler, 
nominally a Democrat, made a careE!r of opposing taxes, though he 
quietly enacted more tax bills than he vocally opposed. 
Since the Civil War, eastern-southeastern Kentucky, which was 
strongly pro-Union, has been the stronghold of the Republican party, 
while pro-Confederate western Kentucky has been the "Gibraltar of 
Democracy." Yet eastern Kentucky produced liberal Democratic Con-
gressman Carl Perkins, while western Kentucky produced conser-
vative Democratic Congressman Carroll Hubbard. And western Ken-
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tucky produced conservative Democratic Congressman William 
Natcher, while eastern Kentucky produced liberal Democratic Gover-
nor Bert Combs. 
Goebel may be said to have been the first to carry the liberal 
banner, opposing as he did the L&N Railroad and its limiting effect on 
state progress. Beckham carried on the liberal cause against the conser-
vative Cantrill, who served the interests of the Jockey Club and later the 
bipartisan combine. Cantrill's mantle fell to the Johnson-Talbott-Klair 
faction, just as Beckham's fell to the Laffoon-Rhea faction. In turn, 
Chandler fell heir to the conservative faction, and Clements wrested 
control of the liberal wing from the Laffoon-Rhea remnants. A strict 
alignment did not always exist, of course. Clements was considered 
more conservative than his 1947 opponent for governor, Harry Lee 
Waterfield; Waterfield later became allied with Chandler, thought to be 
in the traditional conservative mold. John Y. Brown, who considered 
himself a liberal and probably deserved the designation more than 
most others, was widely seen as a maverick. Interestingly, these three 
important figures in Kentucky's political drama were born a few miles 
apart in western Kentucky: Chandler and Brown in Henderson Coun-
ty, Clements a few miles away across the Union County line. 
For the purposes of practical politics, the Chandler wing collapsed 
with Chandler's loss to Breathitt in 1963. The Combs faction remained 
dominant throughout the Breathitt administration, faltered with the 
loss of Henry Ward to Louie Nunn in 1967, and fell from power when 
Combs, attempting a return to the governorship, lost to Wendell Ford 
in 1971. Since then there has been no clear conservative-liberal delinea-
tion within either the Democratic or Republican party. By the same 
token, there has been no dominant Republican figure since the retire-
ment of John Sherman Cooper, nor any wing within the party that 
could reasonably be called liberal. Very generally speaking, Republi-
cans from eastern Kentucky have been considered more conservative 
than those from Louisville and Lexington, also centers of occasional 
GOP strength, but such geographical classification should be regarded 
with caution. 
There is a measure of irony in that Combs's liberal image stemmed 
in part from his taxing and spending for schools, which has historically 
been viewed with suspicion by the very people that liberalism is 
supposed to serve. It also stemmed from his support by liberal news-
papers and intellectuals; from his pro-labor actions, specifically pas-
sage of laws calling for higher unemployment benefits, worker's 
compensation, and a prevailing wage; and from his pro-civil rights 
stance. But it is worth noting that he incited no conservative revolt and 
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throughout his administration remained on relatively good terms with 
the Republican minority and with the business community---even 
though after the first legislative session a spokesman for Associated 
Industries of Kentucky called him a labor lobbyist. 
Perhaps the secret to much of Combs's success lay in his ability-
partly intellectual, partly instinctive-to balance idealism and prac-
ticality. Though he knew that only a small fraction of a 3 percent sales 
tax would be needed for bonus payments, he had bulldozed it through 
the legislature, thus gaining money for his own programs on the 
patriotic pretext of doing something for the veteran. He managed to 
enact a liberal program and survive in a basically conservative state by 
taking care not to sound too liberal, to be down-to-earth in his pro-
nouncements, and to balance populist policies with laws and pro-
grams designed to aid business, sensitive to the fact that healthy 
business and industry were necessary for the economic soundness of a 
modem state-not to mention the vital importance of the tax revenues 
involved. Wilson Wyatt's drive to attract industry and encourage busi-
ness softened (though it did not dissipate) the AIK's dislike of the 
liberalized labor laws. When Combs picked his second highway com-
missioner, he chose Henry Ward, general manager of the Louisville 
Area Chamber of Commerce. His strip-mine control law worried coal 
operators more than it hampered their operations. He failed to disturb 
the cozy arrangement under which Kentucky bankers lent at 6 percent 
interest the state deposits on which they paid 2 percent. And there is 
s~me evidence that much of Combs's success was due to his habit of 
saying no more than necessary and keeping a firm rein on his temper. 
Racial policies and politics posed a special problem for Combs. 
Kentucky has never been racially progressive. It has seldom degener-
ated into the meanness that has often characterized other southern 
states, but it traveled the path of integration only about as fast as federal 
law and court decisions required. The Republican sectors of the state-
especially the eastern, southern, and southeastern counties that re-
mained strongly pro-Union during the Civil War-had been antislave, 
but they were fairly southern in their attitude toward blacks. It was at 
the Harlan railroad depot, as James Jones pointed out in his novel From 
Here to Eternity, that a sign allegedly read "Nigger, don't let the sun set 
on you in Harlan County." 
Neither have central and western Kentucky been noted for liberal 
attitudes toward integration. During the 1950s and 1960s, sporadic 
resistance to school integration erupted throughout western Kentucky, 
where farmers were already racially sensitive because of the departure 
of black labor for better-paying industrial jobs during the two decades 
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following World War II. Just as conservative administrations in Wash-
ington have managed to enact liberal racial and foreign policies, so did 
the Republican administration of Louisville Mayor William 0. Cowger 
manage to push through a public-accommodations ordinance without 
serious opposition. But even in Louisville the city's progressive image 
in race relations rested largely on the pronouncements of the two daily 
newspapers, as the social explosion over forced busing for racial bal-
ance in the schools would later show. Thus Combs chose to emphasize 
his creation of a Human Rights Commission but was hesitant to involve 
the governor's office in the Louisville controversy over the right of 
blacks to public accommodations. Not that he was antiblack, but he 
doubted the ability of Frankfort to change attitudes greatly by law, and 
he did not want to lose-by the injection of racial issues into the 
legislature-support that he would need during the eight weeks of the 
second session. 
Like a successful president, a governor must be able to compro-
mise as well as to lead, especially in his relations with the legislature. 
He enjoys an advantage of sorts in that the legislature is in session only 
four months of his four-year tenure, and he is able to govern most of 
the time without legislative interference. But it is all the more impor-
tant that he be able to exercise considerable influence with, if not 
control over, the legislature during the time it is in session, for he has 
only those eight weeks in which to win passage of the program on 
which his reputation and place in history depend. He must enact his 
program during the first session so that he will have time to put it into 
operation and produce results, and he must protect it against attack 
and supplement it during the second session. 
Legislators, political scientists, and political writers have for gener-
ations deplored the fact that Kentucky's governor has so much power in 
relation to the legislature. Calls go up each year the lawmakers are in 
session for "independence of the legislature from control by the gover-
nor." As a matter of historic fact, legislatures not controlled by the 
governor are usually not controlled by anyone, or led by anyone. If the 
governor doesn't tell the legislators what to do, they often spend their 
time arguing aimlessly, talking endlessly, engaging in factional pol-
itics, trying to pass specialist and ripper legislation, and accomplishing 
very little. 
The legislature, as well as the governor, is the victim of the constitu-
tion. Efforts have been made during the past two decades to increase 
the power of the legislature by creating interim committees to study 
and prepare legislation for approaching sessions, and the Legislative 
Research Commission has been expanded and given considerable 
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latitude to help them. But the Legislative Research Commission has 
been curtailed by the courts to keep it from becoming something of a 
fourth branch of government, and the legislators are still in session too 
little of the time to develop a considerable body of expertise. Nor is 
there any compelling evidence that the interim committees have pro-
dUCed much in improved legislation or anything tangible other than 
rather generous expense accounts for their members and only occa;. 
sionally necessary offices furnished at state expense. 
Combs approached the 1962 session with reasonable optimism. He 
had only to hold the line to be regarded a success, and with his 
majority in both houses he had reason to believe he could do it. There 
was broad speculation in the press that he could not. The Chandler 
forces were going to try to organize the Assembly, and with this 
advantage they would try to repeal or amend the sales tax. Even if they 
failed, their publicized assault on the tax would boost the chances of 
Chandler, who on January 3, 1962, opened headquarters in Frankfort 
for his "ABC in '63" campaign for governor, pledging to repeal or 
weaken the sales tax once he was in office. (It was typical of Kentucky 
that the race for governor should begin almost two years before the 
election, reflecting not only the importance of the factional division of 
the Democratic party but the state's preoccupation with politics.) 
Combs's State of the Commonwealth message to the joint houses 
was a low-key recitation of progress made in his first two years and a 
declaration of his determination to fight to keep that progress. He 
acknowledged that "there are those who want to make this Assembly a 
testing ground for missiles designed to be launched in 1963," an 
obvious thrust at Chandler, adding "But if the schemers insist on 
injecting politics of 1963 ... we will have no choice except to meet the 
challenge." A few Chandlerites commented caustically that he had 
taken credit for the sun coming up every day without accepting blame 
for its going down. Combs did not expect to set the woods afire with his 
speech. Rather, he used the occasion to list the measures he would ask 
of the session,and to test both public and political reaction to them in 
advance of their introduction. Broadly, the list included: 
Reorganization of state government. 
Creation of a community college system, including new com-
munity colleges. 
Acts to clarify the strip-mine control laws. 
Approval of bonds for the establishment of vocational educa-
tion schools. 
A law banning auto junkyards near highways or requiring 
them to be screened from view. 
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Revision of absentee voting laws. 
Expansion of the state crafts program. 
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A redrawing of congressional district lines, reducing districts 
from eight to seven. 
Passage of a record budget. 
Administration Democrats then proceeded, with almost no diffi-
culty, to organize the legislature. If the Chandlerites seriously hoped 
for a ruling majority, they were quickly disabused; From the time 
Senator Alvin Kidwell of Sparta was chosen Senate majority leader by a 
20 to 7 vote, it was obvious that there was no contest. The only 
difference in the administration lineup was in the House, where pre-
vious floor leader Tom Ray, a bright and ambitious young Jefferson 
County lawyer, had decided he could better build a power base for 
himself by running for sheriff. His place was taken by the experienced, 
wily, humorous Richard Moloney of Lexington, a thin-haired, cigar-
chewing Irishman given to rumpled vested suits and a crafty smile; his 
casual manner and confidential tone concealed the political mind of the 
expert poker player. Moloney was not as direct or open as Ray had 
been, but he was able, and he and Combs were on good if not intimate 
terms. 
Frankfort has seldom seen a more complex, competent,or interest-
ing man than Richard P. Moloney. Even those who regarded him with 
caution or suspicion found it hard to resist his charm. Yet he could be 
subtle and devious; his eyes could sparkle one moment and turn flat 
and hard in a second. It is not surprising that he was reputedly one of 
the best poker players in Kentucky; his face did not necessarily reflect 
what he was feeling. 
The son of an Irish policeman, Richard Patrick Moloney was born 
in Lexington's tough Irishtown, attended parochial schools, joined the 
Navy at 16, came home for a while, then went back to sea as a merchant 
seaman for two years. In 1924 he passed the state examination to 
become a druggist and practiced that trade, making 60 cents an hour, 
while he attended law school. By 1926 he was practicing law in Lex-
ington and playing a little politics, which came naturally. 
"Politics was just a part of life when I was a boy," he said later. 
"There was always shooting around the polling places on election day, 
and I loved to hang around. My mother always threatened to skin me 
alive if she caught me; she used to pray all day long on election day. My 
father was a cop and the cops had to patrol the polling places." 
In 1944, Moloney was elected to the state Senate, and was known 
for the rest of his life as "the Senator from Fayette," though he later 
gave up his Senate seat and came back to be elected to the House. After 
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serving as Combs's House majority leader, he was expected to continue 
in the same capacity under Governor Edward Breathitt, but he died of a 
heart attack in December 1963. 
It is likely that no man in the history of the state was ever more 
loved by legislators, politicians, lobbyists, and the press than Dick 
Moloney. In the legislature his reputation was that of the total Irish 
politician, yet he was also the champion of many of the more liberal and 
idealistic proponents of the public welfare who came to Frankfort to 
lobby pro bono publico. 
Perhaps one of the strangest examples of this side of the Moloney 
personality was his relationship with Dr. Gladys Kammerer, a pro-
fessor of political science at the University of Kentucky, who began her 
career believing that Moloney was in league with the devil, or worse. 
Moloney, she declared, was the spokesman for slot-machine interests 
in the Bluegrass and for gambling interests generally. Then Dr. Kam-
merer came to Frankfort to lobby for several causes-a merit system, 
election law reforms, and funds for mental health. (She was generally 
regarded as author of the Youth Authority Act of 1952, which created 
the Youth Authority eventually dismantled by Chandler.) She was 
obliged to call on Moloney. To her surprise, he proved not only ex-
tremely informed but helpful. She also found him philosophical and 
liberal to an extent that she had not imagined. Almost against her will, 
Dr. Kammerer became a staunch Moloney supporter. 
Moloney also became something of a hero to Mrs. John Serpell of 
Louisville, a longtime crusader for mental health. He teamed with 
Louisville's William Childress to push through a bill creating the state 
Human Rights Commission, and was credited with the maneuvering 
that freed the University of Kentucky and the regional colleges from 
the jurisdiction of the Department of Education and the state Division 
of Personnel. 
Yet the idealist in him never overcame the practical-and at times 
whimsical-politician. Once, in 1944, he introduced a bill prohibiting 
wives from engaging in spring housecleaning without the express 
consent of their husbands. He was a great favorite of the Frankfort 
press corps; reporters loved even to hear him rake the press over the 
coals, which he did whenever he felt that journalists were uninformed 
or unrealistic. "For the press had learned," editorialized the Courier-
Journal at his death, "that when the chips were down Dick Moloney 
would be found on the side of good government. And the beginning 
reporter learned, as the old ones knew, that he told the truth." 
Even when they were opposed, on such occasions as the Combs-
Wyatt rivalry, Moloney and Earle Clements enjoyed each other's com-
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pany and the tough politics of which both were capable. Few people 
were more saddened than Moloney by the split between Combs and 
Clements. Not surprisingly, Moloney'S son Michael became a power in 
the legislature during the 1980s as senator from Fayette County. 
In his initial address to the second session Combs had asked for a 
moratorium on politics. That sounded nice, but he probably didn't 
expect it; if he did, he was doomed to quick disappointment. It proved 
to be a tense, raucous, ill-mannered session, shrill and ugly with 
political charges, countercharges, and factional maneuvering. The 
Senate had usually been dignified and deliberative, while the House 
had often been rowdy, but the Senate of 1962 lost its dignity; within a 
week its sessions had degenerated into shouting matches. There were 
delays, a filibuster, loud accusations from the floor, and threats of 
censure. The noise and dissension, fomented by the Chandlerite 
forces, didn't amount to much and didn't produce much, but it gave 
the public a damaging view of the legislative process. 
In the midst of the session, House Speaker Harry King Lowman 
dealt Combs and Wyatt a mild shock when he announced that he was a 
candidate for the U.S. Senate. It was generally known that Wyatt was 
waiting only for the end of the session to announce his candidacy, and 
that he would be strongly supported by the governor. Suddenly 
Combs had two presiding officers running for the same Senate seat, 
and a House speaker who was now aligned with and supported by 
Happy Chandler and by Earle Clements, who had jumped angrily (and 
uneasily) into bed with Chandler. (Combs always believed that Clem-
ents lured Lowman into the race primarily to complicate things for 
Wyatt.) To Lowman's credit, his candidacy made no apparent dif-
ference in the functioning of the House or in his handling of the Combs 
program. But as soon as his hat was in the ring, antiadministration 
Democrats in the Senate stepped up their attacks and accusations 
against Combs and Wyatt, in boisterous mockery of Combs's call for a 
holiday from politics. 
In the Senate, Cap Gardner gave notice of the strategy to be 
anticipated from the Chandler camp in 1963 when he attempted-and 
failed-to exempt food, medicine, and fuel from the sales tax. It was a 
lukewarm effort, apparently intended to keep the issue hot rather than 
to weaken the sales tax. Actually, Chandler didn't want the tax re-
pealed. He intended to run on the issue. 
Combs showed that he was probably going to get the heart of his 
program when the House passed his $1,104,041,713 budget, 
$80,000,000 larger than the Original 1960-61 budget, and $5,770,000 
larger than the budget eventually spent. It was an indication of the 
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tenor of the Assembly that the budget breezed through the House and 
got only the expected four opposing votes in the Senat~from Repub-
lican Nick Johnson and three Chandler Democrats. But Rex Logan kept 
the kettle boiling by denouncing the budget across the board and 
declaring that "the Combs administration is littered with broken prom-
ises and disgraceful extravagances." 
Chandler forces in the House then launched a fight that showed 
they couldn't win floor victories even with unanimous Republican 
support: they challenged the House" gag rule," Number 12 of the rules 
under which the House operated. Rule 12 permitted adoption of the 
previous question by a simple majority of representatives present; 
once the previous question was voted, no amendments could be of-
fered to the bill being considered, and debate was limited to ten 
minutes for each side. Chandlerites behind Representative Fred Mor-
gan of Paducah wanted to change this to require a vote of 51 of the 100 
House members. They lost, 64 to 3D, with 23 Republicans and only 
seven Democrats in favor. Their failure was seen as a bad defeat for the 
Chandler forces and as evidence of their weakness. 
Nevertheless, Combs tended to walk softly and to flourish a stick 
only when necessary. He wanted, above all else, to protect the sales 
tax, and he did not want to alienate enough people in fights over other 
issues to give Chandlerites the muscle to pass exemptions to the tax. In 
his opening address, he said that he would ask later for bonds to 
finance a system of two-year community colleges. This was in line with 
the report by the commission to study public higher education headed 
by Dr. Otis C. Amis of the University of Kentucky. The Amis Report, 
issued in the fall of 1961, had proposed a master board of control for 
higher education (the Council on Public Higher Education that was 
eventually established was only advisory to the governor, and in the 
1980s proponents of higher education were still hoping for a board with 
power). It was one of several proposals that had immediately drawn the 
fire of college presidents. Now Ted Gilbert, director of the Council on 
Higher Education, gave warning that the educational establishment 
was ready to oppose the community college plan when he said, "We're 
more concerned about adequate financing of the [colleges] we have." 
Indeed, the reaction of the school people to Combs's proposals 
showed why true school reform in Kentucky has been so slow and 
hard-won. Wendell Butler and his subordinates in the Department of 
Education were perfectly willing to let local school boards raise taxes 
without voter approval, as Combs proposed. But while Butler had 
promised to support a constitutional amendment to make the superin-
tendent of public instruction appointive, neither he nor most county 
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superintendents actually worked for it. Butler also raised the battle flag 
against a proposal to let the state auditor audit school board books. 
In all, it was one more demonstration of the fact that professional 
educators have historically been more intent on keeping control of their 
little kingdoms than on improving the education of Kentucky students. 
They declare that their stand is necessary to protect the schools against 
the schemes and wiles of politics-one of the most heart-wrenching 
examples of the pot-kettle juxtaposition in history. County boards and 
superintendents defending students from politicians can be compared 
to the efforts of wolves to defend the sheep against foxes. But the 
governor was not likely to persuade or force the educators to accept 
improvements that infringed on their turf. 
Combs ran into the same provincial attitude when he introduced 
his plan to reorganize state government. Several proposals for shifting 
agencies from one umbrella department to another drew sporadic fire 
from some of the agency people involved, but a major outcry arose 
when it was announced that the plan would combine the Department 
of Fish and Wildlife Resources with Parks, Conservation, and Mines 
and Minerals. Using state money to thwart the governor, warning 
notices went out to the 301 sportsmen's clubs, and Combs was inun-
dated with snarls from hunters and fishermen, decrying this threat to 
the independence of Fish and Wildlife. They demanded that nothing 
be done to disturb the setup under which the Fish and Wildlife Depart-
ment got state funds but was under the control of the "sportsmen" 
whose activities it was supposed to control. It was, and had long been, 
a highly questionable if not blatantly unethical arrangement, but it was 
one issue on which the thousands of sportsmen or their represen-
tatives in the Assembly were prepared to fight. Combs, not one for 
windmills, sidestepped-affording another small example of how 
progress is nitpicked to pieces in Kentucky. 
Still, the Assembly went into the second month of its session with 
the Combs forces firmly in control. The administration bill to create a 
joint Senate-House investigating committee ran into some oratory but 
passed, 69 to 16 and 26 to 8. A move to delay a vote on the governor's 
budget appropriations bill flopped, the administration prevailing by 69 
to 21, with nine Democrats voting with Republicans to delay. In a 
Louisville speech, Combs said he expected trouble on his plan to 
realign the state's congressional districts and was prepared for a tough 
fight on the sales tax, but his leaders in both houses seemed not to take 
his remarks seriously. From all indications, he had major matters well 
under control. 
___ 14 __ _ 
The Kingmakers and 
the Candidates 
A governor must always govern with an eye out for politics, like a 
pioneer plowing with one eye peeled for Indians; in 1962, guber-
natorial politics were not about to wait for the legislature to finish its 
business. Chandler had his "ABC in '63" race well underway, and his 
activities were beginning to concern "kingmakers" of the Combs wing 
(Bill May, Louis Cox, Lawrence Wetherby, Doc Beauchamp, Smith 
Broadbent), who felt that theyshould get a horse on the track before the 
unopposed Chandler made too much political headway. On January 
21, 1962, newspaper stories in Louisville and Lexington reported that 
the kingmakers were fairly solid in their support of Highway Commis-
sioner Henry Ward for governor, though Cox was reportedly backing 
Sixth District Congressman John Watts. 
This didn't bother Combs too much; he was leaning increasingly 
toward Ned Breathitt but he thought the kingmakers would eventually 
support his choice. What concerned him more was the prospect of 
Earle Clements supporting Chandler. It was not just that he knew 
Clements could hurt; the thought of Clements in the Chandler camp 
was painful. He and Clements had been personally close. They had 
worked together, campaigned together, had taken abuse from 
Chandler and come back to beat him. He knew that philosophically, 
ideologically, the liberal Clements did not belong with the conservative 
Chandler. So on January 24 he flew to Washington and had lunch with 
his former mentor and friend. He tried to sound Clements out on the 
idea of Breathitt as the candidate, but Clements was chilly and noncom-
mittal. Neither would he agree to stay out of the race, or not to support 
Chandler. Beneath his old familiar surface politeness there was a 
marked strain of barely concealed bitterness. It was apparent to Combs 
that he had done the one thing that Clements could never forgive or 
forget-h~ had hurt the Clements pride. 
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The lunch produced nothing, but Combs did not return to Frank-
fort dejected. Instead, the meeting cleared his mind. He had done all 
that could be expected of him, he felt. His first obligation was to protect 
his program. If Clements was beyond appeal, Combs had no choice but 
to follow his own policy judgment. 
The day after he returned, Combs announced that he would ask 
the Assembly to start action leading to a vote on a limited constitutional 
convention in the elections of November 1964. The next day he intro-
duced his school-reform package, which contained four principal 
points: independent audits of local school systems; state power to oust 
local school officials; removal of the superintendent of public instruc-
tion from the state board of education after 1964; and a professional 
practices commission to help police the conduct of teachers and admin-
istrators. The bill also set up procedures for having special judges hear 
local school controversies when there were charges that local judges 
were not impartial, and it set a minimum of 185 school days a year. 
Combs said he was still thinking about a constitutional amendment to 
make the superintendent appointive; he admitted that his school bill 
was not as strong as some legislators had urged, but said that he 
thought it was the best he could get through the legislature without 
hurtful fights. He and Wendell Butler had differed on ways to finance 
education of the mentally retarded, but Butler now told the press that 
he would support the bill. 
It was the practical Combs, willing to give on minor issues in order 
to win major ones. His bill did not go down well with a group of House 
members who had served on the committee investigating state educa-
tion. There were reports of meetings, a possible rebellion, but Combs 
decided to stick his ground and hope for time. A few days later he 
announced that he favored two constitutional amendments: one to 
make the state superintendent of public instruction an appointive 
office, one to make it easier to amend the constitution and call a 
revision convention. 
While Combs could hope to escape a school rebellion, he could not 
escape the injection of politics into the session. On February 6, Clem-
ents met with Chandler, Treasurer Thelma Stovall, Frankfort attorney 
Clifford Smith, attorney and Chandler adviser Joe Leary, attorney 
James Gordon, and Louisville labor official Eulick "Mike" Walsh-at 
the same Standiford Motel where Clements had arranged the Wyatt-
Combs merger-and agreed to support Harry King Lowman for the 
U. S. Senate. The next day Lowman made his formal announcement for 
the race. It didn't surprise anyone and seemed to have little impact, 
except to give notice that the Chandler campaign was in full swing, and 
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to warn Wyatt that he could probably expect the same people to be 
against him in the general election. 
On February 8, Combs launched an effort on which he had been 
working since the beginning of his administration, an effort brought 
close to home by the fact that his son Tommy was mentally retarded: he 
announced his "New Deal" for the mentally retarded in Kentucky. The 
program carried a two-year budget of $4,405,200, construction of a 
$750,000 building at the Frankfort Training Home, new programs of 
field service, new rules on foster home care, and a study of possible 
local centers for the care of 350 to 500 patients. The next day he went to 
Washington, where he and Glenn Seaborg, chairman of the Atomic 
Energy Commission, presided over a meeting at which it was an-
nounced that Kentucky had become the first state to take control of 
most of the nuclear activities within its borders. At the time, hopes for 
peaceful development of nuclear energy were running high, and Ken-
tucky had optimistic plans for becoming a leader in the field. 
On February 15, Earle Clements told a reporter that he had intend-
ed all along to reject the trucks acquired from Thurston Cooke on a 
lease basis in the famous "truck deal." He added thathe knew the state 
could not legally acquire the trucks without competitive bidding. He 
said he had never met Cooke until the latter became finance chairman 
for the Combs-Wyatt campaign, and that he had signed the truck lease 
only after Highway Department attorney Jack Reed had said it was 
legal. He said he could not answer other questions because the joint 
investigating committee had the matter under study. 
Clements' statement left once more an air of suspicion around the 
whole matter of the truck deal, which seemed to have more lives than a 
cat. If Clements had known that the lease arrangement was illegal, and 
that he could not acquire the trucks without competitive bidding, why 
had he defended the noncompetitive lease before the Louisville Cham-
ber of Commerce the day after Combs canceled the contract? If he knew 
the contract was illegal, why had he signed it? And why had he 
accepted Jack Reed's opinion that it was legal if he knew that it was not? 
Clements' blast, however, was only the first of what appeared to be 
a well-planned attack designed to cast suspicion on Combs and Wyatt. 
On February 21, Senator Rex Logan delivered a fiery speech in the 
Senate, in which he accused Combs and Wyatt of direct participation in 
the truck deal. In a tirade delivered on a point of personal privilege, 
Logan charged that Combs and Wyatt discussed the truck matter with 
Cooke weeks before they took office; that Combs and Wyatt or their 
representative persuaded Cooke to plead guilty to fraud charges aris-
ing from the collapse of his auto business after the truck deal was 
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exposed; that Combs promised to pardon Cooke at the end of six 
months but reneged on the promise; that Cooke took the Fifth Amend-
ment in hearings before the joint investigating committee as a result of 
an agreement between Wyatt and Cooke's attorney, Robert Grubbs; 
that Cooke, then a prisoner at LaGrange Reformatory, was afraid to 
testify before the legislative committee because he was under the penal 
custody of the Combs administration and was afraid he would be 
murdered in prison if he talked and jeopardized the governor; and that 
the interference of Combs in the investigation was grounds for im-
peachment. 
Logan added that the events before the investigating committee 
were worth 50,000 votes for Happy Chandler, a bit of very wishful 
thinking. Rex Logan might have been an effective legislator under 
different circumstances. He was a good speaker, with an impressive 
voice; he wasn't afraid to tackle any subject or opponent. But he was 
intemperate; he let his emotions and perhaps the sound of his own 
voice destroy his perspective. He went too far in personal attacks, 
became vituperative, at times preposterous, amusing those he might 
have impressed. In the course of his attack on Combs and Wyatt, 
Logan, as quoted in the Lexington and Louisville papers, referred to 
his fellow senators as puppets and "hoop dogs." He called president 
pro tem Alvin Kidwell "Robot Kidwell, who is wound up every morn-
ing so he will know what to say." Speaking of Cooke's reliance on the 
Fifth Amendment to keep from testifying, Logan said, "If I were in his 
place I would not want to divulge the truth of the truck deal . . . 
because I think he probably would come out of there [prison I in a box," 
implying that Combs would have had Cooke killed had he told the 
truth. "And," added Logan, "1'11 say that outside of the Senate cham-
ber, too. At the time Cooke was involved in this trouble ... either 
Combs or Wyatt ... went to him and told him that if he didn't plead 
guilty they'd keep him there as long as they had political influence in 
Kentucky. . . they also told him they would give him a pardon at the 
end of six months. That's another Combs lie .... If the ... legislature 
had the backbone, there's enough here to condemn Combs and to 
impeach him from office." 
Wyatt retorted that"I am not going to indulge in a daily alley-cat 
fight with the raving henchman of Happy Chandler." Alvin Kidwell, 
shaking with anger, swore he would never give Logan the floor under a 
point of personal privilege again. Combs said nothing and reportedly 
discouraged friends in the Senate who wanted to censure Logan. 
How much damage, if any, the Clements and Logan attacks 
achieved is questionable. Chandler, of course, made much of the 
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matter, charging that it proved what he had been saying about the bad 
moral tone of the Combs administration. The truck charges were 
apparently in retaliation for what opposition forces saw as a Combs 
plot against the Chandler forces. On the day before the legislature 
convened, Senator Tom Raney, a former United Mine Workers official 
from Pike County, had called Combs and told him that he had been 
offered $5,000 and a job for his wife by Pikeville businessman Zach 
Charles Justice if he would vote with the antiadministration forces next 
day to organize the legislature. Justice, he said, had told him the offer 
came from A.B. Chandler. Combs, reluctant to "put my dog in that 
fight," urged Raney to tell his story to the newspapers. Raney did. 
Chandler denied knowing anything about the bribe offer, which was 
then referred to the investigating committee that was also probing the 
truck deal. It was shortly afterward that Senator Logan began making 
headlines with his truck-deal attacks on Combs and Wyatt. 
Combs tried to regard these attacks in the context of their real, 
rather than their apparent, effect on governmental process. They irri-
tated. They stung. But while they titillated the legislature, they did not 
materially change its operation. It was necessary to answer the more 
serious charges, so that they would not be useful in future election 
campaigns. Otherwise, the best thing to do was to let the accusers 
scream until the screams became monotonous. 
Weeks before, Combs had pushed a bill through the legislature 
forcing operators of auto junkyards to screen their roadside eyesores 
from public view or move them away from public highways. It had 
been a more bitter battle than might have been expected over what 
seemed to be a minor matter, but Kentucky was dotted with sprawling 
auto graveyards, and most of them were profitable because, the oper-
ators protested, they could be seen from the road by potential custom-
ers. A considerable lobby came to Frankfort to fight the bill, and it took 
work to get it passed. But on Feburary 17, Combs accepted the "Keep 
America Beautiful" award at the annual meeting of the National Ad-
visory Council of Keep America Beautiful, and his junkyard law was 
cited in the award. 
This pleased him more than he admitted, for he had devoted a lot 
of time and attention to beautifying the state. His parks program, his 
roadside planting and small lakes programs, his drive to get junk cars 
off roadways and out of creek beds, his efforts to beautify the capitol 
grounds with the floral clock, the extensive planting of the median on 
Capitol Avenue, and his rose garden around the mansion-all had 
helped to restore the state's natural beauty and lure tourists. 
As a part of the capital city's renovation, Combs launched a pro-
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gram to beautify the Old Capitol, a project that had at least one 
humorous result. When the rock wall around the Old Capitol grounds 
was restored, metal spikes were placed on top of the new walls, not 
only for their decorative function but to keep away the loafers who had 
been sitting there as long as anyone could remember. The loafers 
complained bitterly, and in time the complaints filtered through to the 
governor's office. Combs investigated. Yes, said the Buildings and 
Grounds people, the spikes had been put there to fend off the loafers, 
adding, "Governor, those people have been sitting there for 50 years." 
"Well," said Combs, "if they've been sitting there for 50 years, they've 
probably got squatters' rights by this time. And remember, loafers have 
an interest in the place, like the rest of us. Let's let them sit for another 
50. There are too few places in the world where a man can do any 
decent loafing." The spikes came down, and gradually the loafers 
came back. 
But Combs was by no means out of the woods. Significantly, the 
Senate beat his proposed amendment to make it easier to amend the 
constitution. This shook him. He had known he would have trouble 
with the bill but thought he had done his homework well enough to 
ensure close passage. Yet once more the strange affection of Ken-
tuckians for their outmoded constitution showed itself. And the inci-
dent showed also that while failure to support progressive measures 
can often be blamed on poor leadership, Kentuckians cling to their past 
shackles even when their leaders try desperately to tug them into the 
present. In the end, Combs was obliged to settle for two lesser amend-
ments: one to remove the salary limit, the other to provide for carrying 
on state and local governments in case an atomic attack wiped out 
major officials. (Tensions between Russia and the United States were 
creating a great scare at the time, with people rushing to create shelters 
of one type or another, stocked with food and water and presumably 
safe from fallout. The president of the University of Kentucky, Dr. 
Frank Dickey, had gotten one of the first shelters in Lexington but 
explained that it was proof against only fallout, not blast. Combs 
refused to dig a shelter at the mansion.) 
That Kentucky was not champing at the bit to lead the way into the 
second half of the twentieth century was demonstrated by the passage 
of a bill that would have reduced the working age from 14 to 12; Combs 
vetoed it. However, with little heated opposition, the Assembly 
adopted his plan redrawing congressional district lines. This had to be 
done because the 1960 census showed that Kentucky had fallen behind 
the national average in population growth and would have to reduce its 
congressional districts from eight to seven. Under the plan, the Fourth 
and Fifth Congressional Districts were lumped together, the First, 
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Second, Sixth, and Seventh were changed slightly, and the Third was 
left largely untouched. It was a painful step in one sense, forcing Joe 
Bates in the Fifth District and Frank Chelf in the Fourth to fight it out. 
But in a more long-range sense it was one more reminder that Kentucky 
was losing people, not keeping pace. 
Finally, on March 14, the joint legislative investigating committee 
released its report on the truck deal and on the Raney bribe charge. 
Raney, said the committee, had volunteered to take lie-detector tests 
which showed he was telling the truth; he had indeed been offered a 
bribe by Zach Charles Justice, but there was no proof that the bribe had 
come from A.B. Chandler. Similarly, there had been some sloppy 
handling of the aborted truck lease by Highway Department officials, 
but there was no evidence that any illegal or unethical instructions had 
come from Combs or Wyatt or that they had known of the nature of the 
truck deal prior to the time Combs canceled it. 
When the report was released, Rex Logan threw the Senate once 
more into turmoil with a shouting, fist-shaking attack on Wyatt, this 
time adding a new charge: that a lease-purchase contract for the trucks 
had been drawn up by Ed Prichard. Prichard denied it, calling Logan's 
remarks "the products of a sick mind." And while the anti-Combs 
forces were occupied with accusations, the leadership was methodi-
cally enacting the major portion of the Combs program. 
On March 7, Combs signed the bill creating a system of nine 
community colleges, including five then constituted as branches of UK 
and four more scheduled for construction. This marked a definite 
change in the nature of junior colleges, as they had been known 
previously. Before, they had been founded when and where the legis-
lature could be persuaded to finance them. Combs made them a 
unified system, with uniform requirements and standards, fees, and 
tuition. And he placed them under the University of Kentucky, which 
had the power to enforce performance standards and to recommend 
new community colleges. 
There were immediate protests from the presidents of the regional 
colleges, who would have preferred to see the individual community 
colleges placed under the control of the closest regional college, or 
under an independent board. They lost the fight, but there have been 
repeated efforts through the years by presidents and boards of the 
regional universities to get such control. All such efforts have failed, 
and it has been so generally agreed that the University of Kentucky 
system has worked well that in 1985 the Council on Higher Education 
voted to put the vocational education schools also under UK jurisdic-
tion. 
The system has been the target of other political pressures, how-
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ever. In the 1960s, as the postwar baby boom began to hit the colleges, 
expansion of the community college system was hailed by college 
officials and enabled the state to handle the student flood. As the boom 
subsided, however, empty dormitory rooms and classrooms became a 
financial burden, especially as city students chose to attend communi-
ty colleges, where they could live at home and continue to work while 
attending classes. Strangely, instead of producing pressures to reduce 
the number of community colleges in order to force students back to 
the universities, it increased pressure for the more convenient com-
munity colleges, to the point where the issue became almost 
ridiculous. For example, in 1986 the legislature approved a community 
college for Owensboro, despite the fact that there was a community 
college a few miles away in Henderson. The only pretense at justifying 
such an expenditure was the fact that Owensboro's downtown needed 
an economic shot in the arm. 
There was the usual flurry of bills during the last week of the 
session, and then on March 17 it was over. Asked what his feelings 
, were on the occasion, Combs said, "Whew!" then added, "I feel like 
I've been rode hard and put up wet." 
But he had gotten out of the session much of what he had wanted. 
If there is any substance to the legend that governors always have 
trouble with their second session, it was not evident in 1962. During 
the session, 371 Senate bills and 583 House bills had been introduced. 
The legislature had passed 298 bills and 18 resolutions. Combs had 
signed 278 bills, vetoed 8, and allowed 12 to become law without his 
signature. 
For all intents and purposes, Combs was over his roughest road. 
Barring special sessions of the legislature, he had all the laws and all the 
authority to start programs and spend money that he was going to get. 
He still had about 19 months in office, but his duty would be largely 
administrative. Politics, of course, would be a major concern during the 
coming year: the imprint that he would leave on the history of Ken-
tucky depended to a great extent on how well he influenced the 
elections of 1963. A victory by Happy Chandler would mean, he knew, 
the dismantling of much of the program he had built. 
Combs felt, in this regard, a certain sense of mission. He had been 
a young law student when the Democratic party of Kentucky was split 
into the Rhea and Chandler factions. He was a young veteran just 
home from the wars when Earle Clements had taken control of the 
Rhea faction and the Clements and Chandler factions had divided the 
state. Now Clements had gone over to the enemy, and the contesting 
camps were the Combs and Chandler factions. He deeply wanted to 
see his wing of the party triumph and survive, not only for the power it 
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would give those who had fought at his side but because it would 
mean, or so he hoped, an end to the Chandler influence that he felt had 
helped so materially to keep Kentucky backward. He wanted to elect 
people who would carry forward his programs and effect the plans he 
had not completed. And he knew that this depended to some extent on 
how well he managed the affairs of state in the meantime and what 
kind of image he and his administration could fashion. 
One pleasant aspect of a governor's last months in office is that 
during that time he begins to see the results of some of his programs. 
For example, Conservation Commissioner J.a. Matlick announced on 
April 13 that the small-lakes program had 14 projects completed or 
underway: seven small lakes had been formed by highway fills, three 
were nonhighway dams, and four were being planned. A week later 
the Garden Clubs of Kentucky, Inc., hailed Combs's moves to keep 
billboards off interstate highway rights-of-way, his roadside beautifica-
tion and parks programs, his law to screen juitkyards, his program to 
get junked cars off the roadsides and out of creek beds, and his efforts 
to beautify the capitol grounds, including construction of the floral 
clock. The club members made Combs their first honorary male mem-
ber. ("I don't know how this is going to work out," Combs said.) 
And as Derby Day of 1962 approached, interest in politics heated 
up as much as interest in the horse race. Marion Vance, a Glasgow 
Democrat, announced that he was in the race for the U.S. Senate and 
immediately charged that Combs had added 5,000 people to the state 
payroll to help Wyatt's Senate campaign. Harry King Lowman, now 
that the session was over, felt free to begin his own Senate effort and 
charged that Wyatt had failed miserably in his effort to bring industry 
to the state. 
But what worried Wyatt was not the charges of Lowman or Vance. 
Though the governor's race was more than 18 months away, he was 
afraid that Ned Breathitt was going to announce his campaign for the 
governorship before the fall Senate elections. This, he feared, would 
take the attention of Democrats away from his Senate race against 
Thruston Morton and divert it to the 1963 governor's race. Although 
most state politicians tend to consider the U.S. Senate a better post 
than that of governor, both politicians and voters are usually more 
interested in the run for the state house; governors control more jobs 
and programs than do senators. Wyatt knew, too, that if Democrats 
started dividing their ranks between Breathitt and Chandler, some 
would drop away from him, since the Combs-Wyatt administration was 
pro-Breathitt and anti-Chandler. Wyatt wanted to keep his campaign 
and the governor's race as separate as possible. 
It wasn't to be. "I asked Bert not to launch the campaign for the 
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1963 gubernatorial primary until after the 1962 Senate election," Wyatt 
wrote later. "I was convinced that the simultaneous running of both 
races in 1962 would alienate the Chandler wing of the party from my 
candidacy and could easily spell a Morton victory. Bert listened, but I 
could see that he was determined to defeat Chandler for governor, and 
felt that an early start would help his candidate." 
That was precisely the case. On May 2, Breathitt announced in 
Louisville that he would be a candidate for the Democratic nomination 
for governor. The announcement did not create tidal waves of enthusi-
asm. Chandler ridiculed it. The leaders of the Jefferson County Demo-
cratic organization openly expressed doubt that Breathitt could beat 
Chandler, suggested that Henry Ward would make a stronger candi-
date, and proposed a Ward-Breathitt ticket. The kingmakers also con-
tinued to support Ward over Breathitt. 
PartIy for these reasons, Combs came out on the same day with a 
strong endorsement for Breathitt, designed to head off further criticism 
or party division. "I consider it my first duty to concentrate on being 
governor for the remainder of my term," he said, "but I will support 
Ned Breathitt within the limitations of that job." Breathitt quickly 
added that he would not campaign or open a headquarters but would 
"donate all my energies to the election of Wilson Wyatt." But the 
damage, Wyatt thought, had already been done. Later, in his autobio-
graphy, Wyatt wrote that when he heard of Breathitt's announcement 
and Combs's endorsement he told Combs, "Bert, that will cost me 
5OiOOO votes." 
Combs remembers the incident differently. "Wilson and Barry 
Bingham came to the mansion to see me one night," he recalled. "We 
sat in the little study off the hallway and talked. They asked me if I 
could support Wilson for the Senate. This didn't surprise me because 
there had been some speculation, I knew, that I might want to run for 
the Senate. I was glad to put a stop to those rumors--I had no intention 
of running-and told them I would be glad to support Wilson. But I 
told them that night that I was primarily interested in defeating 
Chandler, and that he was making a lot of waves, and that I felt that we 
had to get our man into the race as soon as possible in order to keep 
Happy from making too much headway. And I said specifically that we 
could not delay the governor's race until the Senate race was over. I am 
confident that they left that night knowing that I was going to an-
nounce for Ned as soon as he got into the race." 
Combs's action showed how vital he considered the election of a 
suitable successor and the defeat of Chandler, who, he feared, would 
dismantle much of what Combs had accomplished. Many party wheel-
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horses still regarded Breathitt with misgivings: he was too young, he 
was unknown, Happy Chandler would "eat him alive, head, tail and 
pinfeathers" once they faced each other on the stump. 
There was a story at the time that Dick Moloney and 19 other 
people interested in the governor's race called on Combs at the man-
sion to talk about a candidate. Moloney, like most of the others, was for 
Henry Ward and made a strong case for his candidacy. It turned into a 
considerable session. Moloney later reported to a friend, "Well, we 
talked it over with Combs, and the vote was 18 for Ward, and one for 
Breathitt." The friend said, "Good! Then Ward's our man." "No," said 
Moloney. "Breathitt's our man. The one vote for him was that little blue-
eyed mountain governor of ours." Some say he did not use the term 
"governor." Highway Department employees, not believing the deci-
sion was final, continued to campaign for Ward until he passed them 
the word to quit. 
In retrospect, it is doubtful that Breathitt's early announcement 
hurt Wyatt's campaign. The Chandler people had already gotten the 
word that Happy was going for Morton. Everyone knew that Happy 
was against Combs-Wyatt, and that Combs-no matter who he was 
for-would be against Happy. In western Kentucky, Breathitt support-
ers tried to soothe the feelings of Wyatt and his headquarters by 
running prominent ads in the local papers assuring the voters that 
Breathitt and Breathitt people were solidly behind Wyatt. "A vote for 
Wilson Wyatt for U.S. Senator will be an endorsement of Edward T. 
Ned Breathitt for Governor," the ads declared. Pro-Chandler Demo-
crats saw this, or pretended to see this, as proof that Wyatt was allied 
with Breathitt and against Chandler. It gave them an excuse, if they 
needed one, to stay at home or vote against Wyatt. 
"Happy," said Combs, "tried to stir trouble in the Wyatt camp by 
telling Wyatt people it was disloyal of us to back Breathitt while the 
Senate race was on. That was typical of Happy. It was wrong for us, 
who were backing Wyatt, to run the race for governor, but it was all 
right for him, who was backing a Republican, to be running his race for 
governor. In any event, Chandler and Clements would have opposed 
Wilson regardless of Breathitt's candidacy. Breathitt's running did not 
make them any stronger against him." 
Whether or not it was essential for Breathitt to get the early start, 
there is no question that a lot of his backers were afraid that Chandler 
was making too much headway, and that only with an announced 
candidate in the field could they begin to form the organization they 
were going to need. 
___ 15 __ _ 
A Party Divided Once More 
Wyatt won an easy victory in the primary (Harry King Lowman, his 
only serious opponent, became ill and withdrew) and prepared to face 
U.S. Senator Thruston Morton in the fall election. He knew he was in 
for a fight. Chandler was against him, though he continued to say that 
he would support the ticket in spite of all the slings and arrows he had 
suffered at the hands of Combs. Clements had never been warm 
toward Wyatt, and now was reported to be making common cause with 
his old enemy Chandler. As Wyatt wrote in his autobiography, Whistle 
Stops: "Since Clements and Combs had become estranged it soon 
developed that Clements would support his long-time political enemy 
Chandler rather than a candidate supported by Combs. Clements' 
antipathy toward Combs carried over to me as well. Early in the 
preparation for the Senate race I visited Clements at his apartment in 
Washington and asked for his support. He came quickly to the point 
and asked how I stood with Combs and with the Courier-Journal. I told 
him that, as he well knew, my relationship with both was entirely 
friendly. He responded sharply, 'Then how can you expect me to 
support you?' " 
Even without the help of the Democratic bolters, Thruston Morton 
would have been a formidable opponent. Tall, handsome, urbane, and 
articulate, Morton was-like Wyatt-a wealthy and successful 
Louisvillian. Yale educated, he had assumed direction of his family's 
Ballard mills and had engineered their sale to the Pillsbury Company, 
leaving him with time and money to spend on politics. He had served 
as assistant secretary of state and as chairman of the Republican sen-
atorial campaign committee, and had surprised the political 
soothsayers by defeating Earle Clements for the Senate, with the help 
of Dwight Eisenhower and Happy Chandler. 
Morton found himself at home in the inner circle of Republicans in 
Washington. He was usually considered a moderate on fiscal policy 
and sturdily anti-Communist on foreign policy. He was a conservative 
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candidate running in a state that had been voting Democratic in state 
races and Republican in national races with increasing frequency. 
Republican Senator John Sherman Cooper had become almost a Ken-
tucky tradition. Eisenhower had carried Kentucky over Stevenson by 
95,739 votes in 1956, and Nixon had carried it over Kennedy by 80,752 
in 1960. In 1961, Republican Marlow Cook had been elected Jefferson 
County judge, while Republican William 0. Cowger had won the race 
for mayor of Louisville. There was an apparent Republican tide run-
ning, and many of Wyatt's friends urged him to run for governor 
instead of for the Senate. His reply was curious. 
"All aspects of the Combs-Wyatt program had been launched," he 
said in his autobiography, "and I felt that I had done probably all I could 
in that area. Certainly it was not worth four more years just for a better 
title." 
Actually, as Combs pointed out in a speech to the Kentucky Educa-
tion Association in September 1962, a staggering amount remained to 
be done. State teachers still received $2,000 a year less than the national 
average; illiteracy was widespread; unemployment continued high; 
industrial development was lagging; and the economic problems of 
eastern Kentucky were as stubborn as ever. The truth is that Wyatt 
enjoyed the excitement and high stakes of government in the world's 
most powerful city more than the hard, bitter, and often unrewarding 
struggle in Frankfort. 
Combs's role in the fall campaign was fairly active. He made more 
than a dozen speeches for Wyatt, and did what he could to help with 
organization and strategy. Indeed, he did more than some of his and 
Wyatt's friends thought he should, believing that his participation in 
the campaign would only give Chandler cause to stage an open bolt. 
From the start, Wyatt had tried to avoid more factional clashes and had 
gone out of his way to make it plain that he wanted to represent all 
members of the Democratic party. That included Chandler. But, in 
retrospect, this attitude was unrealistic. Chandler was not to be wooed. 
He wanted not only to become governor, with the power over the party 
that the office carried, but to crush the opposing wing of the party. 
Clements, for so long his major obstacle, was no longer a factor. If 
Chandler could crush Combs and Wyatt, there would be no effective 
opposition on the horizon. 
Meanwhile, Combs had his hands fairly full with the flood of small 
duties that occupy a governor between sessions. He had been thinking 
for some time of moving the statue of assassinated Governor William 
Goebel from the drive in front of the capitol to the lawn of the Old 
Capitol across the river. It was a logical idea, since Goebel's statue 
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would then stand within a few yards of the spot where he was shot. 
Furthermore, at the top of Capitol Avenue the statue constituted some-
thing of a traffic hazard. But Combs had hesitated to move it for fear 
that Frankfort citizens, people from northern Kentucky, garden clubs, 
and historical societies might object. Now he gave the order, and the 
statue was swiftly and quietly moved at daybreak. He waited for the 
protests. They never came. On the contrary, the move prompted 
several people to suggest that the statue of Daniel Boone be moved 
from the Frankfort cemetery to a spot more easily accessible to tourists. 
"One statue at a time," Combs told them. "Let's let old Daniel rest for 
the time being." 
Not all his problems were so easily handled. Early in the summer 
the American Automobile Association (AAA) had charged, in a bul-
letin sent to its seven million members, that "Kentucky has become far 
and away the worst [state] for speed traps in the nation" -not exactly 
the kind of publicity the state, in its drive to develop tourism, was 
seeking. Combs had quickly denied the charge, but the AAA respond-
ed by naming the offending towns: Bedford, Bonnieville, Crofton, and 
Hanson, all small towns on north-south U.S. highways~ And there was 
nothing Combs could do about it, since the governor has no control 
over speed laws in towns. He can spend millions on parks and tourist 
facilities, build highways and spend other millions to promote the 
state's attractions. But a handful of small towns willing to fatten their 
own treasuries by shaking down outsiders can ruin the image and hurt 
the tourist trade. Combs called in the mayors of the offending towns 
and tried to be the diplomat. The situation gradually improved. (The 
police chief of Bedford, for example, was once reported to have sug-
gested, when the city was criticized for its speed trap, "Why don't we 
just arrest them till noon and knock off the rest of the day?") 
Combs then did a curious thing. While dedicating the new lodge at 
Jennie Wiley State Park near Prestonsburg, Combs praised Andrew 
Jackson May, the former congressman for whom the lodge was named 
(and uncle of Bill May), and then deliberately poked a stick into the 
political hornet's nest with a joking attack on critics of his parks and 
road spending: "They ran to tell the king the sky was falling, but they 
found it was merely an acorn falling from a tree beside a pool in 
Versailles. " 
This was too much for Chandler, the only Democratic politician in 
Versailles with a famous swimming pool. The pool was famous because 
it had been built during World War II, while Chandler was in the U.S. 
Senate, with wartime-scarce steel and concrete; and the job had been 
done by Ben Collings, a wealthy Louisville contractor who had been 
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awarded considerable work for the state. Happy had repeatedly fought 
off the allegations of favoritism and corruption leveled by newspapers 
and political opponents, and now he charged into the fray with a roar. 
Combs, he said, had broken the truce that he, Chandler, had tried so 
hard to keep, and was trying to divide the party. Combs rubbed more 
salt into the wound when, on his birthday, August 13, he announced at 
an eastern Kentucky ceremony that he had chosen the name Mountain 
Parkway for the toll road-which, he reminded his listeners, Chandler 
had ridiculed as "that road that starts nowhere and goes nowhere. If 
you get on it, you can't get off. If you get off, you can't get back on." 
"It was apparent by that time," he said later,"that Chandler and 
Oements were working against Wyatt in every way possible. It would 
have been silly to court them at that stage, and I thought it was better to 
call their hand than to permit them to work behind the scenes un-
detected. Wyatt never had a chance to get their support; everyone 
knew that but Wilson." 
Actually, there was another reason for Combs's attack, one that 
showed the extent to which he had matured as a political strategist. He 
had discovered, the hard way, the secret of campaigning against 
Chandler. Happy was a master of attack but was vulnerable when put 
on the defensive. He was brilliant in ridicule~ sarcasm, abuse, and 
accusation; but when the same tactics were turned on him, he reacted 
ineptly, losing his composure, becoming visibly angry and unim-
pressive. During the days of the "crippled goose," "Castro," and 
swimming pool charges, Chandler had found himelf on the defensive 
and had lost the charm, assurance, and ebullience that made him such 
a crowd pleaser. Combs felt that Breathitt had to avoid the mistake that 
he, Combs, had made in his first campaign, the mistake of letting 
Chandler keep him on the defensive. Instead, he was testing Chandler, 
finding out what bait he would rise to, showing Breathitt the effec-
tiveness of attack. Breathitt later used the tactic brilliantly in his charge 
that Chandler voted to begin World War II and then resigned his army 
commission. The charge threw Chandler into a fury. He was never able 
to answer it convincingly, nor was he able to regain his old fighting 
balance. 
Combs also faced the task of redrawing the legislative districts of 
the state. Section 33 of the Kentucky constitution demands that every 
ten years, or within two years of each federal census, the legislature 
divide the state into 38 senatorial and 100 representative districts of 
approximately equal population. The realignment was overdue, not 
having been done since 1942; officials in the counties that had gained 
population, and were thus entitled to additional representation in the 
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legislature, were demanding that Combs call a special session and get 
the redistricting over with. But Combs, like every governor before him, 
did not relish the job. In every redrawing of district lines some counties 
gain representation, and some lose; the gainers are seldom grateful, 
and the losers are always resentful. Combs knew that he was going to 
have to call a special session to deal with the matter before he left office, 
but he knew that to call the legislature into special session and hand the 
lawmakers a plan would signal a fight. He was hoping that someone 
would sue to force him to call the session so that he would not be 
blamed for what happened. In September, Louisville Mayor William 0. 
Cowger obliged. His district stood to gain representation. 
To stall for time and to develop a plan as nonpartisan as possible, 
Combs appointed a 13-man committee to study various redistricting 
suggestions and come up with a proposal for the legislature. Although 
there are few better ways to avoid taking action than appointing a 
committee, the federal court to which Cowger's suit was referred ruled 
that Combs was acting in good faith. By the time the special session 
came up on January 28, 1963, several plans had been formed, and no 
one seemed to blame Combs for the unavoidable. 
Meantime, back on the campaign trail, Wyatt was having an even 
rougher time than he had anticipated. Thruston Morton had appar-
ently decided to take not only the rough road but the low road, which is 
to say that parts of his campaign did not reflect on him favorably. 
Morton was a social if not a political friend of Wyatt, and the two men 
had a considerable regard for each other.· Further, Morton was a person-
al friend of long standing to Courier-Journal and Louisville Times pub-
lisher Barry Bingham. Yet as the summer wore on and the race for the 
Senate became tougher, Morton's attacks on Wyatt, and on the Bin-
gham newspapers that supported him, became reckless; they con-
tained statements Morton knew were not true and for which he later 
expressed regret. 
He began, in a free-swinging speech in Lexington, to imply that 
Wyatt was in league with, if not an outright supporter of, people who 
were friendly to the Communist cause. He did this at first by tying 
Wyatt (accurately enough) to Adlai Stevenson-who, he claimed, had 
been /I soft on Communism. /I This approach apparently did not sell too 
well. So, beginning with a speech in Louisville, he alleged that Wyatt 
had shown his true colors by becoming the first chairman of Americans 
for Democratic Action, which, Morton said, was the favorite hiding 
place for Communist fellow travelers. That caught on; the ADA had 
always been suspect, largely because few people had ever understood 
exactly what it was or why it had been formed in the first place. This 
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was in a day when Communist China referred to itself as a "people's 
democratic republic," Communist East Germany was "democratic," 
and various other totalitarian governments chose to wrap themselves 
in the robes of democracy. 
Actually, as the Courier-Journal immediately pointed out, the ADA 
had been formed in 1948 to help Harry Truman's presidential cam-
paign by keeping liberal Democrats from following Henry Wallace off 
into the extreme left fringes of the party. The ADA red herring had 
been dragged across the campaign trail once before by none other than 
Chandler, who wrote to Truman-when the president came to 
Paducah to speak for Combs and Wyatt-that he could not share the 
stage with people who bolted Democrats, and reminding Truman that 
Wyatt had tried to defeat him by helping found the ADA. It is possible 
that Morton took his cue here from Chandler, who was again proving 
helpful, as he had been when Morton defeated Clements in 1956. 
Speaking to the chamber of commerce in Louisville, Morton took 
what was, for a man of his caliber, a surprising step: he fabricated a 
charge against his old friend Barry Bingham. Earlier in the summer, he 
charged, Bingham had called a meeting at Louisville's Pendennis Club 
of the reporters and editors involved in the campaign, and had laid out 
instructions on how news of the Morton-Wyatt race was to be covered, 
ignored, or slanted. Bingham at once denied angrily that any meeting 
had been held by himself or any other official of his companies, or that 
any instructions to slant or distort the news had been given to anyone 
by anyone. News and political reporters, some of them admirers of 
Morton, appeared more hurt than angry. But a small seed of suspicion 
had been planted. 
Wyatt fought back, and in a statewide Democratic rally in Louisville 
on August 25 (which neither Clements nor Chandler attended), he tore 
into Morton as the representative of the rich in Washington and as a man 
more concerned with the success of the Republican party than with the 
problems of Kentucky. Combs, speaking to the Democratic Women's 
Club of Lexington on September 28, tolled off a list of Morton's sins, 
which included his opposition to federal funds for teachers, his vote 
against creation of a Department of Urban Affairs, his vote against 
Medicare, and votes against increased funds for old-age pensions and 
dependent children. Morton wound up his campaign in Louisville on 
November 4 with an attack on the Combs administration for supplying, 
with taxpayers' money, a publicity machine for Wyatt. The same day, 
Wyatt barnstormed through the First Congressional District with what 
one reporter termed "the oratorical vigor of the great Alben Barkley." 
It didn't help. On November 7, 1962, more than 800,000 Ken-
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tuckians went to the polls and elected Thruston Morton by a margin of 
45,208 votes. It had been a campaign that both parties should have been 
glad to forget. 
The next day Happy Chandler was out in full voice, blaming 
Wyatt's loss on Combs, the sales tax, Combs's mismanagement of state 
government, and his disloyalty to other Democrats. Combs fired back 
with a list of the times Chandler had bolted the candidates of his party. 
Chandler returned the fire with a charge that Combs was hysterical 
and needed a rest. "He must face up to the terrible mess he has made," 
Chandler said in a press statement. "The escape hatch to the federal 
bench has been closed. I predict that Breathitt will be dumped just as 
Clements was dumped. The evidence is persuasive." 
In this statement are contained many hints to the remarkable 
resiliency of Happy Chandler the politician. His ability to rationalize 
his own conduct and to condemn with great indignation others engag-
ing in the same conduct; his habit of interpreting as sin actions which, 
committed by him, became virtue; and his willingness to state as fact 
things that the record showed were made up out of whole cloth-such 
tactics, employed consistently, stood the man in good stead through-
out a long career. 
Combs had now taken his second painful defeat. He had lost his 
appeal for a constitutional revision, and he had failed to help Wyatt to 
the Senate. What chance did he have, he wondered, to elect Breathitt as 
his successor with a divided party in a state that was voting Republican, 
and against a Chandler who seemed to rise from each political fire like 
a phoenix, denying that the fire had singed a feather? The final weeks 
of 1962 were not very enjoyable ones. 
On December 18 Combs greeted his final year in office by an-
nouncing two major programs and several smaller ones that he hoped 
to get underway before he left the mansion. Penal reform and better 
housing for the elderly headed the list. Others were an increase in 
tourist promotion, an expansion of educational television service, a 
wider highway cleanup and beautification program, more roadside 
parks and small lakes, more treatment for alcoholics, and a program to 
enrich higher education. 
On December 23 he issued the call for a special session on reappor-
tionment of the state's legislative districts, to convene January 28,1963. 
The call seemed to silence his critics, and some, such as Louisville's 
Mayor William 0. Cowger, had kind words to say. The next day station 
WHAS of Louisville presented its fifteenth annual "News-Man of the 
Year Award" jointly to Combs, Cowger, and Jefferson County Judge 
Marlow Cook. In presenting the award, Barry Bingham praised Combs 
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for his educational achievements: expansion of the vocational educa-
tion system, creation of the educational television network, and estab-
lishment of the community college system. 
At a small cake-and-coffee party in the state reception room of the 
capitol, Combs said he would rather look forward to 1963 than back on 
the year passing. "Although we got a lot done," he said. "We took some 
licks. You don't find a possum up every tree. I face 1963 with two 
resolutions," he went on. "First, I intend to work as hard next year as I 
have the first three years. Second, I intend to keep my sense of humor, 
and not get mad at anybody." 
"You mean you're not going to get mad at ABC?" a newsman asked 
(referring to Albert Benjamin Chandler). 
"I said everybody," he said, "and that includes ABC." 
"Are you going to campaign for Breathitt?" he was asked. 
"Well," he said, perhaps thinking of the Wyatt race, "1 have a 
feeling Kentuckians don't want to be told how to vote. I'm for Breathitt, 
and I want him to win for the sake of our programs. But just what I'll do 
about it remains to be seen. I'll play that by ear." 
Combs had by that time become rather famous for his preference 
for "playing it by ear" rather than staking out in advance a hard and fast 
policy. Some saw this as a shrewd way to keep from committing 
himself on tough issues; others saw it as ducking. Ed Prichard was fond 
of telling a story in which the Lord "looking down upon this great 
spinning globe with its burden of sinful humanity, decided that the 
time had come for Judgment Day, when every man should be called to 
account and the pure separated from the impure, the godly from the 
ungodly, the good from the evil. And so he spoke, and the world was 
wracked and tom, and the seas were dried to their beds and the 
mountains brought down, and the earth was shattered and the graves 
gave up their dead. And as the great wailing, cringing mass of mankind 
gathered quivering and fearful before the throne of God, the Lord 
looked down and at the edge of the great mass he saw this little white-
haired figure in a white raincoat, and he called for him to come 
forward, and he spoke, in a voice that was the great rumbling of 
thunder, and said.to him, 'Judge Combs, in your life you have been a 
leader and a judge of men, and now I want you to help me to decide 
how I shall judge these people before me, separating the good from the 
bad, the sheep from the goats, deciding which shall be hurled into 
outer darkness to suffer eternal damnation and eternal suffering, and 
which shall live with me in bliss in paradise.' And Combs looked at the 
Lord, and he shuffled his feet, and he scratched, and then he sort of 
grinned and he said, 'Lord, why don't ya just play this by ear?' " 
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As it turned out, Combs did quite a bit of campaigning for Breathitt 
between the first of 1963 and the primary election on May 28, but a lot 
of it was rather indirect. Most of his speeches asked voters to defend the 
sales tax or the road program. He had several opportunities to get in his 
political licks without scheduling a political talk because he spent much 
of the first part of 1963 at dedications, occasions where as speaker he 
was expected to say a few kind words for his administration, his 
friends, his policies, or other agencies responsible for the structure 
being dedicated. 
For example, during January he cut ribbons opening a stretch of 
Interstate 75 between the Kentucky River and Richmond, portions of 
1-64 around Frankfort, Lexington's New Circle Road between U.S. 60 
and U.S. 421, and parts of Kentucky 52 between Richmond and Irvine. 
Much of the money for these roads came from Washington, of course, 
but it is customary for state officials to take credit, and Combs was not 
about to let the voters forget whence came their blessings. 
During February he dedicated projects at Eastern Kentucky State 
College costing $6,750,000, and evaluation and admission centers at 
Outwood Hospital and the Frankfort Training Home. He took advan-
tage of school meetings to ask teachers, school administrators and 
parent-teacher groups to support his program of increased aid to 
schools-which, he pointed out, depended on the sales tax. During his 
term, he reminded them, 3,595 new classrooms had been built, and 
$71,500,000 spent on new buildings. But Kentucky teachers were still 
paid less than the national average, and the state still had 890 one-room 
or one-teacher schools. With Chandler ranging the state, promising to 
slash the tax and blasting Combs for wasting money, Combs didn't 
have to spell out his message. If you want to keep the state moving, he 
was saying, keep Chandler out of office. 
A great deal of time and effort-and patience-was consumed 
during February by the special session of the legislature called to 
reapportion the state's legislative districts. It was a fight from which 
Combs could hardly gain; on the contrary, there was a danger that 
voters displeased by the final reapportionment plan would react 
against him and his candidate, Ned Breathitt. So he kept as aloof from 
the routine pull and haul as possible. In his opening address he 
reminded the legislators that other states failing to produce fair district-
ing plans had been forced to accept plans produced by the courts, and 
urged them to settle on a plan acceptable to everyone. He also gave 
them alternative plans devised by three University of Kentucky pro-
fessors-Malcolm Jewell, Jack Reeves, and Max Milam-and one by 
Mayor William Cowger of Louisville, then left them pretty much to 
their own devices. 
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It took the legislators the entire month to grind out a law. It did not 
please everyone, including Combs. He thought it "a little bit rough" to 
lump all four far western Kentucky counties-Ballard, Carlisle, 
Hickman and Fulton-into one House district; he questioned the suit-
ability of combining Clark County, in the Bluegrass, with coal-mining 
counties farther east; and he criticized the political judgment and 
fairness that put Democratic Warren County into a Republican district. 
But, in all, he thought the law would stand up in court. 
And he was satisfied that he had done right to refuse a request 
from Louisville to include in the special session a move to change the 
state's 161-year-old Sunday closing law, which was causing a storm of 
controversy in Louisville and Jefferson County. No one seemed to 
know exactly what the law would and would not permit; passed at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, it specified that only those estab-
lishments whose services were "essential" could open on Sunday, but 
changing times had made this criterion a source of endless confusion. 
Were filling stations essential? If so, could they sell candy and soft 
drinks? Food was obviously a necessity, but did this mean groceries 
could remain open? If so, could they sell tobacco? Beer? Razor blades? 
Could restaurants open? Movies? 
Combs decided, and probably wisely, to postpone action on that 
one. He had gotten past one potentially damaging hurdle and had 
garnered reams of praise from the press for his "progressive" attitude 
in acknowledging the "right of the legislature to independence." And 
there were a handful of other pitfalls between him and the all-impor-
tant primary election. 
Combs had other ceremonial duties-indeed, he welcomed 
them-such as the long-awaited dedication of the Mountain Parkway, 
and the dedication of Herndon Evans Lodge at Pine Mountain State 
Park in Pineville, named for the Lexington Herald editor who had once 
been editor of the Pineville Sun and who, as a member of Combs's Parks 
Board, had worked tirelessly to expand and improve the beautiful park 
near his old homestead, even donating land of his own. 
But the primary hung over everything like a funnel-shaped cloud 
that threatens constantly without ever quite touching earth. Always 
Combs had to come back to the race for governor. Breathitt, considered 
inexperienced and unimpressive at the start of the campaign, was 
beginning to change the minds of a lot of his detractors. Far from being 
shy or awkward on the platform, he was showing a flair for speaking 
and for platform theatrics. With Ed Prichard lending his touch to the 
speeches, Breathitt was starting to lay into Chandler with gusto, and 
the natural process of politics began to take its course-the better the 
performance, the bigger the crowds; the bigger the crowds, the better 
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the performance-as the electricity began to flow between candidate 
and public. 
Chandler was still trying to ignore Breathitt and center his fire on 
Combs. But Breathitt was tearing into Happy in Chandleresque fash-
ion, ridiculing him, imitating him, polishing tricks and tactics of his 
own, while Prichard and his claque shouted in the background, "Pour 
it on!" "Tell them the truth about Happy!" and (for some reason) "He's 
clean! He's clean!" And there was a fresh, energetic group of campaign 
workers around Breathitt, men able to work days at a time and willing 
to take chances on new ideas-men such as Foster Ockerman, a 
Lexington attorney who was his campaign manager; John Y. Brown, Jr., 
son of the Democratic warhorse; Thomas Carroll, Don Mills, Field 
McChesney, William Biven, advertising man William Beam. They offered 
a rather striking contrast to the familiar, aging faces around Chandler. 
On May I, Combs addressed the Law Day ceremonies at the 
University of Louisville law school, encouraging the students to work 
toward returning some semblance of dignity to political campaigns in 
Kentucky so that the public could hear, and even think about, the 
issues in the election-a good idea that no one seemed ready to 
practice. No one involved in the primary campaign was discussing the 
growing argument about the purpose of the Council on Higher Educa-
tion, the relative roles of state colleges and the university, and the 
proper place of the community college system. The Amis Report on 
higher education had recommended that the presidents of the state 
colleges be removed from the council and that it be reorganized to 
operate without the political catfights over appropriations that oc-
curred every time the state budget was considered. The proposal made 
sense, but the college presidents were not likely to adopt a reform that 
would deprive them of power, especially the power to horsetrade for 
appropriations and new construction funds, control admission stan-
dards that might restrict enrollments, and decide who should be able 
to establish graduate schools. And they were rigidly opposed to giving 
the council these powers. 
Eventually, the council would, indeed, be given limited powers 
and placed under a professional director and staff, sparking an idea for 
a similar agency to bring order, honesty, and uniformity to the state's 
system of elementary and high schools. But Combs, in the meantime, 
was engaging in a battle with a powerful figure within the college 
hierarchy-University of Kentucky Vice-President Frank Peterson. 
Frank Peterson seemed at first an unlikely target for a reform 
move. Easygoing, quick to smile, quietly efficient, Peterson had come 
to the university through Frankfort, where he had been a key finance 
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man in Chandlers first administration, 1935-39. He remained in Frank-
fort during the Keen Johnson administration following Chandlers and 
came under fire from the press, especially from Howard Henderson of 
the Courier-Journal, for his purchasing practices. He was given a post in 
the UK administration as a reward for his service, and for years seemed 
to be nothing more than an affable financial administrator, gradually 
rising to become the almost indispensable comptroller of the universi-
ty. In the process he had made friends, including many in the political 
arena, by doing small favors here and there. He had also developed a 
follo:wing within the university. (Both President Frank Dickey and 
former President Herman Donovan came to his defense when he was 
charged with irregularities in financial matters, though trustees later 
complained that they did so because Peterson had had work done on 
their farms gratis.) He also had some very stubborn critics who charged 
that he had used his position to feather his own ne$t. For example, on 
March 4, 1963, the Courier-Journal reported that Combs had told the UK 
board of trustees that Peterson 
bought property near UK, then sold it to the university at a 
whopping profit; 
used his position to have the university buy soap and de-
tergents in quantity and then sell them to a laundry he 
partly owned; 
owned part of a tire company that sold tires to vendors doing 
business with the university; 
and owned, with his wife, half interest in a vending company 
having 130 vending machines on the UK campus. 
/II didn't pick that fight," said Combs in a 1985 Courier-Journal 
interview. /lit was forced on me. Peterson's shenanigans, especially his 
involvement in the vending machine business, was common talk in 
Lexington. It was said that he gave his company the best locations for 
machines on the UK campus. There were other serious charges. Two of 
the trustees were demanding an investigation. At least one reporter, 
Kyle Vance of the Courier-Journal, was becoming interested. When all of 
these accusations came to me, I knew that if I didn't take the initiative I 
would be accused of a whitewash. As governor, I was chairman of the 
board of trustees. And I didn't want another truck deal on my hands. 
So I took the initiative. It is significant that Peterson didn't fight his 
ouster. He was clearly guilty of some of the charges./I 
After reading the accusations against Peterson, Combs called for a 
report from a committee of three trustees he had appointed on January 
25, 1963, to study the matter. To his surprise the committeemen-
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Judge James Sutherland of Bloomfield, Dr. Harry Denham of Mays-
ville, and Dr. Lewis Cochran, a UK professor-said that in their opin-
ion these facts were not sufficient grounds for preferring charges 
against Peterson. This brought cries of "whitewash" from trustees Sam 
Ezelle and Clifford Smith. The board finally voted five to four to 
suspend Peterson until the allegations could be further studied. On 
April 27 the trustees voted unanimously to bring formal charges of 
misconduct in office against Peterson (though it was never explained why 
the three trustee-committeemen had changed their minds). And on Au-
gust 25, after a UK audit had questioned Peterson's methods, he was given 
a year's leave of absence with pay, and his office was abolished. 
As might have been foreseen, Happy Chandler insisted that Peter-
son had been punished for being a Chandler supporter, but it is not 
likely that Combs would have gone so far out of his way to expose such 
a relatively unimportant political figure. His action did, however, serve 
to leave the impression that many of the coterie of minor officials 
faithful to Chandler were cynical, if not corrupt, and create some 
suspicion of Chandler himself at a critical time. 
At any rate, it was good to have the case out of the way. In the 
summer of 1963, John Oswald, a vice-president of the University of 
California, was chosen as the new president of UK, succeeding Frank 
Dickey. The Oswald appointment was not without critics in both the 
Combs and Chandler camps. "I took some heat from some of my 
friends for recommending Oswald," Combs admitted. "They thought 
there were some deserving Kentuckians from whom a new president 
should be chosen. But UK needed a fresh face, and a man of Oswald's 
caliber." 
The muttering against Oswald-and it continued as long as he 
remained in Lexington-reflected not only resentment of his policies, 
,which many people both on and off campus considered harsh and 
unfeeling, but the view that in choosing him Combs had violated 
political tradition. With few exceptions, the presidency of UK and of 
the state colleges had gone not only to Kentuckians but to Kentuckians 
of the proper party alignment, men enjoying the approval of local 
politicians and civic powers. It has not been unusual to find former 
superintendents of public instruction, senators, and representatives 
becoming heads of regional universities. Membership on the board of 
trustees of the University of Kentucky has always been a political plum, 
as have posts on regional boards of regents. This injection of partisan 
politics into the university system has had a deadening effect. During 
the middle 1980s, two regional presidents were driven off by regents 
who charged not that they were incapable or ineffective, but that they 
"just moved a little too fast for folks around here." 
16 __ 
Tale of a Fate Foretold 
Oswald was able to take over as president of the University of Kentucky 
on September 1, 1963, for perhaps the most exciting and expansive 
period in UK history, without the embarrassment the Peterson case 
might have caused. He also avoided fallout from the May 28 primary, 
which was just as well, because the primary got rough. So rough that 
Happy Chandler lost his composure when Breathitt charged that 
Chandler had voted to declare World War II and then had resigned his 
reserve army commission. Happy blew up. "I hate to hear a dirty, 
stinking little liar impugn my patriotism," he told a Whitley City crowd 
on May 16. He did not deny that he resigned his captain's commission 
shortly after voting to declare war. He insisted, however, that he had 
called Secretary of War Henry Stimson and told him to "pull my card" 
(place him on active duty) but that Stimson had said "he would rather 
have a senator than a captain." So he, Chandler, had resigned the 
commission. 
Breathitt continued the charge. He and his corps of speakers, Ed 
Prichard in particular, charged that Chandler's son-in-law, James J. 
Gimmy Jack) Lewis, was collecting money for Chandler's campaign, 
some from people desiring favors from the state. This was surely no 
novelty in Kentucky, but the charge took on a c()mic character when 
Prichard shouted that Chandler was riding the state insisting that 
people "fill the sack for Jimmy Jack!" It became one of those campaign 
gimmicks which-like Chandler's "$20,000 rug" of 1955---could be 
counted on for a laugh, and the Breathitt speakers never missed a 
chance to bellow "Fill the sack for Jimmy Jack!" Breathitt, in brief, was 
pulling a Chandler act on Chandler. It was part demagoguery, part 
buffoonery, part hyperbole, as it had been when Chandler used it; it 
was also, as it had been for Happy, effective. 
"We were interested in the legislative races," says Combs, "but 
primarily we were concerned with Ned. He was a good candidate, but 
he had little to do with financing, headquarters work, schedules, 
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press, that sort of thing. We financed his campaign, just as Wetherby 
financed mine. We obtained our money mainly by these dinners. We 
had passed a law against assessing state workers, but we could give 
these dinners. It wasn't mandatory that state employees come to them, 
and we tried to make that plain, but I knew that department heads were 
suggesting pretty plainly that they come. It was the better part of valor. 
Buy a couple of tickets at $250 each. Good insurance." 
The campaign was not without its painful moments, chief among 
them the appearance of Earle Clements on the platform with Happy 
Chandler at a rally in Morganfield in which Chandler charged that the 
truck deal had been engineered by Combs to discredit Clements--an 
evil scheme which, he implied, had been hatched at least in part by the 
Courier-Journal. Clements seemed uncomfortable, and some of his 
longtime supporters and friends stayed away from the rally or left 
early. But Chandler pulled good crowds in his western Kentucky 
swing, causing some worry in the Breathitt camp. 
May 28 dawned, like the proverbial day of battle, fine and clear, and 
Kentucky voters streamed to the polls. Chandler, casting his ballot in 
Versailles, told reporters that he would beat Breathitt "world without 
end," a favorite expression of his; and he stuck to his optimism when, 
late in the afternoon, the early returns showed Breathitt doing well in 
places where he was not expected to do well. 
At Breathitt headquarters in Louisville, campaign workers began 
getting their first phone calls, chiefly from eastern Kentucky, in late 
afternoon; as each favorable report came in, wild cheers went up. And 
the reports were good. Surprisingly good. Foster Ockerman and his 
lieutenants, watching the incomplete returns, began to wonder if their 
people were not gilding the lily. At the Frankfort Chandler headquar-
ters, equally rosy reports were going up on the board, to similar cheers 
from the campaign staff. 
But as the dinner hour passed and the polls closed across the state, 
it became obvious that Chandler had a real scrap on his hands. Usually 
Chandler and a group of supporters would listen to returns in the log 
cabin on the lawn of his Versailles home, waiting for the victory trend 
to become comfortable, at which time they would march to his brick 
home and from there drive to Louisville for the celebration. But this 
time the calls were not telling him what he wanted to hear. He was not 
carrying the First Congressional District as he had predicted. He was 
getting shellacked in the Third, though this was no real surprise; he 
had talked about carrying it, but few people in his organization really 
expected him to. His dependable home district, the Sixth, was coming 
through for him, but elsewhere the balloting was taking a strange turn. 
By seven o'clock, according to Associated Press and Lexington 
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Herald reporters, the enthusiasm and optimism among the Chandler 
officials were beginning to wane, and looks of surprise and worry 
began to appear on faces around the room. No one who has ever been 
in a campaign headquarters when the bad news starts coming in can 
forget that feeling of dread, that premonition of disaster that seeps into 
the workers, though they continue to cheer and try to smile and turn 
increasingly to the candidate for reassurance. The uneasy feeling slow-
ly yielded to serious concern. Things were not going the way they 
should have gone. Breathitt was running very strongly in the moun-
tains. He was doing well in the Second District. Louisville was going 
more heavily for him than anyone had predicted or even imagined. 
By nine o'clock it was obvious to everyone that a major, smashing 
upset was in the making. Breathitt entered the hotel ballroom where 
his returns were being tabulated to a wild uproar. Nothing was heard 
from Chandler or his headquarters, but that was not necessary. The 
story was written in the figures on the board. Breathitt had won, and 
he had "won big." 
The returns not only shook the Commonwealth; they wrote an end 
to one of its most colorful political careers. Ned Breathitt, 43, had 
defeated the 64-year-old Chandler by a shocking 60,000 votes. 
Chandler had prepared to drive into Louisville for a riotous victory 
celebration. Instead, he retired to his home, surrounded by his family 
and a few friends, and heard with disbelief the returns come thunder-
ing in. And while he sat, trying to accept the unacceptable, the incredi-
ble end of his time, the Breathitt headquarters were bedlam. Time and 
change had caught up with Happy Chandler. To show the devastating 
extent to which the election had been a personal rebuff, his running 
mate Harry Lee Waterfield easily won nomination for lieutenant gover-
nor. The results were a painful handwriting on the wall for Earle 
Oements, too. His home county, Union, went for Breathitt 2,528 to 
1,913. His home precinct went for Breathitt 317 to 274 . 
. It was not until the following day that Chandler could bring himself 
to concede defeat. Even then he would not admit that it was the end of 
the line; that just ashe had, more than a quarter of a century before, 
brushed aside those who had referred to him as "that boy," now he had 
been brushed aside by a young man he had called "this little fella." Two 
weeks later, on June 11, he told Bill Neikirk of the Associated Press, 
"This faction is not dead. It's lively. Any faction that can get 264,000 
votes isn't dead." Asked if he would support Breathitt, he snorted, "I 
haven't any high opinion of that fellow. They were responsible for that 
scurrilous campaign. I won't be a party to that. I'm not going to be 
counted out of anything." 
But he had, of course, already been counted out, set aside by the 
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voters. He had not known it at the time, but he had delivered his own 
valedictory the night before the election when he quoted for reporters 
the lines from Kipling's "Recessional": "The tumult and the shouting 
dies; the Captains and the Kings depart." Now, in his last hurrah, the 
words had a painful, personal ring. It was, as Courier-Journal reporter 
Ben Reeves wrote, Kentucky'S final break with the nineteenth century. 
And when the voters sent Happy off into history they sent with 
him another great of the old days: Earle Chester Clements, the big man 
from Morganfield, a man who had denied himself the better farewell 
that he had earned. 
"Yesterday," Reeves wrote, "seems to have been Kentucky's day to 
say goodbye to the days of William McKinley. . . . Chandler is more 
than a typical Kentucky politician. He is part of a larger American 
genre that included such famous political names as Cotton Ed Smith, 
Tom Watson, Theodore Bilbo, Earl Long, Michael James Curley, W. Lee 
Pappy O'Daniel, Ole Gene Talmadge. They were all colorful, dynamic, 
forceful political personalities who were admirably geared by nature to 
their eras and their areas. Time caught up with them, too. 
"The effect of Breathitt's victory over Chandler creates a whole new 
political climate and environment for Kentucky. It seems to establish 
Governor Bert T. Combs, who has been called by friends and foes alike 
the worst politician ever to occupy the governor's chair, as an emi-
nently shrewd and successful politician after all." . 
And it is likely that for no one, Breathitt included, were the election 
results sweeter than for Bert Combs. He had spent election evening at 
the mansion watching the returns on television. According to those 
present, he gave no outward sign of the tremendous stresses he must 
have been enduring. When the outcome was announced, he made a 
statement to a few reporters watching with him, congratulating 
Breathitt on his victory. "Ned has made an unusually good candidate 
and run a great race," he said. "Mabel [Mrs. Combs] and I extend to 
him and Frances [Mrs. Breathitt] our congratulations and very best 
wishes." From Louisville, Breathitt called to ask Combs, who had 
chosen Breathitt over the advice of his closest advisers and had stuck to 
him through months of adverse reports and predictions, to come to 
Louisville and share the celebration. But Combs said, "This is your 
night. We'll watch you on television, and Mabel and I will come by 
tomorrow afternoon." 
Significantly, Combs called and talked with his daughter Lois at 
Randolph-Macon College in Virginia. The two were extremely close, 
and he knew that she would be waiting to hear the results,in itself a 
measure of his concern about the election and his relief over the 
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outcome. He worked for about an hour on a commencement speech he 
was scheduled to deliver next day at the Kentucky School for the Deaf; 
then he and Mabel took a walk around the mansion grounds. It was a 
soft, late spring evening, and the scent of early flowers from the 
gardens he had planted around the mansion was pleasant on the air. 
He felt a little tired, as the tension and uncertainty of months drained 
slowly out of him, and deeply satisfied. He went to bed shortly before 
midnight and was asleep almost at once. 
___ 17-__ _ 
Hard Times Now Are Gone 
As far as crises were concerned, the hard days were past for Combs. 
Not that he could rest on his accomplishments. June 16 found the 
legislature in special session for the second time in 1963, and for an 
unusual reason. 
In 1956 the Welfare and Retirement Fund of the United Mine 
Workers of America opened ten hospitals, five of them in Kentucky, 
financed by the royalty of 40 cents collected by the union for each ton of 
coal mined. The hospitals, big and modem in a region desperate for 
modem hospital facilities, cost about $27,000,000. These hospitals, 
spread across the coalfields of Appalachia, had long been a dream of 
UMW boss John L. Lewis and represented his determination to im-
prove the medical care available to his union miners. 
But the cost of operating the hospitals was greater than anticipated. 
Furthermore, the shaggy-maned Lewis had provided his beloved hos-
pitals with their own Achilles' heel. In the years following World War 
II, he had forced on the soft-coal operators a contract requiring such 
increases in miners' wages that the operators had been obliged to 
mechanize the mines, digging coal with machines instead of men. 
Slowly, the number of miners decreased, and the decrease in union 
miners and union families was cutting demand for the hospitals' serv-
ices and reducing hospital income. By 1962 officials of the Welfare and 
Retirement Fund had decided to jettison the drain on their treasury by 
selling or closing the hospitals. 
This was of painful concern to the state, for five of the hospitals 
were in eastern Kentucky-at Middlesboro, McDowell, Hazard, 
Harlan, and Whitesburg. The asking price was $7,732,000, and Combs 
knew there was not that much excess in the treasury; nor had the 
legislature voted any money whatever for such a purchase. Yet officials 
and doctors throughout the coalfields warned that if the hospitals 
closed, the situations in the eastern counties would be acute. 
To its eternal credit, the United Presbyterian Church's Board of 
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National Missions stepped in to offer its services in an effort to keep the 
hospitals open. The Rev. Gordon Corbett of Lexington had studied the 
situation for months, calling on Combs, members of Kentucky'S con-
gressional delegation, UMW officials, and officers of his own church, 
trying to find some way to finance the purchase. It is doubtful whether 
the hospitals could have survived without him. But the mission board 
put its weight behind the effort because, as Dr. Kenneth G. Neigh, its 
general secretary, said, "I believe we need to do this. I believe we can 
do the impossible." 
On April 22, Combs went to Washington and, with Seventh Dis-
trict Congressman Carl Perkins, called on Josephine Roche, former 
assistant to John L. Lewis and then secretary of the Welfare and 
Retirement Fund, to see whether the price of the hospitals could not be 
negotiated. "That was the coldest woman I ever ran up against in my 
life," said Combs. If we can't get our money out of them, Roche said in 
effect, we will close them by July 1. Take it orleave it. 
Combs and Perkins then went to see Bill Batt, head of the Area 
Development Administration, but were told that while the administra-
tion wanted to help, it would be setting a dangerous precedent to do 
so, and that only President John F. Kennedy could make such a deci-
sion. The Hill-Burton Act (for financing hospital construction in pover-
. ty areas) could finance only new construction, Batt reminded them; if 
he used Hill-Burton money to bail out the miners' hospitals, he would 
be deluged with demands that he bail out other hospitals in financial 
trouble. But eventually, with the personal intervention of Kennedy, the 
ADA committed itself to an initial grant of more than $3,000,000. With 
this encouragement the Presbyterian board began negotiations to buy 
the hospitals, which it proposed to turn over to an independent board. 
But an annual operating deficit of $700,000 was expected, and 
Kentucky, or the agency assuming responsibility for their operation, 
would be required to pick up that amount. Combs knew that the state 
could not forever carry the burden; he also knew it could not afford to 
let the hospitals be closed. Doctors and administrators assured him 
that with tighter management, the Kentucky hospitals could operate 
without the deficit, and on this assurance he called the legislature into 
special session on July 16 to implement the federal grant that would 
enable the Presbyterians to buy the hospitals. It was his fifth special 
session, more than called by any other Kentucky chief executive. 
The lawmakers responded quickly. "I was impressed," Combs said 
later. "I thought it showed a lot of good will on the part of members 
from other parts of the state, voting money like that for eastern Ken-
tucky counties, people from Louisville, for instance. We don't always 
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pull together like that." The legislators also approved a constitutional 
amendment outlawing Kentucky'S poll tax, an anachronism that had 
been defunct for years because of federal prohibitions but needed 
removing from Kentucky'S cluttered books. Two weeks later Combs 
also signed into law the special session's bill providing a considerable 
measure of parole reform, giving the Parole Board the right to say when 
a prisoner is eligible for parole rather than requiring a set minimum of 
time to be served, and enlarging the board from three to five members. 
Said Combs, "It's a start." But national corrections officials called it"a 
great credit to Kentucky." 
Now Combs could feel his time as governor getting short. In some 
respects, he looked forward to his last day eagerly; in others, he felt that 
he was leaving too much undone. There were many pleasant occasions 
in the final weeks-dedications, speeches before admiring and appre-
ciative audiences. He took his final governor's tour and got a good 
reception at just about every stop. He dedicated General Burnside 
Island State Park. He opened the 127-mile Western Kentucky Parkway 
and unveiled a statue of Alben Barkley in the rotunda of the capitol. 
Earlier, he had received the first payment of an eventual $3,000,000 that 
Kentucky would receive from the Federal Highway Administration for 
banning billboards from the interstate rights-of-way. 
But there was one critical area to which he still had to address 
himself. Louisville Mayor William Cowger had gone out on a limb to 
pass an ordinance forbidding racial discrimination in public accom-
modations. He was taking a lot of heat for it and had urged Combs 
repeatedly to propose to the legislature a similar law. When Combs 
failed to include it in his call for the second special session of the year, 
black leaders as well as members of the Human Rights Commission 
and officials of the Kennedy cabinet in Washington began putting 
pressure on him to amend the call. On June 19, 1963, Combs met with 
President Kennedy in Washington, and while he avoided a commit-
ment to a state public accommodation law, he did pledge to support 
expanded minority rights. This didn't please anyone. 
Combs was already on record concerning civil rights. In October of 
1962, at a southern governors' conference in Hollywood, Florida, he 
was one of the few governors willing to stand up and approve Presi-
dent Kennedy's speech earlier that week insisting that Mississippi obey 
the ruling of the Supreme Court and admit a black man to the Universi-
ty of Mississippi. Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett condemned Ken-
nedy and the court for violating the rights of his state, declared he 
would not preside over the involuntary integration of the university, 
and in effect defied federal authorities to enforce the court's edict. But 
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while Deep South governors rushed to deplore the Kennedy speech, 
Combs said: "I can sympathize with the chief executive of any state 
whose traditions and customs have come into conflict with the law of 
the land. All governors, however, have taken an oath to support the 
constitution ... for the sake of himself and his state, Ross [Barnett] 
should stop playing Custer's Last Stand and join us." 
"But," he said later, "I had already sampled the legislature, and 
concluded that in view of the civil rights fight going on, and all the 
emotions involved in it, I'd have no chance at all of passing an accom-
modations bill through the legislature. I had already asked them for a 
lot, and that was a very touchy issue just then. So I decided on an 
executive order [issued on June 26, 1963] prohibiting any state-regu-
lated establishment from discriminating against blacks. 
"That was my response to the civil rights leaders. At first, some of 
them didn't think it amounted to much. But then they realized that this 
included eating establishments, hotels, motels, state parks, all state 
facilities, in fact any facility that some state agency regulated or li-
censed, and they thought better of it. 
"It had some strange twists to it. For instance, we decided that, 
under it, we had to close Cherokee Park, down near Kenlake, because it 
had been an all-black park, and since they now had access to all parks, 
there was no need for it. But a lot of blacks wanted their own park, 
objected to closing it." 
Naturally, not everyone stood up and cheered the executive order. 
Though he was now a lame duck, Combs had plenty of political 
enemies who had not forgotten. On June 28, Rex Logan rose in the 
special session of the assembly to blast Combs for the executive order. 
He asked the Senate to adopt a resolution condemning him and pre-
dicted that the order would prompt at least 100,000 Chandler Demo-
crats to bolt to Louie Nunn, the Republican gubernatorial nominee, in 
the fall general elections. It was a case of deja vu-Logan's last blast. 
Nunn also attacked the order as "a dictatorial edict of questionable 
constitutionality" and charged that it had been dictated by U.S. Attor-
ney General Robert F. Kennedy, brother of the president. From his 
home in Versailles, Happy Chandler-like an old Confederate soldier 
who could not accept Appomattox-declared that the "illegal act" 
showed that Combs knew that Breathitt was going to lose the race for 
governor, and that the two of them were "desperate." 
As a matter of fact, it is hard to see how Combs (and/or Breathitt) 
had anything to gain politically from the integration issue one way or 
another. Either way he went, special session or executive order, Combs 
was bound to catch abuse and arouse strong feelings and possible 
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reprisals in the governor's race. In all probability, he took the less 
dangerous way out. With Republicans possibly trying to make hay for 
Louie Nunn and such Democrats as Rex Logan hungry for one more 
shot at the hated target, the introduction of civil rights at the special 
session could have made it a madhouse. The executive order got the 
issue settled quickly and attracted all of the fire toward Combs, rather 
than letting legislative oratory include Breathitt. 
Actually, the Antidiscrimination Order was one more way in which 
the reticent, wryly humorous governor from Appalachia resembled 
the outgoing, openly emotional Boston Irish president. Combs had 
forfeited his chance of becoming close to Kennedy when, out of loyalty 
to Earle Clements, he backed Lyndon Johnson for president over 
Kennedy in 1960--a bit of loyalty later ignored by Clements. But 
Combs and Kennedy had felt and acted alike in their concern for 
Appalachia, in their feelings for civil rights, in their desire to ease the 
blight of poverty. After he issued his executive order, Combs received 
from Kennedy a short but expressive note: "Thanks, Bert," it read. "We 
need more governors like you." 
Of course, the resulting situation posed something of a problem for 
Happy, who had claimed all along to have the ear and support of his 
friend President Kennedy. And it was something of a touchy political 
matter for Nunn. Louisville's Mayor Cowger-who, with Jefferson 
County Judge Marlow Cook, represented a huge bloc of Republicans-
openly differed with Nunn on the executive order. Indeed, the issue 
seemed to split Republicans all over the lot. Thruston Morton· sent a 
letter to Nunn, agreeing with him and criticizing Combs for issuing the 
order. Meanwhile, the Record, the Catholic newspaper of the Diocese of 
Louisville, carried a strong editorial endorsing Combs's action. 
Finally, however, Franklin Circuit Judge Henry Meigs dismissed a 
suit by the Louisville Tavern Operators Association challenging the 
legality of the order. There was no controversy existing, said Meigs, 
since nothing had been done to enforce the order. Nunn switched 
tactics to attack Combs on the cost of groceries for the mansion, an 
issue whose time, apparently, had not come. He then attacked Combs 
for allegedly ignoring bootlegging in Floyd County. That didn't make 
much impression, either, but Nunn followed it with a charge that 
Combs had permitted the parks to sell gift dolls that had been made in 
East Germany. Combs promised with a straight face that he would see 
that the parks were not infiltrated by Communist dolls. 
Nunn's was not the first criticism of merchandise sold in state 
parks. Members of his own administration and some newspapers had 
complained that much of the merchandise in park gift shops was 
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flimsy, imported junk; they had urged that more Kentucky items be 
stocked. As a result, the shops soon blossomed with Kentucky-made 
cornshuck dolls, woven baskets, books by Kentucky authors, and 
rustic furniture produced in the mountains of eastern Kentucky. But, 
as proprietors of the shops complained, many of the best-selling items 
still came from Japan. And, apparently, Germany. 
Combs interpreted these assaults as evidence that the Republicans 
were having a hard time finding issues. He was right. Nevertheless, 
Nunn was a good candidate and ran a strong campaign, for a man who 
had been little known outside his home county of Barren until a few 
months earlier, and who represented a party long accustomed to a 
minor role. His criticism of Combs's executive order was aimed at the 
method rather than the purpose of the order, though the New Republic 
called his attack racist. Generally, however, the campaign was con-
ducted on a fairly high level. 
On November 5, Breathitt won the governorship by 13,055 votes 
(449,551 to 436A96), a much smaller margin than he and the media had 
predicted. Harry Lee Waterfield waltzed in on a 65,000 margin, indicat-
ing that Chandler had been of considerable value to Nunn. Even 
conceding Chandler's help, however, the Nunn showing was very 
impressive for a man who, ten years earlier, had been a total unknown. 
He had gained attention when he became the first Republican in half a 
century to win the post of county judge in staunchly Democratic 
Barren County. And his showing against a young, popular, and rising 
Democrat was clear warning that he would be heard from again, as of 
course he was, coming back four years later to win the governorship. 
A final special session remained, called by Combs to raise the pay 
of state judges and to require periodic inspections of automobiles in an 
effort to get dangerous clunkers off the highways. Without hesitation, 
the lawmakers passed the pay bill on December 4. The next day, just as 
expeditiously, they defeated the auto inspection bill and went home. 
This was all right with Combs, who had not expected the bill to pass but 
had pleased some constituents by having it introduced. As House 
Majority Leader Richard Moloney explained, had the bill been passed, 
it would not have gone into effect until the following July, and by that 
timeit could be brought before the next regular session and get more 
thorough consideration without damaging the inspection program. A 
dozen or more legislators came by the office to say goodbye, since it 
would be the last time they and the governor would meet in their 
current roles. 
Now Combs became aware of a strange but unmistakable feeling 
around the executive offices and around the mansion. He was still 
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governor, he still had a job to do, but now the hours and days seemed 
to rush upon him and past him. Each time he sat at his desk in the big 
executive office, he was aware that he would feel a twinge of regret 
when he took the last pictures from the walls and the last mementos of 
his administration from the desk. 
Later he recalled that each time he walked into the mansion and 
spoke to the trooper on duty and the trusty at the door, it seemed that 
he was seeing them in a somehow different light. He found a curious 
pleasure in sitting in the small office to the left of the southern doorway 
to the mansion, where he had sat so many times-with small groups 
over coffee or a drink, making telephone calls, studying speeches, 
writing notes. A pleasant room. 
"I found myself reflecting," he wrote to a friend, "on the role in my 
life that these rooms, these places had played, and about the twists of 
fate that had brought me from my modest home in the hills to this 
building of large and imposing rooms, with its graceful furnishings 
and chandeliers, its white-jacketed servants. And I thought of how my 
time in the mansion was somehow symbolic of the transient nature of 
my role in the state of which the building was itself a symbol." 
There were times during the final days when he admitted that it 
would be good to get away from the unrelenting burden of respon-
sibility and go back to an ordinary house and an ordinary law office to 
pursue a more ordinary life-if life could ever again be ordinary. Still 
he knew that he was going to miss much of it, miss the smiles that 
greeted him in so many places, miss the feeling of having been part of 
life on a meaningful scale, miss the feeling of satisfaction at having 
done something of which he could be proud-things that h~ would 
remember when the details of life as governor began to blur and only 
the broad memories remained. And he knew that he would miss, too, 
the feeling of power that was part of what he had achieved. And he 
would miss the feeling almost of pleased surprise at having come face 
to face with himself, as though he had had the chance to look into a 
magic mirror in which he could see his inner self. 
He had a few details left to take care of. He had already pardoned 
Newport Police Chief Harry Stuart, restoring his rights and allowing 
him to run for office again if he wanted to. Now he pardoned Campbell 
County Sheriff Norbert Roll so that he could run, too, or at least live 
without the stigma hanging over him. It seemed a good way to end the 
rather messy affair of Newport and to avoid needless or permanent 
hurt to those involved, now that the town had been cleaned up to the 
satisfaction of the reformers-though probably not, he realized, for all 
time. There'll always be a Newport, he thought wryly. 
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On November 30, Combs was the guest of honor at a special 
gathering of the Kentucky Education Association in Frankfort, and the 
attending teachers thanked him for having done more for the educa-
tion of Kentucky's children than any governor in the state's history. He 
could not, he said, have asked for a finer tribute. On December 7 he 
gave Shakertown, at Pleasant Hill, $50,000 toward its restoration proj-
ect; in a speech to state employees, he asked them to look after the 
floral clock when he was gone. Friends knew that Combs had always 
had a warm spot for the clock; it had been his idea, and he had stuck to 
it when all around were saying it was a bad idea. On December 10 he 
followed tradition, and issued pardons to 11 of his mansion trusties, 
commuted the sentences of five others to time they had already served, 
and reduced tP-e sentences of the remaining five. This, too, he told a 
friend, was a rewarding experience. He had gotten to know these 
people and to like them. They had made mistakes; they had paid; and 
it had been interesting, as well as touching, to watch the nervous 
determination and uncertainty with which they viewed their days and 
their duty, on which depended their futures. 
On December 10, Bert Combs walked for the last time from the 
mansion to his office in the capitol. Two reporters fell in step with him, 
asking him how he felt. In the chill winter air that turned their breath to 
mist, workmen were hammering and sawing away at the big platform 
taking shape where, four years earlier, had stood the platform on 
which he had taken the oath of office, and where on the morrow he 
would close a chapter of his life. 
Nodding, speaking now and then to familiar faces, he entered the 
capitol through the familiar eastern doorway and walked past the 
guard and down the marble hallway, noting the people rushing in and 
out of offices,laughing, shaking hands, carrying things back and forth, 
conferring on the matters that had for the past three weeks occupied 
members of the team of men and women who helped accomplish the 
transition from one administration to the next. Around the executive 
offices there were new people, eager to get to the task ahead. 
There was not much to do-some papers to sign, people to speak 
to, people to thank, brief ceremonies. In the afternoon there was a little 
party, and some gifts which, again, touched him. Among the secre-
taries and clerks in the offices around the waiting room, there were 
some tears. 
He turned from the office, emptied of the mementos that had 
marked the room as his, and walked for the last time as governor down 
the corridor, out the great bronze doors and into the dusk of the 
wintering day. The next morning he rode in the inevitable parade with 
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his successor, Edward Breathitt, shared with him the shouts and plau-
dits of the crowd, and sat with him on the inaugural platform. The 
scene was much the same as it had been four years earlier, and yet it 
was different, as he himself was different. The four years between had 
changed his life, and had brought change to the state and those about 
him. He wondered how well history would judge him. Then it was 
time for him to speak his valedictory. 
"I do not expect to stand here again," he said, 
and being only human, I look back today and wonder how. . . 
Kentucky has fared under our stewardship. I have not done all 
that I hoped to do when I stood here four years ago. Perhaps no 
man ever does. But when I addressed you four years ago, full 
of new plans and bright hopes, I said, liThe only thing I can 
hope for is to leave the governor's office four years from now 
with the respect and perhaps the affection of the people I 
serve." My hope then is my hope now, and to the extent that I 
have earned your respect and perhaps a little of your affection, 
to that extent I have been successful. 
When I look back on what has been done, it seems that we 
have done well, that our progress has been great. But then I 
look at the problems that remain, the terrible difficulties that 
face our successors, and I realize again how small an impress a 
man makes upon his world, how long and trying is the road 
we travel, how few are the victories, how elusive the answers 
we seek. 
These have been years of great change in the world and in 
our state; years also of great tragedy, great sorrow, great hope. 
So, undoubtedly, will be the years ahead. Yet there is reason to 
believe that we face better things. For governors and their 
works and their little hour upon the stage soon pass. It is the 
spirit that survives, and the spirit of Kentucky is strong. We 
may change her laws, we may alter her lovely countryside, but 
the spirit of Kentucky endures. And if during my stay in office I 
have helped to keep intact our faith in ourselves, if I have 
added a bit to the heritage we pass on to our children, if I have 
helped to keep proud the spirit of Kentucky, then I am content. 
To all of you, I say thank you for permitting me to serve as 
your governor. 
Then Bert Combs stepped to one side, and Edward Breathitt 
stepped forward. 
_____ EPILOGUE ____ _ 
How It Can Be Done 
Three men-Combs, Clements, and Chandler-have dominated this 
brief survey of Kentucky gubernatorial politics in the middle years of 
this century. They were, or are, interesting men, men of personal 
strength, intellect, and ambition. Each left an impression on his state. 
There was for each of them a measure of glory; there was also a degree 
of pathos. 
It is symbolic that A.B. Chandler, who epitomized his state in so 
many ways, wrote a record which, like that of Kentucky, was less than it 
should have been because of missed opportunity. Yet he remained true 
to his own ideal of limited government, of an individual independence 
the virtue of which is perhaps greater than its practicality in today's 
world. He symbolized a time, a mood, that was essentially Kentucky. If 
he had been more willing to risk the danger of today for the gain of 
tomorrow, he might have written the brightest pages of Kentucky's 
history, for he enjoyed the power that comes with immense popularity. 
But, through the basic reserve of the southern conservative, he failed to 
take the steps that might have brought Kentucky into the American 
mainstream. Yet that conservatism should be borne in mind. He repre-
sented, as Allan Trout once said, the Republican wing of the Demo-
cratic party in Kentucky. Many Chandler critics have tended to blame 
him for a failure to be something he never pretended to be-a liberal 
Democrat whose liberal policies might have benefited Kentucky more 
than his cautious ones. At the same time his career reminds us that 
great men take great risks. 
Earle C. Clements had attributes of greatness-strength, courage, 
and intellect. In fact, he may well have been the greatest political 
intellect of this century in Kentucky, and it is significant that there were 
close and strong ties between him and another outstanding political 
mind, Ed Prichard. Those who watched Earle Clements move through 
the political milieu commented frequently on his ability to foresee not 
only the result of each action but the results of that result. He made few 
false moves except when he moved through temper or injured pride. 
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He was also the victim of ill fortune. He did much for his state and 
might have done still more had he not run afoul the combined forces of 
state Republicans and errant Democrats at a time when Republicans 
nationally were in the ascendant. The loss led him into the series of 
events that culminated with his involvement in the Highway Depart-
ment troubles of the Combs administration, and his subsequent break 
with Combs and his awkward alliance with Chandler, an alliance of 
differing philosophies. His last years, most of them spent in lingering 
bitterness and ill health, were less than he deserved. Let it be of 
comfort to the many who loved him that as hard pride softened in his 
last days, the warmth of the inner man emerged once more. 
It may be presumptuous to attempt here a precise assessment of 
the administration of Bert Combs or of his contribution to his state. 
Time will place a value on his work, as on the work of his predecessors. 
But a generation has passed now since he held the office, and in the flat 
light of more than 20 years, his record seems to be sound. 
He was unusual, and in this no flattery of him or derogation of 
others is intended. When we contemplate the difficulty and often the 
pain of the governorship of Kentucky, it would seem that we owe a 
measure of admiration to any person who attains it and holds it to the 
benefit of his state, and nothing in this brief and incomplete account 
should be permitted to cast an unintended shadow on any of those 
who have played their parts in it. 
The four years of Bert Combs were good years. He did well. He 
paved the way for the administration of Ned Breathitt, and that too was 
a benefit to the state and its people. Combs has always believed that the 
election of Breathitt, who endorsed without exception the particulars 
of the Combs program, was proof that his program, his reforms, were 
accepted by the people of Kentucky. He is probably correct in this, 
although it is also likely that by 1963 the people had simply tired of old 
faces, old tactics, and wanted a change to men younger than Happy 
Chandler. The gratitude of the electorate is as brief as its memory. 
The Combs administration, and the Breathitt administration that 
followed, saw Democratic factionalism in Kentucky begin to ebb. This 
was probably due in part to the slow shift of population from rural to 
urban, in part to the modest Republican resurgence that made 
factionalism more likely to cost Democrats general elections. Some of 
the decline may have been due to television, which dramatically in-
creased the cost of campaigning, forcing candidates to look to sources 
other than courthouse organizations, and which made an appealing 
camera appearance more important than issues or organization. 
But until his defeat by Wendell Ford in 1971, Combs was the 
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undisputed leader of the last strong faction. He may also be called the 
last of the strong governors. He was able to enact an almost revolution-
ary program of laws because he held the legislature in tight control. 
There were two reasons for this: he had strong and loyal leaders in both 
houses, and he had enough money to propose programs that the 
people, and therefore their legislators, wanted. Money-specifically 
money yielded by the sales tax-that was the secret. Without it there 
would have been no university expansion program, no community 
colleges, no broad teachers' raises, no park facilities construction, no 
mental health programs, no welfare-payment increases, no tourism 
programs, no industrial promotion. That is why every move Combs 
made, every political tactic he devised was made with the protection of 
the sales tax in mind. Without it his program could not have been 
financed; without it his program could not have been continued by a 
successor. That is why the defeat of Chandler was his primary goal, 
why it was more important than the election of Wyatt or the passage of 
any single piece of legislation. 
The sales tax and the improvements it made possible had the effect 
also of encouraging succeeding governors to attempt similar moves; 
Edward Breathitt withstood Chandler's promises to repeal the tax, and 
defended it successfully throughout his administration. Louie Nunn 
had a precedent for his courageous move to increase the tax from 3 to 5 
percent in order to finance his school and parks programs. The tempta-
tion to lure votes by cutting the tax will always be there, of course. Nor 
is there anything magical about the tax. It has not yielded enough 
money to keep Kentucky education in step with that of other states. At 
this writing the state ranks somewhere between 43rd and 46th among 
the states, and no candidate for governor has dared to admit the 
obvious-that it is going to take an increase in the sales tax, in personal 
and corporate taxes, and probably the imposition of a substantial state 
property tax to get Kentucky into the educational mainstream. 
Some of Combs's success can be traced to simple self-control. 
Unlike Chandler, he controlled his tongue. The tirades of Rex Logan, 
the needling of Cap Gardner, the obstructionism of Wendell Butler 
rankled him, as they would rankle any sensitive man, but he refused to 
get into name-calling contests. He would not trade insults with 
Chandler. Like Clements, he was a tireless worker. Like Clements, he 
believed in the dignity of the office. But he brought his own style to the 
governor's office, and left his own mark on it. 
Like other governors before and since, Combs improved the opera-
tion of state government through his reorganization. Whether this was 
a major accomplishment is debatable. Government and governors 
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respond to changing conditions, changing needs. When roads were 
the great need of the state, the Highway Department was the weapon 
and the measure of a governor. Evolving social needs and the growth of 
federal programs forced a shift of emphasis to welfare functions. 
Combs altered, expanded, and tuned the agencies and functions of 
government to meet the pressing demands for better education, broad-
er welfare services, and multi-lane, limited-access highways. He was 
the first to use the state's bonding power in a creative way, as in his 
financing of the Mountain Parkway, basing support not on existing 
traffic but on traffic the road would stimulate. He was, in a sense, the 
state's first modem governor, a break with the political past of sec-
tionalism, patronage, and exploitation of state employees, though the 
radical change probably came with John Y. Brown, Jr., the first of the 
television candidates, the first intentionally weak governor, who tried 
neither to organize nor to dominate the legislature. 
Combs tried his best to drag Kentucky into the modem era, with 
modern roads, modern education, modern parks, modem welfare 
services. But he could drag the people of Kentucky only so far; he could 
not persuade them to create conditions for truly modem, efficient 
government by revising the state constitution. He showed them that 
while taxes are not painless, neither are they unbearable, and that it is 
probably less painful to pay a little more now than to wait until 
accumulating needs require the payment of a great deal. But he could 
not convince them that sensible taxation is necessary for progress, that 
taxes can be creative, that individual goals can often best be achieved 
through social action. He gave the people a taste of progress. But, as 
the record shows, Kentucky remains a backward, poorly educated, 
technologically deficient state. As of this writing, yet another high-
level statewide committee, this one appointed by the lieutenant gover-
nor, has recommended revision of the constitution and steps to raise 
the educational level of the state. But it makes no mention of the 
essential ingredient of this improvement-taxes. Kentucky still has a 
way of turning its back on tomorrow. 
One reason Bert Combs did well is that he could and did take risks. 
He could take risks because he aspired to no higher office, unlike most 
of the men who have held the governorship; he could therefore chance 
the unpopularity that must at times be the portion of those who would 
lead along a hard but upward path. He had opportunities to run for 
Congress or the Senate, during and after his term. He had, and took, 
the opportunity to be a federal judge, but found that he did not like it 
much and quit it to come home to Kentucky. 
Bert Combs liked being governor of Kentucky. He tried once more 
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for the office, in 1971, and failed. That failure has generally been 
attributed to lingering resentment of the sales tax, though the tax had 
proved the salvation of Kentucky's government. Combs rejects this 
theory: "My failure in that second race was a personal one," he says 
now. "As long as I was on the scene and in a position of leadership, I 
could win; I did win, and people I supported won on the strength of 
my policies. I have reason to believe, and do believe, that I could have 
won had I run when Henry Ward ran. I was strongly urged, and 
refused; and people, including many close to me, accepted my refusal 
as a sign of my withdrawal from active political life. 
"I had long been inclined toward the judiciary, and it was gratifying 
to attain the federal bench. To my surprise, it proved a disappointing 
experience, possibly because I had become too accustomed to, too fond 
of, the clash and excitement of public life and the satisfaction of achieve-
ment and accomplishment that came with the governor's office. But by 
the time I removed myself from the bench and returned to Kentucky, 
other forces had been at work, people had made other alignments. 
Many did not understand why I wanted to give up a judgeship paying 
$42,500 a year for a chance at a governorship paying $30,000, and were 
suspicious of my motives. I never managed to get my message across. 
And I must admit that I did not run a good race. Perhaps I had been 
away too long. That had created a vacuum, and [Wendell] Ford moved 
into it." 
It is true that his resignation from the federal bench in order to run 
again for the governorship hurt Combs. As he says, people could not 
believe that any manwithout ulterior motives would resign the higher-
paying office of the federal circuit bench to be a more modestly paid 
governor. This is especially true in a poor state, where the idea of 
seeking a lesser-paying but more satisfying job is suspect. We demand 
dedication on the part of our politicians, but when they demonstrate 
dedication, we become suspicious of their motives. 
It cannot be. denied that Ford made excellent use of the sales tax 
issue without putting himself into a position where carrying out his 
promises involved damaging the state very greatly. He promised mere-
ly to reduce it, but that was enough to give him the initial spark needed 
to ignite his race. Yet we cannot ignore the fact that the man who 
defeated Combs promised to reduce the sales tax. And the people 
responded, as they have for long responded to the siren song of the 
easy way. That too was an echo of the tragedy that has been histOrically 
a dark cloud over the land of Kentucky. 
Curiously, for a state that has produced so many statesmen, Ken-
tucky has suffered from wayward leadership. It is true that the divisive 
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circumstances of their early years made Kentuckians suspicious of and 
resistant to progress, but in this they were little different from the 
people of other developing states. The tragedy was that they lacked 
progressive and unselfish leaders, public officials who would take 
political risk in an effort to inspire and lift the people. On the contrary, 
Kentucky has suffered too many pseudo-leaders who were willing to 
play upon their fears and resentments, their opposition to taxes and 
individual sacrifice, in order to gain political power. Political leaders 
have played to the weakest nature of Kentuckians and have too often 
brought forth the worst. 
It is hoped that these pages have shown how divisions have ham-
pered Kentucky's drive toward excellence. Political factions were one 
aspect of that division, but not the only one. Since the defeat of 
Chandler, the death of Clements, and the defeat of Combs, there have 
been no true factional leaders, yet there has been little enlightenment 
or progress in the government and welfare of Kentucky. At this writ-
ing, it is still far down the list among the states in the quality of its 
services and the education it offers its young. It did not maintain the 
forward movement begun under Combs. 
Since his departure from Frankfort, Happy Chandler has attained 
something of the stature of a folk figure, appearing at athletic events 
and other public functions, singing "My Old Kentucky Home," and 
waving to people, many of whom no longer recognize him. 
Combs has retained an interest and a measure of influence in state 
politics, especially since the death of Clements, but the days of his 
ambition are past. Nor has anyone risen to mold a dynasty, a dominant 
faction. John Young Brown, Jr., might have done so, but his personality 
does not seem designed for the often tedious chores of political organi-
zation. He is by nature a great salesman rather than a political phi-
losopher. As Chandler was the great showman of the courthouse lawn, 
so Brown appears to be a television candidate. 
Kentuckians have long been drawn to the showman rather than the 
statesman. More's the pity, perhaps, and that fact too casts a kindly 
light on the four years of Bert T. Combs. 
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